2. Before getting down to business, two assumptions underlying the subsequent discussion should be made explicit. The first concerns the choice of methods. Our problem is one of the proper description of a distinctive fact of consciousness, but there is an indirect as well as a direct manner of approach. The indirect approach would be to examine the structure of the language used in talk about such a feeling of freedom; the direct approach would be to employ to (...) the full our capacities of attention to the contents of consciousness. These linguistic and phenomenological methods are in many cases complementary, each suggesting to the other directions which might be followed to advantage. In the present case, however, the indirect approach seems ill-fitted to be of any substantial use, for it must be obvious, in the first place, that the relevant talk is found among professional philosophers only and, in the second place, where such talk is found it is confessedly meager beside that to which it is intended to draw our attention. Talk which concerns itself with the importance of attending to the phenomenon itself is peculiarly modest and self-effacing talk. In light of this fact my remarks will be similarly phenomena-oriented. My method will be direct. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. (...) I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise. (shrink)

Aesthetic hedonists agree that an aesthetic value is a property of an item that stands in some constitutive relation to pleasure. Surprisingly, however, aesthetic hedonists need not reduce aesthetic normativity to hedonic normativity. They might demarcate aesthetic value as a species of hedonic value, but deny that the reason we have to appreciate an item is simply that it pleases. Such is the approach taken by an important strand of South Asian rasa theory that is represented with great clarity and (...) ingenuity in the work of K. C. Bhattacharyya. Bhattacharyya is an aesthetic hedonist who grounds aesthetic normativity in freedom. (shrink)

Despite his rejection of the metaphysical conception of freedom of the will, Nietzsche frequently makes positive use of the language of freedom, autonomy, self-mastery, self-overcoming, and creativity when describing his normative project of enhancing humanity through the promotion of its highest types. A number of interpreters have been misled by such language to conclude that Nietzsche accepts some version of compatibilism, holding a theory of natural causality that excludes metaphysical or “libertarian” freedom of the will, while endorsing (...) morally substantial alternative conceptions of freedom, autonomy, and responsibility. I argue to the contrary that although Nietzsche’s rejection of... (shrink)

Critics of Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy argue that Arendt fails to address the most important problem of political judgment, namely, validity. This essay shows that Arendt does indeed have an answer to the problem that preoccupies her critics, with one important caveat: she does not think that validity is the all-important problem of political judgment--the affirmation of human freedom is.

My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are the deduction (...) of pure concepts of understanding and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason. The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”. (shrink)

Salsa dancing, a partnered dance premised on the felt sense of connection, is well suited to an exploration of Henry’s radical phenomenology of immanence and Heidegger’s facticity of life. Birthed in social celebratory contexts, salsa carries a particular motile freedom. What matters most is not how the dance movements are created from an outer frame of reference, but the experience of interactive responsiveness that emerges from unanticipated acts of giving life to another. Connecting to one’s partner and exuding a (...) presence filled with life is revealed in an indepth interview with two-time world champion salsa dancer, judge, choreographer and coach, Anya Katsevman. This interview attempts to invoke the kinetic, kinesthetic and affective registers of the lividness and livingness of salsa dancing. As a phenomenological inquiry into factical life, the inter-view is presented not so much as a matter of shared perspectives or viewpoints, but more in the way of an inter-feeling, a practice of life engagement. This affectively-oriented approach provides both promise and challenge to the field of phenomenology. It invites us to delve more deeply into feeling acts of seeing. It also helps us understand how, through attending more fully to acts of seeing, we can increase the intensity with which we feel the upsurge of life. (shrink)

The essays collected in this volume by Paul Guyer, one of the world's foremost Kant scholars, explore Kant's attempt to develop a morality grounded on the intrinsic and unconditional value of the human freedom to set our own ends. When regulated by the principle that the freedom of all is equally valuable, the freedom to set our own ends -- what Kant calls "humanity" - becomes what he calls autonomy. These essays explore Kant's strategies for establishing the (...) premise that freedom is the inner worth of the world or the essential end of humankind, as he says, and for deriving the specific duties that fundamental principle of morality generates in the empirical circumstances of human existence. The Virtues of Freedom further investigates Kant's attempts to prove that we are always free to live up to this moral ideal, that is, that we have free will no matter what, as well as his more successful explorations of the ways in which our natural tendencies to be moral -- dispositions to the feeling of respect and more specific feelings such as love and self-esteem -- can and must be cultivated and educated. Guyer finally examines the various models of human community that Kant develops from his premise that our associations must be based on the value of freedom for all. The contrasts but also similarities of Kant's moral philosophy to that of David Hume but many of his other predecessors and contemporaries, such as Stoics and Epicureans, Pufendorf and Wolff, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith, are also explored. (shrink)

What is freedom? In this study, Thomas Dumm challenges the conventions that have governed discussions and debates concerning modern freedom by bringing the work of Michel Foucault into dialogue with contemporary liberal thought. While Foucault has been widely understood to have characterized the modern era as being opposed to the realization of freedom, Dumm shows how this characterization conflates Foucault’s genealogy of discipline with his overall view of the practices of being free. Dumm demonstrates how Foucault’s critical (...) genealogy does not shrink from understanding the ways in which modern subjects are constrained and shaped by forces greater than themselves, but how it instead works through these constraints to provide, not simply a vision of liberation, but a joyous wisdom concerned with showing us, in his words, that we “are much freer than we feel.” Both as an introduction to Foucault and as an intervention in liberal theory, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom is bound to change how we think about the limits and possibilities of freedom in late modernity. (shrink)

The main idea behind this article is that in order to understand themeaning that Kant’s political philosophy is rendered to by the givensocio-historical context of a community we need to turn for help toartistic genius whose subjective “I” holds a general feeling of the worldand life. It is in this sense that authors of great novels can help us in twoways. First, their works summarise for our imagination artistic truth aboutman’s capacity for humanity, the very thing that Kant considers (...) to bethe scientifically improvable “fact of reason”. Second, works of greatwriters offer for our insight destinies of individuals who decide to pursuemoral dictate in a society, thus actualising the potential that lies hiddenin all of us, making us worthy of respect. As we lack objective scientificstandard of measurement, artist’s universal feeling of the world is impressedupon us through a narrative about a man who, in a given society and ina given moment, decides to exercise his autonomy and seek the divinein himself. Contemporary social scientists’ attempts to prove historicalprogress is characterised by the very lack of humbleness. Referring tothe great novelists’ works in this article is aimed to remind scientists ofrestraint and self-control demanded from them by the citizen of Konigsberg. (shrink)

Human rights theory generally conceptualizes freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief as well as freedom of opinion and expression, as offering absolute protection in what is called the forum internum. At a minimum, this is taken to mean the right to maintain thoughts in one’s own mind, whatever they may be and independently of how others may feel about them. However, if we adopt this stance, it seems to imply that there exists an absolute right to hold (...) psychotic delusions. This article takes the position that this conclusion is ethically problematic from the perspective of psychiatric treatment and the rights of persons with psychosis. The article reflects on this particular challenge and sets forth an understanding of freedom in the forum internum that might apply to situations where for various reasons it is not, necessarily accurate to maintain that persons have an absolute right to their own thoughts. For the purpose of proposing such an understanding, the article engages with current debates within human rights theory and political philosophy and analyzes discussions about psychotic delusions and the way in which involuntary treatment is justified. Based on this analysis, this article in turn conceptualizes freedom in the forum internum as ‘negative liberty’, ‘authenticity’, and ‘capability’. This article suggests that when forum internum is redefined as encompassing a right to certain internal capabilities, the right remains meaningful for persons with psychotic delusions as well. (shrink)

Globalization and a Normative Framework of Freedom The author considers the question of whether or even what normative structure of social order is able to encourage the advancement of the measure of positive liberty in the process of globalization. Related to this is the issue of the insufficiency of guarantees provided by orthodox liberalism for human self-determination. The author considers possible scenarios as to the way in which an elite cosmopolitan minority, profiting from globalization and feeling no responsibility (...) for the majority left to its own fate, would pursue its own interests. The ideas of Ralf Dahrendorf concerning the global rule of law in the name of freedom and the need for international law are referred to. Globalization is occurring just as Marx intuitively predicted: capitalism becomes the bearer of hidden immanent self-destructive mechanisms. In conclusion, the author's hypothesis is that the new era of law in the 21st century will ensure that certain civilization legal norms become natural or customary. (shrink)

The main idea behind this article is that in order to understand the meaning that Kant?s political philosophy is rendered to by the given socio-historical context of a community we need to turn for help to artistic genius whose subjective?I? holds a general feeling of the world and life. It is in this sense that authors of great novels can help us in two ways. First, their works summarise for our imagination artistic truth about man?s capacity for humanity, the (...) very thing that Kant considers to be the scientifically improvable?fact of reason?. Second, works of great writers offer for our insight destinies of individuals who decide to pursue moral dictate in a society, thus actualising the potential that lies hidden in all of us, making us worthy of respect. As we lack objective scientific standard of measurement, artist?s universal feeling of the world is impressed upon us through a narrative about a man who, in a given society and in a given moment, decides to exercise his autonomy and seek the divine in himself. Contemporary social scientists? attempts to prove historical progress is characterised by the very lack of humbleness. Referring to the great novelists? works in this article is aimed to remind scientists of restraint and self-control demanded from them by the citizen of Konigsberg. nema. (shrink)

All but two of the essays included in this book were previously published in full, but many are in proceedings volumes or periodicals not likely to be readily available. Their presentation here in logical groupings is a useful service. In a prophetic and oracular style, Heschel presents existentialist perceptions from a Jewish standpoint on subjects such as "Religion in a Free Society," "Religion and Race," "Depth Theology," "Sacred Image of Man," "The Ecumenical Movement," "Prayer as Discipline," and "Jews in the (...) Soviet Union." Illustrative of his style is the following paragraph: "Every child is a prince; every man is obliged to feel that the world was created for his sake. Man is not the measure of all things, but the means by which to accomplish all tasks." Of the difference between ordinary theology and depth theology, he writes: "Theology strives for communication...; depth theology strives for insight.... Theology is like sculpture, depth theology is like music. Theology is in the books; depth theology is in the hearts.... Theologies divide us; depth theology unites us." The author describes religion as made up not only of ritual and myth, which are generally recognized as essential components, but also of a vital additional ingredient, namely, "innerness". Innerness, he concludes, is "the heart of religious existence."—W. G. (shrink)

All but two of the essays included in this book were previously published in full, but many are in proceedings volumes or periodicals not likely to be readily available. Their presentation here in logical groupings is a useful service. In a prophetic and oracular style, Heschel presents existentialist perceptions from a Jewish standpoint on subjects such as "Religion in a Free Society," "Religion and Race," "Depth Theology," "Sacred Image of Man," "The Ecumenical Movement," "Prayer as Discipline," and "Jews in the (...) Soviet Union." Illustrative of his style is the following paragraph: "Every child is a prince; every man is obliged to feel that the world was created for his sake. Man is not the measure of all things, but the means by which to accomplish all tasks." Of the difference between ordinary theology and depth theology, he writes: "Theology strives for communication...; depth theology strives for insight.... Theology is like sculpture, depth theology is like music. Theology is in the books; depth theology is in the hearts.... Theologies divide us; depth theology unites us." The author describes religion as made up not only of ritual and myth, which are generally recognized as essential components, but also of a vital additional ingredient, namely, "innerness". Innerness, he concludes, is "the heart of religious existence."—W. G. (shrink)

The author considers the particularities of Jiddu Krishnamurti’s negativism. Jiddu Krishnamurti is a well-known thinker, spiritual teacher, and master, who did not join in with anytrend of religion, philosophy or social and political movements. The atypical nature of his negativism is that Jeddah Krishnamurti rejects the external forms of achieving freedom and truth, emphasizing the impossibility of cultivating and developing a sense of love, and draws attention to the need for an internal revolution here and now. It is carried (...) out only on the basis of a choiceless, total, and careful observation of the whole field of life, which includes the individual and society, the observer and the observed. Such observation leads to the destruction of the self as a center in which the past (experience) and projection (future) are intertwined. Being here and now, without any support for the past or for the future, a person realizes truth and freedom, and her/his only feeling is the love for the whole creation. The significance of the basic concepts used by Jiddu Krishnamurti several times to explain his position during meetings, as well as in his books is analyzed. These are concepts of active now, unconscious awareness, conditionality, denial, nothingness, emptiness, that make possible certain streamlining of his philosophy and defining its basic concepts. (shrink)

The author considers the particularities of Jiddu Krishnamurti’s negativism. Jiddu Krishnamurti is a well-known thinker, spiritual teacher, and master, who did not join in with any trend of religion, philosophy or social and political movements. The atypical nature of his negativism is that Jeddah Krishnamurti rejects the external forms of achieving freedom and truth, emphasizing the impossibility of cultivating and developing a sense of love, and draws attention to the need for an internal revolution here and now. It is (...) carried out only on the basis of a choiceless, total, and careful observation of the whole field of life, which includes the individual and society, the observer and the observed. Such observation leads to the destruction of the self as a centre in which the past (experience) and projection (future) are intertwined. Being here and now, without any support for the past or for the future, a person realizes truth and freedom, and her/his only feeling is the love for the whole creation. The significance of the basic concepts used by Jiddu Krishnamurti several times to explain his position during meetings, as well as in his books is analyzed. These are concepts of active now, unconscious awareness, conditionality, denial, nothingness, emptiness, that make possible certain streamlining of his philosophy and defining its basic concepts. (shrink)

This interesting and important contribution to scholarship on Kant’s account of sublime feeling develops an argument that the author first makes in an article, “Kant’s Consistency Regarding the Regime Change in France” (Philosophy and Social Criticism 32 [2006]: 443–60). The heart of the argument, presented in chapters 2 through 5, concludes that aesthetic enthusiasm (Enthusiasm, which Clewis distinguishes from Schwärmerei, or fanaticism) is a kind of sublime feeling, which can indirectly support morality and thus elicit an interest of (...) reason (as Kant claims the beautiful does). In chapter 6, Clewis uses the foregoing analysis to resolve an apparent inconsistency between Kant’s remarks on the enthusiasm of .. (shrink)

In the Ethics, Spinoza famously rejects freedom of the will. He also offers an error theory for why many believe, falsely, that the will is free. Standard accounts of his arguments for these claims focus on their efficacy against incompatibilist views of free will. For Spinoza, the will cannot be free since it is determined by an infinite chain of external causes. And the pervasive belief in free will arises from a structural limitation of our self-knowledge: because we are (...) aware of our actions but unaware of their causes, we suppose that we alone must be responsible for them. Yet I argue that the standard accounts miss a further element of Spinoza’s arguments that also targets compatibilist views on which free will is consistent with a specific kind of determination—namely, self-determination in accordance with our value judgments. For Spinoza, we are misled not only in supposing that our actions lack external determination but also in thinking that they are determined by our representations of value. In fact, our actions are determined by our appetites, which are blind to our value judgments. And the pervasive belief that our actions are determined by such judgments arises from the projection of value onto the objects we seek. As he denies us free will, then, Spinoza also denies us a capacity central to agency—the capacity to determine our actions in accordance with our ideas of the good. This makes his arguments against free will more consequential, and more radical, than commonly assumed. (shrink)

Freedom of mind.--Subjunctive conditionals.--Multiply general sentences.--Dispositions.--Fallacies in moral philosophy.--Ethics: A defense of Aristotle.--Ryle's the Concept of mind.--The analogy of feeling.--On referring and intending.--Feeling and expression.--Disposition and memory.--Spinoza and the idea of freedom.--A kind of materialism.--Sincerity and single-mindedness.

This clear reference to unlimited freedom in values despite limited freedom in causality pictures quite accurately the theme of this article. Lord Russell made the statement in the closing eloquent paragraph of a 1927 volume he wrote to outline the problems of philosophy. He evidently feels that, prescinding from determinism or non-determinism in the causal sphere, freedom can still be meaningfully discussed in the ethical sphere, the realm of human values, though obviously in a special sense of (...) the word ‘freedom’. In other words, regardless of man’s psychological freedom or nonfreedom, Russell asserts that in the moral order man has perfect ‘freedom’ to decide for himself what shall be good or evil, right or wrong. (shrink)

Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm anyone of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism. This paper sketches a potential explanation for our feeling of freedom. The freedom that I postulate is not causal but epistemic (in a sense that I shall define), and the result is that it (...) is quite compatible with determinism. I therefore claim that insofar as we feel metaphysically free-free in a sense that would be incompatible with determinism-we are mistaking the epistemic freedom that we have for a kind of freedom that we may lack. This claim will lead me, at the end of the paper, to a projectivist account of moral responsibility. Ascriptions of moral responsibility, I shall suggest, should be treated in the same way as ascriptions of color or other secondary qualities. (shrink)

The ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is typically associated with a punishing conception of responsibility rather than freedom. In this chapter, our aim is to explore Levinas’s often overlooked theory of freedom. Specifically, we compare Levinas’s account of freedom to the Kantian (and Fichtean) idea of freedom as autonomy and the Hegelian idea of freedom as relational. Based on these comparisons, we suggest that Levinas offers a distinctive conception of freedom—“finite freedom.” In contrast (...) to Kantian autonomy, finite freedom constitutively involves standing in certain social relations with others. And in contrast to Hegelian relational freedom, the social relations involved in finite freedom are not defined by mutual recognition, but by feelings of separation and even antagonism. Along the way, we promote a reading Levinas’s Totality and Infinity as a Hegel-style story of Bildung (development), and show how, on Levinas’s view, freedom can develop or mature in the life of the individual. (shrink)

The critical aspects of deep brain stimulation are usually the focus of the ethical debate about the implantation of electrodes into the brain of patients with Parkinson’s disease. Above all, potential postoperative side effects on personality caused by DBS mark the debate. However, rehabilitation of agility and mobility by DBS can be posited against critical aspects. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to emphasize the hitherto neglected positive aspects of that technology. A detailed study of the rehabilitation of controlled (...) movements will thus be the object of this article. The possibility to move again in a controlled way will be discussed as freedom of movement. The concept freedom of movement is being linked to the observation of feelings of euphoria and joy that can occur after surgery for patients with PD stimulated in the subthalamic nucleus. This is done based on phenomenological analysis and qualitative interviews, in which the relation between freedom of movement and feelings of joy becomes clear. The aim here is to show that these feelings of exaltation express an essential feeling of freedom – a bodily felt freedom – which is grounded in movement and can be regained by STN-DBS. (shrink)

The subjective feeling of free choice is an important feature of human experience. Experimental tasks have typically studied free choice by contrasting free and instructed selection of response alternatives. These tasks have been criticised, and it remains unclear how they relate to the subjective feeling of freely choosing. We replicated previous findings of the fMRI correlates of free choice, defined objectively. We introduced a novel task in which participants could experience and report a graded sense of free choice. (...) BOLD responses for conditions subjectively experienced as free identified a postcentral area distinct from the areas typically considered to be involved in free action. Thus, the brain correlates of subjective feeling of free action were not directly related to any established brain correlates of objectively-defined free action. Our results call into question traditional assumptions about the relation between subjective experience of choosing and activity in the brain’s so-called voluntary motor areas. (shrink)

The idea and the feeling of freedom play such a part in the life of man that he is ready to sacrifice in their name his own life and still more frequently that of his fellow-men. Man feels that he is really man only when he is able to realize himself indivi dually, socially and cosmically in a complete freedom, i. e. according to the inner bio-psychical depths of his own being without any constraint from the outer (...) - social or cosmic - world. However, although people like very much, and often too much, to speak about freedom, its content and limits are so vague for most of them that everybody determines the content and limits of freedom according to his own tastes, dispositions and interests. Perhaps just because of this vagueness of the idea of freedom, this idea has such a great influence on man, giving a free play to his imagination. Therefore, it would be good to clarify the idea of freedom by analysing its different aspects in their connection with the general problem of determinism and indeterminism. (shrink)

This article explores the contributions to a history of sexuality, capitalism and revolution made when we consider the work of anarchist thinker and activist Emma Goldman (1869–1940). I suggest that Goldman's centring of sexual freedom at the heart of revolutionary vision and practice is part of a long tradition of sexual politics, one which struggles to make sense of how productive and reproductive labour come together, and to identify the difference between sexual freedom and capitalist opportunity. Goldman's concern (...) with the significance of kinship in holding together capitalism, militarism and religion, as well as sexual feeling's capacity to disrupt those relationships, echoes across more than a century to resonate with Marxist, feminist and queer scholars’ engagements with similar issues. But where contemporary scholars often tend to retain the opposition between culture and society, representation and the real, making it difficult to produce a materialist analysis of sexuality as transformative rather than always already overdetermined, Goldman's energetic insistence on sexual connectivity as freeing provides an important vantage point. Not only does Goldman consistently situate sexuality in a broad political context of the sexual division of labour, the institutions of marriage and the church, consumerism, patriotism and productive (as well as reproductive) labour, she frames sexual freedom as both the basis of new relationships between men and women, and as a model for a new political future. (shrink)

Este artículo propone un análisis de los Aforismos sobre religión y deísmo escritos por J. G. Fichte en 1790, poco antes de su conversión a la filosofía kantiana. Sostenemos que este texto no expresa la adhesión de Fichte al determinismo, ni al punto de vista del corazón, ni tampoco se limita a presentar la religión y el deísmo como dos sistemas opuestos. Según nuestra interpretación, Fichte defiende dos tesis. En primer lugar, que la mezcla de ambos sistemas es inaceptable y (...) hay que respetar el límite que existe entre ellos. En segundo lugar, que es imposible sostener ninguno de los dos sistemas, porque necesariamente entran en colisión y dejan al ser humano en una situación de desgarramiento. La conclusión del fragmento es, por lo tanto, la necesidad de buscar una posición superadora, que logre subsanar la escisión. Esa posición superadora será la Doctrina de la ciencia, que modifica los términos del planteo antagónico y logra la reconciliación de la libertad y la filosofía. This article proposes an analysis of the Aphorisms on Religion and Deism written by J. G. Fichte in 1790, shortly before his conversion to the Kantian philosophy. We argue that this text does not express Fichte’s accordance with determinism, or with the point of view of the heart, nor merely present religion and deism as two opposing systems. According to our interpretation, Fichte defends two theses. First, that the mixture of both systems is unacceptable and the limit between them must be respected. Secondly, that it is impossible to affirm neither of them, because they necessarily collide and leave the human being in a situation of scission. The conclusion of the fragment is, therefore, the need to seek a position that overcomes this situation of scission. That position will be the Doctrine of science, which amends the antagonistic terms of the dilemma and achieves the reconciliation between freedom and philosophy. (shrink)

Written for general readers and students, this book provides an accessible and brief metaphysical defense of freedom. James W. Felt, S.J., invites his audience to consider that we are responsible for what we do precisely because we do it freely. His perspective runs counter to the philosophers who argue that the freedom humans feel in their actions is merely an illusion. Felt argues in detail that there are no compelling reasons for thinking we are not free, and very (...) strong ones for thinking that we are. The view that Felt develops parallels that of the French philosopher Henri Bergson. In the course of his analysis, Felt considers determinism, compatibilism, agency, and the problem of evil. Featuring an updated list of suggested readings, this clearly and engagingly written introductory work is ideal for the undergraduate classroom. (shrink)

Addressing himself not only to an academic but to a generally educated public, Lamont introduces the perennial debate between determinism and freedom of choice with liberal and lively quotes from both sides down through history. He proceeds to argue with passionate conviction that both objective contingency and necessity exist as correlative cosmic ultimates, and that the world must therefore be viewed as essentially pluralistic. Moving from a consideration of contingency to the notion of potentiality, Lamont analyzes freedom of (...) choice as the actualization of one of a plurality of genuinely open alternatives which are made possible by contingency and potentiality. Following Hartshorne, he argues that the relation of universal to particular, of determinable to determinate, is one of indeterminate or contingent or potential to determinate or actual; on this ground he finds contingency or freedom inherent in the very act of rational deliberation. Moreover, scientific theories of probability are interpreted as confirming the existence of this sort of objective contingency. Determinism on the other hand, he maintains, not only rules out universals altogether but denies the dynamic character of time, undercuts the notion of ethical responsibility, and defies common sense and ordinary use of language. The book is highly readable--and highly provocative. A fair example of its provocative character is provided in the mileage Lamont gets out of his crucial chapter which seeks to establish the existence of objective contingency as a cosmic ultimate which "demolishes the case for a completely determined universe". On the one hand, contingency is taken to be "simply the opposite of determinism or necessity, meaning that an event, object, or state of affairs either may or may not be". On this interpretation it is not difficult to see why Lamont feels that "freedom of choice is obviously an impossibility unless contingency objectively exists in Nature". On the other hand, it turns out that what it means to say that a contingent event "may or may not be" is perhaps not after all so clearly incompatible with determinism. Thus contingency "does not imply that any event is causeless" but only that it is possible for causally determined factors to impinge on other factors--themselves in turn causally but independently determined. In the long run this seems to involve an act of faith that "the infinitely diverse world of Nature radiates from different centers... that if there ever was a beginning to the universe, which is most doubtful, it would have been beginnings, that is, a multitude of first causes all popping at once". Moreover, it is not wholly clear just how this sort of contingency--which seems to be non-teleological and by definition must operate from outside the causal sequence--is supposed to make possible or even provide a parallel to the exercise of free choice. To a believer in freedom, Lamont's account of contingency seems to offer a meager foundation for so important a theory.--R. D. (shrink)

Stated briefly, the problem of this thesis centers around Jonathan Edwards' interpretation and meaning of freedom of the will and the contrast of this to the meaning employed by St. Thomas. Jonathan Edwards was a defender of the doctrines of John Calvin. His work, The Freedom of the Will, is directed to a defense of two particular Calvinistic doctrines, primarily the absolute sovereignty of the divine will and secondarily the predestination of man, by showing that freedom of (...) the will is no~ incompatible with this absolute sovereignty and predestination. However, in the presentation of his defense, the author feels that the solutions to the conflicts and problems which necessarily arise in the discussion of such a difficult topic present considerable variation to views held by St. Thomas. It is the purpose of this thesis to analyze the solutions to these conflicts and problems and to indicate any differences that may be discovered between Edwards' interpretation of the freedom of the will and that of St. Thomas. It should be.noted that the original work of Jonathan Edwards bore the title: A careful and strict Enquiry into The modern prevailing Notions Of That FREEDOM OF WILL, Which is supposed to be essential To Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise Blame. Since that time, the title has been considerably shortened so that the work has come to be known simply as the Freedom of the Will, and is often referred to, for brevity, simply as the Inquiry. Edwards' work was written in 1754 and first published in that ea.me year in Boston by S. Kneeland. The text used in this paper is one edited by Paul Ramsey from this original edition. One precautionary warning must be given. Because of the several changes that occur in a language over a long period of time, some one hundred to two hundred years in this case, the reader will note what appear to be errors in grammar, spelling and punctuation, not only in the works of Edwards himself, but also in related writing by subsequent authors. No attempt has been made by the author of this present work, to change any such "apparent" errors. Excerpts used have been quoted as they appeared in the works cited. Any structural changes that may have been made in the writings of Edwards were the doings of those who edited them. In view of the brevity of such a work as this in contrast to the profundity and depth of the man, Jonathan Edwards, whose Freedom of the Will is the fulcrum of this paper, no consideration can be given to the personality behind the writings. Consequently, any criticisms or refutations that may occur are to be referred only to what Edwards said, as expressed in his writings and in the reviews of others, and in no way are to be interpreted as a defamation of his character. Jonathan Edwards was an upright man of firm belief and constant devotion and dedication to his cause. The present work is not a character analysis or investigation. It seeks only to illuminate what the man said and to view this in the ever-awing light of truth. (shrink)

It is not often that one picks up a newly published book and feels that one has read what should become a new classic. Velkley's volume is a courageous piece of imaginatively responsible scholarship that goes far beyond the realm of the ordinary. Effectively taking much pedestrian writing in stride, it points out new horizons of Kant interpretation which are systematically, as well as historically, sound and long overdue.

The legacy of totalitarianism thwarts discourse and practice of academic freedom in post-Soviet universities. For legacy-holders, “academic freedom” causes disorientation, irresponsibility, demoralization and inequity. They see more threats than benefits from empowering decision-makers who are non-compliant with local bureaucracy. For innovators, freedoms enhance flexibility and creativity. However, granting such freedom also reinforces value clashes on campuses and tends to intensify feelings of guilt and shame in regard to actions which show a disrespect of authority and tradition. While (...) both legacy-holders and innovators endeavour to redefine their practices and norms in their teaching, they appear to still struggle to shed their predispositions to a paternalistic and colonial philosophy of education. Presumably curative, their engagement with international networks of scholarship exposes their particular positions of vulnerabilities to that end. Both groups continue to push patriotism and cultural idiosyncrasy in order to hedge their power and status in the global marketplace of ideas. As in the past, a discourse of anti-westernization prevails, shoring up legacies of regulative thinking, indoctrination, and insularity. Progressive academics succeed primarily by taking bold steps to go above and beyond the dominant discourses and norms within their universities and policy-building communities. This article explicates why, in turn, a “surrogate academic freedom” tends to emerge as a conundrum across the post-Soviet higher education space. (shrink)

Perhaps it is best to begin on a semi-autobiographical note. In my liberal days, Mill's arguments in On Liberty for freedom of speech struck me as a paradigm of rationality: the force and eloquence of his presentation, I then thought, could not fail to impress themselves on any mature member of our species. But I am a Marxist now, and more and more of my former political beliefs now strike me as less and less tenable. It was considerations such (...) as the one that follows which have recently led me to modify drastically, and in some cases abandon entirely, my former political views vis à vis the question of freedom of speech.Whenever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emenates from its class interests and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and returiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings …. (shrink)

Schadenfreude is the emotion we experience when we obtain pleasure from others’ misfortunes. Typically, we are not proud of it and admit experiencing it only sheepishly or apologetically. Philosophers typically view it, and the disposition to experience it, as moral failings. Two recent defenders of Schadenfreude, however, argue that it is morally permissible because it stems from judgments about the just deserts of those who suffer misfortunes. I also defend Schadenfreude, but on different grounds that overcome two deficiencies of those (...) recent defenses. First, my defense accounts for the wide range of circumstances in which we experience Schadenfreude. Those circumstances often involve feelings and judgments that are less noble and admirable than judgments regarding just deserts. Second, it accounts for the sheepish or apologetic feelings that commonly accompany Schadenfreude. The two recent defenses can account for those feelings only by holding that they are mistaken or misguided. In opposition to those who view Schadenfreude as a moral failing, I argue that it is morally permissible unless it is part of a causal chain that produces an immoral act. The moral permissibility of the emotion is necessary in order for individuals to have the emotional freedom that, in turn, is necessary for their well-being. Schadenfreude’s moral status is similar to a sexual fetish’s. Like a fetish, experiencing Schadenfreude is not immoral in itself, but sharing and discussing it with others is immoral in many contexts. (shrink)