Search results for 'equal weight view' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tomas Bogardus (2009). A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View. Episteme 6 (3):324-335.score: 540.0
    Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples – cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the (...)
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  2. Jimmy Alfonso Licon (2013). On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View. [REVIEW] Philosophia 41 (3):809-823.score: 540.0
    There is a controversy, within social epistemology, over how to handle disagreement among epistemic peers. Call this the problem of peer disagreement. There is a solution, i.e. the equal-weight view, which says that disagreement among epistemic peers is a reason for each peer to lower the credence they place in their respective positions. However, this solution is susceptible to a serious challenge. Call it the merely modal peers challenge. Throughout parts of modal space, which resemble the actual (...)
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  3. Alastair Wilson (2010). Disagreement, Equal Weight and Commutativity. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):321 - 326.score: 396.0
    How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.
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  4. Branden Fitelson & David Jehle (2009). What is the “Equal Weight View'? Episteme 6 (3):280-293.score: 360.0
    In this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on disagreement. We will show that the renditions of (EWV) that immediately suggest themselves are untenable from a Bayesian point of view. In the end, we will propose some tenable (but not necessarily desirable) interpretations of (EWV). Our aim here will not be to defend any particular Bayesian precisification of (...)
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  5. Samuel Ruhmkorff (2013). The Equal Weight Argument Against Religious Exclusivism. In Jeanine Diller & Asa Kasher (eds.), Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities. Springer.score: 297.0
    In the last decade, analytic epistemologists have engaged in a lively debate about Equal Weight, the claim that you should give the credences of epistemic peers the same consideration as your own credences. In this paper, I explore the implications of the debate about Equal Weight for how we should respond to religious disagreement found in the diversity of models of God. I first claim that one common argument against religious exclusivism and for religious pluralism can (...)
     
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  6. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2013). Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation. Noûs 47 (4):767-794.score: 270.0
    What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk of being incompatible with a pair of real epistemic phenomena, what I call evidential attenuation and evidential amplification. I focus on a popular and intuitive view of disagreement, the equal weight view. I take it to state that in cases of peer disagreement, a subject (...)
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  7. Tomas Bogardus (2013). Disagreeing with the (Religious) Skeptic. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):5-17.score: 270.0
    Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate (...)
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  8. Stewart Cohen (2013). Equal Weight View. In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 98.score: 270.0
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  9. Jonathan Matheson & Brandon Carey (2013). How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View? In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge. 131-149.score: 270.0
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  10. Carlo Martini (2013). A Puzzle About Belief Updating. Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160.score: 183.0
    In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s (...)
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  11. Bryan Frances (2012). Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.score: 180.0
    Suppose you know that someone is your epistemic peer regarding some topic. You admit that you cannot think of any relevant epistemic advantage you have over her when it comes to that topic; you admit that she is just as likely as you to get P's truth-value right. Alternatively, you might know that she is your epistemic superior regarding the topic. And then after learning this about her you find out that she disagrees with you about P. In those situations (...)
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  12. Joshua C. Thurow (2012). Does Religious Disagreement Actually Aid the Case for Theism? In Jake Chandler & Victoria Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.score: 180.0
  13. Mark V. Roehling (2002). Weight Discrimination in the American Workplace: Ethical Issues and Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 40 (2):177 - 189.score: 93.0
    Research providing consistent evidence of pervasive discrimination against overweight job applicants and employees in the American workplace raises important questions for organizational stakeholders. To what extent is the disparate treatment of job applicants or employees based on their weight ethically justified? Are there aspects of weight discrimination that make it more acceptable than discrimination based on other characteristics, such as race or gender? What operational steps can employers take to address concerns regarding the ethical treatment of overweight individuals (...)
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  14. David Enoch (2010). Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement. Mind 119 (476):953 - 997.score: 90.0
    How should you update your (degrees of) belief about a proposition when you find out that someone else — as reliable as you are in these matters — disagrees with you about its truth value? There are now several different answers to this question — the question of `peer disagreement' — in the literature, but none, I think, is plausible. Even more importantly, none of the answers in the literature places the peer-disagreement debate in its natural place among the most (...)
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  15. Brian Weatherson, Disagreeing About Disagreement.score: 90.0
    I argue with my friends a lot. That is, I offer them reasons to believe all sorts of philosophical conclusions. Sadly, despite the quality of my arguments, and despite their apparent intelligence, they don’t always agree. They keep insisting on principles in the face of my wittier and wittier counterexamples, and they keep offering their own dull alleged counterexamples to my clever principles. What is a philosopher to do in these circumstances? (And I don’t mean get better friends.) One popular (...)
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  16. Tomoji Shogenji, My Way or Her Way: A Conundrum in Bayesian Epistemology of Disagreement.score: 90.0
    The proportional weight view in epistemology of disagreement generalizes the equal weight view and proposes that we assign to judgments of different people weights that are proportional to their epistemic qualifications. It is shown that if the resulting degrees of confidence are to constitute a probability function, they must be the weighted arithmetic means of individual degrees of confidence, while if the resulting degrees of confidence are to obey the Bayesian rule of conditionalization, they must (...)
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  17. Barry Lam (2011). On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement. Philosophical Review 120 (2):207 - 245.score: 90.0
    This paper considers two questions. First, what is the scope of the Equal Weight View? Is it the case that meeting halfway is the uniquely rational method of belief-revision in all cases of known peer disagreement? The answer is no. It is sometimes rational to maintain your own opinion in the face of peer disagreement. But this leaves open the possibility that the Equal Weight View is indeed sometimes the uniquely rational method of belief (...)
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  18. Sherrilyn Roush (2009). Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual. Episteme 6 (3):251-268.score: 90.0
    I develop a general framework with a rationality constraint that shows how coherently to represent and deal with second-order information about one's own judgmental reliability. It is a rejection of and generalization away from the typical Bayesian requirements of unconditional judgmental self-respect and perfect knowledge of one's own beliefs, and is defended by appeal to the Principal Principle. This yields consequences about maintaining unity of the self, about symmetries and asymmetries between the first- and third-person, and a principled way of (...)
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  19. Jan Sprenger, Carlo Martini & Stephan Hartmann (2009). Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers. Episteme 6 (2):110-129.score: 90.0
    This paper focuses on the question of how to resolve disagreement and uses the Lehrer-Wagner model as a formal tool for investigating consensual decision-making. The main result consists in a general definition of when agents treat each other as epistemic peers (Kelly 2005; Elga 2007), and a theorem vindicating the “equal weight view” to resolve disagreement among epistemic peers. We apply our findings to an analysis of the impact of social network structures on group deliberation processes, and (...)
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  20. Clayton Littlejohn (2013). Disagreement and Defeat. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and Skepticism.score: 90.0
    The equal weight view says that if you discover that you disagree with a peer, you should decrease your confidence that you are in the right. Since peer disagreement seems to be quite prevalent, the equal weight view seems to tell us that we cannot reasonably believe many of the interesting things we believe because we can always count on a peer to contest the interesting things that we believe. While the equal (...) view seems to have skeptical implications, few epistemologists worry about these implications because the equal weight view is quickly falling out of favor. In this paper, I present an analogical argument for the view and defend it from critics who think that we can justifiably retain confidence in the face of peer disagreement. (shrink)
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  21. Shawn Graves (2013). The Self-Undermining Objection in the Epistemology of Disagreement. Faith and Philosophy 30 (1):93-106.score: 90.0
    Disagreements about, within, and between religions are widespread. It’s no surprise, then, that there’s an enormous philosophical literature on religious diversity. But in recent years, philosophers working in mainstream epistemology have done a lot of work on disagreement in general. This work has focused in particular upon the epistemology of peer disagreement, i.e., disagreements between parties who are justifiably believed to be epistemic equals regarding the matter at hand. In this paper, I intend to defend a thesis in the epistemology (...)
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  22. Evelyn Pluhar (1992). Who Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (2):189-215.score: 84.0
    Kathryn Paxton George has recently argued that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even if Tom Regan is correct in arguing that humans and certain nonhuman animals are equally inherently valuable. She holds that Regan's liberty principle permits humans to kill and eat innocent others who have a right to life, provided that doing so prevents humans from being made worse off. George maintains that obstaining from meat and dairy products would in fact make most humans (...)
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  23. Bernard Jeune, Denis Barabé & Christian Lacroix (2006). Classical and Dynamic Morphology: Toward a Synthesis Through the Space of Forms. Acta Biotheoretica 54 (4).score: 83.0
    In plant morphology, most structures of vascular plants can easily be assigned to pre-established organ categories. However, there are also intermediate structures that do not fit those categories associated with a classical approach to morphology. To integrate the diversity of forms in the same general framework, we constructed a theoretical morphospace based on a variety of modalities where it is possible to calculate the morphological distance between plant organs. This paper gives emphasis on shoot, leaf, leaflet and trichomes while ignoring (...)
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  24. J. Adam Carter (2013). A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.score: 81.0
    Duncan Pritchard has, in the years following his (2005) defence of a safety-based account of knowledge in Epistemic Luck, abjured his (2005) view that knowledge can be analysed exclusively in terms of a modal safety condition. He has since (Pritchard in Synthese 158:277–297, 2007; J Philosophic Res 34:33–45, 2009a, 2010) opted for an account according to which two distinct conditions function with equal importance and weight within an analysis of knowledge: an anti-luck condition (safety) and an ability (...)
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  25. Richard Bradley & Thompson (2012). A (Mainly Epistemic) Case for Multiple-Vote Majority Rule. Episteme 9 (1):63-79.score: 81.0
    Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.
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  26. Manuel G. Bedia & Ezequiel Di Paolo (2012). Unreliable Gut Feelings Can Lead to Correct Decisions: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis in Non-Linear Decision Chains. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 81.0
    Dual system approaches of decision making examine the interaction between affective/intuitive and deliberative processes underlying value judgment. Decisions are arise from a combination of relatively explicit capabilities for abstract reasoning and relatively implicit evolved domain-general as well as learned domain-specific affective responses. One such approach, the somatic markers hypothesis (SMH), expresses these processes as a system of evolved primary emotions supplemented by associations between affect and experience that accrue over lifetime, or somatic markers (SMs). In this view, SMs are (...)
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  27. Ezequiel Di Paolo Manuel G. Bedia (2012). Unreliable Gut Feelings Can Lead to Correct Decisions: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis in Non-Linear Decision Chains. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 81.0
    Dual system approaches of decision making examine the interaction between affective/intuitive and deliberative processes underlying value judgment. Decisions are arise from a combination of relatively explicit capabilities for abstract reasoning and relatively implicit evolved domain-general as well as learned domain-specific affective responses. One such approach, the somatic markers hypothesis (SMH), expresses these processes as a system of evolved primary emotions supplemented by associations between affect and experience that accrue over lifetime, or somatic markers (SMs). In this view, SMs are (...)
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  28. Alan H. Cromer (1997). Connected Knowledge: Science, Philosophy, and Education. Oxford University Press.score: 81.0
    When physicist Alan Sokal recently submitted an article to the postmodernist journal Social Text, the periodical's editors were happy to publish it--for here was a respected scientist offering support for the journal's view that science is a subjective, socially constructed discipline. But as Sokal himself soon revealed in Lingua Franca magazine, the essay was a spectacular hoax--filled with scientific gibberish anyone with a basic knowledge of physics should have caught--and the academic world suddenly awoke to the vast gap that (...)
     
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  29. Judith Andre (1987). The Equal Moral Weight of Self- and Other-Regarding Acts. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):155 - 165.score: 72.0
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  30. Robert D. Heslep (1963). Thomas Jefferson's View of Equal Social Opportunity. Educational Theory 13 (2):142-148.score: 72.0
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  31. L. Arons & F. W. Irwin (1932). Equal Weights and Psychophysical Judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology 15 (6):733.score: 56.7
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  32. Susan Wolf (1999). Morality and the View From Here. Journal of Ethics 3 (3):203-223.score: 54.0
    According to one influential conception of morality, being moral is a matter of acting from or in accordance with a moral point of view, a point of view which is arrived at by abstracting from a more natural, pre-ethical, personal point of view, and recognizing that each person''s personal point of view has equal standing. The idea that, were it not for morality, rational persons would act from their respectively personal points of view is, (...)
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  33. Alex Voorhoeve (2005). Equal Opportunity, Equality, and Responsibility. Dissertation, University of Londonscore: 46.0
    This thesis argues that a particular version of equal opportunity for welfare is the best way of meeting the joint demands of three liberal egalitarian ideals: distributional equality, responsibility, and respect for individuals’ differing reasonable judgements of their own good. It also examines which social choice rules best represent these demands. Finally, it defends the view that achieving equal opportunity for welfare should not only be a goal of formal public institutions, but that just citizens should also (...)
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  34. Edward M. Hubbard & Vilayanur S. Ramachandran (2004). The Size-Weight Illusion, Emulation, and the Cerebellum. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):407-408.score: 46.0
    In this commentary we discuss a predictive sensorimotor illusion, the size-weight illusion, in which the smaller of two objects of equal weight is perceived as heavier. We suggest that Grush's emulation theory can explain this illusion as a mismatch between predicted and actual sensorimotor feedback, and present preliminary data suggesting that the cerebellum may be critical for implementing the emulator.
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  35. David Pinkowski (2013). Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature of Equality and Incomparability. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (4):457-470.score: 46.0
    There exists an ongoing debate about the nature of incomparability. In this paper, I argue that incomparability is most usefully seen as a practical, rather than a metaphysical, issue. When confronted with an important choice between two options, an agent often will be at a loss as to how to decide between them. A common response to this problem is to assert that the options must therefore be equal, and that it is perfectly rational to be indifferent and decide (...)
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  36. Matthew A. Smith, Religion and the Freedom-Weighted View: Reconsidering First Amendment Challenges to Laws Promoting Autonomy.score: 45.3
    In this paper, I defend a novel view of the religion clauses. The historical origins of the clause suggest two competing conceptual interpretations: one which privileges religion (the religion-weighted view) and one which privileges freedom (the freedom-weighted view). I argue for the freedom-weighted view and explore the jurisprudential implications of both views. I also argue for the counterintuitive result that, if we accept the freedom-weighted view, Free Exercise challenges to certain laws promoting autonomy (freedom) in (...)
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  37. Mikael Stenmark (2009). Religious Pluralism and the Some-Are-Equally-Right View. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2):21 - 35.score: 44.0
    In this essay I identify and develop an alternative to pluralism which is overlooked in contemporary debate in philosophy of religion and in theology. According to this view, some but not all of the great world religions are equally correct, that is to say, they are just as successful when it comes to tracking the truth and providing a path to salvation. This alternative is not haunted by the same difficulty as pluralism, namely the problem of emptiness. It is (...)
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  38. Jennifer Lackey (2008). What Should We Do When We Disagree? In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oup. 274-93.score: 43.0
    You and I have been colleagues for ten years, during which we have tirelessly discussed the reasons both for and against the existence of God. There is no argument or piece of evidence bearing directly on this question that one of us is aware of that the other is not—we are, then, evidential equals1 relative to the topic of God’s existence.2 There is also no cognitive virtue or capacity, or cognitive vice or incapacity, that one of us possesses that the (...)
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  39. Ryan Long (2011). The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism. Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.score: 43.0
    Luck egalitarianism makes a fundamental distinction between inequalities for which agents are responsible and inequalities stemming from luck. I give several reasons to find luck egalitarianism a compelling view of distributive justice. I then argue that it is an incomplete theory of equality. Luck egalitarianism lacks the normative resources to achieve its ends. It is unable to specify the prior conditions under which persons are situated equivalently such that their choices can bear this tremendous weight. This means that (...)
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  40. Jakob Elster (2011). Procreative Beneficence – Cui Bono? Bioethics 25 (9):482-488.score: 43.0
    Recently, Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane have defended the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB), according to which prospective parents ought to select children with the view that their future child has ‘the best chance of the best life’. I argue that the arguments Savulescu and Kahane adduce in favour of PB equally well support what I call the Principle of General Procreative Beneficence (GPB). GPB states that couples ought to select children in view of maximizing the overall expected (...)
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  41. Nelson T. Potter (2002). Kant and Capital Punishment Today. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2-3):267-282.score: 43.0
    We will consider alternative ways that Kant’s philosophical views on ethics generally and on punishment more particularly could be brought into harmony with the present near consensus of opposition to the death penalty. We will make use of the notion of the contemporary consensus about certain issues, particularly equality of the sexes and the death penalty, found in widespread agreement, though not unanimity. Of course, it is always possible that some consensuses are wrong, or misguided, or mistaken. We should not (...)
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  42. Seiriol Morgan (2006). Naturalism and Normativity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):319 - 344.score: 43.0
    Synthetic naturalism is a form of moral realism which holds that we can discover a posteriori that moral properties exist and are natural properties. On this view moral discourse earns the right to be construed realistically because it meets the conditions that license realism about any discourse, that properties it represents as existing pull their weight in empirical explanations of our observations of the world. I argue that naturalism is an inadequate metaphysics of moral value, because parallel arguments (...)
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  43. Ingmar Persson (2012). Prioritarianism and Welfare Reductions. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):289-301.score: 43.0
    Derek Parfit has argued that egalitarianism is exposed to a levelling down objection because it implies, implausibly, that a change, which consists only in the better-off sinking to the level of the worse-off, is in one respect better, though it is better for nobody. He claims that, in contrast, the prioritarian view that benefits to the worse-off have greater moral weight escapes this objection. This article contends, first, that prioritarianism is equally affected by the levelling down objection as (...)
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  44. Ben Woodard (2010). Mad Speculation and Absolute Inhumanism: Lovecraft, Ligotti, and the Weirding of Philosophy. Continent 1 (1):3-13.score: 43.0
    continent. 1.1 (2011): 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...)
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  45. Robert Der Veevann (2008). Reasonable Partiality for Compatriots and the Global Responsibility Gap. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (4):413-432.score: 43.0
    According to David Miller, duties of domestic national and global justice are of equal importance, given that nationhood is both intrinsically valuable and not inherently an unjust way of excluding outsiders. The consequence of this ?split?level? view is that it may be reasonable to prioritize domestic justice in some cases, while letting demands of global justice take precedence in others, depending on a weighting model which seeks to account for the relative urgency of domestic and global claims and (...)
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  46. Wolfgang Greiner (1998). Organverteilungssysteme Im Transplantationswesen Aus Ökonomischer Sicht. Ethik in der Medizin 10 (2):64-73.score: 43.0
    Definition of the problem: Even after the new German legislation about organ donors and transplantation (“information solution”), the question of criteria for distributing the organs is still not solved. The various alternatives to solve this problem face different social acceptance and economic efficiency.Arguments: Medical criteria (e.g. HLA compatibility) and non-medical criteria (e.g. willingness to pay of the patients) are valued on the basis of generally accepted objectives (e.g. equal access to health services or low costs). As an innovative form (...)
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  47. Aaron Simmons (2007). A Critique of Mary Anne Warren's Weak Animal Rights View. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):267-278.score: 42.0
    In her book, Moral Status, Mary Anne Warren defends a comprehensive theory of the moral status of various entities. Under this theory, she argues that animals may have some moral rights but that their rights are much weaker in strength than the rights of humans, who have rights in the fullest, strongest sense. Subsequently, Warren believes that our duties to animals are far weaker than our duties to other humans. This weakness is especially evident from the fact that Warren believes (...)
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  48. Paul Bou-Habib (2011). Distributive Justice, Dignity, and the Lifetime View. Social Theory and Practice 37 (2):285-310.score: 42.0
    This paper provides a critical examination of the strongest defenses of the pure lifetime view, according to which justice requires taking only people's whole lives as relevant when assessing and establishing their distributive entitlements and obligations. The paper proposes that we reject a pure lifetime view and replace it with an alternative view, on which some time-specific considerations--that is to say, considerations about how people fare at specific points in time--have nonderivative weight in determining what our (...)
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  49. Ø Grøn (1979). The Weight of Extended Bodies in a Gravitational Field with Flat Spacetime. Foundations of Physics 9 (7-8):501-514.score: 42.0
    Einstein's gravitational field equations in empty space outside a massive plane with infinite extension give a class of solutions describing a field with flat spacetime giving neutral, freely moving particles an acceleration. This points to the necessity of defining the concept “gravitational field” not simply by the nonvanishing of the Riemann curvature tensor, but by the nonvanishing of certain elements of the Christoffel symbols, called the physical elements, or the nonvanishing of the Riemann curvature tensor. The tidal component of a (...)
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