Search results for 'ethical epistemology' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Hallvard Lillehammer (2011). The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions. Philosophy 86 (336):175-200.
    Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a (...)
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  2.  57
    David Copp (2013). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):30-74.
    (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 30-74.
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  3.  8
    Rosemarie Tong (1991). The Epistemology and Ethics of Consensus: Uses and Misuses of 'Ethical' Expertise. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (4):409-426.
    In this paper I examine the epistemology and ethics of consensus, focusing on the ways in which decision makers use/misuse ethical expertise. The major questions I raise and tentative answers I give are the following: First, are the ‘experts’ really experts? My tentative answer is that they are bona fide experts who often represent specific interest groups. Second, is the experts' authority merely epistemological or is it also ethical? My tentative answer is that the experts' authority consists (...)
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  4. Dalibor Renić (2012). Ethical & Epistemic Normativity: Lonergan & Virtue Epistemology. Marquette University Press.
     
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  5.  15
    David Ingram, Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, and Social Rights: A Discourse Ethical Contribution to Social Epistemology.
    In today’s America the persistence of crushing poverty in the midst of staggering affluence no longer incites the righteous jeremiads it once did. Resigned acceptance of this paradox is fueled by a sense that poverty lies beyond the moral and technical scope of government remediation. The failure of experts to reach agreement on the causes of poverty merely exacerbates our despair. Are the causes internal to the poor – reflecting their more or less voluntary choices? Or do they emanate from (...)
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  6.  5
    Anthony S. Cua (1990). Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology. Philosophy East and West 40 (2):266-268.
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  7.  50
    Robert Audi (1991). Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):1-24.
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  8.  16
    Edgar Valdez (2013). Ethical & Epistemic Normativity: Lonergan & Virtue Epistemology By Dalibor Renic. The Lonergan Review 4 (1):223-227.
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  9.  10
    Andrew Altman (1982). Justice, Epistemology and Ethical Compromise. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 4:99-110.
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  10.  3
    Christopher Friel (2013). Ethical & Epistemic Normativity: Lonergan & Virtue Epistemology. By Dalibor Renić. Pp. 268, Milwaukee, WI, Marquette University Press, 2012, $29.00. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 54 (5):904-905.
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  11.  6
    Albert Lefevre (1902). Epistemology and Ethical Method. Philosophical Review 11 (6):557-564.
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  12. David Copp (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):30-74.
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  13.  85
    Klemens Kappel (2002). Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):391-413.
    Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism (Audi, 1997, 1998) deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges to (...)
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  14. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, (...)
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  15. Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1069-1083.
    Here I examine the major theories of ethical intuitions, focusing on the epistemic status of this class of intuitions. We cover self-evidence theory, seeming-state theory, and some of the recent contributions from experimental philosophy.
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  16.  51
    Danny Frederick (forthcoming). Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique. Journal of Value Inquiry:1-17.
    Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid that by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. That does not avoid the problem. (...)
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  17.  94
    Gebhard Geiger (1992). Why There Are No Objective Values: A Critique of Ethical Intuitionism From an Evolutionary Point of View. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 7 (3):315-330.
    Using concepts of evolutionary game theory, this paper presents a critique of ethical intuitionism, or non-naturalism, in its cognitivist and objectivist interpretation. While epistemological considerations suggest that human rational learning through experience provides no basis for objective moral knowledge, it is argued below that modern evolutionary theory explains why this is so, i.e., why biological organisms do not evolve so as to experience objective preferences and obligations. The difference between the modes of the cognition of objective and of valuative (...)
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  18.  53
    Alison M. Jaggar (2000). Ethics Naturalized: Feminism's Contribution to Moral Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 31 (5):452-468.
  19.  60
    Garrett Cullity (1999). Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):277-294.
    Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This virtue ethical claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral (...)
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  20.  46
    Sarah Moss (forthcoming). Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
    This paper defines and defends time-slice epistemology, according to which there are no essentially diachronic norms of rationality. First I motivate and distinguish two notions of time-slice epistemology. Then I defend time-slice theories of action under indeterminacy, i.e. theories about how you should act when the outcome of your decision depends on some indeterminate claim. I raise objections to a theory of action under indeterminacy recently defended by Robbie Williams, and I propose some alternative theories in its place. (...)
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  21. Guy Axtell (2003). Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
    Luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions of both moral and epistemic evaluation. This essay examines the problem of luck as a metaphilosophical problem spanning the division between subfields in philosophy. I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields. I then focus upon Duncan Pritchard's challenge to the motivations underlying virtue epistemology, based specifically on its handling of the problem of (...)
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  22.  93
    Sabine Roeser (2006). A Particularist Epistemology: 'Affectual Intuitionism'. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 21 (1):33-44.
    Jonathan Dancy has developed a very refined theory called ethical particularism. He has argued extensively for the metaphysical part of his position. However, the accompanying epistemology is not yet clear. In this paper I will sketch a particularist epistemology that is consistent with Dancy’s particularist metaphysics, although my approach differs in certain respects from epistemological claims Dancy has made. I will defend an epistemology that states: 1. that moral knowledge is based on intuitions and 2. that (...)
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  23.  81
    Matt Stichter (2013). Virtues as Skills in Virtue Epistemology. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:333-348.
    One approach to understanding moral virtues is to compare them with practical skills, since both involve learning how to act well. This paper inquires whether this approach can be extended to intellectual virtues. The relevance of the analogy between virtues and skills for virtue epistemology can be seen in two prominent discussions of intellectual virtues and skills. Linda Zagzebski has argued that intellectual virtues can be modeled on moral virtues, and that a key component of virtue being understood as (...)
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  24.  35
    Desh Raj Sirswal (2008). Ethical Ideas in Descartes’ Philosophy. K.U. Research Journal of Arts and Humanities:89-97.
    Descartes is not well known for his contributions to ethics. Some have charged that it is a weakness of his philosophy that it focuses exclusively on metaphysics and epistemology to the exclusion of moral and political philosophy. Such criticisms rest on a misunderstanding of the broader framework of Descartes’ philosophy. Evidence of Descartes’ concern for the practical import of philosophy can be traced to his earliest writings. In agreement of wisdom that is sufficient for happiness. The Third part of (...)
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  25.  25
    Marcel Mertz (2007). Complementary and Alternative Medicine: The Challenges of Ethical Justification. [REVIEW] Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (3):329-345.
    With the prevalence of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) increasing in western societies, questions of the ethical justification of these alternative health care approaches and practices have to be addressed. In order to evaluate philosophical reasoning on this subject, it is of paramount importance to identify and analyse possible arguments for the ethical justification of CAM considering contemporary biomedical ethics as well as more fundamental philosophical aspects. Moreover, it is vital to provide adequate analytical instruments for this task, (...)
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  26.  2
    Osamu Muramoto (2014). Retrospective Diagnosis of a Famous Historical Figure: Ontological, Epistemic, and Ethical Considerations. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 9 (1):10.
    The aim of this essay is to elaborate philosophical and ethical underpinnings of posthumous diagnosis of famous historical figures based on literary and artistic products, or commonly called retrospective diagnosis. It discusses ontological and epistemic challenges raised in the humanities and social sciences, and attempts to systematically reply to their criticisms from the viewpoint of clinical medicine, philosophy of medicine, particularly the ontology of disease and the epistemology of diagnosis, and medical ethics. The ontological challenge focuses on the (...)
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  27.  6
    Samuel D. Downs, Edwin E. Gantt & James E. Faulconer (2012). Levinas, Meaning, and an Ethical Science of Psychology: Scientific Inquiry as Rupture. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):69-85.
    Much of the understanding of the nature of science in contemporary psychology is founded on a positivistic philosophy of science that cannot adequately account for meaning as experienced. The phenomenological tradition provides an alternative approach to science that is attentive to the inherent meaningfulness of human action in the world. Emmanuel Levinas argues, however, that phenomenology, at least as traditionally conceived, does not provide sufficient grounds for meaning. Levinas argues that meaning is grounded in the ethical encounter with the (...)
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  28. Earl Brink Conee (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve the problem of (...)
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  29.  69
    Robert Audi (1997). Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi, a renowned defender of the rationalist position in ethics. Taken together, the essays present a vigorous, broadly-based argument in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on moral justification and moral character. Part I details Audi's compelling moral epistemology while Part II offers a unique vision of ethical concepts and an account of moral explanation, as well as (...)
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  30.  74
    Matt Bedke (2013). 22 Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge 416.
    You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...)
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  31.  6
    Frederick Antczak (1994). Hearing Our Cassandras: Ethical Criticism and Rhetorical Receptions of Paul Ehrlich. Social Epistemology 8 (3):281 – 288.
    (1994). Hearing our cassandras: Ethical criticism and rhetorical receptions of Paul Ehrlich. Social Epistemology: Vol. 8, Public Indifference to Population Issues, pp. 281-288.
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  32.  23
    Robert Cowan, Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief (...)
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  33. William Casebeer (2003). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. MIT Press.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts (...)
     
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  34. Matt Stichter (2007). Ethical Expertise: The Skill Model of Virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):183 - 194.
    Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea that virtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which the intellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefit of this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue. This benefit, though, (...)
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  35. Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.
    The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does (...)
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  36.  87
    Robert Cowan (2015). Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1097-1116.
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief (...)
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  37. Jason Kawall (2006). On the Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer Theories. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):359 - 374.
    In this paper I attempt to defuse a set of epistemic worries commonly raised against ideal observer theories. The worries arise because of the omniscience often attributed to ideal observers -- how can we, as finite humans, ever have access to the moral judgements or reactions of omniscient beings? I argue that many of the same concerns arise with respect to other moral theories (and that these concerns do not in fact reveal genuine flaws in any of these theories), and (...)
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  38. David Copp (ed.) (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory is a major new reference work in ethical theory consisting of commissioned essays by leading moral philosophers. Ethical theories have always been of central importance to philosophy, and remain so; ethical theory is one of the most active areas of philosophical research and teaching today. Courses in ethics are taught in colleges and universities at all levels, and ethical theory is the organizing principle for all of them. The Handbook (...)
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  39.  9
    Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, Bernd Carsten Stahl & N. Ben Fairweather (2015). How to Shape a Better Future? Epistemic Difficulties for Ethical Assessment and Anticipatory Governance of Emerging Technologies. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1027-1047.
    Empirical research into the ethics of emerging technologies, often involving foresight studies, technology assessment or application of the precautionary principle, raises significant epistemological challenges by failing to explain the relative epistemic status of contentious normative claims about future states. This weakness means that it is unclear why the conclusions reached by these approaches should be considered valid, for example in anticipatory ethical assessment or governance of emerging technologies. This paper explains and responds to this problem by proposing an account (...)
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  40.  47
    Joseph Long (2014). In Defence of Cornell Realism: A Reply to Elizabeth Tropman. Theoria 80 (2):174-183.
    Cornell realists claim, among other things, that moral knowledge can be acquired in the same basic way that scientific knowledge is acquired. Recently in this journal Elizabeth Tropman has presented two arguments against this claim. In the present article, I attempt to show that the first argument attacks a straw man and the second mischaracterizes the Cornell realists' epistemology and ends up begging the question. I close by suggesting that, given Tropman's own apparent views, her objections are also probably (...)
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  41.  55
    Robert Audi (2013). Knowledge, Justification, and the Normativity of Epistemology. Res Philosophica 90 (2):127-145.
    Epistemology is sometimes said to be a normative discipline, but what this characterization means is often left unclear. This paper distinguishes two kindsof normativity and thereby provides a new way of understanding attributions of normativity. Associated with this distinction are two kinds of epistemological reflection. These are shown to be parallel to two kinds of ethical reflection. In the light of what emerges in showing these points, the paper clarifies the requirements for naturalizing epistemology, the place normativity (...)
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  42. Georges A. Legault, Johane Patenaude, Jean-Pierre Béland & Monelle Parent (2013). Nanotechnologies and Ethical Argumentation: A Philosophical Stalemate? Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):15-22.
    When philosophers participate in the interdisciplinary ethical, environmental, economic, legal, and social analysis of nanotechnologies, what is their specific contribution? At first glance, the contribution of philosophy appears to be a clarification of the various moral and ethical arguments that are commonly presented in philosophical discussion. But if this is the only contribution of philosophy, then it can offer no more than a stalemate position, in which each moral and ethical argument nullifies all the others. To provide (...)
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  43.  61
    Rachel Tillman (2013). Ethical Embodiment and Moral Reasoning: A Challenge to Peter Singer. Hypatia 28 (1):18-31.
    This paper addresses Peter Singer's claim that cognitive ability can function as a universal criterion for measuring moral worth. I argue that Singer fails to adequately represent cognitive capacity as the object of moral knowledge at stake in his theory. He thus fails to put forth credible knowledge claims, which undermines both the trustworthiness of his moral theories and the morality of the actions called for by these theories. I situate Singer's methods within feminist critiques of moral reasoning and moral (...)
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  44.  22
    Danny Frederick (2015). Book Review: Robert Audi, 'Moral Perception'. [REVIEW] Reason Papers 37 (1):164-69.
    I summarise Robert Audi's 'Moral Perception.' I concede that there is such a thing as moral perception. However, moral perceptions are culturally-relative, which refutes Audi’s claims that moral perception may ground moral knowledge and that it provides inter-subjectively accessible grounds which make ethical objectivity possible. Audi's attempt to avoid the refutation tends to convert rational disputes into ad hominem ones. I illustrate that with the example of the ethics of prostitution.
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  45.  64
    William E. Smythe & Maureen J. Murray (2000). Owning the Story: Ethical Considerations in Narrative Research. Ethics and Behavior 10 (4):311 – 336.
    This article argues that traditional, regulative principles of research ethics offer insufficient guidance for research in the narrative study of lives. These principles presuppose an implicit epistemology that conceives of research participants as data sources, a conception that is argued not tenable for narrative research. The case is made by drawing on recent discussions of research ethics in the qualitative and narrative research literature. This article shows that narrative ethics is inextricably entwined with epistemological issues--namely, issues of narrative ownership (...)
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  46.  39
    Heather Battaly (2008). Metaethics Meets Virtue Epistemology: Salvaging Disagreement About the Epistemically Thick. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):435-454.
    Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology shift the focus of evaluation from thin concepts to thick ones. Simon Blackburn has argued that a shift to thick ethical concepts dooms us to talking past one another. I contend that virtue epistemologists can answer Blackburn's objection, thus salvaging genuine disagreement about the epistemically thick. Section I introduces the standard cognitivist and non-cognitivist analyses of thick concepts. Section II argues that thick epistemic concepts are subject to combinatorial vagueness. I contend that virtue (...)
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  47.  72
    Pekka Väyrynen (2008). Slim Epistemology with a Thick Skin. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):389-412.
    The distinction between “thick” and “thin” value concepts, and its importance to ethical theory, has been an active topic in recent meta-ethics. This paper defends three claims regarding the parallel issue about thick and thin epistemic concepts. (1) Analogy with ethics offers no straightforward way to establish a good, clear distinction between thick and thin epistemic concepts. (2) Assuming there is such a distinction, there are no semantic grounds for assigning thick epistemic concepts priority over the thin. (3) Nor (...)
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  48.  20
    Jeffrey Epstein (2014). Habermas, Virtue Epistemology, and Religious Justifications in the Public Sphere. Hypatia 29 (2):422-439.
    Jürgen Habermas's recent challenge to secular citizens calling for greater inclusivity of religious justifications in the public sphere opens new epistemological debates that could benefit from the rich insights of feminist epistemologists. Despite certain theoretical tensions, there is some common ground between Habermas and recent work in feminist epistemology. Specifically, this article explores the shared interests between Habermas and one feminist theorist in particular, Miranda Fricker. I choose Fricker because her formulation of the epistemological and ethical hybrid virtues (...)
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  49.  4
    Mohammed Y. A. Rawwas, Surendra Arjoon & Yusuf Sidani (2013). An Introduction of Epistemology to Business Ethics: A Study of Marketing Middle-Managers. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 117 (3):525-539.
    A vast majority of marketing theory and research has focused on relativism and idealism in order to understand ethical behavior. However, making ethical assessments that in turn influence behavior is much more complicated than it appears. One of the most important developments in contemporary philosophy has been the renewed interest in epistemic virtue. Epistemologists contend that belief is an ethical process that is susceptible to the intellectual virtue or vice of one’s own life and personal experiences. Open-mindedness, (...)
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  50.  70
    Richard Foley, The Foundational Role of Epistemology in a General Theory of Rationality.
    A common complaint against contemporary epistemology is that its issues are too rarified and, hence, of little relevance for the everyday assessments we make of each other=s beliefs. The notion of epistemic rationality focuses on a specific goal, that of now having accurate and comprehensive beliefs, whereas our everyday assessments of beliefs are sensitive to the fact that we have an enormous variety of goals and needs, intellectual as well as nonintellectual. Indeed, our everyday assessments often have a quasi- (...) dimension; we want to know, for example, whether someone has been responsible, or at least non-negligent, in forming opinions. Nevertheless, epistemology, properly conceived, is relevant to our commonplace intellectual concerns. Epistemic rationality is an idealized notion, but its idealized character makes it suitable to serve as a theoretical anchor for other notions of rationality, including notions that are less idealized and, hence, potentially more directly relevant to our everyday assessments. (shrink)
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