Search results for 'first-person perspective' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  3
    Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2015). The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford University Press Uk.
    When we represent the world in language, in thought, or in perception, we often represent it from a perspective. We say and think that the meeting is happening now, that it is hot here, that I am in danger and not you; that the tree looks larger from my perspective than from yours. This book is an exploration and defence of the view that perspectivality is a philosophically shallow aspect of the world. This book opposes one of the (...)
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  2.  56
    Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
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  3. Mihretu P. Guta & Sophie Gibb (eds.) (2015). Insights Into the First-Person Perspective and the Self: An Interdisciplinary Approach. A Special Issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Imprint Academic.
    The essays in this volume focus on the notion of the first-person pro-noun ‘I’, the notion of the self or person, and the notion of the first-person perspective.
     
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  4. Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it (...)
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  5. Mihretu P. Guta (2015). 'Editorial Introduction' in Mihretu P. Guta and Sophie Gibb (Eds.). Insights Into the First-Person Perspective and the Self: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-22):8-19.
    The essays in this volume focus on the notion of the first-person pro-noun ‘I’, the notion of the self or person,1 and the notion of the first-person perspective. Let us call these the three notions. Ever since Descartes set the initial tone in his Meditations, modern philosophical controversies concerning the three notions have continued unabated. Part of the reason for ongoing debates has to do with the sorts of questions that the three notions give rise to.
     
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  6. Thomas Natsoulas (2001). On the Intrinsic Nature of States of Consciousness: Attempted Inroads From the First Person Perspective. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):219-248.
    The Jamesian streams of consciousness are each made up of states of consciousness one at a time in tight temporal succession except when a stream stops flowing momentarily or for a longer time. These pulses of mentality are typically complex in the sense of their possessing, each of them, many ingredients or features. But, also, every state of consciousness is, in a different sense, simple: a unitary awareness, a single mental act. Although unitary, a state of (...) often has many objects, which have some kind of existence, past, present, or future, or which are nonexistent, merely apparent, only imaginary. The problem concerning the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness is what they are themselves, not what they are about or what they may seem to be about, but what are their own intrinsic properties. For example, in my view, conscious states are, literally, certain occurrent states of the brain. In James’s different view, conscious states are mental in the sense of nonphysical yet directly produced by the total brain process or by a substantial part of it. In our attempts to determine the intrinsic properties of states of consciousness, we are well advised to attend to our inner awareness of them. Any true statement about a state of consciousness that we may succeed in formulating from the first-person perspective is, in my view, a fact concerning a brain state and may help us to learn which among the occurrent brain states are actually the states of consciousness. Their being unitary awarenesses is among the facts we know firsthand about the states of consciousness. I can think of no instance of such a state that is missing the property of intentionality, the property of its being at least as though about something. Also, although we may distinguish various ingredients belonging to a state of consciousness — a state can be, for example, an auditory, a visual, a sexual, a memorial, and an anticipatory experience, all at the same time — these ingredients are not apprehended side by side, but as integrated together in a unitary state. It will be argued that how we find firsthand a state of consciousness to be is illusory, that any such state is actually made up of separate processes. But this claim has its own problems, including having to explain the difference between two simultaneous states of consciousness belonging each of them to a different stream and an integral state that includes several different kinds of experience. (shrink)
     
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  7. Jack Reynolds & Patrick Stokes (forthcoming). Writing the First Person: Existentialist Methodology and Perspective. In Soren Overgaard & Giuseppina D'Oro (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology. Cambridge UP
    Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary (...)
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  8. Thomas Metzinger (2004). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Networks:285--306.
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be (...)
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  9.  35
    Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2013). The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
    Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person (...)
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  11.  54
    David Copp (2013). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (sup1):30-74.
    (2000). Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 30-74.
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  12. Sydney Shoemaker (2011). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  13. N. Georgalis (2006). Representation and the First-Person Perspective. Synthese 150 (2):281-325.
    The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call.
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  14. John Haglund (forthcoming). The View From Somewhere - Investigations Pertaining to the Implications of the Impurity of the Third- and the First-Person-Perspective. Continental Philosophy Review.
    The old duality that eventually came to produce the mind/body-problem indicates the problem of transcendental subjectivity. The enduring significance of this problem shows itself in a provocation of any paradigm that has become too objectivistic, too naturalistic – even too idealistic in a certain sense – and too forgetful of its own departure from a perspective always presumed. Analytic philosophy bears a tendency towards such a ‘view from nowhere’ which denies a fundamental subjective connection. The rebuttal of this position (...)
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  15.  2
    Dan Zahavi (2008). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. A Bradford Book.
    What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct--or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can (...)
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  16. Dilip Ninan (2009). Persistence and the First-Person Perspective. Philosophical Review 118 (4):425--464.
    When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are "further facts," over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the (...) point of view is a guide to centered possibility , a type of possibility analyzed in terms of centered worlds. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this? (shrink)
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  17.  87
    Mark Rowlands (2008). From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
    To adopt a first-person perspective on consciousness is typically understood as a matter of inwardly engaging one's awareness in such a way as to make one's conscious states and their properties into objects of awareness. When awareness is thus inwardly engaged, experience functions as both act and object of awareness. As objects of awareness, an experience-token and its various properties are items of which a subject is aware. As an act of awareness, an experience-token is that in virtue (...)
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  18.  68
    Dan Zahavi (2007). Subjectivity and the First-Person Perspective. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):66-84.
    Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like rather straightforward interaction. The first issue (...)
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  19. Sydney Shoemaker (2010). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). “Tätigsein Und Die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the First-Person Perspective). In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag
    It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there (...)
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  21.  2
    Monica Meijsing (2006). The Development of the First-Person Perspective. A Gradualist Approach. Manuscrito 29 (2):677-705.
    What are we, most fundamentally? Two topical answers to this question are discussed and rejected and a more evolutionary account is offered. Lynne Baker argues that we are persons: beings with a first-person perspective. Persons form a separate ontological category, with persistence conditions that are different from those of the body. Eric Ol-son, by contrast, claims that we are human organisms. No psychological property is definitive of what we are. Our persistence conditions are those of the human organism. (...)
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  22. Mihretu P. Guta (2015). Consciousness, First-Person Perspective and Neuroimaging in Mihretu P. Guta and Sophie Gibb (Eds.) Insights Into the First-Person Perspective and the Self: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):218-245.
    In this paper, my main goal is to discuss two incompatible answers proposed to what I shall call, the objectivity seeking question (OSQ). The first answer is what I shall call the primacy thesis, according to which the third-person perspective is superior to that of the first-person perspective. Ultimately I will reject this answer. The second answer is what I shall call the skepticism thesis, according to which the distinction between the first-person perspective and the (...)
     
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  23.  41
    Jesse Butler (2013). Rethinking Introspection: A Pluralist Approach to the First-Person Perspective. Palgrave MacMillan.
    We seem to have private privileged access to our own minds through introspection, but what exactly does this involve? Do we somehow literally perceive our own minds, as the common idea of a 'mind's eye' suggests, or are there other processes at work in our ability to know our own minds? Rethinking Introspection offers a new pluralist framework for understanding the nature, scope, and limits of introspection. The book argues that, contrary to common misconceptions, introspection does not consist of a (...)
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  24.  31
    O. Gambini, V. Barbieri & S. Scarone (2004). Theory of Mind in Schizophrenia: First Person Vs Third Person Perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):39-46.
    Patients suffering from schizophrenia have an impaired meta-representation also known as Theory of Mind . Moreover, the presence of delusions or other positive symptoms of schizophrenia has been correlated to poor ToM performances. Lack of insight is a common symptom of schizophrenia and can be considered a critical manifestation of impaired ToM abilities. In particular, the present study addresses the role of perspective ToM ability in schizophrenic patients. Thirty severely delusional schizophrenic patients completely lack insight when (...)
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  25.  23
    Simon Hoffding & Joel Krueger (2016). The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas. Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2):158-178.
    In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.
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  26. Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 285--306.
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
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  27.  57
    Maria van der Schaar (2011). The Cognitive Act and the First-Person Perspective: An Epistemology for Constructive Type Theory. [REVIEW] Synthese 180 (3):391-417.
    The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’ that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb ‘to know’. (...)
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  28.  29
    Max Velmans (1991). Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
    The sequence of topics in this reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output. The discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reverse this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, does the reply.
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  29.  4
    Maria van der Schaar (2011). The Cognitive Act and the First-Person Perspective: An Epistemology for Constructive Type Theory. Synthese 180 (3):391 - 417.
    The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb 'to know' that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb 'to know'. (...)
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  30.  87
    Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For (...)
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  31. Kai Vogeley & Gereon R. Fink (2003). Neural Correlates of the First-Person Perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):38-42.
  32. Anne Pollok (2015). The First and Second Person Perspective in History: Or, Why History is ‘Culture Fiction’. In Sebastian Luft & J. Tyler Friedman (eds.), The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment. De Gruyter 341-360.
    Who would hold that history is a dialogue? It sounds somewhat striking to concentrate on the second-person perspective in Cassirer’s account of history, since it is obviously true that the past may somewhat “speak to us”, but that it cannot “speak with us” in a truly dialogical sense. What is here and now contrasts with what is stored away in the past, as two different levels of fluidity. Symbols, as the expressions of past consciousness, are no longer in flux (...)
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  33. Dirk Kindermann, Perspective in Context : Relative Truth, Knowledge, and the First Person.
    This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (...)
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  34.  52
    Kai Vogeley, M. May, A. Ritzl, P. Falkai, K. Zilles & Gereon R. Fink (2004). Neural Correlates of First-Person Perspective as One Constituent of Human Self-Consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (5):817-827.
  35.  9
    Robert J. Howell (2013). Perception From the First‐Person Perspective. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):n/a-n/a.
    This paper develops a view of the content of perceptual states that reflects the cognitive significance those states have for the subject. Perhaps the most important datum for such a theory is the intuition that experiences are ‘transparent’, an intuition promoted by philosophers as diverse as Sartre and Dretske. This paper distinguishes several different transparency theses, and considers which ones are truly supported by the phenomenological data. It is argued that the only thesis supported by the data is much weaker (...)
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  36. Karsten Stueber, Intentional Explanation, Psychological Laws, and the Irreducibility of the First Person Perspective.
    1. Introduction: Naturalism and Psychological Explanations To a large extent, contemporary philosophical debate takes place within a framework of naturalistic assumptions. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, naturalism is the legacy of positivism without its empiricist epistemology and empiricist conception of meaning and cognitive significance. Systematically, it is best to characterize naturalism as the philosophical articulation of the underlying presuppositions of a reductive scientific research program that was rather successful in the last few centuries and, equally important, (...)
     
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  37.  27
    C. Petitmengin (2011). Is the “Core Self” a Construct? Review of “Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective” by Dan Zahavi. Constructivist Foundations 6 (2):270-274.
    Upshot: Is lived experience always the experience of a self? The central thesis of Dan Zahavi’s book is that there is a “minimal” or “core” self, according to which a quality of “self-givenness” is a constitutive feature of experience. The adoption of a dynamic phenomenological perspective leads us to call this thesis into question.
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  38.  38
    Mario De Caro (2015). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 124 (1):156-158.
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  39.  30
    Gurpreet Rattan (2014). Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective. Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.
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  40. Michael Tye (2000). Shoemaker's the First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):461-464.
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  41. H. Kockler, L. Scheef, R. Tepest, N. David, B. H. Bewernick, A. Newen, H. H. Schild, M. May & K. Vogeley (2010). Visuospatial Perspective Taking in a Dynamic Environment: Perceiving Moving Objects From a First-Person-Perspective Induces a Disposition to Act☆. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):690-701.
  42. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The First-Person Perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22.
  43.  79
    Brian Loar (1995). Reference From the First Person Perspective. Philosophical Issues 6:53-72.
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  44.  60
    Shaun Gallagher (2012). First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag 47--245.
  45.  24
    Jacob Berger (2015). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective, by Lynne Rudder Baker. Mind 124 (493):317-321.
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  46.  34
    Charles K. Fink (2012). The ‘Scent’ of a Self: Buddhism and the First-Person Perspective. Asian Philosophy 22 (3):289-306.
  47.  34
    Stephen Kearns (2014). Naturalism and the First Person Perspective By Lynne Rudder Baker. Analysis 74 (4):733-735.
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  48.  34
    Philip Atkins (2016). The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person By Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever. Analysis 76 (1):99-102.
    Due largely to the influence of Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979), many philosophers now believe that certain attitudes are ‘essentially indexical’, and that this fact is philosophically significant. Going against the conventional wisdom, Cappelen and Dever (2013) (henceforth ‘C&D’) have two goals. The modest goal is to show that Perry, Lewis and their followers have failed to establish any clear ‘essential indexicality’ thesis. The ambitious goal is to show that indexicality is ‘shallow’, in that it does not play any interesting (...)
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  49. Charles Siewert (2008). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):840-843.
  50.  49
    B. Dainton (2008). Review: Dan Zahavi: Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (465):241-245.
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