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Bibliography: Evidentialism in Epistemology
  1. Higher-Order Evidence Evidentialism (forthcoming). Richard Feldman. Episteme.score: 30.0
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  2. Guy Axtell (2011). From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    Evidentialism as its leading proponents describe it has two distinct senses, these being evidentialism as a conceptual analysis of epistemic justification, and as a prescriptive ethics of belief—an account of what one ‘ought to believe’ under different epistemic circumstances. These two senses of evidentialism are related, but in the work of leading evidentialist philosophers, in ways that I think are deeply problematic. Although focusing on Richard Feldman’s ethics of belief, this chapter is critical of evidentialism in (...)
     
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  3. Anthony Robert Booth (2007). The Two Faces of Evidentialism. Erkenntnis 67 (3):401 - 417.score: 24.0
    In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle (...)
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  4. Dorit Ganson (2008). Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.score: 24.0
    Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to (...)
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  5. Richard Amesbury (2008). The Virtues of Belief: Toward a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):25 - 37.score: 24.0
    William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name "ethics of belief" can (...)
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  6. Chris Tucker (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology. In Kelly James Clark & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford University Press. 52--73.score: 24.0
    Phenomenal conservatism holds, roughly, that if it seems to S that P, then S has evidence for P. I argue for two main conclusions. The first is that phenomenal conservatism is better suited than is proper functionalism to explain how a particular type of religious belief formation can lead to non-inferentially justified religious beliefs. The second is that phenomenal conservatism makes evidence so easy to obtain that the truth of evidentialism would not be a significant obstacle to justified religious (...)
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  7. Andrew E. Reisner (forthcoming). A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism. Inquiry:1-9.score: 24.0
    This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.
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  8. Tommaso Piazza (2009). Evidentialism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):311 - 324.score: 24.0
    Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one’s personal data or beliefs in one’s area of expertise, intuitively amount to knowledge, and so are justified. This uncontroversial datum arguably tells against evidentialism, the position according to which a belief is justified if it fits the available evidence: stored beliefs are normally not sustained by one’s available evidence. Conee and Feldman have tried to meet this potential objection by relaxing the notion of available evidence. According to their proposal, stored beliefs are (...)
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  9. Masahiro Yamada (2010). A New Argument for Evidentialism? Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.score: 24.0
    In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
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  10. Dylan Dodd (2012). Evidentialism and Skeptical Arguments. Synthese 189 (2):337-352.score: 24.0
    Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (‘skepticism’) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world – e.g., my current belief that I have hands – aren’t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism – the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument – from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it is clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than (...)
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  11. David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.score: 24.0
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of (...)
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  12. Benjamin Bayer, An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Possibility.score: 24.0
    Michael Huemer (2007) has articulated a provocative account of the concept of "epistemic possibility" which he hopes will explicate the explanatory value of the concept while also lending support to a broader anti-skeptical strategy. While I think his account has a number of advantages, many of which Huemer himself identifies, there are also significant disadvantages which should prompt us to seek an alternative. In this paper I describe an alternative which builds on some of the better features of Huemer's account, (...)
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  13. Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.score: 24.0
    Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that input, (...)
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  14. Bob Beddor (forthcoming). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies:1-22.score: 24.0
    This paper explores what happens if we construe evidentialism as a thesis about the metaphysical grounds of justification. According to grounding evidentialism, facts about what a subject is justified in believing are grounded in facts about that subject’s evidence. At first blush, grounding evidentialism appears to enjoy advantages over a more traditional construal of evidentialism as a piece of conceptual analysis. However, appearances are deceiving. I argue that grounding evidentialists are unable to provide a satisfactory story (...)
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  15. Andrew Reisner (2007). Evidentialism and the Numbers Game. Theoria 73 (4):304-316.score: 21.0
  16. Daniel M. Mittag, Evidentialism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 21.0
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  17. L. Leydon-Hardy (2012). Evidentialism and its Discontents * Edited by Trent Dougherty. Analysis 72 (4):852-854.score: 21.0
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  18. Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.score: 18.0
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to (...)
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  19. Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.score: 18.0
    When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation 'transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be (...)
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  20. Juan Comesaña (2010). Evidentialist Reliabilism. Noûs 44 (4):571-600.score: 18.0
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
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  21. Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view ofjustification.
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  22. Alvin I. Goldman, Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.score: 18.0
    For most of their respective existences, reliabilism and evidentialism (that is, process reliabilism and mentalist evidentialism) have been rivals. They are generally viewed as incompatible, even antithetical, theories of justification.1 But a few people are beginning to re-think this notion. Perhaps an ideal theory would be a hybrid of the two, combining the best elements of each theory. Juan Comesana (forthcoming) takes this point of view and constructs a position called “Evidentialist Reliabilism.” He tries to show how each (...)
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  23. Earl Brink Conee (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic justification, it helps to resolve (...)
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  24. Scott F. Aikin (2008). Evidentialism and James' Argument From Friendship. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):173-180.score: 18.0
    William James' main argument in “The Will to Believe” against evidentialism is that there are facts that cannot come to be without a preliminary faith in their coming. James primarily makes this case with the argument from friendship. I will critically present James' argument from friendship and show that the argument does not yield a counter-example to evidentialism and is in the end unsound.
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  25. Jason Baehr (2009). Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567.score: 18.0
    Evidentialists maintain that epistemic justification is strictly a function of the evidence one has at the moment of belief. I argue here, on the basis of two kinds of cases, that the possession of good evidence is an insuflicient basis for justification. I go on to propose a modification of evidentialism according to which justification sometimes requires intellectually virtuous agency. The discussion thereby underscores an important point of contact between evidentialism and the more recent enterprise of virtue epistemology.
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  26. Rob Lovering (2010). The Problem of the Theistic Evidentialist Philosophers. Philo 13 (2):185-200.score: 18.0
    That theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make the evidential case for theism to atheistic evidentialist philosophers raises a problem—a question to be answered. I argue here that—of the most plausible possible solutions to this problem—each is either inadequate or, when adequate, in conflict with the theistic evidentialist philosophers’ defining beliefs. I conclude that the problem of the theistic evidentialist philosophers—the question of why theistic evidentialist philosophers have failed to make their case to atheistic evidentialist philosophers—is a problem for theistic (...)
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  27. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism? Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.score: 18.0
    Nishi Shah has recently argued that transparency in doxastic deliberation supports a strict version of evidentialism about epistemic reasons. I argue that Shah's argument relies on a principle that is incompatible with the strict version of evidentialism Shah wishes to advocate.
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  28. Anthony Brueckner (2013). Bootstrapping, Evidentialist Internalism, and Rule Circularity. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):591-597.score: 18.0
    Bootstrapping, evidentialist internalism, and rule circularity Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-7 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9876-9 Authors Anthony Brueckner, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  29. Inga Nayding (2011). Conceptual Evidentialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):39-65.score: 18.0
    Two recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism? The pragmatist traditionally conceived belief through its motivational role. Therefore, when confronted with conceptual evidentialism, the pragmatist should cede the term ‘belief,’ but insist (...)
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  30. Ted Poston (2007). Foundational Evidentialism and the Problem of Scatter. Abstracta 3 (2):89-106.score: 18.0
    This paper addresses the scatter problem for foundational evidentialism. Reflection on the scatter problem uncovers significant epistemological lessons. The scatter problem is evaluated in connection with Ernest Sosa’s use of the problem as an argument against foundational evidentialism. Sosa’s strategy is to consider a strong intuition in favor of internalism—the new evil demon problem, and then illustrate how a foundational evidentialist account of the new evil demon problem succumbs to the scatter problem. The goal in this paper is (...)
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  31. John Zeis (2010). Evidentialism Versus Faith. Social Epistemology 24 (1):1 – 13.score: 18.0
    In his Epistula , Saint Augustine seems to suggest an epistemic position that is antithetical to an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. However, I think it can be shown that even if evidentialism is taken to be the preferred method of epistemic justification, an epistemic position that incorporates a faith which is grounded in the truth and produces knowledge is epistemologically justified. Evidentialist objections to such a faith-grounded position founder on principles that even the staunchest defenders of an evidentialist (...)
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  32. Horace Fairlamb (2010). Sanctifying Evidentialism. Religious Studies 46 (1):61-76.score: 18.0
    In contemporary epistemology of religion, evidentialism has been included in a wider critique of traditional foundationalist theories of rational belief. To show the irrelevance of evidentialism, some critics have offered alternatives to the foundationalist approach, prominent among which is Alvin Plantinga's 'warrant as proper function'. But the connection between evidentialism and foundationalism has been exaggerated, and criticisms of traditional foundationalism do not discredit evidentialism in principle. Furthermore, appeals to warranted belief imply that the heart of (...) — the proportioning of belief to rational grounds — has not been discredited but assimilated to the reliabilist view of knowledge by expanding the concept of evidence to include religious experience. In the end, the warrant concept extends the reach of evidentialism, thereby enhancing rather than diminishing its relevance for rational belief. (shrink)
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  33. Scott F. Aikin (2006). Modest Evidentialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):327-343.score: 18.0
    Evidentialism is the view that subjects should believe neither more than nor contrary to what their current evidence supports. I will critically present two arguments for the view. A common source of resistance to evidentialism is that there are intuitive cases where subjects should believe contrary to their evidence. I will present modest evidentialism as the view that subjects should believe in accord with what their evidence supports, but that this norm may be overridden under certain conditions. (...)
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  34. T. Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. (...)
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  35. Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (2005). Some Virtues of Evidentialism. Veritas 50 (4).score: 18.0
    O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemológicas de uma forma que (...)
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  36. John Zeis (2006). Evidentialism and Faith. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:185-200.score: 18.0
    Evidentialism is generally taken to be a position which is not friendly to a religious epistemology. However, in this paper, I will argue for a religious epistemology which is compatible with fundamental tenets of an evidentialist position on epistemic justification. It is a position which entails both a “will to believe” which goes beyond the standard evidentialist principles governing the appropriate doxastic attitude towards a proposition, but nonetheless satisfies epistemic principles at the basis of an evidentialist position on justification. (...)
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  37. Duncan Pritchard (2011). Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  38. Michael Bergmann (2011). Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 123.score: 18.0
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  39. Trent Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. (...)
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  40. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). And Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 254.score: 18.0
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  41. Kevin McCain (2014). Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification. Routledge.score: 18.0
    Evidentialism is a popular theory of epistemic justification, yet, as early proponents of the theory Earl Conee and Richard Feldman admit, there are many elements that must be developed before Evidentialism can provide a full account of epistemic justification, or well-founded belief. It is the aim of this book to provide the details that are lacking; here McCain moves past Evidentialism as a mere schema by putting forward and defending a full-fledged theory of epistemic justification. In this (...)
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  42. Daniel M. Mittag (2014). A Meno Problem for Evidentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):250-266.score: 18.0
    The original Meno problem is to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In this paper I argue that evidentialists face an additional Meno problem, a Meno problem that, to date, no evidentialist has considered. Specifically, evidentialists must account for the additional epistemic value of a doxastically justified doxastic attitude as compared to a doxastic attitude that is merely propositionally justified. I consider the nature of the problem facing evidentialism and critically discuss two attempts to account (...)
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  43. John Greco (2011). 10.1 Evidentialism About Knowledge. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 167.score: 18.0
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  44. Gordon D. Kaufman (1989). Evidentialism”. Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):35-46.score: 18.0
    Current discussions of “evidentialism” seem to presuppose essentially traditional theistic conceptions and formulations. For many theologians. however, these have become problematic because of (a) the rise of a new consciousness of the significance of religiouspluralism; (b) the emergence of theories about the ways in which our symbolic frames of orientation shape all our experiencing and thinking; (c) a growing awareness that significant responsibility for some of the major evils of the twentieth century must be laid to ourreligious traditions. Since (...)
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  45. Keith DeRose (2011). Questioning Evidentialism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  46. Richard Fumerton (2011). Evidentialism and Truth. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  47. Alvin I. Goldman (2011). Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
  48. John Greco (2011). Evidentialism About Knowledge. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  49. Keith Lehrer (2011). Evidentialism and the Paradox of Parity. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  50. Matthias Steup (2011). Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
     
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