Search results for 'final value' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jonas Olson (2004). Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism About Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.score: 240.0
    The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. (...)
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  2. Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.score: 192.0
    In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final (...). It is not attractive for two reasons: the first being that the BPA lacks the features typical of successful conceptual analyses and the second being that it is unable to deliver on the advantages that its proponents claim for it. While not offering a knock-down technical refutation of the BPA, this paper aims to show that there is little reason to think that the BPA is correct, and that it should therefore be given up as an analysis of final value. (shrink)
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  3. Carlo Alberto Magni (2005). On Decomposing Net Final Values: Eva, Sva and Shadow Project. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 59 (1):51-95.score: 156.0
    A decomposition model of Net Final Values (NFV), named Systemic Value Added (SVA), is proposed for decision-making purposes, based on a systemic approach introduced in Magni [Magni, C. A. (2003), Bulletin of Economic Research 55(2), 149–176; Magni, C. A. (2004) Economic Modelling 21, 595–617]. The model translates the notion of excess profit giving formal expression to a counterfactual alternative available to the decision maker. Relations with other decomposition models are studied, among which Stewart’s [Stewart, G.B. (1991), The Quest (...)
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  4. Christopher Grau (2006). Irreplaceability and Unique Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):111-129.score: 120.0
    This essay begins with a consideration of one way in which animals and persons may be valued as “irreplaceable.” Drawing on both Plato and Pascal, I consider reasons for skepticism regarding the legitimacy of this sort of attachment. While I do not offer a complete defense against such skepticism, I do show that worries here may be overblown due to the conflation of distinct metaphysical and normative concerns. I then go on to clarify what sort of value is at (...)
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  5. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.score: 120.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. (...)
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  6. Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly.score: 120.0
    Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
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  7. Martin Peterson (2004). Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (3):293-307.score: 120.0
    Peter Singer has famously argued that people living in affluent western countries are morally obligated to donate money to famine relief. The central premise in his argument is that, If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so. The present paper offers an argument to the effect that affluent people ought to support foreign aid projects based on a much weaker ethical premise. The (...)
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  8. Hillel Steiner (1995). Persons of Lesser Value Moral Argument and the 'Final Solution'. Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (2):129-141.score: 120.0
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  9. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2002). Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.score: 100.0
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...) is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value. (shrink)
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  10. Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2002). Instrumental Values €“ Strong and Weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.score: 100.0
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental (...) is a kind of value, then it is a kind of extrinsic final value. (shrink)
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  11. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007). Analysing Personal Value. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405 - 435.score: 96.0
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the value bearer). (...)
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  12. Guy Fletcher (2009). On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value. Philosophia 37 (1):149-152.score: 96.0
    Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.
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  13. Martin Fougère, Nikodemus Solitander & Suzanne Young (2014). Exploring and Exposing Values in Management Education: Problematizing Final Vocabularies in Order to Enhance Moral Imagination. Journal of Business Ethics 120 (2):175-187.score: 70.0
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  14. B. J. C. Madison (forthcoming). Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 66.0
    In this paper I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that (...)
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  15. Kris McDaniel (2014). A Moorean View of the Value of Lives. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46.score: 66.0
    Can we understand being valuable for in terms of being valuable? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the (...) bearers are totality states of affairs. The final section of the article discusses the possibility of organic unification without organic unities. (shrink)
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  16. Duncan Pritchard (2010). The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? (...)
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  17. Anne Meylan (2013). The Value Problem of Knowledge. Res Philosophica 90 (2):261-275.score: 60.0
    The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the creditsolution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most important conclusion (...)
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  18. Dale Dorsey (2012). Can Instrumental Value Be Intrinsic? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):137-157.score: 60.0
    In this article, I critique a common claim that instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value. Instead, I offer an alternative dispositional analysis of instrumental value, which holds that instrumental value can, in certain circumstances, be an example of intrinsic value. It follows, then, that a popular account of the nature of final value – or value as an end – is false: the Moorean identification of final value with (...)
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  19. Martijn Blaauw (2008). Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.score: 60.0
    A central intuition many epistemologists seem to have is that knowledge is distinctively valuable. In his paper 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', Duncan Pritchard rejects the virtue-theoretic explanation of this intuition. This explanation says that knowledge is distinctively valuable because it is a cognitive achievement. It is maintained, in the first place, that the arguments Pritchard musters against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement are unconvincing. It is argued, in the second place, that (...)
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  20. Jonas Olson (2003). Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):412–422.score: 60.0
    In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable since (...)
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  21. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). Tropic of Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):389 - 403.score: 60.0
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion pre-supposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of (...)
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  22. Robert E. Carter (1975). C. I. Lewis and the Immediacy of Intrinsic Value. Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (3):204-209.score: 60.0
    Immediate experiences may be found good or bad at the time of occurrence, and this value contributes to the goodness or badness of life in general. In addition, they may continue to affect later experiences to the very end of a lifetime. The final assessment of an experience, therefore, cannot be made until a lifetime has come to an end, at which point one would no longer be in a position to assess. It remains instructive, nevertheless, to apply (...)
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  23. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:33 - 51.score: 60.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. (...)
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  24. Noah Marcelino Lemos (1994). Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant. Cambridge University Press.score: 58.0
    This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic (...)
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  25. Salim Kemal & Ivan Gaskell (eds.) (1993). Explanation and Value in the Arts. Cambridge University Press.score: 58.0
    Explanation and Value in the Arts offers penetrating studies by art historians, literary theorists, and philosophers, of issues central to explaining works of literature and painting. The first chapters look at the sources of interest in the fine arts and point to the intimate relation between aesthetic and other values. The next contributions develop the interaction between value and explanation in the study of the arts, including considerations of the nature of creativity and the principles for the explanations (...)
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  26. Simon A. Hailwood (2000). The Value of Nature's Otherness. Environmental Values 9 (3):353 - 372.score: 56.0
    Environmentalist philosophers often paint a holistic picture, stressing such things as the continuity of humanity with wider nature and our membership of the 'natural community' . The implication seems to be that a non-anthropocentric philosophy requires that we strongly identify ourselves with nature and therefore that we downplay any human/non-human distinction. An alternative view, I think more interesting and plausible, stresses the distinction between humanity and a nature valued precisely for its otherness. In this article I discuss some of its (...)
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  27. Thomas Hurka (2006). Value and Friendship: A More Subtle View. Utilitas 18 (3):232-242.score: 54.0
    T. M. Scanlon has cited the value of friendship in arguing against a ‘teleological’ view of value which says that value inheres only in states of affairs and demands only that we promote it. This article argues that, whatever the teleological view's final merits, the case against it cannot be made on the basis of friendship. The view can capture Scanlon's claims about friendship if it holds, as it can consistently with its basic ideas, that (i) (...)
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  28. Leon Culbertson (2008). Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value? Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (3):302 – 320.score: 54.0
    This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of (...)
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  29. Rowan Cruft (2010). On the Non-Instrumental Value of Basic Rights. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):441-461.score: 54.0
    Basic rights are often of great instrumental value in securing protection for important human needs and interests. The first two sections of this paper defend the thesis that basic rights are also valuable independently of their instrumental role. Taking my cue from Frances Kamm's suggestion that basic rights reflect or express human worth, in the third, fourth and fifth sections I develop the proposal that the non-instrumental value of basic rights derives from their constitutive role in a universal (...)
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  30. Anthony Hatzimoysis (2003). Sentimental Value. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):373–379.score: 54.0
    I analyse the concept of sentimental value, with a view to identifying its relations with the notions of intrinsic, final, extrinsic and instrumental value. The analysis explores issues arising in the understanding of an object as sentimentally valuable, and reveals a serious tension in the common sense extrinsic conception of sentimental value.
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  31. Andrew Roberts (forthcoming). A Republican Account of the Value of Privacy. European Journal of Political Theory:1474885114533262.score: 54.0
    This article provides an account of the value of privacy in securing the republican aims of self-government and conditions of non-domination. It describes how loss of privacy might lead to subjugation to dominating power. The republican concept of domination provides the foundation of a broad and coherent account of the value of privacy. One that encompasses circumstances in which the subject (i) suffers interference as a result of the loss, (ii) is aware that he has suffered a loss (...)
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  32. Michael J. Zimmerman (2001). The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Rowman and Littlefield.score: 54.0
    At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other types (...)
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  33. William J. Morgan (2007). Caring, Final Ends and Sports. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 1 (1):7 – 21.score: 54.0
    In this essay I argue that sports at their best qualify as final ends, that is, as ends whose value is such that they ground not only the practices whose ends they are, but everything else we do as human agents. The argument I provide to support my thesis is derived from Harry Frankfurt's provocative work on the importance of the things we care about, more specifically, on his claim that it is by virtue of caring about things (...)
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  34. Horacio Arló Costa (2006). Rationality and Value: The Epistemological Role of Indeterminate and Agent-Dependent Values. Philosophical Studies 128 (1):7 - 48.score: 54.0
    An important trend in contemporary epistemology centers on elaborating an old idea of pragmatist pedigree: theory selection (and in general the process of changing view and fixing beliefs) presupposes epistemic values. This article focuses on analyzing the case where epistemic values are indeterminate or when the sources of valuation are multiple (epistemic values like coherence and simplicity need not order options in compatible ways). According to the theory that thus arises epistemic alternatives need not be fully ordered by an underlying (...)
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  35. Grant Farred (2010). The Final 'Thank You'. Derrida Today 3 (1):21-36.score: 54.0
    ‘The Final “Thank You”’ uses the work of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche to think the occasion of the 1995 rugby World Cup, hosted by the newly democratic South Africa. This paper deploys Nietzsche's Zarathustra to critique how a figure such as Nelson Mandela is understood as a ‘Superman’ or an ‘Overhuman’ in the moment of political transition. The philosophical focus of the paper, however, turns on the ‘thank yous’ exchanged by the white South African rugby captain, François Pienaar, (...)
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  36. L. Nandi Theunissen, The Value of Humanity.score: 54.0
    My dissertation is on foundational questions about the value of human beings. This is a Kantian topic but I develop a proposal in a non-Kantian framework. I argue that to be a Kantian in ethics is to be committed to rationalism, but that the foundations of ethics should take account of the nature of human beings and our circumstances in the world. I develop a non-Kantian theory in which the value of human beings is no different, metaphysically speaking, (...)
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  37. Stephen R. L. Clark (2000). The Cosmic Priority of Value. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (4):681 - 700.score: 54.0
    Adam Sedgwick's complaint that Darwin's rejection of final causes indicated a "demoralized understanding" cannot easily be dismissed: if nothing happens because it should, our opinions about what is morally beautiful are no more than projections. Darwin was carrying out an Enlightenment project — to exclude final causes or God's purposes from science because we could not expect to know what they were. That abandonment of final causes was an episode in religious history, a reaction against complacent idolatry, (...)
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  38. Peter M. Hopsicker (2012). 'The Value of the Inexact': An Apology for Inaccurate Motor Performance. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 40 (1):65-83.score: 54.0
    Philosophic inquiry into the mental states of elite athletes during skilled motor performance continues to grow. In contrast to the bulk of these works that focus almost exclusively on skillful performance, this paper examines athletic motor behavior from a point of inexactness ? or even failure ? in athletic performance. Utilizing the works of Michael Polanyi, who believed that both ideas of achievement and failure were equally necessary to understand the behavior of living things and their physical actions, I examine (...)
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  39. Stephane Lemaire (2012). The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons. Dialogue 51 (1):31-53.score: 52.0
    ABSTRACT: Confronted with the , several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an analysis of (...) value and because it is relativistic. (shrink)
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  40. Peter P. Kirschenmann (2001). “Intrinsically” or Just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32 (2):237-256.score: 46.0
    Debates about scientific (though rarely about otherforms of) knowledge, research policies or academic trainingoften involve a controversy about whether scientificknowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simpleopposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of agreater variety of structural types of values attributableto (scientific) knowledge. (Intermittently, I address thepuzzling habit of attributing “intrinsic” value to quitedifferent things, e.g. also to nature, in environmentalethics.) After some remarks on relevant broader philosophicaldebates about scientific knowledge, (...)
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  41. S. Matthew Liao (2012). The Genetic Account of Moral Status: A Defense. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):265-277.score: 42.0
    Christopher Grau argues that the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding is problematic because it fails to grant all human beings the moral status of rightholding; it grants the status of rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve such status; and it assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value. Grau also argues that those who are inclined to hold that (...)
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  42. Richard Rowland (2014). Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-20.score: 42.0
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. (...)
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  43. Stephen Rl Clark (1995). Objective Values, Final Causes: Stoics, Epicureans, and Platonists. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3.score: 40.0
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  44. Theodore Mary Hemelt (1929). Final Moral Values in Sociology. Washington, D.C.,The Sulpician Seminary Press.score: 40.0
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  45. Ralph Wedgwood (2009). Diotima's Eudaemonism: Intrinsic Value and Rational Motivation in Plato's Symposium. Phronesis 54 (4):297-325.score: 38.0
    This paper gives a new interpretation of the central section of Plato’s Symposium (199d–212a). According to this interpretation, the term ‘καλόν’, as used by Plato here, stands for what many contemporary philosophers call “intrinsic value”; and “love” (ἔρως) is in effect rational motivation, which for Plato consists in the desire to “possess” intrinsically valuable things – that is, according to Plato, to be happy – for as long as possible. An explanation is given of why Plato believes that “possessing” (...)
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  46. Nils Holtug (2001). On the Value of Coming Into Existence. Journal of Ethics 5 (4):361-384.score: 38.0
    In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence canbe better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claimsare highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objectionswhich threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical,metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is animportant sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to comeinto existence. Again, I consider (...)
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  47. J. J. McMurtry (2009). Ethical Value-Added: Fair Trade and the Case of Café Femenino. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 86 (1):27 - 49.score: 38.0
    This article engages various critiques of Fair Trade, from its participation in commodification to providing a cover for "Fair-washing" corporations, and argues that Fair Trade has the potential to answer the challenges contained within them if and when it initiates an ongoing process of developing the "ethical valuedadded" content of the label. This argument is made in a number of ways. First, by distinguishing between economic and human development impacts and ethics, this article argues that these impacts are necessary but (...)
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  48. Gerhard Zecha (1992). Value-Neutrality and Criticism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 23 (1):153-164.score: 38.0
    Among the methodological rules of the social sciences we find the principles of value-neutrality and the principle of criticism. Both principles are of vital importance in the social sciences, but both seem to conflict with one another. The principle of criticism excludes value-judgments from the social sciences, because they cannot be empirically tested. Hence, criticism methodologically implies value-neutrality. Yet there is the opposing view that it is precisely the critical social researcher who looks beyond mere 'social facts' (...)
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  49. G. Anthony Bruno (2009). Aesthetic Value, Intersubjectivity and the Absolute Conception of the World. Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 6 (3).score: 38.0
    In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant diagnoses an antinomy of taste: either determinate concepts exhaust judgments of taste or they do not. That is to say, judgments of taste are either objective and public or subjective and private. On the objectivity thesis, aesthetic value is predicable of objects. But determining the concepts that would make a judgment of taste objective is a vexing matter. Who can say which concepts these would be? To what authority does one (...)
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