Search results for 'evidence' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jacob Stegenga (forthcoming). Herding QATs: Quality Assessment Tools for Evidence in Medicine. In Huneman, Silberstein & Lambert (eds.), Herding QATs: Quality Assessment Tools for Evidence in Medicine.score: 27.0
    Medical scientists employ ‘quality assessment tools’ (QATs) to measure the quality of evidence from clinical studies, especially randomized controlled trials (RCTs). These tools are designed to take into account various methodological details of clinical studies, including randomization, blinding, and other features of studies deemed relevant to minimizing bias and error. There are now dozens available. The various QATs on offer differ widely from each other, and second-order empirical studies show that QATs have low inter-rater reliability and low inter-tool reliability. (...)
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  2. Maya J. Goldenberg (2012). Innovating Medical Knowledge: Undestanding Evidence-Based Medicine as a Socio-Medical Phenomenon. In Nikolaos Sitaras (ed.), Evidence-Based Medicine: Closer to Patients or Scientists? InTech Open Science.score: 27.0
    Because few would object to evidence-based medicine’s (EBM) principal task of basing medical decisionmaking on the most judicious and up-to-date evidence, the debate over this prolific movement may seem puzzling. Who, one may ask, could be against evidence (Carr-Hill, 2006)? Yet this question belies the sophistication of the evidence-based movement. This chapter presents the evidence-based approach as a socio-medical phenomenon and seeks to explain and negotiate the points of disagreement between supporters and detractors. This is (...)
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  3. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.score: 24.0
    In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, (...)
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  4. Thomas Kelly (2010). Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. 183--217.score: 24.0
    My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture.
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  5. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Experience and Evidence. Mind 122 (487):699-747.score: 24.0
    I argue that perceptual experience provides us with both phenomenal and factive evidence. To a first approximation, we can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. To a first approximation, we can understand factive evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment. I argue that the rational source (...)
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  6. David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.score: 24.0
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  7. Thomas D. Senor, Perception, Evidence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.score: 24.0
    In this paper I argue for a version of the Total Evidence view according to which the rational response to disagreement depends upon one's total evidence. I argue that perceptual evidence of a certain kind is significantly weightier than many other types of evidence, including testimonial. Furthermore, what is generally called "The Uniqueness Thesis" is actually a conflation of two distinct principles that I dub "Evidential Uniqueness" and "Rationality Uniqueness." The former principle is likely true but (...)
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  8. Elliott Sober (2009). Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (1):63 - 90.score: 24.0
    “Absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence” is a slogan that is popular among scientists and nonscientists alike. This article assesses its truth by using a probabilistic tool, the Law of Likelihood. Qualitative questions (“Is E evidence about H ?”) and quantitative questions (“How much evidence does E provide about H ?”) are both considered. The article discusses the example of fossil intermediates. If finding a fossil that is phenotypically intermediate between two extant species provides (...) that those species have a common ancestor, does failing to find such a fossil constitute evidence that there was no common ancestor? Or should the failure merely be chalked up to the imperfection of the fossil record? The transitivity of the evidence relation in simple causal chains provides a broader context, which leads to discussion of the fine-tuning argument, the anthropic principle, and observation selection effects. (shrink)
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  9. Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.score: 24.0
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism (...)
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  10. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (3):479 - 500.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I shall discuss a problem that arises when you try to combine an attractive account of what constitutes evidence with an independently plausible account of the kind of access we have to our evidence. According to E = K, our evidence consists of what we know. According to the principle of armchair access, we can know from the armchair what our evidence is. Combined, these claims entail that we can have armchair knowledge of (...)
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  11. Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs (forthcoming). Evil and Evidence. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.score: 24.0
    The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA, epistemic appearances, 'gratuitous' evils, 'levering' evidence, and the representativeness of goods. We aim to clarify some confusions about these notions, and also to offer a few new responses to the problem of evil.
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  12. Maya J. Goldenberg (2009). Iconoclast or Creed? Objectivism, Pragmatism, and the Hierarchy of Evidence. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (2):168-187.score: 24.0
    Because “evidence” is at issue in evidence-based medicine (EBM), the critical responses to the movement have taken up themes from post-positivist philosophy of science to demonstrate the untenability of the objectivist account of evidence. While these post-positivist critiques seem largely correct, I propose that when they focus their analyses on what counts as evidence, the critics miss important and desirable pragmatic features of the evidence-based approach. This article redirects critical attention toward EBM’s rigid hierarchy of (...)
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  13. Jonathan Matheson (2009). Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279.score: 24.0
    Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence (evidence about the character of one's evidence) made by Thomas Kelly (2005).
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  14. Yuri Cath (2012). Evidence and Intuition. Episteme 9 (4):311-328.score: 24.0
    Many philosophers accept a view according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only (...)
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  15. Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Goldman on Evidence and Reliability. In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 24.0
    Goldman, though still a reliabilist, has made some recent concessions to evidentialist epistemologies. I agree that reliabilism is most plausible when it incorporates certain evidentialist elements, but I try to minimize the evidentialist component. I argue that fewer beliefs require evidence than Goldman thinks, that Goldman should construe evidential fit in process reliabilist terms, rather than the way he does, and that this process reliabilist understanding of evidence illuminates such important epistemological concepts as propositional justification, ex ante justification, (...)
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  16. Aaron Rizzieri (2009). Evidence Does Not Equal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242.score: 24.0
    Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S ’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S ’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base (...)
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  17. John Hawthorne (2005). Knowledge and Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452–458.score: 24.0
    Most of us, tacitly or explicitly, embrace a more or less Cartesian conception of our epistemic condition. According to such a conception, "what we have to go on" in learning about the world is, on the one hand, that which is a priori accessible to us, and, on the other, the inner experiences - visual imagery, tactile sensations, recollective episodes and so on - that pop into our Carte- sian theaters. One of the central themes of Knowledge and its Limits (...)
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  18. Peter Murphy (ed.) (2003). Evidence, Proof, and Facts: A Book of Sources. New York ;Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This book is a collection of materials concerned not only with the law of evidence, but also with the logical and rhetorical aspects of proof; the epistemology of evidence as a basis for the proof of disputed facts; and scientific aspects of the subject. The editor also raises issues such as the philosophical basis for the use of evidence.
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  19. Glen I. Spielmans & Peter I. Parry (2010). From Evidence-Based Medicine to Marketing-Based Medicine: Evidence From Internal Industry Documents. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 7 (1):13-29.score: 24.0
    While much excitement has been generated surrounding evidence-based medicine, internal documents from the pharmaceutical industry suggest that the publicly available evidence base may not accurately represent the underlying data regarding its products. The industry and its associated medical communication firms state that publications in the medical literature primarily serve marketing interests. Suppression and spinning of negative data and ghostwriting have emerged as tools to help manage medical journal publications to best suit product sales, while disease mongering and market (...)
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  20. Mark Phelan (2013). Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence. Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.score: 24.0
    Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.733363.
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  21. Maya J. Goldenberg (2013). How Can Feminist Theories of Evidence Assist Clinical Reasoning and Decision-Making? Social Epistemology (TBA):1-28.score: 24.0
    While most of healthcare research and practice fully endorses evidence-based healthcare, a minority view borrows popular themes from philosophy of science like underdetermination and value-ladenness to question the legitimacy of the evidence-based movement’s philosophical underpinnings. While the feminist origins go unacknowledged, those critics adopt a feminist reading of the “gap argument” to challenge the perceived objectivism of evidence-based practice. From there, the critics seem to despair over the “subjective elements” that values introduce to clinical reasoning, demonstrating that (...)
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  22. Jacob Stegenga (2013). An Impossibility Theorem for Amalgamating Evidence. Synthese 190 (12):2391-2411.score: 24.0
    Amalgamating evidence of different kinds for the same hypothesis into an overall confirmation is analogous, I argue, to amalgamating individuals’ preferences into a group preference. The latter faces well-known impossibility theorems, most famously “Arrow’s Theorem”. Once the analogy between amalgamating evidence and amalgamating preferences is tight, it is obvious that amalgamating evidence might face a theorem similar to Arrow’s. I prove that this is so, and end by discussing the plausibility of the axioms required for the theorem.
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  23. Nancy Cartwright (2009). Evidence-Based Policy: What's to Be Done About Relevance? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (1):127 - 136.score: 24.0
    How can philosophy of science be of more practical use? One thing we can do is provide practicable advice about how to determine when one empirical claim is relevant to the truth of another; i.e., about evidential relevance. This matters especially for evidence-based policy, where advice is thin—and misleading—about how to tell what counts as evidence for policy effectiveness. This paper argues that good efficacy results (as in randomized controlled trials), which are all the rage now, are only (...)
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  24. Clayton Littlejohn (2013). No Evidence is False. Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.score: 24.0
    If evidence is propositional, is one’s evidence limited to true propositions or might false propositions constitute evidence? In this paper, I consider three recent attempts to show that there can be ‘false evidence,’ and argue that each of these attempts fails. The evidence for the thesis that evidence consists of truths is much stronger than the evidence offered in support of the theoretical assumptions that people have relied on to argue against this thesis. (...)
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  25. Heather Douglas (2012). Weighing Complex Evidence in a Democratic Society. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22 (2):139-162.score: 24.0
    Weighing complex sets of evidence (i.e., from multiple disciplines and often divergent in implications) is increasingly central to properly informed decision-making. Determining “where the weight of evidence lies” is essential both for making maximal use of available evidence and figuring out what to make of such evidence. Weighing evidence in this sense requires an approach that can handle a wide range of evidential sources (completeness), that can combine the evidence with rigor, and that can (...)
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  26. Miriam Solomon (2011). Just a Paradigm: Evidence-Based Medicine in Epistemological Context. [REVIEW] European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):451-466.score: 24.0
    Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) developed from the work of clinical epidemiologists at McMaster University and Oxford University in the 1970s and 1980s and self-consciously presented itself as a "new paradigm" called "evidence-based medicine" in the early 1990s. The techniques of the randomized controlled trial, systematic review and meta-analysis have produced an extensive and powerful body of research. They have also generated a critical literature that raises general concerns about its methods. This paper is a systematic review of the critical (...)
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  27. Jacob Stegenga (2011). Is Meta-Analysis the Platinum Standard of Evidence? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 42 (4):497-507.score: 24.0
    An astonishing volume and diversity of evidence is available for many hypotheses in the biomedical and social sciences. Some of this evidence—usually from randomized controlled trials (RCTs)—is amalgamated by meta-analysis. Despite the ongoing debate regarding whether or not RCTs are the ‘gold-standard’ of evidence, it is usually meta-analysis which is considered the best source of evidence: meta-analysis is thought by many to be the platinum standard of evidence. However, I argue that meta-analysis falls far short (...)
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  28. Hillel D. Braude (2009). Clinical Intuition Versus Statistics: Different Modes of Tacit Knowledge in Clinical Epidemiology and Evidence-Based Medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):181-198.score: 24.0
    Despite its phenomenal success since its inception in the early nineteen-nineties, the evidence-based medicine movement has not succeeded in shaking off an epistemological critique derived from the experiential or tacit dimensions of clinical reasoning about particular individuals. This critique claims that the evidence-based medicine model does not take account of tacit knowing as developed by the philosopher Michael Polanyi. However, the epistemology of evidence-based medicine is premised on the elimination of the tacit dimension from clinical judgment. This (...)
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  29. Peter J. Markie (2004). Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):530-553.score: 24.0
    How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, "[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to--being appeared to greenly, say--is evidence for the proposition that I see something green?" Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such (...)
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  30. Robert T. Pennock (1996). Naturalism, Evidence and Creationism: The Case of Phillip Johnson. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 11 (4):543-559.score: 24.0
    Phillip Johnson claims that Creationism is a better explanation of the existence and characteristics of biological species than is evolutionary theory. He argues that the only reason biologists do not recognize that Creationist's negative arguments against Darwinism have proven this is that they are wedded to a biased ideological philosophy —Naturalism — which dogmatically denies the possibility of an intervening creative god. However,Johnson fails to distinguish Ontological Naturalism from Methodological Naturalism. Science makes use of the latter and I show how (...)
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  31. Susan Haack (2009). Evidence and Inquiry: A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Epistemology. Prometheus Books.score: 24.0
    Introduction -- Foundationalism versus coherentism : a dichotomy disclaimed -- Foundationalism undermined -- Coherentism discomposed -- Foundherentism articulated -- The evidence of the senses : refutations and conjectures -- Naturalism disambiguated -- The evidence against reliabilism -- Revolutionary scientism subverted -- Vulgar pragmatism : an unedifying prospect -- Foundherentism ratified -- Selected essays -- "Know" is just a four-letter word -- Knowledge and propaganda : reflections of an old feminist -- "The ethics of belief" reconsidered -- Epistemology legalized (...)
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  32. Jakob Hohwy (2004). Evidence, Explanation, and Experience: On the Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 101 (5):242-254.score: 24.0
    Creatures that have different physical realizations than human beings may or may not be conscious. Ned Block’s ‘harder problem of consciousness’ is that naturalistic phenomenal realists have no conception of a rational ground for belief that they have or have not discovered consciousness in such a creature. Drawing on the notion of inference to the best explanation, it appears the arguments to these conclusions beg the question and ignore that explanation may be a guide to discovery. Thus, best explanation can (...)
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  33. Boaz Miller (forthcoming). Catching the WAVE: The Weight-Adjusting Account of Values and Evidence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.score: 24.0
    It is commonly argued that values “fill the logical gap” of underdetermination of theory by evidence, namely, values affect our choice between two or more theories that fit the same evidence. The underdetermination model, however, does not exhaust the roles values play in evidential reasoning. I introduce WAVE – a novel account of the logical relations between values and evidence. WAVE states that values influence evidential reasoning by adjusting evidential weights. I argue that the weight-adjusting role of (...)
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  34. Peter Achinstein (2001). The Book of Evidence. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference (...)
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  35. Timothy Williamson (1997). Knowledge as Evidence. Mind 106 (424):1-25.score: 24.0
    It is argued that a subject's evidence consists of all and only the propositions that the subject knows.
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  36. Simon Burgess (2012). Newcomb's Problem and its Conditional Evidence: A Common Cause of Confusion. Synthese 184 (3):319-339.score: 24.0
    This paper aims to make three contributions to decision theory. First there is the hope that it will help to re-establish the legitimacy of the problem, pace various recent analyses provided by Maitzen and Wilson, Slezak and Priest. Second, after pointing out that analyses of the problem have generally relied upon evidence that is conditional on the taking of one particular option, this paper argues that certain assumptions implicit in those analyses are subtly flawed. As a third contribution, the (...)
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  37. Aaron Meskin & Jonathan Cohen (2008). Photographs as Evidence. In Scott Walden (ed.), Photography and Philosophy: Essays on the Pencil of Nature. Blackwell.score: 24.0
    Photographs furnish evidence. This is true in both formal and informal contexts. The use of photographs as legal evidence goes back to the very earliest days of photography, and they have been used in American trials since around the time of the Civil War. Photographs may also serve as historical evidence (for example, about the Civil War). And they serve in informal contexts as evidence about all sorts of things, such as what we and our loved (...)
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  38. William L. Twining (2006/1994). Rethinking Evidence: Exploratory Essays. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    The Law of Evidence has traditionally been perceived as a dry, highly technical, and mysterious subject. This book argues that problems of evidence in law are closely related to the handling of evidence in other kinds of practical decision-making and other academic disciplines, that it is closely related to common sense and that it is an interesting, lively and accessible subject. These essays develop a readable, coherent historical and theoretical perspective about problems of proof, evidence, and (...)
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  39. Charlotte Werndl (2013). On Choosing Between Deterministic and Indeterministic Models: Underdetermination and Indirect Evidence. Synthese 190 (12):2243-2265.score: 24.0
    There are results which show that measure-theoretic deterministic models and stochastic models are observationally equivalent. Thus there is a choice between a deterministic and an indeterministic model and the question arises: Which model is preferable relative to evidence? If the evidence equally supports both models, there is underdetermination. This paper first distinguishes between different kinds of choice and clarifies the possible resulting types of underdetermination. Then a new answer is presented: the focus is on the choice between a (...)
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  40. Shannon Vallor (2009). The Fantasy of Third-Person Science: Phenomenology, Ontology and Evidence. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):1-15.score: 24.0
    Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states. By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue (...)
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  41. Simon Evnine, Old Evidence Again.score: 24.0
    A critique of Mark Kaplan's attempt to solve the problem of old evidence by restricting the principle of when something is evidence explicitly to cases in which we are less than certain of it.
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  42. Andrew Jordan (2014). On Reasons, Evidence of Oughts, and Morally Fitting Motives. Philosophia 42 (2):391-403.score: 24.0
    In a series of papers, Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star defend the following general account of reasons: R: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ iff F is evidence that an agent ought to Φ.In this paper, I argue that the reasons as evidence view will run afoul of a motivational constraint on moral reasons, and that this is a powerful reason to reject the reasons as evidence view. The motivational constraint (...)
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  43. William L. Twining (1985). Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore. Stanford University Press.score: 24.0
    The Rationalist Tradition of evidence scholarship1 The history of the law of evidence is the history of a series of largely isolated responses to particular ...
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  44. Maya J. Goldenberg (2010). Perspectives on Evidence-Based Healthcare for Women. Journal of Women's Health 19 (7):1235-1238.score: 24.0
    We live in an age of evidence-based healthcare, where the concept of evidence has been avidly and often uncritically embraced as a symbol of legitimacy, truth, and justice. By letting the evidence dictate healthcare decision making from the bedside to the policy level, the normative claims that inform decision making appear to be negotiated fairly—without subjectivity, prejudice, or bias. Thus, the term ‘‘evidence-based’’ is typically read in the health sciences as the empirically adequate standard of reasonable (...)
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  45. John Worrall (2010). Evidence: Philosophy of Science Meets Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):356-362.score: 24.0
    Obviously medicine should be evidence-based. The issues lie in the details: what exactly counts as evidence? Do certain kinds of evidence carry more weight than others? (And if so why?) And how exactly should medicine be based on evidence? When it comes to these details, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has got itself into a mess – or so it will be argued. In order (...)
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  46. James V. Allen (2001). Inference From Signs: Ancient Debates About the Nature of Evidence. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Original and penetrating, this book investigates of the notion of inference from signs, which played a central role in ancient philosophical and scientific method. It examines an important chapter in ancient epistemology: the debates about the nature of evidence and of the inferences based on it--or signs and sign-inferences as they were called in antiquity. As the first comprehensive treatment of this topic, it fills an important gap in the histories of science and philosophy.
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  47. Damien Fennell & Nancy Cartwright (2010). Does Roush Show That Evidence Should Be Probable? Synthese 175 (3):289 - 310.score: 24.0
    This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush's (Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence and science, 2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We suggest that Roush treats not one sense of 'evidence' but three: relevance, leveraging and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is sufficient (...)
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  48. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2013). Empirical Evidence Claims Are a Priori. Synthese 190 (14):2821-2834.score: 24.0
    This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues (...)
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  49. James Hawthorne (2004). Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.score: 24.0
    Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension seems very natural, but there are other plausible ways to extend Bayesian updating that maintain order-independence. (...)
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  50. Eleonora Montuschi (2009). Questions of Evidence in Evidence-Based Policy. Axiomathes 19 (4):425-439.score: 24.0
    Evidence-based approaches to policy-making are growing in popularity. A generally embraced view is that with the appropriate evidence at hand, decision and policy making will be optimal, legitimate and publicly accountable. In practice, however, evidence-based policy making is constrained by a variety of problems of evidence. Some of these problems will be explored in this article, in the context of the debates on evidence from which they originate. It is argued that the source of much (...)
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