Search results for 'evolutionary dynamics' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  49
    Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (1):177 - 191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  2.  6
    Timo Maran (2015). Scaffolding and Mimicry: A Semiotic View of the Evolutionary Dynamics of Mimicry Systems. Biosemiotics 8 (2):211-222.
    The article discusses evolutionary aspects of mimicry from a semiotic viewpoint. The concept of semiotic scaffolding is used for this approach, and its relations with the concepts of exaptation and semiotic co-option are explained. Different dimensions of scaffolding are brought out as ontogenetic, evolutionary, physiological and cognitive. These dimensions allow for interpreting mimicry as a system that scaffolds itself. With the help of a number of mimicry cases, e.g. butterfly eyespots, brood parasitism, and plant mimesis, the evolutionary (...)
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  3.  18
    M. Huttegger Simon, Rory Smead Brian Skyrms & J. S. Zollman Kevin (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. Synthese 172 (1).
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  4.  1
    Martin Lockley (2010). The Evolutionary Dynamics of Consciousness: An Integration of Eastern and Western Holistic Paradigms. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):9-10.
    Gebserian consciousness structures as expressed in human culture are readily understood as analogous to developmental dynamics in holistic biology, and eastern praxis and philosophy. Probably the most integral and fruitful western paradigm of whole-organism biology is that carefully developed in the Goethean tradition to incorporate an understanding of consciousness. This tradition profoundly understands our early childhood through adult development as a dynamic organic process in time, thus integrating the study of heterochrony and chronobiology with morphology, physiology and consciousness. In (...)
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  5.  4
    William H. Sandholm (2010). Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. The MIT Press.
    A systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and unified overview of evolutionary game theory.
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  6.  41
    Robert A. Skipper Jr (2006). Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics: Drift Versus Draft. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):655-665.
    In a small handful of papers in theoretical population genetics, John Gillespie (2000a, 2000b, 2001) argues that a new stochastic process he calls "genetic draft" is evolutionarily more significant than genetic drift. This case study of chance in evolution explores Gillespie's proposed stochastic evolutionary force and sketches the implications of Gillespie's argument for philosophers' explorations of genetic drift.
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  7.  33
    Robert Skipper (2006). Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics: Drift Versus Draft. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):655-665.
    In a small handful of papers in theoretical population genetics, John Gillespie argues that a new stochastic process he calls "genetic draft" is evolutionarily more significant than genetic drift. This case study of chance in evolution explores Gillespie's proposed stochastic evolutionary force and sketches the implications of Gillespie's argument for philosophers' explorations of genetic drift.
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  8.  3
    Francisco Franchetti & William H. Sandholm (2013). An Introduction to Dynamo: Diagrams for Evolutionary Game Dynamics. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 8 (2):167-178.
    Dynamo: Diagrams for Evolutionary Game Dynamics is free, open-source software used to create phase diagrams and other images related to dynamical systems from evolutionary game theory. We describe how to use the software’s default settings to generate phase diagrams quickly and easily. We then explain how to take advantage of the software’s intermediate and advanced features to create diagrams that highlight the key properties of the dynamical system under study. Sample code and output are provided to help (...)
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  9.  1
    Michael Doebeli (2012). Adaptive Dynamics: A Framework for Modeling the Long-Term Evolutionary Dynamics of Quantitative Traits. In E. Svensson & R. Calsbeek (eds.), The Adaptive Landscape in Evolutionary Biology. OUP Oxford 227.
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  10. Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin J. S. Zollman (2010). Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling. Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
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  11.  5
    John Maynard Smith, Edward J. Feil & Noel H. Smith (2000). Population Structure and Evolutionary Dynamics of Pathogenic Bacteria. Bioessays 22 (12):1115-1122.
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  12.  16
    Ruud Koopmans (2004). Movements and Media: Selection Processes and Evolutionary Dynamics in the Public Sphere. Theory and Society 33 (3/4):367-391.
  13.  5
    Carlos M. Parra & Masakazu Yano (2006). Evolutionary Dynamics of Knowledge. Complexity 11 (5):12-19.
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  14.  6
    Alexander Spradling (1993). Evolutionary Dynamics in Societal Development. World Futures 36 (2):203-210.
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  15. Philip V. Fellman, Roxana Wright & Justus Oguntuase (forthcoming). The Evolutionary Dynamics of Technology Replacement. Complexity.
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  16.  4
    C. Kello (2004). Characterizing the Evolutionary Dynamics of Language. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):392-394.
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  17.  5
    S. Balaji & L. Aravind (2007). The Two Faces of Short‐Range Evolutionary Dynamics of Regulatory Modes in Bacterial Transcriptional Regulatory Networks. Bioessays 29 (7):625-629.
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  18.  30
    Rob Boyd, Evolutionary Dynamics of the Continuous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
    The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been widely used in the biological and social sciences to model dyadic cooperation. While most of this work has focused on the discrete prisoner’s dilemma, in which actors choose between cooperation and defection, there has been some analysis of the continuous IPD, in which actors can choose any level of cooperation from zero to one. Here, we analyse a model of the continuous IPD with a limited strategy set, and show that a generous strategy (...)
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  19.  6
    J. McKenzie Alexander, Marc Ebner & Richard Watson, Co-Evolutionary Dynamics on a Deformable Landscape.
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  20. Erwin Diener (1988). C. Dyke, Evolutionary Dynamics of Complex Systems: A Study in Biosocial Complexity Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 8 (12):477-480.
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  21.  2
    Don Ross (2007). Game Theory as Mathematics for Biology: Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games Ross Cressman Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003 (330 Pp; $48.00 Hbk; ISBN 0262033054); Moral Sentiments and Material Interests Herbert Gintis , Samuel Bowles , Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr , Eds Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005 (416 Pp; $50.00 Hbk; ISBN 0262072521). [REVIEW] Biological Theory 2 (1):104-107.
  22. C. Dyke (1988). The Evolutionary Dynamics of Complex Systems. Oxford U.P..
  23. U. Wilensky & M. Novak (2010). Understanding Evolution as an Emergent Process: Learning with Agent-Based Models of Evolutionary Dynamics. In Roger S. Taylor & Michel Ferrari (eds.), Epistemology and Science Education: Understanding the Evolution Vs. Intelligent Design Controversy. Routledge
     
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  24.  9
    Brian Skyrms (1992). Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:374-394.
    This paper discusses the explanatory significance of the equilibrium concept in the context of an example of extremely complicated dynamical behavior. In particular, numerical evidence is presented for the existence of chaotic dynamics on a "strange attractor" in the evolutionary game dynamics introduced by Taylor and Jonker [also known as the "replicator dynamics"]. This phenomenon is present already in four strategy evolutionary games where the dynamics takes place in a simplex in three dimensional space-the (...)
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  25.  57
    Elisabeth A. Lloyd (2000). Groups on Groups: Some Dynamics and Possible Resolution of the Units of Selection Debates in Evolutionary Biology. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 15 (3):389-401.
    David Hull's analysis of conceptual change in science, as presentedin his book, Science as a Process (1988), provides a useful framework for understanding one of the scientific controversies in which he actively and constructively intervened, the units of selectiondebates in evolutionary biology. What follows is a brief overview ofthose debates and some reflections on them.
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  26.  6
    Joseph A. Marsh & Sarah A. Teichmann (2014). Parallel Dynamics and Evolution: Protein Conformational Fluctuations and Assembly Reflect Evolutionary Changes in Sequence and Structure. Bioessays 36 (2):209-218.
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  27.  17
    Seth Bullock & Mark A. Bedau, Exploring the Dynamics of Adaptation with Evolutionary Activity Plots.
    Evolutionary activity statistics and their visualization are introduced, and their motivation is explained. Examples of their use are described, and their strengths and limitations are discussed. References to more extensive or general accounts of these techniques are provided.
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  28.  3
    Gabriel Dover (2000). How Genomic and Developmental Dynamics Affect Evolutionary Processes. Bioessays 22 (12):1153-1159.
  29.  6
    Ezio M. Insinna (1998). 11/L Nonlinear Dynamics in the Photoreceptor of the Unicellular Alga Euglena Gmcilis: An Application to the Evolutionary Aspects of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Ii. MIT Press 2--407.
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  30.  5
    Jeffrey Ihara (1999). Darwinian Dynamics: Evolutionary Transitions in Fitness and Individuality by Richard E. Michod. Complexity 5 (1):42-43.
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  31. P. S. Timiras (2002). Darwinian Dynamics: Evolutionary Transitions in Fitness and Individuality. By Richard E. Michod. The European Legacy 7 (4):532-532.
     
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  32.  27
    Brian Skyrms (1992). Chaos in Game Dynamics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (2):111-130.
    Two examples demonstrate the possibility of extremely complicated non-convergent behavior in evolutionary game dynamics. For the Taylor-Jonker flow, the stable orbits for three strategies were investigated by Zeeman. Chaos does not occur with three strategies. This papers presents numerical evidence that chaotic dynamics on a strange attractor does occur with four strategies. Thus phenomenon is closely related to known examples of complicated behavior in Lotka-Volterra ecological models.
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  33.  8
    Erika G. Schielke, Eric P. Palkovacs & David M. Post (2011). Eco-Evolutionary Feedbacks Drive Niche Differentiation in the Alewife. Biological Theory 6 (3):211-219.
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  34.  23
    Anya Plutynski (2006). Strategies of Model Building in Population Genetics. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):755-764.
    In 1966, Richard Levins argued that there are different strategies in model building in population biology. In this paper, I reply to Orzack and Sober’s (1993) critiques of Levins, and argue that his views on modeling strategies apply also in the context of evolutionary genetics. In particular, I argue that there are different ways in which models are used to ask and answer questions about the dynamics of evolutionary change, prospectively and retrospectively, in classical versus molecular (...) genetics. Further, I argue that robustness analysis is a tool for, if not confirmation, then something near enough, in this discipline. (shrink)
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  35.  16
    Sara Green, Melinda Fagan & Johannes Jaeger (2015). Explanatory Integration Challenges in Evolutionary Systems Biology. Biological Theory 10 (1):18-35.
    Evolutionary systems biology aims to integrate methods from systems biology and evolutionary biology to go beyond the current limitations in both fields. This article clarifies some conceptual difficulties of this integration project, and shows how they can be overcome. The main challenge we consider involves the integration of evolutionary biology with developmental dynamics, illustrated with two examples. First, we examine historical tensions between efforts to define general evolutionary principles and articulation of detailed mechanistic explanations of (...)
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  36.  7
    Hannah Rubin (2016). The Phenotypic Gambit: Selective Pressures and ESS Methodology in Evolutionary Game Theory. Biology and Philosophy 31 (4):551-569.
    The ‘phenotypic gambit,’ the assumption that we can ignore genetics and look at the fitness of phenotypes to determine the expected evolutionary dynamics of a population, is often used in evolutionary game theory. However, as this paper will show, an overlooked genotype to phenotype map can qualitatively affect evolution in ways the phenotypic approach cannot predict or explain. This gives us reason to believe that, even in the long-term, correspondences between phenotypic predictions and dynamical outcomes are not (...)
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  37.  18
    Roland Mühlenbernd (2011). Learning with Neighbours. Synthese 183 (S1):87-109.
    I present a game-theoretical multi-agent system to simulate the evolutionary process responsible for the pragmatic phenomenon division of pragmatic labour (DOPL), a linguistic convention emerging from evolutionary forces. Each agent is positioned on a toroid lattice and communicates via signaling games , where the choice of an interlocutor depends on the Manhattan distance between them. In this framework I compare two learning dynamics: reinforcement learning (RL) and belief learning (BL). An agent’s experiences from previous plays influence his (...)
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  38.  26
    Till Grüne-Yanoff (2011). Evolutionary Game Theory, Interpersonal Comparisons and Natural Selection: A Dilemma. Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):637-654.
    When social scientists began employing evolutionary game theory (EGT) in their disciplines, the question arose what the appropriate interpretation of the formal EGT framework would be. Social scientists have given different answer, of which I distinguish three basic kinds. I then proceed to uncover the conceptual tension between the formal framework of EGT, its application in the social sciences, and these three interpretations. First, I argue that EGT under the biological interpretation has a limited application in the social sciences, (...)
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  39.  21
    Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews (2005). No Switchbacks: Rethinking Aspiration-Based Dynamics in the Ultimatum Game. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 58 (4):351-385.
    Aspiration-based evolutionary dynamics have recently been used to model the evolution of fair play in the ultimatum game showing that incredible threats to reject low offers persist in equilibrium. We focus on two extensions of this analysis: we experimentally test whether assumptions about agent motivations (aspiration levels) and the structure of the game (binary strategy space) reflect actual play, and we examine the problematic assumption embedded in the standard replicator dynamic that unhappy agents who switch strategies may return (...)
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  40.  3
    Klaus Jaffe (2001). On the Relative Importance of Haplo-Diploidy, Assortative Mating and Social Synergy on the Evolutionary Emergence of Social Behavior. Acta Biotheoretica 49 (1):29-42.
    Advances in multiagent simulation techniques make it possible to study more realistic dynamics of complex systems and allow evolutionary theories to be tested. Here I use simulations to assess the relative importance of reproductive systems (haplodiploidy vs. diploidy), mate selection (assortative mating vs. random mating) and social economics (pay-off matrices of evolutionary games) in the evolutionary dynamics leading to the emergence of social cooperation in the provision of parental care. The simulations confirm that haplo-diploid organisms (...)
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  41. Cristina Bicchieri (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press.
    In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we (...)
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  42.  10
    Leonard Katz (ed.) (2000). Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives. Imprint Academic.
    Four principal papers and a total of 43 peer commentaries on the evolutionary origins of morality. To what extent is human morality the outcome of a continuous development from motives, emotions and social behaviour found in nonhuman animals? Jerome Kagan, Hans Kummer, Peter Railton and others discuss the first principal paper by primatologists Jessica Flack and Frans de Waal. The second paper, by cultural anthropologist Christopher Boehm, synthesizes social science and biological evidence to support his theory of how our (...)
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  43.  25
    Werner Güth, Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels (2007). An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets. Theory and Decision 63 (3):265-282.
    Applying an evolutionary framework, we investigate how a reputation mechanism and a buyer insurance (as used on Internet market platforms such as eBay) interact to promote trustworthiness and trust in markets with moral hazard problems. Our analysis suggests that the costs involved in giving reliable feedback determine the gains from trade that can be obtained in equilibrium. Buyer insurance, on the other hand, can affect the trading dynamics and equilibrium selection. We find that, under reasonable conditions, buyer insurance (...)
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  44.  13
    Fabrizio Germano (2007). Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games. Theory and Decision 62 (4):311-333.
    The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the “folk results” of evolutionary game theory, typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies, carry over to the present environments. The results are also related to some recent experiments on rules and games.
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  45.  17
    Donald S. Borrett, Saad Khan, Cynthia Lam, Danni Li, Hoa B. Nguyen & Hon C. Kwan (2006). Evolutionary Autonomous Agents and the Naturalization of Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):351-363.
    The phenomenological goal of grounding the content of conceptual thought in the background understanding of everyday, skillful coping was approached using evolutionary autonomous agent methodology. The behavior of an EAA evolved to perform a specified motor task was identified with skillful coping. Changes in the dynamics of the EAA controller occurred when the EAA encountered an unexpected obstacle with loss of longer time scale components in its hierarchical temporal organization. These temporal changes are consistent with the phenomenological changes (...)
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  46.  23
    Stefan Artmann (2004). Four Principles of Evolutionary Pragmatics in Jacob's Philosophy of Modern Biology. Axiomathes 14 (4):381-395.
    The French molecular biologist François Jacob outlined a theory of evolution as tinkering. From a methodological point of view, his approach can be seen as a biologic specification of the relation between laws, describing coherently the dynamics of a system, and contingent boundary conditions on this dynamics. From a semiotic perspective, tinkering is a pragmatic concept well-known from the information-theoretic anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss. In idealized contrast to an engineer, the tinkerer has to accept the concrete restrictions on (...)
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  47.  4
    Roberta Dreon (2013). What is Evolutionary Aesthetics for? Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (2):95-111.
    What is evolutionary aesthetics for? This paper investigates whether and in what way it may be useful to develop a conception of artistic practices as culturally differentiated behaviours in response to our vital needs, without resorting to a reductionist and substantial conception of human nature. Through an approach based on cultural naturalism, the suggested inquiry is also meant to verify whether in the debate on the evolutionary origins of the arts there are conceptual tools and theses which can (...)
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  48.  38
    Patrick Forber & Rory Smead (2014). An Evolutionary Paradox for Prosocial Behavior. Journal of Philosophy 111 (3):151-166.
    We investigate how changes to the payoffs of cooperative behavior affect the evolutionary dynamics. Paradoxically, the larger the benefits of cooperation, the less likely it is to evolve. This holds true even in cases where cooperation is strictly dominant. Increasing the benefits from prosocial behavior has two effects: first, in some circumstances it promotes the evolution of spite; and second, it can decrease the strength of selection leading to nearly neutral evolution of strategies. In light of these results (...)
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  49.  30
    Simon M. Huttegger (2007). Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives. Erkenntnis 66 (3):409 - 436.
    Recently there has been some interest in studying the explanation of meaning by using signaling games. I shall argue that the meaning of signals in signaling games remains sufficiently unclear to motivate further investigation. In particular, the possibility of distinguishing imperatives and indicatives at a fundamental level will be explored. Thereby I am trying to preserve the generality of the signaling games framework while bringing it closer to human languages. A number of convergence results for the evolutionary dynamics (...)
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  50.  22
    Silvia Dell'orco & Mauro Maldonato (2011). Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Rationality. World Futures 66 (2):103-123.
    Since the dawn of time, humankind's singular ability to make decisions has allowed human beings to face innumerable environmental challenges and complex evolutionary dynamics. Environmental pressures are not so urgent anymore, comparing to our ancestors. Nonetheless, the number of decisions that contemporary humans are called to make is very high. During the last three centuries, the change from normative to descriptive theories, from formal to natural logic, from substantive to limited rationality has allowed us to explain how many (...)
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