Search results for 'epistemic virtues' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jason Kawall (2002). Other–Regarding Epistemic Virtues. Ratio 15 (3):257–275.score: 90.0
    Epistemologists often assume that an agent’s epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both individualistic and social epistemologists. Candidate virtues include such traits as honesty, integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one’s status as an expert), (...)
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  2. Boudewijn de Bruin (2013). Epistemic Virtues in Business. Journal of Business Ethics 113 (4):583-595.score: 90.0
    This paper applies emerging research on epistemic virtues to business ethics. Inspired by recent work on epistemic virtues in philosophy, I develop a view in which epistemic virtues contribute to the acquisition of knowledge that is instrumentally valuable in the realisation of particular ends, business ends in particular. I propose a conception of inquiry according to which epistemic actions involve investigation, belief adoption and justification, and relate this to the traditional ‘justified true belief’ (...)
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  3. Herman Paul (2011). Performing History: How Historical Scholarship is Shaped by Epistemic Virtues. History and Theory 50 (1):1-19.score: 75.0
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  4. Stewart Clem (2008). Warrant and Epistemic Virtues: Toward and Agent Reliabilist Account of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Dissertation, Oklahoma State Universityscore: 62.0
    Alvin Plantinga’s theory of knowledge, as developed in his Warrant trilogy, has shaped the debates surrounding many areas in epistemology in profound ways. Plantinga has received his share of criticism, however, particularly in his treatment of belief in God as being “properly basic”. There has also been much confusion surrounding his notions of warrant and proper function, to which Plantinga has responded numerous times. Many critics remain unsatisfied, while others have developed alternative understandings of warrant in order to rescue Plantinga’s (...)
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  5. Reza Lahroodi (2007). Collective Epistemic Virtues. Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.score: 62.0
    At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, (...)
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  6. Adam Kovach (2006). Epistemic Virtues and the Deliberative Frame of Mind. Social Epistemology 20 (1):105 – 115.score: 62.0
    Believing is not much like premeditated intentional action, but neither is it completely reflexive. If we had no more control over believing than we have over our automatic reflexes, it would be hard to make sense of the idea of epistemic virtues. There is, after all, no excellence of the eye blink or the knee jerk. If there are epistemic virtues, then our degree of voluntary control over believing must lie somewhere between the extremes of what (...)
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  7. Tim Henning & David P. Schweikard (eds.) (2013). Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge.score: 62.0
    This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are for . The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, (...)
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  8. Guy Axtell (2001). Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 158--177.score: 61.0
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists'responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board and locates the source of some of their deepest disagreements in divergent, value-charged “interests in explanation,” which epistemologists (...)
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  9. Brian Weatherson, Easy Knowledge and Other Epistemic Virtues.score: 60.0
    This paper has three aims. First, I’ll argue that there’s no good reason to accept any kind of ‘easy knowledge’ objection to externalist foundationalism. It might be a little surprising that we can come to know that our perception is accurate by using our perception, but any attempt to argue this is impossible seems to rest on either false premises or fallacious reasoning. Second, there is something defective about using our perception to test whether our perception is working. What this (...)
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  10. Linton Wang & Wei-Fen Ma (2012). Scientific Knowledge and Extended Epistemic Virtues. Erkenntnis 77 (2):273-295.score: 60.0
    This paper investigates the applicability of reliabilism to scientific knowledge, and especially focuses on two doubts about the applicability: one about its difficulty in accounting for the epistemological role of scientific instruments, and the other about scientific theories. To respond to the two doubts, we extend virtue reliabilism, a reliabilist-based virtue epistemology, with a distinction of two types of epistemic virtues and the extended mind thesis from Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58:7–19, 1998 ). We also present a case (...)
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  11. Adam Morton (2004). Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity. Noûs 38 (3):481–502.score: 60.0
    I argue that considerations about computational complexity show that all finite agents need characteristics like those that have been called epistemic virtues. The necessity of these virtues follows in part from the nonexistence of shortcuts, or efficient ways of finding shortcuts, to cognitively expensive routines. It follows that agents must possess the capacities – metavirtues –of developing in advance the cognitive virtues they will need when time and memory are at a premium.
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  12. Professor Adam Morton (2004). Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity. Noûs 38 (3):481-502.score: 60.0
    I argue that considerations about computational complexity show that all finite agents need characteristics like those that have been called epistemic virtues. The necessity of these virtues follows in part from the nonexistence of shortcuts, or efficient ways of finding shortcuts, to cognitively expensive routines. It follows that agents must possess the capacities – metavirtues –of developing in advance the cognitive virtues they will need when time and memory are at a premium.
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  13. Reza Lahroodi (2006). Evaluational Internalism, Epistemic Virtues, and the Significance of Trying. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:1-20.score: 60.0
    While there is general agreement about the list of epistemic virtues, there has been much controversy over what it is to be an epistemic virtue. Three competing theories have been offered: evaluational externalism, evaluational internalism, and mixed theories. A major problem with internalism, the focus of this paper, is that it disconnects the value of epistemic virtue from actual success in the real world (the Disconnection Problem). Relying on a novel thesis about the relation of “trying” (...)
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  14. Jonathan E. Adler (2005). Diversity, Social Inquiries, and Epistemic Virtues. Veritas 50 (4).score: 60.0
    A teoria das virtudes epistêmicas (VE) sustenta que as virtudes dos agentes, tais como a imparcialidade ou a permeabilidade intelectual, ao invés de crenças específicas, devem estar no centro da avaliação epistêmica, e que os indivíduos que possuem essas virtudes estão mais bem-posicionados epistemicamente do que se não as tivessem, ou, pior ainda, do que se tivessem os vícios correspondentes: o preconceito, o dogmatismo, ou a impermeabilidade intelectual. Eu argumento que a teoria VE padece de um grave defeito, porque fracassa (...)
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  15. Michael Brady & Duncan Pritchard (2006). Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):1--8.score: 57.0
    This paper introduces the articles in this volume, and offers an overview of each piece.
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  16. Jason Kawall (2010). The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (1-2):109-28.score: 54.0
    To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information—about morality, environmental issues, the impacts of our actions and commitments, our options for alternatives, and so on. On the other hand, we are finite beings with limited time and resources. We cannot feasibly investigate all of our options, and all environmental issues (let alone moral issues, more broadly). In this paper I attempt to provide initial steps towards addressing the epistemic demands of environmental virtue. In the first half of the paper (...)
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  17. Pieranna Garavaso & Nicla Vassallo (2003). On the Virtues and Plausibility of Feminist Epistemologies. Epistemologia, Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Della Scienza (1):99-131.score: 51.0
    In this paper, we examine some issues debated in mainstream epistemology for which the social features of knowledge are relevant, such as the epistemic relevance of social contexts, the nature of practical knowledge, and the epistemic role of testimony. In the first part of the paper, we show how feminist epistemologies have usefully stressed the social character of knowledge in many central areas of debate within mainstream epistemology. We call these the virtues of feminist epistemology: the denial (...)
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  18. Christopher Hookway (1994). Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2):211 – 227.score: 48.0
    (1994). Cognitive virtues and epistemic evaluations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 211-227. doi: 10.1080/09672559408570791.
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  19. Michael J. Raven (2013). Subjectivism is Pointless. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):733-748.score: 46.0
    Epistemic objectivists and epistemic subjectivists might agree that inquiry pursues epistemic virtues (truth, knowledge, reason, or rationality) while disagreeing over their objectivity. Objectivists will evaluate this disagreement in terms of the epistemic virtues objectively construed, while subjectivists will not. This raises a rhetorical problem: objectivists will fault subjectivism for lacking some objective epistemic virtue, whereas subjectivists, by rejecting objectivity, won’t see this as a fault. My goal is to end this impasse by offering (...)
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  20. Kevin McCain (2008). The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 164 (2):185 - 200.score: 45.0
    Although several important methodologies implicitly assume the truth of epistemic conservatism, the view that holding a belief confers some measure of justification on the belief, recent criticisms have led some to conclude that epistemic conservatism is an implausible view. That conclusion is mistaken. In this article, I propose a new formulation of epistemic conservatism that is not susceptible to the criticisms leveled at earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism. In addition to withstanding these criticisms, this formulation of (...)
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  21. Sharon Ryan (1996). The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency. Synthese 109 (2):121-141.score: 45.0
    The lottery paradox has been discussed widely. The standard solution to the lottery paradox is that a ticket holder is justified in believing each ticket will lose but the ticket holder is also justified in believing not all of the tickets will lose. If the standard solution is true, then we get the paradoxical result that it is possible for a person to have a justified set of beliefs that she knows is inconsistent. In this paper, I argue that the (...)
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  22. Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard (2003). Moral and Epistemic Virtues. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):1-11.score: 45.0
  23. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo (2011). Epistemic Virtues and Transparency. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):257-266.score: 45.0
    Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely accepted they are from (...)
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  24. Roger Pouivet (2010). Moral and Epistemic Virtues: A Thomistic and Analytical Perspective. Forum Philosophicum 15:1-15.score: 45.0
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  25. Mohammed Y. A. Rawwas, Surendra Arjoon & Yusuf Sidani (2013). An Introduction of Epistemology to Business Ethics: A Study of Marketing Middle-Managers. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 117 (3):525-539.score: 45.0
    A vast majority of marketing theory and research has focused on relativism and idealism in order to understand ethical behavior. However, making ethical assessments that in turn influence behavior is much more complicated than it appears. One of the most important developments in contemporary philosophy has been the renewed interest in epistemic virtue. Epistemologists contend that belief is an ethical process that is susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one’s own life and personal experiences. Open-mindedness, curiosity, careful (...)
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  26. Alvin Goldman (2002). ``The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues&Quot. In Pathways to Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. 51-72.score: 45.0
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  27. Oren Harman & Peter L. Galison (2008). Epistemic Virtues and Leibnizian Dreams: On the Shifting Boundaries Between Science, Humanities and Faith. The European Legacy 13 (5):551-575.score: 45.0
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  28. Anti-Skeptical Stratagem (2006). Michael Brady, Duncan Pritchard/Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology 1–8 John Greco/Virtue, Luck and the Pyrrhonian Problematic 9–34 Duncan Pritchard/Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck 35–45 Christopher Hookway/Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtues 47–70. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 130:659-661.score: 45.0
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  29. Nenad Miščević (2007). MS Brady and DH Pritchard (Eds.), Epistemic Virtue and Epistemology; MS Brady and DH Pritchard (Eds.), Moral and Epistemic Virtues. [REVIEW] Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20:309-314.score: 45.0
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  30. Duncan Pritchard (2008). Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues. In Ernest Sosa (ed.), Epistemology: An Anthology. Blackwell Pub.. 2--462.score: 45.0
     
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  31. Herman Paul (2012). Weak Historicism: On Hierarchies of Intellectual Virtues and Goods. Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (3):369-388.score: 42.0
    This article seeks to reconcile a historicist sensitivity to how intellectually virtuous behavior is shaped by historical contexts with a non-relativist account of historical scholarship. To that end, it distinguishes between hierarchies of intellectual virtues and hierarchies of intellectual goods . The first hierarchy rejects a one-size-fits-all model of historical virtuousness in favor of a model that allows for significant varieties between the relative weight that historians must assign to intellectual virtues in order to acquire justified historical understanding. (...)
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  32. Roger Crisp (2010). Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):22-40.score: 40.0
    The aim of this essay is to test the claim that epistemologists—virtue epistemologists in particular—have much to learn from virtue ethics. The essay begins with an outline of virtue ethics itself. This section concludes that a pure form of virtue ethics is likely to be unattractive, so the virtue epistemologist should examine the "impure" views of real philosophers. Aristotle is usually held up as the paradigm virtue ethicist. His doctrine of the mean is described, and it is explained how that (...)
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  33. Jason Kawall (2005). Grounded Knowledge, Place and Epistemic Virtue. Ethics, Place and Environment 8 (3):361 – 371.score: 39.0
    A response to Christopher Preston's book "Grounding Knowledge" (2003). I first argue that Preston’s work strongly suggests that epistemologists would do well to re-examine and pay greater attention to ‘knowledge how’. Second, I briefly consider several of Preston’s proposals (concerning the importance of place to our cognitive lives) through the lens of contemporary virtue epistemology and suggest how Preston’s work might inform and shape theorizing in this area. Finally, I turn to a set of potential questions for Preston, focusing in (...)
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  34. Guy Axtell (1996). Epistemic-Virtue Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology? Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10 (3):172 - 198.score: 39.0
    This was my first paper on virtue epistemology, and already highlights the connections with epistemic value and axiology which I would later develop. Although most accounts were either internalist or externalist in an exclusive sense, I suggest an inquiry-focused version through connections with the American pragmatism.
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  35. Juli Eflin (2003). Epistemic Presuppositions and Their Consequences. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):48-68.score: 39.0
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  36. Reza Lahroodi (2007). Evaluating Need for Cognition: A Case Study in Naturalistic Epistemic Virtue Theory. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):227 – 245.score: 38.0
    The recent literature on epistemic virtues advances two general projects. The first is virtue epistemology, an attempt to explicate key epistemic notions in terms of epistemic virtue. The second is epistemic virtue theory, the conceptual and normative investigation of cognitive traits of character. While a great deal of work has been done in virtue epistemology, epistemic virtue theory still languishes in a state of neglect. Furthermore, the existing work is non-naturalistic. The present paper contributes (...)
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  37. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..score: 37.0
    The regress problem and foundationalism -- Externalist accounts of justification -- In search of coherentism -- Back to foundationalism -- The conceptualization of sensory experience and the problem of the external world -- Knowledge and justification -- Does knowledge have foundation -- Skepticism and the internal/external divide -- A virtue epistemology -- Reply to Sosa -- Reply to Bonjour.
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  38. Duncan Pritchard (2003). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.score: 36.0
    The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic (...)
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  39. Heather D. Battaly (ed.) (2010). Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 36.0
    Machine generated contents note: Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Virtue and Vice: Heather Battaly -- 1. Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology: Roger Crisp -- 2. Exemplarist Virtue Theory: Linda Zagzebski -- 3. Right Act, Virtuous Motive: Thomas Hurka -- 4. Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad: Guy Axtell -- 5. Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism: Sarah Wright -- 6. Virtue, Emotion, and Attention: Michael S. Brady -- 7. Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons from the (...)
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  40. Duncan Pritchard (2004). Review: Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (450):319-322.score: 36.0
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  41. Baron Reed (2001). Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):507-526.score: 36.0
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  42. Christopher Lepock (2005). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa Great Debates in Philosophy Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003, 240 Pp., $26.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44 (04):811-.score: 36.0
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  43. M. Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.score: 36.0
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  44. Marina Bakalova (2006). Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:363-368.score: 36.0
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  45. Trent Dougherty (2006). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):142-143.score: 36.0
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  46. Christopher Lepock (2005). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Dialogue 44 (4):811-813.score: 36.0
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  47. Alan Thomas (2008). The Genealogy of Epistemic Virtue Concepts. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):345-369.score: 35.0
    Abstract This paper examines the treatment of thick ethical concepts in Williams's work in order to evaluate the consistency of his treatment of ethical and epistemic concepts and to assess whether the idea of a thick concept can be extended from ethics to epistemology. A virtue epistemology is described modeled on a cognitivist virtue ethics. Williams's genealogy of the virtues surrounding propositional knowledge (the virtues of ?truthfulness?) is critically evaluated. It is concluded that this genealogy is an (...)
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  48. Cesare Cozzo (2012). Gulliver, Truth and Virtue. Topoi 31 (1):59-66.score: 34.0
    What is the role of a notion of truth in our form of life? What is it to possess a notion of truth? How different would we be, if we did not possess a notion of truth? Gulliver’s description of three peoples encountered during his fifth travel will help me to answer. One might say that the basic anti-realist tenet is that we should explain the notion of truth by connecting it with our practice of assertion. In this sense the (...)
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  49. Greg Scherkoske (2012). Could Integrity Be An Epistemic Virtue? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):185-215.score: 34.0
    Abstract 1 This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams? seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding (...)
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  50. Alfonso Arroyo-Santos & Xavier de Donato-Rodríguez, Idealization and the Structure of Theories in Biololgy.score: 33.0
    In this paper we present a new framework of idealization in biology. We characterize idealizations as a network of counterfactual conditionals that can exhibit different degrees of contingency. We use the idea of possible worlds to say that, in departing more or less from the actual world, idealizations can serve numerous epistemic, methodological or heuristic purposes within scientific research. We defend that, in part, it is this structure what helps explain why idealizations, despite being deformations of reality, are so (...)
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