Search results for 'fact' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. James R. Hofmann & Bruce H. Weber (2003). The Fact of Evolution: Implications for Science Education. Science and Education 12 (8):729-760.score: 18.0
    Creationists who object to evolution in the science curriculum of public schools often cite Jonathan Well’s book Icons of Evolution in their support (Wells 2000). In the third chapter of his book Wells claims that neither paleontological nor molecular evidence supports the thesis that the history of life is an evolutionary process of descent from preexisting ancestors. We argue that Wells inappropriately relies upon ambiguities inherent in the term ‘Darwinian’ and the phrase ‘Darwin’s theory’. Furthermore, he does not accurately distinguish (...)
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  2. Holmes Rolston (2004). Caring for Nature: From Fact to Value, From Respect to Reverence. Zygon 39 (2):277-302.score: 18.0
    . Despite the classical prohibition of moving from fact to value, encounter with the biodiversity and plenitude of being in evolutionary natural history moves us to respect life, even to reverence it. Darwinian accounts are value-laden and necessary for understanding life at the same time that Darwinian theory fails to provide sufficient cause for the historically developing diversity and increasing complexity on Earth. Earth is a providing ground; matter and energy on Earth support life, but distinctive to life is (...)
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  3. Jos Lehmann & Aldo Gangemi (2007). An Ontology of Physical Causation as a Basis for Assessing Causation in Fact and Attributing Legal Responsibility. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (3):301-321.score: 18.0
    Computational machineries dedicated to the attribution of legal responsibility should be based on (or, make use of) a stack of definitions relating the notion of legal responsibility to a number of suitably chosen causal notions. This paper presents a general analysis of legal responsibility and of causation in fact based on Hart and Honoré’s work. Some physical aspects of causation in fact are then treated within the “lite” version of DOLCE foundational ontology written in OWL-DL, a standard description (...)
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  4. L. Morawski (1999). Law, Fact and Legal Language. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):461-473.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses the difference between the factual and the legal, both as to terms and as to statements, on the analogy of the methodologists' distinction of the observational and the theoretical. No absolute distinction exists, and pure `brute facts' do not exist in law because of the socialisation of physical world and juridification of the social world.; also, the effect of evidentiary constraints. Law/fact distinction depends on `applicability rules'. The problem of `mixed terms' is partly a matter of (...)
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  5. John H. Zammito (2012). The Last Dogma of Positivism: Historicist Naturalism and the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (3):305-338.score: 18.0
    Has the emergence of post-positivism in philosophy of science changed the terms of the “is/ought” dichotomy? If it has demonstrated convincingly that there are no “facts” apart from the theoretical frames and evaluative standards constructing them, can such a cordon sanitaire really be upheld between “facts” and values? The point I wish to stress is that philosophy of science has had a central role in constituting and imposing the fact/value dichotomy and a revolution in the philosophy of science should (...)
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  6. G. Marshall (1999). Provisional Concepts and Definitions of Fact. Law and Philosophy 18 (5):447-460.score: 18.0
    The paper explains and differentiates the concept of `fact' in the legal setting. Fact and evidence, fact/falsity distinguished; fact and law considered -- a real difference or a pragmatic device? Questions of fact and degree considered, in themselves and in the context of jury trial and of appeals. Primary fact, factual inferences from primary fact, questions of classification of fact are considered. Whether inference is supported by evidence, and whether classification is correct (...)
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  7. Zohar Livnat (2009). The Concept of Scientific Fact: Perelman and Beyond. [REVIEW] Argumentation 23 (3):375-386.score: 18.0
    This paper applies the argumentative perspective to the concept of scientific fact by combining the rhetorical and the sociological perspectives. The scientific fact is presented as an entity having both an epistemic and a social meaning, and the scientific paper is presented as a discourse that has both an epistemic value and role related to knowledge and to the description of the ‘world,’ and a social value, fulfilling social roles within its relevant discourse community. The discussion leads to (...)
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  8. Wojciech Krysztofiak (forthcoming). Hyper-Slingshot. Is Fact-Arithmetic Possible? Foundations of Science:1-18.score: 18.0
    The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model (world) of arithmetical theories. It may be interpreted as showing that it is impossible to construct fact-arithmetic. The importance of this conclusion arises in the context of cognitive science. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which is called hyper-slingshot. The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact (...)
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  9. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011). Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact. In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies. 95 - 113.score: 18.0
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider (...)
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  10. Toru Tani (2008). The Ego, the Other and the Primal Fact. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (4):385-399.score: 15.0
    Japan has absorbed many western ideas since the late nineteenth century, but Japanese philosophers have often been reluctant to accept the western idea of the “I” in its entirety. The I transgresses to the Other more easily than western philosophies think and imports what belongs to the Other as his own. How is this possible? Husserl attempted to explain the constitution of the Other by the intentionality that goes from the I to the Other, mediated by the body. However, Husserl (...)
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  11. Bryan Lueck (2011). The Fact of Sense: Nancy and Kant on the Withdrawn Origin of Moral Experience. MonoKL 10:216-230.score: 15.0
  12. H. Gurnee (1937). A Comparison of Collective and Individual Judgments of Fact. Journal of Experimental Psychology 21 (1):106.score: 15.0
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  13. Kevin McKenzie (2001). Fact and the Narratives of War: Produced Undecidability in Accounts of Armed Conflict. [REVIEW] Human Studies 24 (3):187-209.score: 15.0
    This paper explores how providing the inferential basis to argue for a range of equally plausible interpretations features as a way of managing issues of accountability in talk about armed confrontation. We examine conversation produced in open-ended interviews with diplomatic representatives of the United States and Great Britain in discussion about those countries'' involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990–91. By providing the inferential basis upon which to argue for a range of equally plausible interpretative scenarios, speakers attend to (...)
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  14. Ann Dowker (2014). Young Children's Use of Derived Fact Strategies for Addition and Subtraction. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 15.0
  15. Carlos Kh Wong, Cindy Lk Lam, Wai‐Lun Law, Jensen Tc Poon, Pierre Chan, Dora Lw Kwong & Janice Tsang (2012). Validity and Reliability Study on Traditional Chinese FACT‐C in Chinese Patients with Colorectal Neoplasm. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (6):1186-1195.score: 15.0
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  16. Mark Balaguer (2011). Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.score: 14.0
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. (...)
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  17. Edward Hall (2013). Political Realism and Fact-Sensitivity. Res Publica 19 (2):173-181.score: 14.0
    Political realists complain that much contemporary political philosophy is insufficiently attentive to various facts about politics yet some political philosophers insist that any critique of normative claims on grounds of unrealism is misplaced. In this paper I focus on the methodological position G.A. Cohen champions in order assess the extent to which this retort succeeds in nullifying the realist critique of contemporary political philosophy. I argue that Cohen’s work does not succeed in doing so because the political principles that we (...)
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  18. Charles Augustus Baylis & Paul Welsh (eds.) (1975). Fact, Value, and Perception: Essays in Honor of Charles A. Baylis. Duke University Press.score: 14.0
    Clark, R. L. Facts, fact-correlates, and fact-surrogates.--Heintz, J. The real subject-predicate asymmetry.--Stenius, E. All men are mortal.--Wilson, N. L. Notes on the form of certain elementary facts.--Binkley, R. The ultimate justification of moral rules.--Castañeda, H. Goodness, intentions, and propositions.--Patterson, R. L. An analysis of faith.--Simpson, E. Discrimination as an example of moral irrationality.--Welsh, P. Osborne on the art of appreciation.--Lachs, J. The omnicolored sky: Baylis on perception.--Strawson, P. F. Causation in perception.--Reid, C. L. Charles A. Baylis: a bibliography.
     
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  19. John S. Wilkins & Paul E. Griffiths (forthcoming). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Three Domains: Fact, Value, and Religion. In James Maclaurin Greg Dawes (ed.), A New Science of Religion. Routledge.score: 12.0
    Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? We consider this problem for beliefs in three different domains: religion, morality, and commonsense and scientific claims about matters of empirical fact. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. One reply is that evolution can (...)
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  20. Shelley Weinberg (2012). The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.score: 12.0
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of personal identity. But the former (...)
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  21. Tim Crane (2003). Subjective Facts. In Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.score: 12.0
    An important theme running through D.H. Mellor’s work is his realism, or as I shall call it, his objectivism: the idea that reality as such is how it is, regardless of the way we represent it, and that philosophical error often arises from confusing aspects of our subjective representation of the world with aspects of the world itself. Thus central to Mellor’s work on time has been the claim that the temporal A-series (...)(previously called ‘tense’) is unreal while the B-series (the series of ‘dates’) is real. The A-series is something which is a product of our representation of the world, but not a feature of reality itself. And in other, less central, areas of his work, this kind of theme has been repeated: ‘Objective decision making’ (1980) argues that the right way to understand decision theory is as a theory of what is the objectively correct decision, the one that will actually as a matter of fact achieve your intended goal, rather than the one that is justified purely in terms of what you believe, regardless of whether the belief is true or false. ‘I and now’ (1989) argues against a substantial subjective conception of the self, using analogies between subjective and objective ways of thinking about time and subjective and objective ways of thinking about the self. And in the paper which shall be the focus of my attention here, ‘Nothing like experience’ (1992), Mellor.. (shrink)
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  22. Hartry Field (2003). No Fact of the Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.score: 12.0
    Are there questions for which 'there is no determinate fact of the matter' as to which answer is correct? Most of us think so, but there are serious difficulties in maintaining the view, and in explaining the idea of determinateness in a satisfactory manner. The paper argues that to overcome the difficulties, we need to reject the law of excluded middle; and it investigates the sense of 'rejection' that is involved. The paper also explores the logic that is required (...)
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  23. Amalia Amaya (2008). Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 306-319.score: 12.0
    This paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of (...)
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  24. Alex Broadbent (2009). Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry. Legal Theory 15 (3):173-191.score: 12.0
    This paper takes it as a premise that a distinction between matters of fact and of law is important in the causal inquiry. But it argues that separating factual and legal causation as different elements of liability is not the best way to implement the fact/law distinction. What counts as a cause-in-fact is partly a legal question; and certain liability-limiting doctrines under the umbrella of “legal causation” depend on the application of factual-causal concepts. The contrastive account of (...)
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  25. Alexei Angelides (2004). The Last Collapse? An Essay Review of Hilary Putnam's the Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Philosophy of Science 71 (3):402-411.score: 12.0
    Hilary Putnam's The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays serves as his latest installment attempting to detail some of the historical background and recent controversies over the so-called fact/value distinction. In it, Putnam claims that the positivists' influence led to an inflated dichotomy, rather than distinction, between descriptive sentences and evaluative sentences. He argues that such a dichotomy is unwarranted through a number of arguments intended to show that attempts to "disentangle" facts from values always fail. (...)
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  26. J. J. C. Smart (1999). Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction. Philosophy 74 (3):431-437.score: 12.0
    This article is a defence of the Fact-Value distinction against considerations brought up by Ruth Anna Putnam in three articles in Philosophy, especially her ‘Perceiving Facts and Values’ January 1998. I defend metaphysical realism about facts and anti-realism about values against Putnam' intermediate position about both and I relate the matter to the logic of imperatives. The motivations of scientists or historians to select fields of investigation are irrelevant to the objectivity of their hypotheses, and so is the goodness (...)
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  27. Benj Hellie (2007). That Which Makes the Sensation of Blue a Mental Fact: Moore on Phenomenal Relationism. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.score: 12.0
    I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view (...)
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  28. Stephen W. Ball (1988). Evolution, Explanation, and the Fact/Value Distinction. Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):317-348.score: 12.0
    Though modern non-cognitivists in ethics characteristically believe that values are irreducible to facts, they nevertheless believe that values are determined by facts, viz., those specified in functionalist, explanatory theories of the evolutionary origin of morality. The present paper probes the consistency of this position. The conventionalist theories of Hume and Harman are examined, and are seen not to establish a tight determinative reduction of values to facts. This result is illustrated by reference to recent theories of the sociobiological mechanisms involved (...)
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  29. Jody Azzouni & Otávio Bueno (2008). On What It Takes for There to Be No Fact of the Matter. Noûs 42 (4):753-769.score: 12.0
    Philosophers are very fond of making non-factualist claims—claims to the effect that there is no fact of the matter as to whether something is the case. But can these claims be coherently stated in the context of classical logic? Some care is needed here, we argue, otherwise one ends up denying a tautology or embracing a contradiction. In the end, we think there are only two strategies available to someone who wants to be a non-factualist about something, and remain (...)
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  30. M. Baurmann (2000). Legal Authority as a Social Fact. Law and Philosophy 19 (2):247-262.score: 12.0
    From a sociological point of view, the conceptual and logical relations between the norms of legal order represent empirical and causal relations between social actors. The claim that legal authority is based on the validity of empowering norms means, sociologically, that the capability to enact and enforce legal norms is based on an empirical transfer of power from one social actor to another. With this process, sociology has to explain how a proclamation of legal rights by the creation of empowering (...)
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  31. Stephen Read (2005). The Unity of the Fact. Philosophy 80 (3):317-342.score: 12.0
    What binds the constituents of a state of affairs together and provides unity to the fact they constitute? I argue that the fact that they are related is basic and fundamental. This is the thesis of Factualism: the world is a world of facts. I draw three corollaries: first, that the Identity of truth is mistaken, in conflating what represents (the proposition) with what is represented (the fact). Secondly, a popular interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, due to Steinus, (...)
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  32. Aaron James, Deflating Fact-Insensitivity.score: 12.0
    This paper seeks to deflate G. A. Cohen’s recent meta-ethical argument that fundamental principles must be “fact-insensitive.” That argument does not advance Cohen’s dispute with Rawls and other social contract theorists. There is attenuated sense of “factinsensitivity” which they can happily grant, which Cohen never rules out on specifically metaethical grounds. While his barrage of substantive (non-meta-ethical) arguments may retain independent force, the argument from fact-insensitivity is largely (though not entirely) inconsequential.
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  33. Christopher Mole (2009). The Matter of Fact in Literature. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):483-502.score: 12.0
    Some works of literature are compromised because their authors get the facts wrong. In other works deviations from the facts don’t seem to matter, and authors quite legitimately make things up. This paper gives an account of the various ways in which matters of fact can make a difference to the aesthetic value of works of literature. It concludes by showing how this account can be applied in determining when a concern with matters of fact is an important (...)
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  34. Aaron Allen Schiller (2012). The Primacy of Fact Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593.score: 12.0
    After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. (...)
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  35. Patrick Kain (2010). Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason. In Benjamin Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. de Gruyter. 211--230.score: 12.0
    Kant’s claims about supersensible objects, and his account of the epistemic status of such claims, remain poorly understood, to the detriment of our understanding of Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological system. In the Critique of Practical Reason, and again in the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that we have practical cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen) of the moral law and of our supersensible freedom; that this cognition and knowledge cohere with, yet go beyond the limits of, our theoretical cognition; and that (...)
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  36. Lawrence Pasternack (2011). The Development and Scope of Kantian Belief: The Highest Good, The Practical Postulates and The Fact of Reason. Kant-Studien 102 (3):290-315.score: 12.0
    This paper offers an account of the historical development of Kant's understanding of belief ( Glaube ) from its early ties to George Friedrich Meier's Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre through various stages of refinement. It will be argued that the Critique of Pure Reason reflects an important but not final stage in Kant's understanding of belief. Its structure is further refined and its scope narrowed in later works, including the Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment . After charting (...)
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  37. Bryan Lueck (2009). Kant's Fact of Reason as Source of Normativity. Inquiry 52 (6):596 – 608.score: 12.0
    _In_ The Sources of Normativity_, Christine M. Korsgaard argues that unconditional obligation can be accounted for in terms of practical identity. My argument in this paper is that practical identity cannot play this foundational role. More specifically, I interpret Korsgaard's argument as beginning with something analogous to Kant's fact of reason, viz. with the fact that our minds are reflective. I then try to show that her determination of this fact is inadequate and that this causes the (...)
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  38. William Ramsey (2010). How Not to Build a Hybrid: Simulation Vs. Fact-Finding. Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):775-795.score: 12.0
    In accounting for the way we explain and predict behavior, two major positions are the theory-theory and the simulation theory. Recently, several authors have advocated a hybrid position, where elements of both theory and simulation are part of the account. One popular strategy for incorporating simulation is to note that we sometimes assign mental states to others by performing cognitive operations in ourselves that mirror what has occurred in the target. In this article, I argue that this way of thinking (...)
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  39. Oswald Hanfling (1996). Fact, Fiction and Feeling. British Journal of Aesthetics 36 (4):356-366.score: 12.0
    I consider and reject two kinds of solution of the problem of feelings about fictional objects: that the relevant beliefs are not really different as between fiction and fact; and that the relevant feelings are not 'really the same'. The problem should be seen in the context of different phases in acquiring the relevant feeling-concepts and I distinguish three such phases. The first is necessarily 'presentational': the child is presented with suitable objects or pictures and responds with appropriate feelings, (...)
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  40. Jonathan Sutton, How to Mistake a Trivial Fact About Probability for a Substantive Fact About Justified Belief.score: 12.0
    I am justified in believing that my lottery ticket—call it t1—will not win, on statistical grounds. Those grounds apply equally to any other ticket, so I am justified in believing of any other ticket ti (let i take values from 2 to 1000000) that it will not win. I am not, however, justified in believing the giant conjunctive proposition that t1 will not win & t2 will not win & . . . & t1,000,000 will not win. On the contrary, (...)
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  41. Colin Johnston (2007). The Unity of a Tractarian Fact. Synthese 156 (2):231-251.score: 12.0
    It is not immediately clear from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus how to connect his idea there of an object with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Toward clarification on this matter, this paper compares Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s versions of the thesis of an atomic fact that it is a complex composition. The claim arrived at is that whilst Russell (at times at least) has one particular of the elements of a fact – the relation – responsible for the unity (...)
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  42. Lars Bergström (2002). Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):117-129.score: 12.0
    In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
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  43. Achim Lohmar (2006). Why Content Relativism Does Not Imply Fact Relativism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):145-162.score: 12.0
    There is widespread belief among realists that it is consistent to think of the world as a totality of absolute facts and of our representation of the world as perspectival. As a pluralist Michael Lynch has challenged this view by arguing that relativism about representational content en tails relativism about facts. Lynch's 'T-argument' is presented and discussed in detail. It is argued not only that the 'T-argument' fails and that content relativism and fact absolutism are compatible, but also that (...)
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  44. Neil Thomason (1992). Could Lakatos, Even with Zahar's Criterion for Novel Fact, Evaluate the Copernican Research Programme? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (2):161-200.score: 12.0
    Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?’, Lakatos and Zahar argued that, on Zahar's criterion for ‘novel fact’, Copernican theory was objectively scientifically superior to Ptolemaic theory. They are mistaken, Lakatos and Zahar applied Zahar's criterion to ‘a historical thought-experiment’—fictional rather than real history. Further, in their fictional history, they compared Copernicus to Eudoxus rather than Ptolemy, ignored Tycho Brahe, and did not consider facts that would be novel for geostatic theories. When Zahar's criterion is applied to real history, (...)
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  45. Bertrand Russell (1961/1994). Fact and Fiction. Routledge.score: 12.0
    This collection of essays and stories by Bertrand Russell, the influential modern philosopher, is divided into four distinct parts. The first part is devoted to six essays on the books that influenced him in youth, broadly speaking from the age of 15 to the age of 21. For Russell, this was a time when each book was an adventure and enormously important to him when first exploring the world and trying to determine his attitude towards it. The writers whom he (...)
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  46. D. K. Johnston (2004). The Natural History of Fact. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):275 – 291.score: 12.0
    The article provides an example of the application of the techniques and results of historical linguistics to traditional problems in the philosophy of language. It takes as its starting point the dispute about the nature of facts that arose from the 1950 Aristotelian Society debate between J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson. It is shown that, in some cases, expressions containing the noun fact refer to actions and events; while (...)
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  47. Peter Jones (2006). Toleration, Value‐Pluralism, and the Fact of Pluralism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9 (2):189-210.score: 12.0
    (2006). Toleration, Value‐pluralism, and the Fact of Pluralism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 189-210.
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  48. Xinli Wang (2003). Where Are Facts? -- A Case for Internal Factual Realism. Diálogos 38 (82):7-30.score: 12.0
    What is the ontological status of facts? Are facts linguistic or extra-linguistic entities? If facts are extra-linguistic entities, are they mind-independent or relative to languages, theories or conceptual schemes? Based on a minimal definition of facts, the author argues that what are specified by true statements are not identical to true propositions expressed, so facts are not linguistic entities. Furthermore, what are specified by true statements are not to which a true statement corresponds, so facts are not mind-independent, either as (...)
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  49. Gerald Vision (2008). 'Indeed,''Really,''In Fact,''Actually'. Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):43-75.score: 12.0
    Interjections, such as those in the title, together with a few similar devices, when qualifying clauses expressing truth-conditions, or that such conditions have been satisfied, are entitled 'force-amplifiers'. Disputes between deflationary and inflationary truth-theories sometimes are assumed to turn on the supposed pivotal role that these devices are construed as playing in the interpretation of the clauses they qualify. I argue that they are not dispensable add-ons. Moreover, even in their absence the relevant clauses giving truth-conditions permit interpretations that are (...)
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  50. David Appelbaum (1987). The Fact of Reason: Kant's Prajna-Perception of Freedom. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (1):87-98.score: 12.0
    I have been experimental in my comparative approach, using the instrument of Hua-yen Buddhism to investigate Kant's ‘fact or reason’. What has been demonstrated? Certainly, the hypothesis that comparative study is flexible enough to illuminate strands of our own philosophical tradition is both interesting and compelling. But for Kant, does the study of practicability with reference to the buddhi-mind end in the perception of the dharmadhatu? I have marshalled some evidence to support this theory, implicit throughout the Second Critique. (...)
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