Search results for 'extrinsic value' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 120.0
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
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  2. James Harold (2005). Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value. Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (1):85–105.score: 114.0
    Moral philosophers who differ from one another on a wide range of questions tend to agree on at least one general point. Most believe that things are worth valuing either because of their relationship to something else worth valuing, or because they are simply (in themselves) worth valuing. I value my car, because I value getting to work; I value getting to work, because I value making money and spending time productively; and I value those (...)
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  3. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.score: 102.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  4. Daniel Halliday (2013). Holism About Value: Some Help for Invariabilists. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.score: 102.0
    G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper (...)
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  5. Rem B. Edwards (1979). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation. Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (2):133-143.score: 96.0
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  6. Ben Bradley (1998). Extrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 91 (2):109-126.score: 90.0
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  7. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002). Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.score: 90.0
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...) is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value. (shrink)
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  8. Robert F. Card (2004). Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):253-265.score: 90.0
    Elizabeth Anderson claims that states of affairs are merely extrinsically valuable, since we value them only in virtue of the intrinsically valuable (e.g.) persons in those states of affairs. Since it considers states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson argues that consequentialism is incoherent because it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. I respond to this objection by distinguishing between two forms of consequentialist teleology and arguing that Anderson''s claim is either (...)
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  9. Ralph D. Ellis (1992). Moral Pluralism Reconsidered: Is There an Intrinsic-Extrinsic Value Distintion? Philosophical Papers 21 (1):45-64.score: 90.0
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  10. Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb (1976). Better Total Consequences: Utilitarianism and Extrinsic Value. Metaphilosophy 7 (3-4):286-306.score: 90.0
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  11. Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2002). Instrumental Values €“ Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.score: 90.0
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...) is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value. (shrink)
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  12. Peter P. Kirschenmann (2001). “Intrinsically” or Just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32 (2):237-256.score: 78.0
    Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, (...)
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  13. Thomas Donaldson (forthcoming). Value-Intrinsic and Value-Extrinsic Associations. The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics:120-123.score: 72.0
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  14. Carrie Figdor (forthcoming). What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property? In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter.score: 72.0
    Work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often motivated by its use in other areas, such as intrinsic value, real vs. Cambridge change, supervenience and other topics. With the exception of Figdor 2008, philosophers have sought to articulate a global distinction -- a distinction between kinds of properties, rather than ways in which individuals have properties. I argue that global I/E distinctions are unable to do the work that allegedly motivates them, focusing on the case of intrinsic value.
     
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  15. Aaron Smuts (2012). Less Good but Not Bad: In Defense of Epicureanism About Death. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227.score: 62.0
    In this article I defend innocuousism– a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, (...)
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  16. Zachary P. Norwood (2013). A Survey of Artistic Value: From Analytic Philosophy to Neurobiology. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (2):135-152.score: 56.0
    Analytic philosophers have disputed the nature of “artistic value” for over six decades, bringing much needed clarity and rigor to a subject discussed with fashionable obscurity in other disciplines. This essay frames debates between analytic philosophers on artistic value and suggests new directions for future research. In particular, the problem of “intrinsic value” is considered, that is, whether a work’s value derives from its experienced properties, as a work of art, or from cultural trends outside the (...)
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  17. Christopher Grau (2006). Irreplaceability and Unique Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):111-129.score: 54.0
    This essay begins with a consideration of one way in which animals and persons may be valued as “irreplaceable.” Drawing on both Plato and Pascal, I consider reasons for skepticism regarding the legitimacy of this sort of attachment. While I do not offer a complete defense against such skepticism, I do show that worries here may be overblown due to the conflation of distinct metaphysical and normative concerns. I then go on to clarify what sort of value is at (...)
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  18. V. Umashanker Trivedi, Mohamed Shehata & Bernadette Lynn (2003). Impact of Personal and Situational Factors on Taxpayer Compliance: An Experimental Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 47 (3):175 - 197.score: 54.0
    This study used a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives to test the impact of three personal factors (moral reasoning, value orientation and risk preference), and three situational factors (the presence/absence of audits, tax inequity, and peer reporting behavior), while controlling for the impact of other demographic characteristics, on tax compliance. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) reveals that all the main effects analyzed are statistically significant and robustly influence tax compliance behavior. These results highlight the importance of obtaining a proper understanding (...)
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  19. Roman Altshuler (2014). The Value of Nonhuman Nature: A Constitutive View. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):469-485.score: 54.0
    A central question of environmental ethics remains one of how best to account for the intuitions generated by the Last Man scenarios; that is, it is a question of how to explain our experience of value in nature and, more importantly, whether that experience is justified. Seeking an alternative to extrinsic views, according to which nonhuman entities possess normative features that obligate us, I turn to constitutive views, which make value or whatever other limits nonhuman nature places (...)
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  20. Martin Riedmiller Joschka Boedecker, Thomas Lampe (2013). Modeling Effects of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Rewards on the Competition Between Striatal Learning Systems. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 54.0
    A common assumption in psychology, economics, and other fields holds that higher performance will result if extrinsic rewards (such as money) are offered as an incentive. While this principle seems to work well for tasks that require the execution of the same sequence of steps over and over, with little uncertainty about the process, in other cases, especially where creative problem solving is required due to the difficulty in finding the optimal sequence of actions, external rewards can actually be (...)
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  21. Dale Dorsey (2012). Can Instrumental Value Be Intrinsic? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):137-157.score: 48.0
    In this article, I critique a common claim that instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value. Instead, I offer an alternative dispositional analysis of instrumental value, which holds that instrumental value can, in certain circumstances, be an example of intrinsic value. It follows, then, that a popular account of the nature of final value – or value as an end – is false: the Moorean identification of final value with intrinsic (...)
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  22. Sven Ove Hansson (2001). The Modes of Value. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):33 - 46.score: 48.0
    Contrary to the received view, decision theory is not primarily devoted to instrumental (ends-to-means) reasoning. Instead, its major preoccupation is the derivation of ends from other ends. Given preferences over basic alternatives, it constructs preferences over alternatives that have been modified through the addition of value object modifiers (modes) that specify probability, uncertainty, distance in time etc. A typology of the decision-theoretical modes is offered. The modes do not have (even extrinsic) value, but they transform the (...) of objects to which they are applied. A rational agent's total set of preferences should be coherent, but from this it does not follow that her preferences over mode-containing objects have to be derivable from her preferences over mode-free objects. (shrink)
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  23. Katie McShane (2007). Why Environmental Ethics Shouldn't Give Up on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 29 (1):43-61.score: 48.0
    Recent critics (Andrew Light, Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, and Bruce Morito, among others) have argued that we should give up talk of intrinsic value in general and that of nature in particular. While earlier theorists might have overestimated the importance of intrinsic value, these recent critics underestimate its importance. Claims about a thing’s intrinsic value are claims about the distinctive way in which we have reason to care about that thing. If we understand intrinsic value in (...)
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  24. Bill Hook (2003). Intrinsic Value: Under the Scrutiny of Information and Evolutionary Theory. Environmental Ethics 25 (4):359-373.score: 44.0
    We do not yet have a sound ontology for intrinsic value. Albert Borgmann’s work on information technology and Daniel Dennett’s thoughts on evolutionary theory can provide the basis for an account of intrinsic value in terms of what it is, how it comes into existence, where it is found, and whether it can be quantified or compared. Borgmann’s information and realization relations are cornerstones forunderstanding value. According to Borgmann, things are valuable when they are meaningful and things (...)
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  25. Simon A. Hailwood (2000). The Value of Nature's Otherness. Environmental Values 9 (3):353 - 372.score: 44.0
    Environmentalist philosophers often paint a holistic picture, stressing such things as the continuity of humanity with wider nature and our membership of the 'natural community' . The implication seems to be that a non-anthropocentric philosophy requires that we strongly identify ourselves with nature and therefore that we downplay any human/non-human distinction. An alternative view, I think more interesting and plausible, stresses the distinction between humanity and a nature valued precisely for its otherness. In this article I discuss some of its (...)
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  26. Josh Parsons, Intrinsic Value and Intrinsic Properties.score: 42.0
    It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call (...)
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  27. Ben Bradley (2002). Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.score: 42.0
    Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.
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  28. John A. Bailey (1979). On Intrinsic Value. Philosophia 9 (1):1-8.score: 42.0
    Intrinsic value is differentiated from extrinsic, And assumed to be an empirical characteristic. Then six definitional hypotheses are introduced as to what "x has intrinsic value" means. Under examination, All collapse but d5. In d5, "x has intrinsic value" means "x is or would be liked or disliked for its own sake." d5's relations to ethical hedonism are next examined. Last, Moore's objection, That what one likes intrinsically, One may believe to be bad or not good (...)
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  29. Anthony Hatzimoysis (2003). Sentimental Value. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):373–379.score: 42.0
    I analyse the concept of sentimental value, with a view to identifying its relations with the notions of intrinsic, final, extrinsic and instrumental value. The analysis explores issues arising in the understanding of an object as sentimentally valuable, and reveals a serious tension in the common sense extrinsic conception of sentimental value.
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  30. Sean Drysdale Walsh (2011). Maximality, Duplication, and Intrinsic Value. Ratio 24 (3):311-325.score: 42.0
    In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that ‘maximality is extrinsic’, on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, (...)
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  31. Warren Neill (1998). An Interest-Satisfaction Theory of Value. Ethics and the Environment 3 (1):55 - 80.score: 42.0
    In this paper, I argue that all value is rooted in the interests of valuing beings. If something satisfies an interest of a valuing entity by contributing to its well-being in some way, then it has value. Anything that fails to satisfy any interests is entirely lacking in value. I defend this conception of value by showing that the usual arguments directed against this kind of view are lacking of force, and by considering various other theories (...)
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  32. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:33 - 51.score: 42.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  33. Philip Brey (2008). Do We Have Moral Duties Towards Information Objects? Ethics and Information Technology 10 (2-3):109-114.score: 36.0
    In this paper, a critique will be developed and an alternative proposed to Luciano Floridi’s approach to Information Ethics (IE). IE is a macroethical theory that is to both serve as a foundation for computer ethics and to guide our overall moral attitude towards the world. The central claims of IE are that everything that exists can be described as an information object, and that all information objects, qua information objects, have intrinsic value and are therefore deserving of moral (...)
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  34. Jens Johansson (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247 - 256.score: 36.0
    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person —can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  35. Henrique Gomes & Tim Koslowski (2013). Frequently Asked Questions About Shape Dynamics. Foundations of Physics 43 (12):1428-1458.score: 36.0
    Barbour’s interpretation of Mach’s principle led him to postulate that gravity should be formulated as a dynamical theory of spatial conformal geometry, or in his terminology, “shapes.” Recently, it was shown that the dynamics of General Relativity can indeed be formulated as the dynamics of shapes. This new Shape Dynamics theory, unlike earlier proposals by Barbour and his collaborators, implements local spatial conformal invariance as a gauge symmetry that replaces refoliation invariance in General Relativity. It is the purpose of this (...)
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  36. Stéphane Lemaire, Norms for Emotions: Intrinsic or Extrinsic? Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.score: 36.0
    It is often suggested that emotions are intrinsically normative or that they have conditions of correctness that are intrinsic. In order to assess this thesis, I consider whether the main argument in favor of the normativity of belief can be transposed to emotions. In the case of belief, the argument is that when we wonder whether to believe that p, we acknowledge that we must abide by some norms. This is understood as showing that these norms are intrinsic to the (...)
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  37. Karen Green (1996). Two Distinctions in Environmental Goodness. Environmental Values 5 (1):31 - 46.score: 32.0
    In her paper, 'Two distinctions in goodness', Korsgaard points out that while a contrast is often drawn between intrinsic and instrumental value there are really two distinctions to be drawn here. One is the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value, the other is that between having value as an end and having value as a means. In this paper I apply this contrast to some issues in environmental philosophy. It has become a commonplace of environmentalism (...)
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  38. Connie S. Rosati (2008). Objectivism and Relational Good. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):314-349.score: 30.0
    In his critique of egoism as a doctrine of ends, G. E. Moore famously challenges the idea that something can be someone. Donald Regan has recently revived and developed the Moorean challenge, making explicit its implications for the very idea of individual welfare. If the Moorean is right, there is no distinct, normative property good for, and so no plausible objectivism about ethics could be welfarist. In this essay, I undertake to address the Moorean challenge, clarifying our theoretical alternatives so (...)
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  39. Peter Miller (1983). Axiology: A Metaphysical Theme in Ethics. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (1):3-16.score: 30.0
    Eschewing the priority of either metaphysics or ethics, This paper addresses their common theme of axiology by proposing an alternative to psychologically based value theories to handle values in nature. Value, Understood as the richness of an entity's potential or realization of potential, Encompasses both extrinsic and intrinsic dimensions of natural values. Environmental ethics, Health, Personality theory, And other areas can be illumined by this conception of potentiality and of value as richness.
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  40. Jean Hillier (1999). What Values? Whose Values? Philosophy and Geography 2 (2):179 – 199.score: 30.0
    Land use planning decisions are recognised as being value judgements, yet the questions of what values and whose values are rarely addressed. Values may be absolute or relative, intrinsic or extrinsic, passionately emotional or coolly reasoned, and 'measured' in a multitude of ways: by rarity, economics, social or aesthetic interpretations. Using examples of land use planning in Western Australia, I examine some of the complex values brought into play. I conclude that we need to explore, rather than reject, (...)
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  41. Irene Vanninen, Helena Siipi, Marjo Keskitalo & Maria Erkkila (2009). Ethical Compatibility of GM Crops with Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values of Farmers: A Review. Open Ethics Journal 3 (3):104-117.score: 30.0
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  42. Jeffrey Morgan (2013). Buddhism and Autonomy‐Facilitating Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (4):509-523.score: 30.0
    This article argues that Buddhists can consistently support autonomy as an educational ideal. The article defines autonomy as a matter of thinking and acting according to principles that one has oneself endorsed, showing the relationship between this ideal and the possession of an enduring self. Three central Buddhist doctrines of conditioned arising, impermanence and anatman are examined, showing a prima facie conflict between autonomy and Buddhist philosophy. Drawing on the ‘two truths’ theory of Nagarjuna, it is then shown that the (...)
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  43. Edmund L. Erde (1983). On Peeling, Slicing and Dicing an Onion: The Complexity of Taxonomies of Values and Medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 4 (1).score: 30.0
    This essay is an array of several taxonomies of values which bear on medicine. The first is a rather low-level list of types of values, meant to be adequate to observational data collection about human valuing. It proceeds to a discussion of levels of valuing so that senses of higher and lower values are articulated. Next, it offers a consideration of intrinsic versus extrinsic and of fundamental versus domestic (or mediating, enabling) values, along with the notions of a practice (...)
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  44. Knut J. Ims, Lars Jacob Tynes Pedersen & Laszlo Zsolnai (2013). How Economic Incentives May Destroy Social, Ecological and Existential Values: The Case of Executive Compensation. Journal of Business Ethics:1-8.score: 30.0
    Executive compensation has long been a prominent topic in the management literature. A main question that is also given substantial attention in the business ethics literature—even more so in the wake of the recent financial crisis—is whether increasing levels of executive compensation can be justified from an ethical point of view. Also, the relationship of executive compensation to instances of unethical behavior or outcomes has received considerable attention. The purpose of this paper is to explore the social, ecological, and existential (...)
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  45. Lydia Zepeda & Cong Nie (2012). What Are the Odds of Being an Organic or Local Food Shopper? Multivariate Analysis of US Food Shopper Lifestyle Segments. Agriculture and Human Values 29 (4):467-480.score: 26.0
    The growth in organic and local foods consumption has been examined using two different approaches to identify characteristics and motivations of food shoppers: market segmentation and economic models using multivariate analysis. The former approach, based on Means-end Chain theory, examines how intrinsic characteristics of foods affect food choices. The latter microeconomic approach examines economic constraints and extrinsic factors. This study demonstrates value in combining the two approaches to generate better empirical predictions of who buys organic and local food. (...)
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  46. Anne Morgan (2008). Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics of Freedom and Absolute Evil. Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 75-89.score: 24.0
    Simone de Beauvoir held that human experience is intrinsically ambiguous and that there are no values extrinsic to experience, but she also designated some actions as absolute evil. This essay explains how Beauvoir utilized an intrinsic absolute value to ground an action-guiding principle of freedom that justifies her notion of evil. Morgan’s analysis counters Robin May Schott’s objections that Beauvoir failed to systematically justify her notion of absolute evil and that Beauvoir shifted from a “logic of action” to (...)
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  47. Jennifer McKitrick, Dispositions and Potentialities.score: 24.0
    Dispositions and potentialities seem importantly similar. To talk about what something has the potential or disposition to do is to make a claim about a future possibilitythe "threats and promises" that fill the world (Goodman 1983, 41). In recent years, dispositions have been the subject of much conceptual analysis and metaphysical speculation. The inspiration for this essay is the hope that that work can shed some light on discussions of potentiality. I compare the concepts of disposition and potentiality, consider whether (...)
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  48. Patricia Díaz-Herrera (2006). The Notion of Time in Francisco Suárez and its Contemporary Relevance. Studia Neoaristotelica 3 (2):142-159.score: 24.0
    In the fiftieth disputation of his Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), Francisco Suárez distinguishes three notions of time. Suárez offers an account of the ways in which the predicate ‘when’ can be taken and presents a more general perspective based on the principle of duration, rather than the Aristotelian definition of time. His view differs from Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ account because Suárez emphasizes that time cannot be reduced to the number of the movement of the last sphere in the Aristotelian model of (...)
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  49. John O. Nelson (1978). Is Freedom Only an Extrinsic Good? Journal of Value Inquiry 12 (4):292-295.score: 24.0
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  50. Zehavit Gross (2013). The Attitudes of Israeli Arab and Jewish High School Students Towards Extrinsic and Intrinsic Values. Journal of Moral Education 42 (1):88-101.score: 24.0
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