Philosophers and theologians acknowledge that "fideism" is difficult to define but rarely agree on what the best characterization of the term is. In this article, I investigate the history of use of "fideism" to explore why its meaning has been so contested and thus why it has not always been helpful for resolving philosophical problems. I trace the use of the term from its origins in French theology to its current uses in philosophy and theology, concluding that " (...) class='Hi'>fideism" is helpful in resolving philosophical problems only when philosophers scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use that informs their understanding of the word. (shrink)
On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond oneâs evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic (...) ventures. I suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which â one might hope â may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)
This paper argues that Kierkegaard is not an irrationalist, but a "responsible fideist." Responsible fideism attempts to answer two important philosophical questions: "Are there limits to reason?" and "How can the limits of reason be recognized?" Kierkegaard's account of the incarnation as "the absolute paradox" does not see the incarnation as a logical contradiction, but rather functions in a way similar to a Kantian antimony. Faith in the incarnation both helps us recognize the limits of reason and also to (...) a degree overcomes those limits. /// O artigo defende que Kierkegaard não é um irracionalista, mas antes um "fideísta responsável". Como tal, o "fideísmo responsável" tenta responder a duas questões fllosóficas particularmente importantes: "Existem limites para a razão?" e "Como podem os limites da razão ser reconhecidos?" Na sua interpretação da incarnação como "paradoxo absoluto", Kierkegaard não interpreta a incarnação como uma contradição lógica, mas antes a vê funcionando de um modo similar à antinomia kantiana. Fé na incarnação ajuda-nos não só a reconhecer os limites da razão, mas também nos ajuda, pelo menos até um certo ponto, a ultrapassar estes limites. (shrink)
Careful readers of Wittgenstein tend to overlook the significance his engineering education had for his philosophy; this despite Georg von Wright’s stern admonition that “the two most important facts to remember about Wittgenstein were, firstly, that he was Viennese, and, secondly, that he was an engineer.” Such oversight is particularly tempting for those of us who come to philosophy late, having first been schooled in math and science, because our education tricks us into thinking we understand engineering by extension. But (...) we do not. I will illustrate this common tendency to misread Wittgenstein by examining three engineering concepts that have little significance for science but played important roles in Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking. These are: method of projection, dynamical similarity, and satisfactoriness. The upshot of this analysis will be a strong challenge to the myth of his putative fideism because neither fideism nor its contrary simply would have occurred to Wittgensteinthe-engineer. (shrink)
Bishop’s main claims are: (I) that James’ criteria on the admissibility of faith leaps need the addition of two moral criteria to be complete; (II) that a Kantian, at least, could not admissibly leap toward God, classically understood, and (III) that a Kantian, and anyone else, could admissibly leap toward God, understood his way. Here I will affirm (I) with a qualification; deny (II); affirm (III); and close with some reservations about Bishop’s novel model of God. This paper was delivered (...) at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)
Introduction he eleventh chapter of Hebrews has been one of the most inspiring chapters of faith in the Bible throughout the history of Christianity. ...
... belief that every creature is a manifestation of God pantheism – belief that everything is divine phenomena – (Kantian) reality-as-it-appears polytheism ...
Contents: Preface; From faith to reason for fideism: Raymond Lull, Raimundus Sabundus and Michel de Montaigne; Nicholas of Cusa and Pythagorean theology; Giordano Bruno's philosophy of religion; Coluccio Salutati: hermeneutics of humanity; Humanism applied to language, logic and religion: Lorenzo Valla; Georgios Gemistos Plethon: from paganism to Christianity and back; Marsilio Ficino's philosophical theology; Giovanni Pico against popular Platonism; Tommaso Campanella: God makes sense in the world; Francisco Suárez – scholastic and Platonic ideas of God; Epilogue: conflicting truth claims; (...) Bibliography; Index. (shrink)
In ‘The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology’ I argue that there are four important presuppositions behind John Hick’s form of religious pluralism that successfully support it against what I call fideistic exclusivism. These are i) the ought/can principle, ii) the universality of religious experience, iii) the universality of redemptive change, and iv) a view of how God (the Eternal) would do things. I then argue that if these are more fully developed they support a different (...) kind of exclusivism, what I call rational exclusivism, and become defeaters for pluralism. In order to explain rational exclusivism and its dependence on these presuppositions I consider philosophers J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, and Alvin Plantinga, who offer arguments for their forms of exclusivism but I maintain that they continue to rely on fideism at important points. I then give an example of how knowledge of the Eternal can be achieved. (shrink)
It will be shown that Wittgenstein's philosophical approach to religion is substantially shaped by William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience. For neither during the Tractatus period nor later does Wittgenstein thematise religious doctrines, but rather struggles to determine what it means for a sincere person to have a specific religious attitude (James called these attitudes "experiences"). Wittgenstein's almost exclusive focus on attitudes explains, (i) why he is able to strictly discriminate between scientific and empirical claims on the one hand (...) and religious utterances on the other, (ii) why religious and mythical narrations should not be understood as promoting (pre-scientific) theories, (iii) why Wittgenstein non-cognitively interprets religious utterances such as "This is God's will" as avowals, and (iv) why he seems to promote fideism. Wittgenstein's one-sided way of reflecting on religious matters, however, should not be understood as adumbrating or even promoting any more specific account of religion, especially bearing in mind that many of his remarks concerning religion are connected to or motivated by reflections on his own life. This thesis is meant to imply that Wittgenstein does not, as the usual understanding holds, offer a theology for atheists. (shrink)
There are two ways that we might respond to the underdetermination of theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response, is to suspend judgment: "Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we should believe nothing". Another response, which we can call the fideist response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: "If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science ever contradicting us". C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested evading (...) the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could be no genuine underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to underdetermination represent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommensurable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each direction. Given the balance of these considerations, there should be a modest presumption of agnosticism. This may conflict with Peirce's Logical Maxim, but it preserves all that we can preserve of the Peircean motivation. (shrink)
Abstract Wittgenstein?s remarks on religious and magical practices are often thought to harbour troubling fideistic and relativistic views. Unsurprisingly, commentators are generally resistant to the idea that religious belief constitutes a ?language?game? governed by its own peculiar ?rules?, and is thereby insulated from the critical assessment of non?participants. Indeed, on this fideist?relativist reading, it is unclear how mutual understanding between believers and non?believers (even between different sorts of believers) would be possible. In this paper I do three things: (i) show (...) why the fideist?relativist reading of Wittgenstein is not wildly implausible (Sections 1?2); (ii) argue that, despite its initial plausibility, this reading fails to take into account Wittgenstein?s naturalism (Sections 3?4); and (iii) explain what sort of naturalism this is, and how it sheds light on Wittgenstein?s remarks on religious belief (Sections 5?6). (shrink)
Inheriting the religious prejudices of the Enlightenment, many supporters of liberal democracy consider John Calvin's theology contrary to the norms and virtues necessary for productive public discourse in a religiously and culturally diverse society. In Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics , Michael Walzer makes a similar assumption, arguing that, despite its contribution to political modernization, the inherent fideism, absolutism, and intolerance of Calvinism constitutes a threat to public discourse in liberal society. In (...) this paper, I contend that the prevailing understanding of Calvin's theology is incorrect. In actuality he is a nuanced natural law thinker, whose complex understanding of human nature and the state encourages the subtle balance of virtues that contemporary political life requires. (shrink)
Hume's 'Natural History of Religion' offers a naturalized account of the causes of religious thought, an investigation into its 'origins' rather than its 'foundation in reason'. Hume thinks that if we consider only the causes of religious belief, we are provided with a reason to suspend the belief. I seek to explain why this is so, and what role the argument plays in Hume's wider campaign against the rational acceptability of religious belief. In particular, I argue that the work threatens (...) a form of fideism which maintains that it is rationally permissible to maintain religious belief in the absence of evidence or of arguments in its favour. I also discuss the 'argument from common consent', and the relative superiority of Hume's account of the origins of religious belief. (shrink)
A recent spate of books on the life and legacy of the political philosopher Leo Strauss, notably Steven B. Smith's Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, and Judaism , suggests a desperate effort to salvage Strauss and the Straussian school of political philosophy from the wreckage of American neoconservatism. Although a number of these works are quite thoughtful and helpfully counter many of the more extreme (and uglier) charges made concerning the meaning of Straussianism and its political influence, their general drift (...) in fact confirms what the more responsible critics of this school have long maintained about its tendency to oppose positions that would help advance meaningful social change and social justice. Key Words: Leo Strauss • Straussianism • Platonism • esoteric writing • zeteti-cism • Socratic • skepticism • relativism • fideism. (shrink)
Professor Penelhum has argued that there is a common error about the history of skepticism and that the exposure of this error would significantly improve our understanding of a current confusion in the philosophy of religion with regard to the issue of the rationality of religious beliefs. Penelhum considers certain contemporary philosophers of religion such as Plantinga skeptics because he reads Plantinga (for example) as arguing that religious beliefs are properly groundless in virtue of the fact that none of our (...) beliefs have any ultimate grounds, and Penelhum argues that this sort of defense of religious belief is both limited and dangerous for religion. I argue that on the interpretation of ancient skepticism which Penelhum gives ancient skepticism is just what it has often been claimed to be: either practically untenable or incoherent or both. I show that in any case the confusion in philosophy of religion which Penelhum wants to sort out with the help of ancient skepticism is not one of which its alleged proponents are guilty. The views of Plantinga and others who take his line are more complex and powerful than Penelhum's presentation makes them seem; these views do not constitute an acceptance of skepticism but a denial of a certain sort of foundationalism. Contrary to Penelhum, then, I argue that ancient skepticism does not serve as a significant corrective for certain trends in contemporary philosophy of religion. (shrink)
The issue of faith and reason arises from the claim that there are two kinds of truths: some truths are discoverable to human understanding and some are not. This paper argues that the epistemology of the prominent orthodox protestant theologian John Owen (1616–1683) does not fit the labels of evidentialism and fideism. According to evidentialism, every cognitive act (including faith) must depend on evidence available to reason. According to fideism, there is no relation between faith and reason so (...) that nothing of reason can be counted for or against faith. But Owen is a fideist in the sense that faith is not based on rational evidence, and an evidentialist in the sense that Christian faith ought to have some rational or cognitive support. Philosophical arguments count in favour of faith and are not the ground of faith. The paper suggests that this nuanced view is a viable alternative and option. (shrink)
In "Culture and Value" Wittgenstein remarks that the truly "religious man" thinks himself to be, not merely "imperfect" or "ill," but wholly "wretched." While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist-relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that (...) Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of "genuine" religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological-salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that "ought implies can." In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense. (shrink)
How do we form and modify our beliefs about the world? It is widely accepted that what we believe is determined by evidence, and is therefore not directly under our control; but according to what criteria is the credibility of the evidence established? Professor Helm argues that no theory of knowledge is complete without standards for accepting and rejecting evidence as belief-worthy. These standards, or belief-policies, are not themselves determined by evidence, but determine what counts as credible evidence. Unlike single (...) beliefs, belief-policies are directly subject to the will, and therefore to the possibility of weakness of will and self-deception. Helm sets out to interpret standard epistemological positions in terms of belief-policies, and to illustrate their operation in the history of philosophy. He establishes connections between belief-policies, responsibility for beliefs, and the desirability of toleration, before reassessing fideism in the light of his argument. (shrink)
The philosophical treatment of religion -- Classical arguments for theism. Teleological arguments -- Cosmological arguments -- Ontological arguments -- Other approaches to religious belief. Experience and revelation as grounds for religious belief -- Fideism -- Naturalistic re-interpretations of religious belief -- Who or what is God? -- Fate, freedom, and foreknowledge -- Religion and morality. Is religion needed for morality? -- Divine command theory and divine motivation theory -- Natural law -- The problem of evil -- Death and immortality. (...) Is death bad? -- Life after death -- The diversity of religions -- Faith, reason, and the ethics of belief. Faith and reason -- Pragmatism and the ethics of belief -- Miracles -- Science religion and naturalism. (shrink)
A Kantian beginning : Georg Hermes -- A Catholic Hegel? Anton Günther -- The response of fideism : Louis Bautain -- Magisterial interventions : Gregory XVI and Pius IX -- Return to the schoolmen : Joseph Kleutgen and Leo XIII -- Embodying the Leonine project : Etienne Gilson -- The philosophy of action : Maurice Blondel -- The dispute over apologetics : from Blondel to Balthasar -- A synthetic outcome? John Paul II's letter Fides et ratio -- From Cracow (...) to Regensburg : Benedict XVI. (shrink)
To improve our methods of rational inquiry and decision-making we need to recognize that such methods should guide but not fully determine the choices of individuals. Failure to acknowledge the essential incompleteness of rational methods made the methods of Classical Rationalism quite impractical and opened them to skeptical refutation. Mitigated Skepticism and Fideism failed to correct the error, and as a result put undesirable limits on rational inquiry. When the guiding character of rational methods is recognized, existing methods of (...) scientific research of personal and social decision-making can themselves be rationally assessed and improved. Viewing rational methods as guides thus opens a whole field of inquiry, the inquiry into what rational methods are most useful for specific purposes and in specific situations. (shrink)
Religious beliefs have often been taken either as absolutely foundational to all others or as ultimately founded on something else. This essay starts with an endorsement of the contemporary critique of foundationalism but sets its task as to search for the foundation(s) of religious belief after foundationalism. In its third and main part, it argues for a Wittgensteinian reflective equilibrium (within a belief system, between believing and acting and among people with different ways of believing and acting) as such a (...) foundation. In this reflective equilibrium, religious beliefs are no more and no less foundational to, or founded by, other beliefs and practices. To appreciate this perspective better, I argue, in the first part, that Kai Neilsen's charge of Wittgenstein as a fideist is not accurate, and, in the second part, that D. Z. Phillips's fideistic contentions are unWittgensteinian. (shrink)
In Truth in Aquinas, John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock attempt to render a “radically orthodox” reading of Aquinas that rejects an autonomous realm of natural reason unaided by faith. I argue that Milbank and Pickstock’s account fails as a reading of Aquinas and is problematic as a theory of the relationship between faith and reason. After sketching Milbank and Pickstock’s understanding of the relationship between faith and reason, I examine Aquinas’s doctrines of grace and divine naming in order to show (...) how they resist Milbank and Pickstock’s attempt to do away with the distinct and autonomous category of natural reason. I then conclude by considering how Milbank and Pickstock’s failure to preserve the integrity and autonomy of natural reason ironically tends toward fideism whilesimultaneously threatening to deprive faith of its meaning. (shrink)
This essay examines relativist and fideist challenges to Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of rationality by reading some of MacIntyre’s more recent works in thecontext of his earlier work in the philosophy of religion, Marxism, and the philosophy of the social sciences.
This article indicates the light that an epistemology like Newman’s, with its stress on the convergence of probabilities, the experience of conscience, and the presence of grace, can shed on the problem of faith and reason. The longstanding controversy over this problem between evidentialists and fideists has found new echoes in recent disputes between foundationalists and nonfoundationalists. It is necessary to distinguish between different aspects of the approach to faith—-the metaphysical, the historical, the religious, and the theological—-each with its own (...) logic and distinct style of epistemology. Examination of these aspects indicates that neither evidentialism nor fideism, neither foundationalism nor nonfoundationalism, does justice to the complexity of the matter. Faith arises out of a process in which human reason, in a large and comprehensive sense, is involved at every step of the way. Faith is not above or beyond reason, even though it depends for its origin and existence upon the grace of God. (shrink)
General agreement exists among historians of rhetoric that Augustine’s De doctrina christiana is the first original theoretical conceptualization of rhetoric in the West after that of Cicero. Kenneth Burke called book 4 of De doctrina christiana “the first great Christian rhetoric” (50). This general opinion has not changed much: the introduction to a 2008 collection of seminal essays on De doctrina christiana states that it “may be the first significant exploration of the relationship between rhetoric and religion in that Augustine (...) negotiates a union between two seemingly irreconcilable ideologies (that is, religious fideism and rhetoric)” (Hermanson et al. 2008, 7–8). However, this understandable focus on .. (shrink)
Philosophers of religion propose an assortment of epistemic preferences with reference to the extent and limits of knowledge of God, ranging from moderate fideism to robust rationalism. In the past two decades, a seismic shift has occurred away from more classical strategies to movements that reflect the current Zeitgeist (e.g. postmodernism and pseudo-modernism). In my paper, I will argue for rational confidence and epistemic modesty in an attempt to find some balance between faith and reason.
In contrast to the fairly entrenched interpretation of Pascal as a fideist who repudiates reason, and perhaps even ethics, in order to render religious faith the only viable option, this essay argues that an ethics of thought or belief pervades Pascal’s apology for the Christian faith. The ethics of thought is a topic much neglected among Pascal’s commentators but of great interest to contemporary virtue epistemologists and philosophers of religion. The central themes in Pascal’s ethics of thought emerge partly from (...) his confrontation with Descartes’s conception of human inquiry, in response to which Pascal forges his own conception of the ethics of thought, an ethics grounded in the inclinations and habits of the human heart. It turns out, moreover, that the standard objections against Pascal’s account of human reason repose upon a selective reading of texts and a failure to grasp Pascal’s dialectical method. Locating particular passages within the context of Pascal’s rich conception of the human condition, this essay evinces the many ways in which Pascal links knowledge to virtuous dispositions and thus develops an ethics of thought, at the pinnacle of which resides the vision of charity. (shrink)
He is the darling of naturalism or the bogeyman of scepticism, a friend to virtue or an unwitting party to incipient nihilism. He is politically conservative, or a liberator from old views. He is a fideist, an advocate of faith over reason, or a precursor of Richard Dawkins.
I argue that Gale’s brilliant critique of theistic arguments is a major contribution to the philosophy of religion that can instruct atheologians and theologians for decades to come. However, his unargued appeal to faith, his reliance on the vague properties of being eminently worthy of worship and being supremely great, his failure to come to grips with the atheological implications of maintaining that God cannot know what He will decide, and the incompleteness of his critique of atheological arguments seriously weaken (...) his tacit case against rational atheism and his acceptance of fideism. I see his use of informal polls regarding modal intuitionsas a first important step to a more rigorous approach. (shrink)
While ‘political theology’ has attracted widespread attention for decades, it is often taken to be too fideist for orthodox Christianity and too illiberal for secular politics. But in the work of Jacques Maritain one finds a defence of a certain political theology, one whose character is key to grasping Maritain’s justification of another controversial concept: ‘Christian philosophy’. In this study I draw out Maritain’s distinction between Christian philosophy and theology, paying particular attention to the relevance of their differences in the (...) realm of practical thought. To illustrate what Maritain has in mind by these claims, I further consider his intriguing classification of the political works of Thomas Aquinas. I argue that distinguishing between rival notions of political theology clarifies the opportunities for dialogue between believing and secular citizens. (shrink)
The following paper argues that Blaise Pascal, in spite of his famous opposition between the God of the Philosophers and the God of “Abraham, Isaac and Jacob“ has significant affinities with the tradition of Renaissance Platonism and is in fact a Platonist in his overall outlook. This is shown in three ways. Firstly, it is argued that Pascal's skeptical fideism has roots in the notion of faith developed in post-Plotinian neo-Platonism. Secondly, it is argued that Pascal makes considerable use (...) of the Platonic notion of an indefinite dyadic principle. Thirdly, it is argued that Pascal's religious psychology gives a centrality to the body that brings it close to the theurgical standpoint of figures like Iamblichus. Pascal is then contrasted to figures like Cusanus and Pico in that a dyadic principle of opposition is more prominent in his work than a triadic logic of mediation. (shrink)
General preface -- Preface to the second edition -- What is philosophy of religion? -- Philosophy of religion and other disciplines -- Philosophy of religion and philosophy -- Can thinking about religion be neutral? -- Fideism -- Neutralism -- Critical dialogue -- The theistic God : the project of natural theology -- Concepts of God -- The theistic concept of God -- A case study : divine foreknowledge and human freedom -- The problem of religious language -- Natural theology (...) -- Proofs of God's existence -- Classical arguments for God's existence -- Ontological arguments -- Cosmological arguments -- Teleological arguments -- Moral arguments -- Conclusions: The value of theistic argument -- Religious experience -- Types of religious experience -- Models for understanding experience -- Experience of God as direct and mediated -- Are religious experiences veridical? -- Checking experiential claims -- Special acts of God : revelation and miracles -- Special acts -- Theories of revelation -- Is the traditional view defensible? -- What is a miracle? -- Is it reasonable to believe in miracles? -- Can a revelation have special authority? -- Religion, modernity, and science -- Modernity and religious belief -- Naturalism -- Do the natural sciences undermine religious belief? -- Objections from the social sciences -- Religious uses of modern atheism -- The problem of evil -- Types of evil, versions of the problem, and types of response -- The logical form of the problem -- The evidential form of the problem -- Horrendous evils and the problem of hell -- Divine hiddenness -- Faith(s) and reason -- Faith : subjectivity in religious arguments -- The evidentialist challenge to religious belief -- Reformed epistemology -- The place of subjectivity in forming beliefs -- Interpretive judgments and the nature of a cumulative case -- Can faith be certain? -- Faith and doubt : can religious faith be tested? -- What is faith? -- Could one religion be true? (shrink)
This unique textbook--the first to offer balanced, comprehensive coverage of all major perspectives on the rational justification of religious belief--includes twenty-four key papers by some of the world's leading philosophers of religion. Arranged in six sections, each representing a major approach to religious epistemology, the book begins with papers by noted atheists, setting the stage for the main theistic responses--Wittgensteinian Fideism, Reformed epistemology, natural theology, prudential accounts of religious beliefs, and rational belief based in religious experience--in each case offering (...) a representative sample of papers by leading exponents, a critical paper, and a substantial bibliography. A comprehensive introductory essay and ample cross-references help students to contrast and evaluate the different approaches, while the overall arrangement encourages them to assess the full range of philosophical positions on the issue. Carefully selected to provide both a comprehensive overview of current work and a series of modern perspectives on many classic sources--Swinburne's detailed discussion of Hume's critique of the design argument, for example, as well as an entire section evaluating and extending Pascal's famous Wager--the essays also provide a uniquely readable survey that will be useful in a wide range of undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of religion and epistemology. (shrink)
For nearly two millennia, theistic philosophers have had to contend with problems raised against their theistic beliefs. Typically raised by nontheistic (atheistic and agnostic) philosophers, these problems have ranged from critiques of theistic philosophers’ arguments for God’s existence to arguments for the nonexistence of God. -/- In this book, I present a new set of problems for theistic philosophers’ theistic beliefs. The problems pertain specifically to three types of theistic philosopher, to be referred to here as “theistic inferentialists,” “theistic noninferentialists,” (...) and “theistic fideists” (to be defined shortly). Each type of theistic philosopher faces a problem unique to his or her type, and they all share two problems, or so I shall argue. In some cases, the problems raised here take us down an entirely new discursive path; in others, they take us down a new discursive path branching off from an old discursive path. In every case, however, they are paths that take us farther and farther away from theism. (shrink)
I argue that at least some of Kierkegaard’s authorship is designed to make a rational case for a religious and specifically Christian existence; he is not a total fideist. He argues that anything short of the existential stance of the “strong spiritual/moral evaluator” is despair. To overcome this we are compelled to reach for religious or transcendent sources of meaning; the authentic life is the life of constant ethical and spiritual evaluation grounded in the authority of God. But I ask (...) how does Kierkegaard justify the stance of the strong evaluator in the first place? I argue that he crafts an existential and pragmatic case for it, but that this approach does not have the strength he suggests. Indeed. I argue that because this defense reflects his own Protestant Christian context, his case for Christian existence (as an existence of strong spiritual/moral evaluation) is seriously weakened. (shrink)
Comparatively recent scholarship suggests that George Berkeley cannot be seen solely or even chiefly as a British empiricist who is reacting to the materialistic implications of Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. C.J. McCracken has shown how Berkeley is influenced by Malebranche’s theses concerning the dependence of bodies on God, without himself doubting the evidence of the senses. McCracken also shows how Berkeley reconstructs and reapplies Malebranche’s fideism.1 Harry Bracken has argued, most notably, that Berkeley espouses certain theses that set (...) him out as an Irish Cartesian. Like Descartes, he takes the challenge of scepticism with regard to sense-experience seriously. He sees experience in general as made up of perceivers and the perceived, with the latter being ontologically dependent on minds. Minds are active and creative substances. They cannot be understood in materialist terms, and are in fact immaterial and immortal. The ultimate mind is God’s, and the divine intellect is responsible for the totality of ideas and notions in their existence, content and structure.2 In this essay I want to suggest, following my title, that Berkeley can also be regarded as a proto-phenomenologist. The term phenomenology will be understood chiefly, though not exclusively, in terms of the approach of Edmund Husserl. It has been argued in at least one study that Husserl’s transcendental philosophy is proximate to Berkeley’s supposed subjective idealism, for all of Husserl’s protestations to the contrary.3 A parallel is only drawn between the two at Berkeley’s expense. What I hope to show, by contrast, are the positive ways in which he anticipates ideas propounded by Husserl and other phenomenologists. In so doing I do not wish to fall into a hasty assimilation of the more recent thinkers to the earlier one, for there remain serious differences between them, most notably in the tasks they set themselves. (shrink)
If God exists, where can we find adequate evidence for God's existence? In this book, Paul Moser offers a new perspective on the evidence for God that centers on a morally robust version of theism that is cognitively resilient. The resulting evidence for God is not speculative, abstract, or casual. Rather, it is morally and existentially challenging to humans, as they themselves responsively and willingly become evidence of God's reality in receiving and reflecting God's moral character for others. Moser calls (...) this 'personifying evidence of God,' because it requires the evidence to be personified in an intentional agent - such as a human - and thereby to be inherent evidence of an intentional agent. Contrasting this approach with skepticism, scientific naturalism, fideism, and natural theology, Moser also grapples with the potential problems of divine hiddenness, religious diversity, and vast evil. (shrink)
Montaigne faz um ataque pirrônico ao conceito acadêmico de verossimilhança ou probabilidade na Apologia de Raymond Sebond. O ataque é paradoxal porque Montaigne parece seguir o verossímil na própria Apologia e em diversos outros ensaios. Para resolver este problema exegético proponho uma dupla restrição do escopo do ataque à verossimilhança. Por um lado, mostro que o ataque visa mais a leitura epistêmica da verossimilhança proposta por Filo de Larissa do que ao conceito original de ordem exclusivamente prática de Carnéades. Por (...) outro, situo-o em um contexto político-religioso bem específico. O ataque pirrônico à verossimilhança é a estratégia oferecida por Montaigne à rainha católica de Navarra e irmã do rei da França, Marguerite de Valois, para eventual uso nas polêmicas religiosas em sua corte majoritariamente protestante de Nérac. Esta contextualização soluciona também outros problemas exegéticos da Apologia, como o da defesa paradoxal de Sebond, a inconsistência aparente entre as respostas de Montaigne às duas objeções feitas ao livro de Sebond, e o problema do fideísmo. In the Apology for Raymond Sebond, Montaigne launches a Pyrrhonian attack on Academic probability. However, Montaigne does follow probability in the Apology and other essays. In order to solve this exegetical problem I propose a double restriction of the attack. On the one hand, I show that it aims at Philo of Larissa's epistemic interpretation of the doctrine rather than at Carneades' original practical conception. On the other hand, I place the attack on a very specific historical context. Montaigne's Pyrrhonian attack on probability is a polemical strategy offered to Marguerite de Valois, the sister of the catholic king of France and wife of the protestant leader Henri de Navarre, to be used in the religious controversies in her predominant protestant court at Nérac. This context also solves other exegetical problems of the Apology such as Montaigne's paradoxical defense of Sebond, the apparent contradiction between the replies to the two objections to Sebond's book addressed by Montaigne, and the problem of fideism. (shrink)
THE AIM OF THE VOLUME IS TO INTRODUCE STUDENTS TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BY ACQUAINTING THEM WITH THE WRITINGS OF SOME OF THE THINKERS WHO HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS AREA. THIS NEW EDITION EXPANDS THE RANGE OF TOPICS BY INCLUDING AN ENTIRELY NEW CHAPTER ON DEATH AND IMMORTALITY AND A NEW SUBSECTION ON THE MORAL ARGUMENT. THERE IS ALSO SOME NEW MATERIAL ON WITTGENSTEIN AND FIDEISM, RELIGIOUS PLURALISM, AND FAITH AND THE NEED FOR EVIDENCE. ALMOST EVERY (...) CHAPTER HAS BEEN CHANGED BY DELETIONS OR ADDITIONS TO UPDATE THE SELECTIONS AND PROVIDE MORE MATERIAL THAT IS UNDERSTANDABLE TO BEGINNING STUDENTS. (shrink)
The report is dedicated to modern understanding of the correlation between science and religion that is based on the analysis of certain ideas formulated by Newton, Berkeley and Mach. Newton proceeded from the existence of infinite (absolute) Space that he interpreted as the Sensory of the intelligent omnipresent Being (God) who sees things themselves intimately, and throughly perceives and comprehends them. Human being also has his little “Sensoriums” perceiving the images of things, the Order and the Beauty of their arrangement. (...) Mach emphasized that since Newton’s period space and time have become “immaterial substances that form the most important basis of our sensual world outlook”. Apparently, this “immateriality of substances” manifests itself in the way Machinterprets our perceptions, conceptions, will, feelings, i.e. all inner and outer world, which he understands as small number of homogeneous elements called sensations (Empfindungen). These sensations are compared in the report to what Berkeley called ideas while he denied the existence of the real absolute noncreated space that is part, or attribute, of God. If we accept the idea that beside space and time inseparable from matter as it is scientifically comprehended, there exist absolute space and time as Newton interpreted them, then these space and time must exist outside our universe or parallel to it. This brings us to the panentheistic model (Eduard I. Sorkin, ХХIst World Congress of philosophy,s 2003, pp. 374‐375). According to Mach the law of causality is separated from space and time while the laws of nature are just limitations that our experience dictates to our expectations. The report shows that if the Mach’s concept had been supplemented by the “idealistic” views of Newton and Berkeley, it would have been more convincing – something contrary to fideism. (shrink)
Some of the most well known figures in three main cultures, Islam, Christianity and Judaism, defend negative theology. They believe that God doesn’t have any positive attribute and that no positive knowledge of Him is possible. Others, who are in majority, are anxious of agnosticism. Maimonides the great Jewish philosopher tries to relive this anxiety. He proposes negative knowledge arguing that in terms of negation we become closer to some knowledge of Him, though His nature still remains out of access. (...) In this way he tries to avoid agnosticism and at the same time justify the extreme differences among believers in knowledge of Him. But it seems that, if we rely on reason alone, Maimonides' arguments are not convincing. This paper tries to criticize his examples and arguments. It seems clear that any negative knowledge should be based on a kind of positive one. No one by mere negation can receive any understanding of Him especially when the realm of negation expands upon the predicate of being too. In that case if someone like Maimonides insists to preserve his faith on God he should seek ways other than reason, like fideism or Gnosticism. And as a philosopher he cannot hold his position anymore. (shrink)
Philosophers have often misunderstood Kierkegaard's views on the nature and purposes of God due to a fascination with his earlier, pseudonymous works. We examine many of Kierkegaard's later works with the aim of setting forth an accurate view on this matter. The portrait of God that emerges is a personal and fiercely loving God with whom humans can and should enter into relationship. Far from advocating a fideistic faith or a cognitively unrestrained leap in the dark, we argue that Kierkegaard (...) connects this God-relationship to (a particular kind of) evidence and even knowledge. However, such evidence and knowledge – and hence God himself – may remain hidden from many individuals due to misconceptions of God and misuses of the human will. (shrink)
This paper examines Küng’s procedure in justifying God at the bar of reason. He first counters nihilism by fundamental trust in reality, which affirms reality as coherent and meaningful. He then builds his case for theism upon trust in God, which is itself the condition of the possibility of fundamental trust in reality. Although claiming an intrinsic rationality for both these acts of trust, his position is ultimately reducible to the fideistic answer to the question of God and thus not (...) justifiable at the bar of reason. A philosophical theology, however, should employ reason in favor of the decision for God. (shrink)
