Search results for 'factuality' (try it on Scholar)

731 found
Sort by:
  1. Bojan žalec (2004). Veber on Knowledge and Factuality. Acta Analytica 19 (33):241-263.score: 18.0
    The article deals with the development of the philosophy of France Veber (1890–1975), the pupil of Meinong and a main Slovene philosopher. One of the most important threads of Veber’s philosophy is the consideration of knowledge and factuality, which may be seen as a driving force of its development. Veber’s philosophical development is usually divided into three phases: the object theory phase, the phase when he created his philosophy of a person as a creature at the crossing of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Gregory Currie (1999). Is Factuality a Matter of Content? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-763.score: 12.0
    Dienes & Perner argue that there is a hierarchy of forms of implicit knowledge. One level of their hierarchy involves factuality, where it may be merely implicit that the state of affairs is supposed to be a real one rather than something imagined or fictional. I argue that the factual or fictional status of a thought or utterance cannot be a matter of concept, implicit or explicit.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Shaun Nichols & Claudia Uller (1999). Explicit Factuality and Comparative Evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):776-777.score: 12.0
    We argue that Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) proposal needs to specify independent criteria when a subject explicitly represents factuality. This task is complicated by the fact that people typically “tacitly” believe that each of their beliefs is a fact. This problem does not arise for comparative evidence on monkeys, for they presumably lack the capacity to represent factuality explicitly. D&P suggest that explicit visual processing and declarative memory depend on explicit representations of factuality, whereas the analogous implicit (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Reinhardt Grossmann (1976). The Factuality of Facts. Grazer Philosophische Studien 2:85-103.score: 12.0
    It is argued that, while there is no such property as truth, there is a feature of factuality which certain states of affairs have and others lack. Since states of affairs can appear before the mind as having this feature when, in reality, they do not have it, a most difficult epistemological problem arises, namely, how to distinguish between a state of affairs which merely appears to have factuality and a state of affairs which really is factual. The (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Hilary Putnam (1989). Model Theory and the 'Factuality' of Semantics. In Alexander George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Basil Blackwell. 213--232.score: 9.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Robert P. McArthur (1974). Factuality and Modality in the Future Tense. Noûs 8 (3):283-288.score: 9.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Yitzhak Benbaji & Menachem Fisch (2005). Factuality Without Realism: Normativity and the Davidsonian Approach to Meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):505-530.score: 9.0
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Nicolas J. Zaunbrecher (2012). Suspending Belief and Suspending Doubt: The Everyday and the Virtual in Practices of Factuality. [REVIEW] Human Studies 35 (4):519-537.score: 9.0
    From an ethnomethodological perspective, this article describes social actors’ everyday and virtual stances in terms of their practices of provisional doubt and belief for the purpose of fact-establishment. Facts are iterated, reinforced, elaborated, and transformed via phenomenal practices configuring relations of equipment, interpretation, and method organized as “other” than, but relevant to, the everyday. Such practices in scientific research involve forms of suspended belief; in other areas they can instead involve forms of suspended doubt. As an illuminating example of this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Manuel Aguirre (1976). Factuality and Modality. Universitaire Instelling Antwerpen, Departementen Ger & Rom, Afd. Linguis̈tiek.score: 9.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Menachem Fisch (2005). Factuality Without Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):505-530.score: 9.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. F. Modenato (1999). The Objective of Factuality According to Alexius Meinong. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 54 (3):437-464.score: 9.0
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Kurt Weinke (1985). Kierkegaard's Chagrin. The Logic of Factuality in the “Philosophical Fragments”. Philosophy and History 18 (1):21-23.score: 9.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Xinli Wang (2003). Where Are Facts? -- A Case for Internal Factual Realism. Diálogos 38 (82):7-30.score: 6.0
    What is the ontological status of facts? Are facts linguistic or extra-linguistic entities? If facts are extra-linguistic entities, are they mind-independent or relative to languages, theories or conceptual schemes? Based on a minimal definition of facts, the author argues that what are specified by true statements are not identical to true propositions expressed, so facts are not linguistic entities. Furthermore, what are specified by true statements are not to which a true statement corresponds, so facts are not mind-independent, either as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Rodrigo Laera (ed.) (2011). Los desvíos de la razón: el lugar de la facticidad en la cadena de justificaciones. Miño y Dávila.score: 6.0
    Moviéndose con libertad entre distintas tradiciones filosóficas, ajeno a cualquier división escolar del pensamiento, el autor describe las formas que toma el simulacro en un recorrido de gran alcance, que abarca desde teoría de la referencia hasta la ontología existencial. "`Todo lo que es profundo ama la máscara´, escribió Nietzsche. En efecto, ¿qué es nuestra existencia, sino una inmensa mascarada? Vivimos como si entendiéramos lo que sucede a nuestro alrededor. Nos comportamos como si pudiéramos prever las consecuencias de nuestros actos. (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Gitte Meyer, Anna Paldam Folker, Rikke Bagger Jørgensen, Martin Krayer von Krauss, Peter Sandøe & Geir Tveit (2005). The Factualization of Uncertainty: Risk, Politics, and Genetically Modified Crops – a Case of Rape. [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 22 (2):235-242.score: 6.0
    Mandatory risk assessment is intended to reassure concerned citizens and introduce reason into the heated European controversies on genetically modified crops and food. The authors, examining a case of risk assessment of genetically modified oilseed rape, claim that the new European legislation on risk assessment does nothing of the sort and is not likely to present an escape from the international deadlock on the use of genetic modification in agriculture and food production. The new legislation is likely to stimulate the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. John Bolender (1998). Factual Phenomenalism: A Supervenience Theory. Sorites 9 (9):16-31.score: 5.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. John T. Saunders (1965). Does All Memory Imply Factual Memory? Analysis 25 (January):109-115.score: 5.0
  18. Jo Eggen (2007). What Did He Actually Say? About Translation as Politics and Interpretation in Factual Literature. Filozofija I Drustvo 18 (2):173-186.score: 5.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. John Cantwell (2008). Indicative Conditionals:Factual or Epistemic? Studia Logica 88 (1):157 - 194.score: 4.0
    It is argued that indicative conditionals are best viewed as having truth conditions (and so they are in part factual) but that these truth conditions are ‘gappy’ which leaves an explanatory gap that can only be filled by epistemic considerations (and so indicative conditionals are in part epistemic). This dual nature of indicative conditionals gives reason to rethink the relationship between logic viewed as a descriptive discipline (focusing on semantics) and logic viewed as a discipline with a normative import (focusing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Mioara Mugur-Schächter (1992). Toward a Factually Induced Space-Time Quantum Logic. Foundations of Physics 22 (7):963-994.score: 4.0
    In the present work are identified the main features of the algebraic structure with respect to the logical operations, of the set of all the quantum mechanical utterances for which can be specified a factual counterpart and factual rules for truth valuation. This structure is found not to be a lattice. It depends crucially on the spacetime features of the operations by which the observer prepares the studied states and performs measurements on them.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Paolo Cherubini, Alberto Mazzocco, Simona Gardini & Aurore Russo (2001). A Re-Examination of Illusory Inferences Based on Factual Conditional Sentences. Mind and Society 2 (2):9-25.score: 4.0
    According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment I); (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Władysław Krajewski (1977). Idealization and Factualization in Science. Erkenntnis 11 (1):323 - 339.score: 4.0
    This paper considers the method of idealization and factualization as the main method of all advanced empirical science. The procedure is as follows. Some idealizing conditions are assumed: the vanishing of factors $(p_{i}=0)$ which never vanish in the real world. An idealization law is formulated -- a law which is exactly (non-vacuously) fulfilled only in an ideal model, not in any real system. Then the idealizing assumptions are abrogated one by one-it is a process of gradual factualization, of the transition (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. David R. Mandel (2003). Effect of Counterfactual and Factual Thinking on Causal Judgements. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):245 – 265.score: 4.0
    The significance of counterfactual thinking in the causal judgement process has been emphasized for nearly two decades, yet no previous research has directly compared the relative effect of thinking counterfactually versus factually on causal judgement. Three experiments examined this comparison by manipulating the task frame used to focus participants' thinking about a target event. Prior to making judgements about causality, preventability, blame, and control, participants were directed to think about a target actor either in counterfactual terms (what the actor could (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. R. G. Swinburne (1973). Confirmability and Factual Meaningfulness. Analysis 33 (3):71 - 76.score: 4.0
    THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONFIRMATIONIST PRINCIPLE, THAT A STATEMENT IS FACTUALLY MEANINGFUL IF AND ONLY IF IT IS AN OBSERVATION-STATEMENT, OR THERE ARE OBSERVATION STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD CONFIRM OR DISCONFIRM IT. THIS PRINCIPLE IS THE FINAL WEAK CLAIM OF VERIFICATIONISM. EVEN IF TRUE, IT WOULD NOT BE OF GREAT USE IN SORTING OUT THE MEANINGFUL FROM THE MEANINGFULNESS, BUT IT IS SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY TO BE FALSE. A CLAIM THAT THERE IS A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THAT MEN WILL EVER (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Tony Hak (1998). "There Are Clear Delusions." The Production of a Factual Account. Human Studies 21 (4):419-436.score: 4.0
    This paper presents a case study of a psychiatric intervention as an example of an institutional ethnography of psychiatric work. Institutional ethnography, a mode of inquiry outlined by Dorothy Smith (1987), is conceived here as an approach to the analysis of work in institutions as the contingent, local and context-bound insertion of a particular "case" - a patron, a pupil, a client, a patient - into both institutional and other social (e. g. gender, class) relations. The case presented in this (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Douglas Ehring (1986). Causation and Causal Factuals. Erkenntnis 25 (1):77 - 84.score: 4.0
    Martin bunzl in "causal factuals" ("erkenntnis" 21, 1984) attempts to adapt and improve upon an approach to causation associated with the counterfactual theory of causation. Bunzl proposes to use possible world semantics to analyze causal sentences without reference to counterfactuals. In this paper I argue that bunzl's analysis is subject to problem cases which bear a close resemblance to those which plague counterfactual theory.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Alan G. Nasser (1971). Factual and Logical Necessity and the Ontological Argument. International Philosophical Quarterly 11 (3):385-402.score: 4.0
    Philosophers from anselm and scotus to hartshorne and malcolm have argued that the true claim that God is a necessary being implies that theism is a-Priori demonstrable. Philosophers such as hick, Penelhum, And geach have denied this, Contending 1) that god's necessity is factual, Indicating his eternal independence, Rather than logical, Indicating his existence in all possible worlds, And 2) that from the former nothing follows a-Priori about the truth or falsity of theism. I argue that factual and logical necessity (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Stephanie Roberts & Lynne Weathered (2009). Assisting the Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1):43-70.score: 4.0
    The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) was the first publicly funded body created to investigate claims of wrongful conviction, with the power to refer cases to the Court of Appeal. In other countries, such as Australia, Canada and the United States, many regard the CCRC as the optimal solution to wrongful conviction and, for years, Innocence Projects in these countries have called for the establishment of a CCRC-style body in their own jurisdictions. However, it is now Innocence Projects which are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Andrew Botterell & Chris Essert (2010). Normativity, Fairness, and the Problem of Factual Uncertainty. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 47 (4):663-693.score: 4.0
    This article concerns the problem of factual uncertainty in negligence law. We argue that negligence law’s insistence that fair terms of interaction be maintained between individuals—a requirement that typically manifests itself in the need for the plaintiff to prove factual or “but-for” causation—sometimes allows for the imposition of liability in the absence of such proof. In particular, we argue that the but-for requirement can be abandoned in certain situations where multiple defendants have imposed the same unreasonable risk on a plaintiff, (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Kit Fine (2001). The Question of Realism. Philosophers' Imprint 1 (2):1-30.score: 3.0
    This paper distinguishes two kinds of realist issue -- the issue of whether the propositions of a given domain are factual and the issue of whether they are fundamental. It criticizes previous accounts of what these issues come to and suggests that they are to be understood in terms of a basic metaphysical concept of reality. This leaves open the question of how such issues are to be resolved; and it is argued that this may be done through consideration of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Mark Balaguer (2011). Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism? Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.score: 3.0
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. David Macarthur (2007). Wittgenstein and Scepticism - Edited by Denis Mcmanus. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 48 (2):168-170.score: 3.0
    Wittgenstein has been likened to a Pyrrhonian sceptic, one who employs dialectical skills to avoid rather than defend doctrine, but it is his role in exposing and excavating the sands upon which modern scepticisms have been built that is the subject of this new volume of largely original essays. The first three chapters, by Crispin Wright, Akeel Bilgrami and Michael Williams find inspiration in On Certainty for singling out key moves in the initial set-up of external world scepticism; the next (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Peter Unger (1968). An Analysis of Factual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.score: 3.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Françoise Dastur (2000). Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise. Hypatia 15 (4):178-189.score: 3.0
    How, asks Françoise Dastur, can philosophy account for the sudden happening and the factuality of the event? Dastur asks how phenomenology, in particular the work of Heidegger, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty, may be interpreted as offering such an account. She argues that the "paradoxical capacity of expecting surprise is always in question in phenomenology," and for this reason, she concludes, "We should not oppose phenomenology and the thinking of the event. We should connect them; openness to phenomena must be identified (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Hartry Field (1994). Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse. Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.score: 3.0
  36. Michael Baumgartner (2010). Shallow Analysis and the Slingshot Argument. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):531-556.score: 3.0
    According to the standard opinions in the literature, blocking the unacceptable consequences of the notorious slingshot argument requires imposing constraints on the metaphysics of facts or on theories of definite descriptions (or class abstracts). This paper argues that both of these well-known strategies to rebut the slingshot overshoot the mark. The slingshot, first and foremost, raises the question as to the adequate logical formalization of statements about facts, i.e. of factual contexts. It will be shown that a rigorous application of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Matthew McGrath (2005). No Objects, No Problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):457 – 486.score: 3.0
    One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited survive the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, we examine one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. William Sin (2012). Internalization and Moral Demands. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):163-175.score: 3.0
    How should we assess the burden of moral demands? A predominant assessment is provided by what Murphy calls the baseline of factual status-quo (FSQ): A moral theory is demanding if the level of agents’ well-being is reduced from the time they begin to comply perfectly with the theory. The aims of my paper are threefold. I will first discuss the limits of the FSQ baseline. Second, I suggest a different assessment, which examines moral demands from a whole-life perspective. My view (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. William T. Scott (1982). The Question of a Religious Reality: Commentary on the Polanyi Papers. Zygon 17 (1):83-87.score: 3.0
    . Two aspects of the problem of interpreting Michael Polanyi’s outlook on religion are discussed. First, various ways of relating to reality beyond the objective perception of factuality must be considered, including the shift from I-It to I-Thou relations, and the self-giving mode of surrender to a symbolized reality. Second, the active use of the imagination in perception involves a commitment that the image is of something real, transcending the person. I believe that Polanyi understands both religious rituals and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Constantin Antonopoulos (2005). Making the Quantum of Relevance. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):223 - 241.score: 3.0
    The two Heisenberg Uncertainties (UR) entail an incompatibility between the two pairs of conjugated variables E, t and p, q. But incompatibility comes in two kinds, exclusive of one another. There is incompatibility defineable as: (p → -q) & (q → -p) or defineable as [(p → -q) & (q → -p)] ↔ r. The former kind is unconditional, the latter conditional. The former, in accordance, is fact independent, and thus a matter of logic, the latter fact dependent, and thus (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Mark T. Nelson (2003). Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? Argumentation 17 (1):35-42.score: 3.0
    Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Ram Neta (2006). Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for Epistemology. Synthese 150 (2):247 - 280.score: 3.0
    Many epistemologists are interested in offering a positive account of how it is that many of our common sense beliefs enjoy one or another positive epistemological status (e.g., how they are warranted, justified, reasonable, or what have you). A number of philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein and/or J. L. Austin, have argued that this enterprise is misconceived. The most effective version of this argument is to be found in Mark Kaplan’s paper “Epistemology on Holiday”. After explaining what this criticism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Patricia Marino (2006). What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do? Philosophical Studies 127 (3):415 - 457.score: 3.0
    Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – “true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,” or implausible – “true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.” I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ldquo;modest” correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Barry Ward (2002). Humeanism Without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-208.score: 3.0
    Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and thereductive Humean analyses that entail it leadsto a litany of inadequately explained conflictswith our intuitions regarding laws andpossibilities. However, the non-reductiveHumeanism developed here, on which law claimsare understood as normative rather than factstating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide aset of consistency relations that ground asemantics formulated in terms offactual-normative worlds, solving theFrege-Geach problem of construing unassertedcontexts. This set of factual-normative worldsincludes exactly the intuitive sets ofnomologically possible worlds associated witheach possible (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Jim Bogen (2004). Analysing Causality: The Opposite of Counterfactual is Factual. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):3 – 26.score: 3.0
    Using Jim Woodward's Counterfactual Dependency account as an example, I argue that causal claims about indeterministic systems cannot be satisfactorily analysed as including counterfactual conditionals among their truth conditions because the counterfactuals such accounts must appeal to need not have truth values. Where this happens, counterfactual analyses transform true causal claims into expressions which are not true.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Douglas Husak (2012). Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on 'The Transfer Principle'. Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):399-410.score: 3.0
    Gideon Yaffe is to be commended for beginning his exhaustive treatment by asking a surprisingly difficult question: Why punish attempts at all? He addresses this inquiry in the context of defending (what he calls) the transfer principle: “If a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized.” I begin by expressing a few reservations about the transfer principle itself. But my main point is that we are justified (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Stanley Munsat (1965). A Note on Factual Memory. Philosophical Studies 16 (3):33-39.score: 3.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Joseph J. Sartorelli (1991). McGinn on Content Scepticism and Kripke's Sceptical Argument. Analysis 51 (March):79-84.score: 3.0
    In Wittgenstein on Meaning, Colin McGinn argues that the skeptical argument that Kripke distills from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations generates at most what might be called meaning skepticism (the non-factuality view of meaning), and not concept skepticism (the non-factuality view of concepts). If correct, this would mean the skeptical reasoning is far less significant than Kripke thinks. Others have seemed to agree with McGinn. I argue that McGinn is wrong here--that, in fact, Kripke's skeptical reasoning has a straightforward extension (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Barry C. Smith (2007). Can We Say More About Factual Discourse? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):413–420.score: 3.0
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Sami Pihlström (2010). Toward a Pragmatically Naturalist Metaphysics of the Fact-Value Entanglement. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:323-352.score: 3.0
    This paper examines the metaphysical status of the fact-value entanglement. According to Hilary Putnam, among others, this is a major theme in both classical and recent pragmatism, but its relevance obviously extends beyond pragmatism scholarship. The pragmatic naturalist must make sense of the entanglement thesis within a broadly non-reductively naturalist account of reality. Two rival options for such metaphysics are discussed: values may be claimed to emerge from facts (or normativity from factuality), or fact and value may be considered (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 731