Search results for 'facts' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
    Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including (...)
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  2.  19
    Jürgen Habermas (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity.
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  3.  69
    Margaret Gilbert (1989). On Social Facts. Routledge.
    This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.
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  4. Riccardo Martinelli (2015). Wolfgang Köhler on Facts and Values. Dialogue and Universalism 4 (4):61-76.
    This essay is about the Wolfgang Köhler’s philosophical ideas expressed in his The Place of Value in a World of Facts of 1938. Köhler, who strongly supports a scientific world view, considers the question as to whether science is able to cope with human values, besides natural facts. Relying upon phenomenological analyses, and on his previous researches in natural philosophy, Köhler introduces his doctrine of “epistemological dualism”. From a historical point of view, this theory exhibits some similarity with (...)
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  5.  95
    Enzo Rossi (forthcoming). Facts, Principles, and Politics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. David Estlund and others have defended subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate normative political judgments. (...)
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  6.  11
    Peter Howlett & Mary S. Morgan (eds.) (2010). How Well Do Facts Travel?: The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: 1. Travelling facts Mary S. Morgan; Part I. Matters of Fact: 2. Facts and building artefacts: what travels in material objects? Simona Valeriani; 3. A journey through times and cultures? Ancient Greek forms in American 19th century architecture: an archaeological view Lambert Schneider; 4. Manning's N: putting roughness to work Sarah J. Whatmore and Catharina Landström; 5. My facts are better than your facts: spreading good news about global warming Naomi Oreskes; 6. (...)
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  7. Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26.
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
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  8. Mark Jago (2011). Setting the Facts Straight. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.
    Substantial facts are not well-understood entities. Many philosophers object to their existence on this basis. Yet facts, if they can be understood, promise to do a lot of philosophical work: they can be used to construct theories of property possession and truthmaking, for example. Here, I give a formal theory of facts, including negative and logically complex facts. I provide a theory of reduction similar to that of the typed λ -calculus and use it to provide (...)
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  9.  77
    Robert Jubb (2009). Logical and Epistemic Foundationalism About Grounding: The Triviality of Facts and Principles. Res Publica 15 (4):337-353.
    In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen ’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘ Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue (...)
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  10. J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens & Stan du Plessis (2011). What is Money? An Alternative to Searle's Institutional Facts. Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):1-22.
    In The Construction of Social Reality (1995), John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We (...)
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  11. William Bynoe (2011). Against the Compositional View of Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):91-100.
    It is commonly assumed that facts would be complex entities made out of particulars and universals. This thesis, which I call Compositionalism, holds that parthood may be construed broadly enough so that the relation that holds between a fact and the entities it ‘ties’ together counts as a kind of parthood. I argue firstly that Compositionalism is incompatible with the possibility of certain kinds of fact and universal, and, secondly, that such facts and universals are possible. I conclude (...)
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  12. Gunnar Björnsson (2007). If You Believe in Positive Facts, You Should Believe in Negative Facts. Hommage À Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    Substantial metaphysical theory has long struggled with the question of negative facts, facts capable of making it true that Valerie isn’t vigorous. This paper argues that there is an elegant solution to these problems available to anyone who thinks that there are positive facts. Bradley’s regress and considerations of ontological parsimony show that an object’s having a property is an affair internal to the object and the property, just as numerical identity and distinctness are internal to the (...)
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  13. Christina Conroy (2012). The Relative Facts Interpretation and Everett's Note Added in Proof. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (2):112-120.
    In this paper I argue that the development of what I take to be the most charitable, faithful and conservative interpretation of Hugh Everett's pure wave mechanics, the relative facts interpretation, leads to a new reading of the most famous quote of his dissertation: the note added in proof. This addresses the question of how to make sense of Everett's claim that "all elements of a superposition are "actual," none any more "real" than the rest.". I present the RFI, (...)
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  14. Achille C. Varzi (2012). The Naming of Facts. Analysis 72 (2):322-323.
    The naming of facts is a difficult matter / it isn’t just one of your holiday games..." A versification of a disturbing philosophical tribulation, after T. S. Eliot’s ‘The Naming of Cats’.
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  15. Uriah Kriegel (2005). Tropes and Facts. Metaphysica 6 (2):83-90.
    The notion that there is a single type of entity in terms of which the whole world can be described has fallen out of favor in recent Ontology. There are only two serious exceptions to this. Factualists (Skyrms 1981, Armstrong 1997) hold that the world can be fully described in terms of facts. Trope theorists (Williams 1953, Campbell 1981, 1990) hold that it can be fully described in terms of tropes. Yet the relationship between facts and tropes remains (...)
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  16.  9
    Luís Duarte D’Almeida (2016). On Pre-Conventions as ‘Normative Facts’. Revus.
    In his essay “Pre-Conventions: A Fragment of the Background”, Bruno Celano seems to endorse three claims about what he calls ‘pre-conventions’: that such ‘entities’ exist; that they are neither rules nor de facto regularities; and that their ‘character’ is at once factual and normative: that pre-conventions are “literally, ‘normative facts’.” I suggest that and are not particularly striking claims, and that Celano’s case for is unpersuasive.
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  17. Patrick Tomlin (2008). Envy, Facts and Justice: A Critique of the Treatment of Envy in Justice as Fairness. Res Publica 14 (2):101-116.
    A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. (...)
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  18. Richard Holton, Facts, Factives and Contra-Factives.
    Frege begins his discussion of factives in 'On Sense and Reference' with an example of a purported contra-factive, i.e. a verb that entails the falsity of the complement sentence. But the verb he cites, 'waehnen', is now obsolete, and native speakers are sceptical about whether it really was a contra-factive. Despite the profusion of factive verbs, there are no clear examples of contra-factive propositional attitude verbs in English, French or German (or indeed any other Indo-European languages). This paper attempts to (...)
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  19.  52
    N. MacCormick (1998). Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts. Law and Philosophy 17 (3):301-345.
    Norms explained as grounds of practical judgment, using example of queue. Some norms informal, inexact, depend on common understanding ; some articulated in context of two-tier normative order: `rules', explicit or implicit. Logical structure of rules displayed. Informal and formal normative order explained, `institutional facts ' depend on acts and events interpreted in the light of normative order. Practical force of rules differentiated; either `absolute application' or `strict application' or `discretionary application', depending on second-tier empowerment. Discretion can be guided (...)
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  20. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (1998). Mellor's Facts and Chances of Causation. Analysis 58 (3):175–181.
    Mellor´s theory of causation has two components, one according to which causes raise their effects´ chances, and one according to which causation links facts. I argue that these two components are not independent from each other and, in particular, that Mellor´s thesis that causation links facts requires his thesis that causes raise their effects´ chances, since without the latter thesis Mellor cannot stop the slingshot argument, an argument that is a threat to any theory postulating facts as (...)
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  21.  8
    Ludwig Fahrbach (2005). Understanding Brute Facts. Synthese 145 (3):449-466.
    Brute facts are facts that have no explanation. If we come to know that a fact is brute, we obviously don’t get an explanation of that fact. Nevertheless, we do make some sort of epistemic gain. In this essay, I give an account of that epistemic gain, and suggest that the idea of brute facts allows us to distinguish between the notion of explanation and the notion of understanding. I also discuss Eric Barnes’ (1994) attack on Friedman’s (...)
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  22.  18
    Michele Paolini Paoletti (2014). Falsemakers: Something Negative About Facts. Grazer Philosophische Studien 90:169-182.
    The author argues for the existence of negative facts. The first section is devoted to an argument, grounded on truthmaker maximalism, that aims at demonstrating that negative facts must exist at least as false propositions’ falsemakers. In the second section, the author analyzes and criticizes several attempts to get rid of negative facts: the ones based on incompatibilities, absences, totality facts and polarities, as well as the ones based on various restrictions on truthmaker maximalism or on (...)
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  23.  42
    M. Oreste Fiocco (2014). On Simple Facts. Res Philosophica 91 (3):287-313.
    It is plausible that every true representation is made true by something in the world beyond itself. I believe that a simple fact is the truthmaker of each true proposition. Simple facts are not familiar entities. This lack of familiarity might lead many to regard them with suspicion, to think that including them in one’s ontology is an ad hoc maneuver. Although such suspicion is warranted initially, it is, I believe, ultimately unfounded. In this paper, I first present what (...)
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  24.  82
    Mark Textor (2011). Knowing the Facts. Dialectica 65 (1):75-86.
    Keith Hossack argues in his The Metaphysics of Knowledge(2007) that knowledge is a simple and metaphysically fundamental relation between a thinker and a fact: knowledge is uptake of fact. Facts are conceived as combinations of particulars and universals, distinct from true propositions. Hossacks's general argument is, roughly, that one can define central philosophical concepts (belief, content, justification, etc.) if one assumes that knowledge is primitive, but that knowledge cannot be defined in terms of such concepts. In this paper, I (...)
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  25.  4
    Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido (2016). Celano on Normative Facts. Revus.
    In “Pre-Conventions. A Fragment of the Background”, Celano argues that there are ways of acting that can be called “conventions” which are, literally, normative facts. There are a number of interesting claims in Celano’s paper about the nature of these conventions, and showing that they amount to normative facts is only part of his strategy for establishing their significance. But given that the question of whether there are normative facts deserves a treatment of its own, the paper (...)
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  26.  34
    Sevket Benhur Oral (2014). Liberating Facts: Harman's Objects and Wilber's Holons. Studies in Philosophy and Education 33 (2):117-134.
    In this paper, an account of two novel ontologies is given to point to the need to revise the status of facts in school curriculum. It is argued that schooling is in dire need of re-enchantment. The way to re-enchant schooling is to re-enliven the world we inhabit. We need to fall head over heels in love with the world again. In order to do that, we need to shake up our conception of “the hard and cold facts (...)
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  27.  2
    Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido (2016). Celano on Normative Facts. Revus.
    In “Pre-Conventions. A Fragment of the Background”, Celano argues that there are ways of acting that can be called “conventions” which are, literally, normative facts. There are a number of interesting claims in Celano’s paper about the nature of these conventions, and showing that they amount to normative facts is only part of his strategy for establishing their significance. But given that the question of whether there are normative facts deserves a treatment of its own, the paper (...)
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  28.  25
    P. Hulsen (1998). Back to Basics: A Theory of the Emergence of Institutional Facts. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 17 (3):271-299.
    In order to account for the mode of existence of social rules and norms, the author develops a theory of the emergence of institutional facts. Just as other kinds of institutional fact, rules and norms are meanings. Therefore, insight into the emergence of social rules and norms can be achieved by studying the recognition and the communication of meanings. Following accounts of meaning and factuality, institutional facts are characterized as unquestionable shared typifications. It is argued that, in becoming (...)
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  29.  19
    Malcolm Parker (2013). Overstating Values: Medical Facts, Diverse Values, Bioethics and Values-Based Medicine. Bioethics 27 (2):97-104.
    Fulford has argued that (1) the medical concepts illness, disease and dysfunction are inescapably evaluative terms, (2) illness is conceptually prior to disease, and (3) a model conforming to (2) has greater explanatory power and practical utility than the conventional value-free medical model. This ‘reverse’ model employs Hare's distinction between description and evaluation, and the sliding relationship between descriptive and evaluative meaning. Fulford's derivative ‘Values Based Medicine’ (VBM) readjusts the imbalance between the predominance of facts over values in medicine. (...)
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  30.  19
    S. Neale (2001). Facing Facts. Clarendon Press.
    This book is an original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations ...
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  31. Crispin Wright (1986). Facts and Certainty. Proceedings of the British Academy 71:429-472.
  32. Guy Longworth, Surveying the Facts.
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  33.  46
    Roger Wertheimer, Forms, Facts &Truth.
  34.  21
    Ulrich Meyer (2016). Tense, Propositions, and Facts. Synthese 193 (11):3691-3699.
    This paper aims to clarify the connection between the logic of temporal distinctions and the temporal features of propositions. Contra Prior, it argues that the adoption of tense operators does not commit one to the view that propositions can change their truth value over time.
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  35.  5
    Peter Hylton (1992). Review of An Essay on Facts by Kenneth Russell Olson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 101 (2):409-411.
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  36.  38
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2003). Review of "Facing Facts", by S. Neale. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (448):780-786.
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  37. Bede Rundle (1993). Facts.
     
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  38.  5
    Alessandro Salice & Luca Tummolini (2014). Social Facts: Metaphysical and Empirical Perspectives—an Introduction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):1-5.
  39.  3
    Silvia Manzo (2014). Certainty, Laws and Facts in Francis Bacon’s Jurisprudence. Intellectual History Review 24 (4):457-478.
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  40. Wesley Cragg (1973). Facts and Values.
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  41. M. C. Doeser & J. N. Kraay (eds.) (1986). Facts and Values: Philosophical Reflections From Western and Non-Western Perspectives. M. Nijhoff.
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  42. J. F. Glastra van Loon (1973). Facts Are Not Facts. The Hague,Institute of Social Studies.
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  43.  39
    John Cusbert & Kristie Miller (forthcoming). The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if (...)
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  44.  69
    D. H. Mellor (1995). The Facts of Causation. Routledge.
    The Facts of Causation grapples with one of philosophy's most enduring issues. Causation is central to all of our lives. What we see and hear causes us to believe certain facts about the world. We need that information to know how to act and how to cause the effects we desire. D. H. Mellor, a leading scholar in the philosophy of science and metaphysics, offers a comprehensive theory of causation. Many questions about causation remain unsettled. In science, the (...)
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  45. Catherine Elgin (2007). Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):33 - 42.
    If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish (...)
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  46.  75
    Aidan Lyon (2012). Mathematical Explanations Of Empirical Facts, And Mathematical Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):559-578.
    A main thread of the debate over mathematical realism has come down to whether mathematics does explanatory work of its own in some of our best scientific explanations of empirical facts. Realists argue that it does; anti-realists argue that it doesn't. Part of this debate depends on how mathematics might be able to do explanatory work in an explanation. Everyone agrees that it's not enough that there merely be some mathematics in the explanation. Anti-realists claim there is nothing mathematics (...)
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  47. William Casebeer (2003). Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. MIT Press.
    In Natural Ethical Facts William Casebeer argues that we can articulate a fully naturalized ethical theory using concepts from evolutionary biology and cognitive science, and that we can study moral cognition just as we study other forms of cognition. His goal is to show that we have "softly fixed" human natures, that these natures are evolved, and that our lives go well or badly depending on how we satisfy the functional demands of these natures. Natural Ethical Facts is (...)
     
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  48. Colin Cheyne & Charles Pigden (2006). Negative Truths From Positive Facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):249 – 265.
    According to the truthmaker theory that we favour, all contingent truths are made true by existing facts or states of affairs. But if that is so, then it appears that we must accept the existence of the negative facts that are required to make negative truths (such as 'There is no hippopotamus in the room.') true. We deny the existence of negative facts, show how negative truths are made true by positive facts, point out where the (...)
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  49.  47
    Chris Tillman (2016). Essence Facts and Explanation. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):190-195.
    Some essence facts have metaphysical explanations. Some metaphysical explanations for essence facts consist in nonessential facts.
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  50. Patrick Todd (2013). Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.
    In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the (...)
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