Search results for 'epistemic logic' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mark Jago (2009). Epistemic Logic for Rule-Based Agents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.score: 246.0
    The logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential (...)
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  2. Barteld P. Kooi (2003). Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (4):381-408.score: 246.0
    In this paper I combine the dynamic epistemic logic ofGerbrandy (1999) with the probabilistic logic of Fagin and Halpern (1994). The resultis a new probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, a logic for reasoning aboutprobability, information, and information change that takes higher orderinformation into account. Probabilistic epistemic models are defined, and away to build them for applications is given. Semantics and a proof systemis presented and a number of examples are discussed, including the MontyHall Dilemma.
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  3. Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-62.score: 246.0
    Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished from the fact (...)
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  4. Joeri Engelfriet & Jan Treur (1998). An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7 (3):369-388.score: 246.0
    When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this (...)
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  5. Cédric Dégremont & Oliver Roy (2012). Agreement Theorems in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (4):735-764.score: 246.0
    This paper introduces Agreement Theorems to dynamic-epistemic logic. We show first that common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreement in epistemic-plausibility models, under common and well-founded priors. We do not restrict ourselves to the finite case, showing that in countable structures the results hold if and only if the underlying plausibility ordering is well-founded. We then show that neither well-foundedness nor common priors are expressible in the language commonly used to describe and reason about epistemic-plausibility (...)
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  6. Joeri Engelfriet, Catholijn M. Jonker & Jan Treur (2002). Compositional Verification of Multi-Agent Systems in Temporal Multi-Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (2):195-225.score: 246.0
    Compositional verification aims at managing the complexity of theverification process by exploiting compositionality of the systemarchitecture. In this paper we explore the use of a temporal epistemiclogic to formalize the process of verification of compositionalmulti-agent systems. The specification of a system, its properties andtheir proofs are of a compositional nature, and are formalized within acompositional temporal logic: Temporal Multi-Epistemic Logic. It isshown that compositional proofs are valid under certain conditions.Moreover, the possibility of incorporating default persistence ofinformation in (...)
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  7. Paolo Maffezioli & Alberto Naibo (forthcoming). Proof Theory of Epistemic Logic of Programs. Logic and Logical Philosophy.score: 246.0
    A combination of epistemic logic and dynamic logic of programs is presented. Although rich enough to formalize some simple game-theoretic scenarios, its axiomatization is problematic as it leads to the paradoxical conclusion that agents are omniscient. A cut-free labelled Gentzen-style proof system is then introduced where knowledge and action, as well as their combinations, are formulated as rules of inference, rather than axioms. This provides a logical framework for reasoning about games in a modular and systematic way, (...)
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  8. Carlo Proietti (2012). Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic, Kripke Models and Fitch's Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):877-900.score: 246.0
    The present work is motivated by two questions. (1) What should an intuitionistic epistemic logic look like? (2) How should one interpret the knowledge operator in a Kripke-model for it? In what follows we outline an answer to (2) and give a model-theoretic definition of the operator K. This will shed some light also on (1), since it turns out that K, defined as we do, fulfills the properties of a necessity operator for a normal modal logic. (...)
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  9. Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada (2014). Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Implicit and Explicit Beliefs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):107-140.score: 246.0
    Epistemic logic with its possible worlds semantic model is a powerful framework that allows us to represent an agent’s information not only about propositional facts, but also about her own information. Nevertheless, agents represented in this framework are logically omniscient: their information is closed under logical consequence. This property, useful in some applications, is an unrealistic idealisation in some others. Many proposals to solve this problem focus on weakening the properties of the agent’s information, but some authors have (...)
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  10. Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard (2010). Moorean Phenomena in Epistemic Logic. In Lev Beklemishev, Valentin Goranko & Valentin B. Shehtman (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic 8. College Publications.score: 246.0
    A well-known open problem in epistemic logic is to give a syntactic characterization of the successful formulas. Semantically, a formula is successful if and only if for any pointed model where it is true, it remains true after deleting all points where the formula was false. The classic example of a formula that is not successful in this sense is the “Moore sentence” p ∧ ¬BOXp, read as “p is true but you do not know p.” Not only (...)
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  11. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Epistemic Logic and Epistemology. In Vincent F. Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 240.0
    This paper contributes to an increasing literature strengthening the connection between epistemic logic and epistemology (Van Benthem, Hendricks). I give a survey of the most important applications of epistemic logic in epistemology. I show how it is used in the history of philosophy (Steiner's reconstruction of Descartes' sceptical argument), in solutions to Moore's paradox (Hintikka), in discussions about the relation between knowledge and belief (Lenzen) and in an alleged refutation of verificationism (Fitch) and I examine an (...)
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  12. Jaakko Hintikka & John Symons (2003). Systems of Visual Identification in Neuroscience: Lessons From Epistemic Logic. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):89-104.score: 240.0
    The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the "where" and "what" systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory.
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  13. Giuseppe Primiero (2009). An Epistemic Logic for Becoming Informed. Synthese 167 (2):363 - 389.score: 240.0
    Various conceptual approaches to the notion of information can currently be traced in the literature in logic and formal epistemology. A main issue of disagreement is the attribution of truthfulness to informational data, the so called Veridicality Thesis (Floridi 2005). The notion of Epistemic Constructive Information (Primiero 2007) is one of those rejecting VT. The present paper develops a formal framework for ECI. It extends on the basic approach of Artemov’s logic of proofs (Artemov 1994), representing an (...)
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  14. Guillaume Aucher (2010). An Internal Version of Epistemic Logic. Studia Logica 94 (1):1 - 22.score: 240.0
    Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents obviously depends on the modeling point of view one takes. We start by identifying the types of modeling points of view which are logically possible. We call the one traditionally followed by epistemic logic the perfect external approach, because there the modeler is assumed to be an omniscient and external observer of the epistemic situation. In the rest of the paper we focus on what we call the internal approach, (...)
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  15. Tomohiro Hoshi & Audrey Yap (2009). Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Branching Temporal Structures. Synthese 169 (2):259 - 281.score: 240.0
    van Bentham et al. (Merging frameworks for interaction: DEL and ETL, 2007) provides a framework for generating the models of Epistemic Temporal Logic ( ETL : Fagin et al., Reasoning about knowledge, 1995; Parikh and Ramanujam, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, 2003) from the models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic ( DEL : Baltag et al., in: Gilboa (ed.) Tark 1998, 1998; Gerbrandy, Bisimulations on Planet Kripke, 1999). We consider the logic TDEL on the (...)
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  16. Nina Gierasimczuk (2009). Bridging Learning Theory and Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 169 (2):371-384.score: 240.0
    This paper discusses the possibility of modelling inductive inference (Gold 1967) in dynamic epistemic logic (see e.g. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007). The general purpose is to propose a semantic basis for designing a modal logic for learning in the limit. First, we analyze a variety of epistemological notions involved in identification in the limit and match it with traditional epistemic and doxastic logic approaches. Then, we provide a comparison of learning by erasing (Lange et (...)
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  17. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). A Note on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Philosophical Studies:1-12.score: 240.0
    The paper explains how Gettier’s conclusion can be reached on general theoretical grounds within the framework of epistemic logic, without reliance on thought experiments. It extends the argument to permissive conceptions of justification that invalidate principles of multi-premise closure and require neighbourhood semantics rather than semantics of a more standard type. The paper concludes by recommending a robust methodology that aims at convergence in results between thought experimentation and more formal methods. It also warns against conjunctive definitions as (...)
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  18. Wesley H. Holliday (forthcoming). Epistemic Logic and Epistemology. In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.score: 240.0
    This chapter provides a brief introduction to propositional epistemic logic and its applications to epistemology. No previous exposure to epistemic logic is assumed. Epistemic-logical topics discussed include the language and semantics of basic epistemic logic, multi-agent epistemic logic, combined epistemic-doxastic logic, and a glimpse of dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemological topics discussed include Moore-paradoxical phenomena, the surprise exam paradox, logical omniscience and epistemic closure, formalized theories of knowledge, (...)
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  19. Joshua Sack (2009). Extending Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 169 (2):241 - 257.score: 240.0
    This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic (...)
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  20. Timothy Williamson (2013). Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):77-96.score: 240.0
    The five commentators on my paper ‘Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic’ (GCEL) demonstrate how fruitful the topic can be. Especially in Brian Weatherson's contribution, and to some extent in those of Jennifer Nagel and Jeremy Goodman, much of the material constitutes valuable development and refinement of ideas in GCEL, rather than criticism. In response, I draw some threads together, and answer objections, mainly those in the papers by Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña and by Goodman.
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  21. Wesley H. Holliday (2012). Epistemic Logic, Relevant Alternatives, and the Dynamics of Context. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7415:109-129.score: 240.0
    According to the Relevant Alternatives (RA) Theory of knowledge, knowing that something is the case involves ruling out (only) the relevant alternatives. The conception of knowledge in epistemic logic also involves the elimination of possibilities, but without an explicit distinction, among the possibilities consistent with an agent’s information, between those relevant possibilities that an agent must rule out in order to know and those remote, far-fetched or otherwise irrelevant possibilities. In this article, I propose formalizations of two versions (...)
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  22. Lorenz Demey (2013). Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis. Foundations of Science 18 (4):599-610.score: 240.0
    This paper studies the Lockean thesis from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic. The Lockean thesis states that belief can be defined as ‘sufficiently high degree of belief’. Its main problem is that it gives rise to a notion of belief which is not closed under conjunction. This problem is typical for classical epistemic logic: it is single-agent and static. I argue that from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic, the Lockean thesis fares much (...)
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  23. Lorenz Demey (2014). Agreeing to Disagree in Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 191 (3):409-438.score: 240.0
    This paper studies Aumann’s agreeing to disagree theorem from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic. This was first done by Dégremont and Roy (J Phil Log 41:735–764, 2012) in the qualitative framework of plausibility models. The current paper uses a probabilistic framework, and thus stays closer to Aumann’s original formulation. The paper first introduces enriched probabilistic Kripke frames and models, and various ways of updating them. This framework is then used to prove several agreement theorems, which are natural (...)
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  24. Ivano A. Ciardelli & Floris Roelofsen (forthcoming). Inquisitive Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese:1-45.score: 240.0
    Information exchange can be seen as a dynamic process of raising and resolving issues. The goal of this paper is to provide a logical framework to model and reason about this process. We develop an inquisitive dynamic epistemic logic (IDEL), which enriches the standard framework of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), incorporating insights from recent work on inquisitive semantics. At a static level, IDEL does not only allow us to model the information available to a set of (...)
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  25. Audrey Yap (2014). Idealization, Epistemic Logic, and Epistemology. Synthese 191 (14):3351-3366.score: 240.0
    Many criticisms of epistemic logic have centered around its use of devices such as idealized knowers with logical omniscience and perfect self-knowledge. One possible response to such criticisms is to say that these idealizations are normative devices, and that epistemic logic tells us how agents ought to behave. This paper will take a different approach, treating epistemic logic as descriptive, and drawing the analogy between its formal models and idealized scientific models on that basis. (...)
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  26. Mark Jago, Rule-Based and Resource-Bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic.score: 222.0
    Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop a framework for modelling resource-bounded agents and show that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties.
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  27. Timothy Williamson (2013). Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):1-14.score: 216.0
    The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry between (...)
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  28. Aviad Heifetz (1997). Infinitary S5‐Epistemic Logic. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 43 (3):333-342.score: 216.0
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  29. Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191-209.score: 212.0
    We model three examples of beliefs that agents may have about other agents’ beliefs, and provide motivation for this conceptualization from the theory of mind literature. We assume a modal logical framework for modelling degrees of belief by partially ordered preference relations. In this setting, we describe that agents believe that other agents do not distinguish among their beliefs (‘no preferences’), that agents believe that the beliefs of other agents are in part as their own (‘my preferences’), and the special (...)
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  30. Swarup Mohalik & R. Ramanujam (2010). Automata for Epistemic Temporal Logic with Synchronous Communication. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (4):451-484.score: 210.0
    We suggest that developing automata theoretic foundations is relevant for knowledge theory, so that we study not only what is known by agents, but also the mechanisms by which such knowledge is arrived at. We define a class of epistemic automata, in which agents’ local states are annotated with abstract knowledge assertions about others. These are finite state agents who communicate synchronously with each other and information exchange is ‘perfect’. We show that the class of recognizable languages has good (...)
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  31. Emiliano Lorini (2013). On the Epistemic Foundation for Iterated Weak Dominance: An Analysis in a Logic of Individual and Collective Attitudes. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):863-904.score: 210.0
    This paper proposes a logical framework for representing static and dynamic properties of different kinds of individual and collective attitudes. A complete axiomatization as well as a decidability result for the logic are given. The logic is applied to game theory by providing a formal analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (IDWDS), or iterated weak dominance for short. The main difference between the analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak (...)
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  32. Ivan Boh (1993). Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages. Routledge.score: 204.0
    Epistemic logic is one of the most exciting areas in medieval philosophy. Neglected almost entirely after the end of the Middle Ages, it has been rediscovered by philosophers of the twentieth century. Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages provides the first comprehensive study of the subject. Ivan Boh explores the contrast between epistemic and alethic conceptions of consequence, the general epistemic rules of consequence, the search for conditions of knowing contingent propositions, the problems (...)
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  33. V. Wiegel, M. J. Van den Hoven & G. J. C. Lokhorst (2005). Privacy, Deontic Epistemic Action Logic and Software Agents. Ethics and Information Technology 7 (4):251-264.score: 192.0
    In this paper we present an executable approach to model interactions between agents that involve sensitive, privacy-related information. The approach is formal and based on deontic, epistemic and action logic. It is conceptually related to the Belief-Desire-Intention model of Bratman. Our approach uses the concept of sphere as developed by Waltzer to capture the notion that information is provided mostly with restrictions regarding its application. We use software agent technology to create an executable approach. Our agents hold beliefs (...)
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  34. Pietro Galliani (2013). Epistemic Operators in Dependence Logic. Studia Logica 101 (2):367-397.score: 192.0
    The properties of the ${\forall^{1}}$ quantifier defined by Kontinen and Väänänen in [13] are studied, and its definition is generalized to that of a family of quantifiers ${\forall^{n}}$ . Furthermore, some epistemic operators δ n for Dependence Logic are also introduced, and the relationship between these ${\forall^{n}}$ quantifiers and the δ n operators are investigated.The Game Theoretic Semantics for Dependence Logic and the corresponding Ehrenfeucht- Fraissé game are then adapted to these new connectives.Finally, it is proved that (...)
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  35. Wesley H. Holliday & John Perry (forthcoming). Roles, Rigidity, and Quantification in Epistemic Logic. In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Trends in Logic, Outstanding Contributions: Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Springer.score: 186.0
    Epistemic modal predicate logic raises conceptual problems not faced in the case of alethic modal predicate logic: Frege’s “Hesperus-Phosphorus” problem—how to make sense of ascribing to agents ignorance of necessarily true identity statements—and the related “Hintikka-Kripke” problem—how to set up a logical system combining epistemic and alethic modalities, as well as others problems, such as Quine’s “Double Vision” problem and problems of self-knowledge. In this paper, we lay out a philosophical approach to epistemic predicate (...), implemented formally in Melvin Fitting’s First-Order Intensional Logic, that we argue solves these and other conceptual problems. Topics covered include: Quine on the “collapse” of modal distinctions; the rigidity of names; belief reports and unarticulated constituents; epistemic roles; counterfactual attitudes; representational vs. interpretational semantics; ignorance of co-reference vs. ignorance of identity; two-dimensional epistemic models; quantification into epistemic contexts; and an approach to multi-agent epistemic logic based on centered worlds and hybrid logic. (shrink)
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  36. Joeri Engelfriet (1996). Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (2):233-259.score: 186.0
    In the study of nonmonotonic reasoning the main emphasis has been on static (declarative) aspects. Only recently has there been interest in the dynamic aspects of reasoning processes, particularly in artificial intelligence. We study the dynamics of reasoning processes by using a temporal logic to specify them and to reason about their properties, just as is common in theoretical computer science. This logic is composed of a base temporal epistemic logic with a preference relation on models, (...)
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  37. Louwe B. Kuijer (2013). The Expressivity of Factual Change in Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):1-14.score: 186.0
    A commonly used dynamic epistemic logic is one obtained by adding commonknowledge and public announcements to a basic epistemic logic. It is known from Kooi (2007) that adding public substitutions to such a logic adds expressivity over the class K of models. Here I show that substitutions also add expressivity over the classes KD45, S4 and S5 of models. Since the combination of common knowledge, public announcements and substitutions, was shown in Kooi (2007) to be (...)
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  38. Peter Fritz, Belief Revision in Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Ranking Theory.score: 180.0
    I want to look at recent developments of representing AGM-style belief revision in dynamic epistemic logics and the options for doing something similar for ranking theory. Formally, my aim will be modest: I will define a version of basic dynamic doxastic logic using ranking functions as the semantics. I will show why formalizing ranking theory this way is useful for the ranking theorist first by showing how it enables one to compare ranking theory more easily with other approaches (...)
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  39. John Symons, Epistemic Logic.score: 180.0
    Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge and belief. It provides insight into the properties of individual knowers, has provided a means to model complicated scenarios involving groups of knowers and has improved our understanding of the dynamics of inquiry.
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  40. Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons (2006). Where's the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):137 - 167.score: 180.0
    Epistemic logic begins with the recognition that our everyday talk about knowing and believing has some systematic features that we can track and re‡ect upon. Epistemic logicians have studied and extended these glints of systematic structure in fascinating and important ways since the early 1960s. However, for one reason or another, mainstream epistemologists have shown little interest. It is striking to contrast the marginal role of epistemic logic in contemporary epistemology with the centrality of modal (...)
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  41. Johan van Benthem (2006). Epistemic Logic and Epistemology: The State of Their Affairs. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):49 - 76.score: 180.0
    Epistemology and epistemic logic At first sight, the modern agenda of epistemology has little to do with logic. Topics include different definitions of knowledge, its basic formal properties, debates between externalist and internalist positions, and above all: perennial encounters with sceptics lurking behind every street corner, especially in the US. The entry 'Epistemology' in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Klein 1993) and the anthology (Kim and Sosa 2000) give an up-to-date impression of the field. Now, epistemic (...)
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  42. John Symons (2006). Where's the Bridge? Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):137 - 167.score: 180.0
    Epistemic logic begins with the recognition that our everyday talk about knowing and believing has some systematic features that we can track and reflect upon. Epistemic logicians have studied and extended these glints of systematic structure in fascinating and important ways since the early 1960s. However, for one reason or another, mainstream epistemologists have shown little interest. It is striking to contrast the marginal role of epistemic logic in contemporary epistemology with the centrality of modal (...)
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  43. Vincent Hendricks, Epistemic Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 180.0
    Epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge and belief. It provides insight into the properties of individual knowers, has provided a means to model complicated scenarios involving groups of knowers and has improved our understanding of the dynamics of inquiry.
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  44. J. Gerbrandy (2007). The Surprise Examination in Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (1):21 - 33.score: 180.0
    We examine the paradox of the surprise examination using dynamic epistemic logic. This logic contains means of expressing epistemic facts as well as the effects of learning new facts, and is therefore a natural framework for representing the puzzle. We discuss a number of different interpretations of the puzzle in this context, and show how the failure of principle of success, that states that sentences, when learned, remain to be true and come to be believed, plays (...)
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  45. P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings (1981). Epistemic Logic, Skepticism, and Non-Normal Modal Logic. Philosophical Studies 40 (1):47 - 67.score: 180.0
    An epistemic logic is built up on the basis of an analysis of two skeptical arguments. the method used is to first construct an inference relation appropriate to epistemic contexts and introduce "a knows that..." as an operator giving rise to sentences closed with respect to this new concept of inference. soundness and completeness proofs are provided using auxiliary three-valued valuations.
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  46. Jan van Eijck, Reducing Dynamic Epistemic Logic to Pdl by Program Transformation.score: 180.0
    We present a direct reduction of dynamic epistemic logic in the spirit of [4] to propositional dynamic logic (PDL) [17, 18] by program transformation. The program transformation approach associates with every update action a transformation on PDL programs. These transformations are then employed in reduction axioms for the update actions. It follows that the logic of public announcement, the logic of group announcements, the logic of secret message passing, and so on, can all be (...)
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  47. Peter K. Schotch (2000). Skepticism and Epistemic Logic. Studia Logica 66 (1):187-198.score: 180.0
    This essay attempts to implement epistemic logic through a non-classical inference relation. Given that relation, an account of '(the individual) a knows that A' is constructed as an unfamiliar non-normal modal logic. One advantage to this approach is a new analysis of the skeptical argument.
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  48. Max Deutscher (1969). Hintikka's Conception of Epistemic Logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):205 – 208.score: 180.0
    "hintikka's conception of epistemic logic" is a critical comment on hintikka's defence of his philosophical method ("epistemic logic and the methods of philosophical analysis", "a.J.P." no.1, 1968). There is a discussion of the symbolization and analysis of "a knows that p", "a knows that he knows that p", And the notions of virtual equivalence and virtual implication. The conclusion drawn is that whereas hintikka thought his critics misunderstood his method, In fact they were attacking his employment (...)
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  49. Yue J. Jiang (1993). An Intensional Epistemic Logic. Studia Logica 52 (2):259 - 280.score: 180.0
    One of the fundamental properties inclassical equational reasoning isLeibniz's principle of substitution. Unfortunately, this propertydoes not hold instandard epistemic logic. Furthermore,Herbrand's lifting theorem which isessential to thecompleteness ofresolution andParamodulation in theclassical first order logic (FOL), turns out to be invalid in standard epistemic logic. In particular, unlike classical logic, there is no skolemization normal form for standard epistemic logic. To solve these problems, we introduce anintensional epistemic logic, based on avariation (...)
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  50. Lauri Carlson (1988). Quantified Hintikka-Style Epistemic Logic. Synthese 74 (2):223 - 262.score: 180.0
    This paper contains a formal treatment of the system of quantified epistemic logic sketched in Appendix II of Carlson (1983). Section 1 defines the syntax and recapitulates the model set rules and principles of the Appendix system. Section 2 defines a possible worlds semantics for this system, and shows that the Appendix system is complete with respect to this semantics. Section 3 extends the system by an explicit truth operatorT it is true that and considers quantification over nonexistent (...)
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