Search results for 'extrinsic value' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
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  2. James Harold (2005). Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value. Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (1):85–105.score: 57.0
    Moral philosophers who differ from one another on a wide range of questions tend to agree on at least one general point. Most believe that things are worth valuing either because of their relationship to something else worth valuing, or because they are simply (in themselves) worth valuing. I value my car, because I value getting to work; I value getting to work, because I value making money and spending time productively; and I value those (...)
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  3. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.score: 51.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  4. Daniel Halliday (2013). Holism About Value: Some Help for Invariabilists. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.score: 51.0
    G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper (...)
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  5. Rem B. Edwards (1979). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation. Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (2):133-143.score: 48.0
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  6. Ben Bradley (1998). Extrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 91 (2):109-126.score: 45.0
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  7. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002). Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.score: 45.0
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...) is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value. (shrink)
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  8. Robert F. Card (2004). Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):253-265.score: 45.0
    Elizabeth Anderson claims that states of affairs are merely extrinsically valuable, since we value them only in virtue of the intrinsically valuable (e.g.) persons in those states of affairs. Since it considers states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson argues that consequentialism is incoherent because it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. I respond to this objection by distinguishing between two forms of consequentialist teleology and arguing that Anderson''s claim is either (...)
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  9. Ralph D. Ellis (1992). Moral Pluralism Reconsidered: Is There an Intrinsic-Extrinsic Value Distintion? Philosophical Papers 21 (1):45-64.score: 45.0
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  10. Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb (1976). Better Total Consequences: Utilitarianism and Extrinsic Value. Metaphilosophy 7 (3-4):286-306.score: 45.0
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  11. Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2002). Instrumental Values €“ Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.score: 45.0
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...) is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value. (shrink)
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  12. Peter P. Kirschenmann (2001). “Intrinsically” or Just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32 (2):237-256.score: 39.0
    Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, (...)
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  13. Thomas Donaldson (forthcoming). Value-Intrinsic and Value-Extrinsic Associations. The Ruffin Series in Business Ethics:120-123.score: 36.0
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  14. Carrie Figdor (forthcoming). What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property? In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter.score: 36.0
    Work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often motivated by its use in other areas, such as intrinsic value, real vs. Cambridge change, supervenience and other topics. With the exception of Figdor 2008, philosophers have sought to articulate a global distinction -- a distinction between kinds of properties, rather than ways in which individuals have properties. I argue that global I/E distinctions are unable to do the work that allegedly motivates them, focusing on the case of intrinsic value.
     
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  15. Aaron Smuts (2012). Less Good but Not Bad: In Defense of Epicureanism About Death. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227.score: 31.0
    In this article I defend innocuousism– a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, (...)
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  16. Zachary P. Norwood (2013). A Survey of Artistic Value: From Analytic Philosophy to Neurobiology. Aisthesis. Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 6 (2):135-152.score: 28.0
    Analytic philosophers have disputed the nature of “artistic value” for over six decades, bringing much needed clarity and rigor to a subject discussed with fashionable obscurity in other disciplines. This essay frames debates between analytic philosophers on artistic value and suggests new directions for future research. In particular, the problem of “intrinsic value” is considered, that is, whether a work’s value derives from its experienced properties, as a work of art, or from cultural trends outside the (...)
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  17. Christopher Grau (2006). Irreplaceability and Unique Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):111-129.score: 27.0
    This essay begins with a consideration of one way in which animals and persons may be valued as “irreplaceable.” Drawing on both Plato and Pascal, I consider reasons for skepticism regarding the legitimacy of this sort of attachment. While I do not offer a complete defense against such skepticism, I do show that worries here may be overblown due to the conflation of distinct metaphysical and normative concerns. I then go on to clarify what sort of value is at (...)
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  18. V. Umashanker Trivedi, Mohamed Shehata & Bernadette Lynn (2003). Impact of Personal and Situational Factors on Taxpayer Compliance: An Experimental Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 47 (3):175 - 197.score: 27.0
    This study used a laboratory experiment with monetary incentives to test the impact of three personal factors (moral reasoning, value orientation and risk preference), and three situational factors (the presence/absence of audits, tax inequity, and peer reporting behavior), while controlling for the impact of other demographic characteristics, on tax compliance. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) reveals that all the main effects analyzed are statistically significant and robustly influence tax compliance behavior. These results highlight the importance of obtaining a proper understanding (...)
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  19. Roman Altshuler (forthcoming). The Value of Nonhuman Nature: A Constitutive View. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-17.score: 27.0
    A central question of environmental ethics remains one of how best to account for the intuitions generated by the Last Man scenarios; that is, it is a question of how to explain our experience of value in nature and, more importantly, whether that experience is justified. Seeking an alternative to extrinsic views, according to which nonhuman entities possess normative features that obligate us, I turn to constitutive views, which make value or whatever other limits nonhuman nature places (...)
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  20. Martin Riedmiller Joschka Boedecker, Thomas Lampe (2013). Modeling Effects of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Rewards on the Competition Between Striatal Learning Systems. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 27.0
    A common assumption in psychology, economics, and other fields holds that higher performance will result if extrinsic rewards (such as money) are offered as an incentive. While this principle seems to work well for tasks that require the execution of the same sequence of steps over and over, with little uncertainty about the process, in other cases, especially where creative problem solving is required due to the difficulty in finding the optimal sequence of actions, external rewards can actually be (...)
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  21. Dale Dorsey (2012). Can Instrumental Value Be Intrinsic? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):137-157.score: 24.0
    In this article, I critique a common claim that instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value. Instead, I offer an alternative dispositional analysis of instrumental value, which holds that instrumental value can, in certain circumstances, be an example of intrinsic value. It follows, then, that a popular account of the nature of final value – or value as an end – is false: the Moorean identification of final value with intrinsic (...)
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  22. Katie McShane (2007). Why Environmental Ethics Shouldn't Give Up on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 29 (1):43-61.score: 24.0
    Recent critics (Andrew Light, Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, and Bruce Morito, among others) have argued that we should give up talk of intrinsic value in general and that of nature in particular. While earlier theorists might have overestimated the importance of intrinsic value, these recent critics underestimate its importance. Claims about a thing’s intrinsic value are claims about the distinctive way in which we have reason to care about that thing. If we understand intrinsic value in (...)
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  23. Sven Ove Hansson (2001). The Modes of Value. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):33 - 46.score: 24.0
    Contrary to the received view, decision theory is not primarily devoted to instrumental (ends-to-means) reasoning. Instead, its major preoccupation is the derivation of ends from other ends. Given preferences over basic alternatives, it constructs preferences over alternatives that have been modified through the addition of value object modifiers (modes) that specify probability, uncertainty, distance in time etc. A typology of the decision-theoretical modes is offered. The modes do not have (even extrinsic) value, but they transform the (...) of objects to which they are applied. A rational agent's total set of preferences should be coherent, but from this it does not follow that her preferences over mode-containing objects have to be derivable from her preferences over mode-free objects. (shrink)
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  24. Bill Hook (2003). Intrinsic Value: Under the Scrutiny of Information and Evolutionary Theory. Environmental Ethics 25 (4):359-373.score: 22.0
    We do not yet have a sound ontology for intrinsic value. Albert Borgmann’s work on information technology and Daniel Dennett’s thoughts on evolutionary theory can provide the basis for an account of intrinsic value in terms of what it is, how it comes into existence, where it is found, and whether it can be quantified or compared. Borgmann’s information and realization relations are cornerstones forunderstanding value. According to Borgmann, things are valuable when they are meaningful and things (...)
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  25. Simon A. Hailwood (2000). The Value of Nature's Otherness. Environmental Values 9 (3):353 - 372.score: 22.0
    Environmentalist philosophers often paint a holistic picture, stressing such things as the continuity of humanity with wider nature and our membership of the 'natural community' . The implication seems to be that a non-anthropocentric philosophy requires that we strongly identify ourselves with nature and therefore that we downplay any human/non-human distinction. An alternative view, I think more interesting and plausible, stresses the distinction between humanity and a nature valued precisely for its otherness. In this article I discuss some of its (...)
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  26. Josh Parsons, Intrinsic Value and Intrinsic Properties.score: 21.0
    It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call (...)
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  27. Ben Bradley (2002). Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.score: 21.0
    Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.
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  28. Nathan Smith (2013). Empirically Socratic. Cognizance Journal.score: 21.0
    In the Republic, Socrates argues that morality (justice) is valuable both for itself and for what comes from it. In contemporary moral theory, this view is not widely accepted. However, contemporary empirical research in psychology reveals that what we experience is also what we come to expect. It follows from this that if we act in an immoral fashion, we will expect the same from others. The more often we act immorally, the more suspicion will be ingrained within us. Suspicion (...)
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  29. John A. Bailey (1979). On Intrinsic Value. Philosophia 9 (1):1-8.score: 21.0
    Intrinsic value is differentiated from extrinsic, And assumed to be an empirical characteristic. Then six definitional hypotheses are introduced as to what "x has intrinsic value" means. Under examination, All collapse but d5. In d5, "x has intrinsic value" means "x is or would be liked or disliked for its own sake." d5's relations to ethical hedonism are next examined. Last, Moore's objection, That what one likes intrinsically, One may believe to be bad or not good (...)
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  30. Joseph Raz (2003). The Practice of Value - Reply. In Jay Wallace (ed.), The Practice of Value. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    The privilege of having three sets of extensive and hard-hitting comments on one's work is as welcome as it is rare, and especially so on this occasion as the lectures were, for me, but thefirst (well, not entirely first) stab at a subject I hope to explore at greater length. The reflectionsthat follow will respond to some of the criticisms, but will not be a point by point reply. I will use the occasion to clarify some obscurities in the lectures, (...)
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  31. Anthony Hatzimoysis (2003). Sentimental Value. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):373–379.score: 21.0
    I analyse the concept of sentimental value, with a view to identifying its relations with the notions of intrinsic, final, extrinsic and instrumental value. The analysis explores issues arising in the understanding of an object as sentimentally valuable, and reveals a serious tension in the common sense extrinsic conception of sentimental value.
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  32. Sean Drysdale Walsh (2011). Maximality, Duplication, and Intrinsic Value. Ratio 24 (3):311-325.score: 21.0
    In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that ‘maximality is extrinsic’, on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, (...)
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  33. Warren Neill (1998). An Interest-Satisfaction Theory of Value. Ethics and the Environment 3 (1):55 - 80.score: 21.0
    In this paper, I argue that all value is rooted in the interests of valuing beings. If something satisfies an interest of a valuing entity by contributing to its well-being in some way, then it has value. Anything that fails to satisfy any interests is entirely lacking in value. I defend this conception of value by showing that the usual arguments directed against this kind of view are lacking of force, and by considering various other theories (...)
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  34. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:33 - 51.score: 21.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  35. Lynch Michael (2009). The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    There are least two different things we might mean when we say that truth is a value: that it is a norm of belief, and that it is an end of inquiry. This paper considers to what extent we might be irrealist about the former claim -- that truth is a norm of belief.
     
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  36. Andras Szigeti (2010). Constitutionalism and Value Theory. In Andras Sajo & Renata Uitz (eds.), Constitutional Topography: Values and Constitutions. ELEVEN INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING.score: 19.0
    The theory and practice of constitutionalism is tightly interwoven with references and appeals to values. However, these references and appeals frequently remain undertheorized and are seldom connected directly to philosophical theories of value. This chapter outlines some ways in which such connections might be established.
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  37. Daniel R. Block, Michael Thompson, Jill Euken, Toni Liquori, Frank Fear & Sherill Baldwin (2008). Engagement for Transformation: Value Webs for Local Food System Development. [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 25 (3):379-388.score: 19.0
    Engagement happens when academics and non-academics form partnerships to create mutual understanding, and then take action together. An example is the “value web” work associated with W. K. Kellogg Foundation’s Food Systems Higher Education–Community Partnership. Partners nationally work on local food systems development by building value webs. “Value chains,” a concept with considerable currency in the private sector, involves creating non-hierarchical relationships among otherwise disparate actors and entities to achieve collective common goals. The value web concept (...)
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  38. Libby Hattersley (2013). Agri-Food System Transformations and Diet-Related Chronic Disease in Australia: A Nutrition-Oriented Value Chain Approach. Agriculture and Human Values 30 (2):299-309.score: 19.0
    Attention has become increasingly focused in recent years on the role agri-food system transformations have played in driving the global diet-related chronic disease burden. Identifying the role played by the food-consuming industries (predominantly large manufacturers, processors, distributors, and retailers) in particular, and identifying possibilities to facilitate healthier diets through intervening in these industries, have been identified as a research priority. This paper explores the potential for one promising analytic framework—the nutrition-oriented value chain approach—to contribute to this area, drawing on (...)
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  39. Katie McShane (2008). Convergence, Noninstrumental Value and the Semantics of 'Love': Reply to Norton. Environmental Values 17 (1):15-21.score: 19.0
    Bryan Norton argues that my recent critique of anthropocentrism presupposes J. Baird Callicott's philosophically problematic distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value and that the problems that it raises for anthropocentrism in general are in fact only problems for strong anthropocentrism. I argue, first, that my own view does not presuppose Callicott's distinction, nor any claims about instrumental value, and second, that the problems it raises for anthropocentrism apply to weak and strong anthropocentrism alike.
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  40. Anne Tallontire, Maggie Opondo, Valerie Nelson & Adrienne Martin (2011). Beyond the Vertical? Using Value Chains and Governance as a Framework to Analyse Private Standards Initiatives in Agri-Food Chains. Agriculture and Human Values 28 (3):427-441.score: 19.0
    The significance of private standards and associated local level initiatives in agri-food value chains are increasingly recognised. However whilst issues related to compliance and impact at the smallholder or worker level have frequently been analysed, the governance implications in terms of how private standards affect national level institutions, public, private and non-governmental, have had less attention. This article applies an extended value chain framework for critical analysis of Private Standards Initiatives (PSIs) in agrifood chains, drawing on primary research (...)
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  41. Neil Sinclair (2012). Expressivism and the Value of Truth. Philosophia 40 (4):877-883.score: 18.0
    This paper is a reply to Michael Lynch's "Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research for 2009. It argues that Lynch's argument against expressivism fails because of an ambiguity in the employed notion of an 'epistemically disengaged standpoint'.
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  42. Richard Yetter Chappell (2013). Value Receptacles. Noûs 47 (3):n/a-n/a.score: 18.0
    Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not.
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  43. Shelly Kagan (1998). Rethinking Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.score: 18.0
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, (...)
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  44. Patrick Hawley (2007). Skepticism and the Value of Knowledge. In Chienkuo Mi Ruey-lin Chen (ed.), Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science.score: 18.0
    The main claim of this essay is that knowledge is no more
    valuable than lasting true belief.
    This claim is surprising. Doesn't knowledge have a unique
    and special value? If the main claim is correct and if, as it seems,
    knowledge is not lasting true belief, then knowledge does not have a unique value:
    in whatever way knowledge is valuable, lasting true belief is just as valuable.
    However, this result does not show that knowledge is worthless, nor does it undermine
    our knowledge gathering (...)
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  45. Guy Fletcher (2008). 'Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value'. Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. The main idea I wish to bring out and defend is that Moore was insufficiently attentive to how distinctive his conception of intrinsic value was, as compared with those of the writers he discussed, and that such inattentiveness skewed his understanding of the positions of others that he discussed and dismissed. My way into this issue is by examining the charge of inconsistency (...)
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  46. Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.score: 18.0
    In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It (...)
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  47. J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon (forthcoming). On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly.score: 18.0
    Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong (...)
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  48. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3):391-423.score: 18.0
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes (...)
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  49. Guy Kahane (2012). The Value Question in Metaphysics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):27-55.score: 18.0
    Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universe we inhabit—how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to which value can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, (...)
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  50. Ruth Chang (2012). &Quot;Value Pluralism&Quot;. In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behaviorial Sciences.score: 18.0
    Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, (...)
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