Search results for 'fitting attitudes' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jens Johansson (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247 - 256.score: 240.0
    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person —can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I (...)
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  2. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3):391-423.score: 210.0
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro- (...) toward objects that are not valuable. Or vice versa: we might have reasons not to have pro-attitudes toward some valuable objects. The paper goes through several attempts to solve (or dissolve) the WKR problem and argues that none of them is fully satisfactory. (shrink)
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  3. Heath White (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):339-364.score: 210.0
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  4. Francesco Orsi (2013). Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods. Mind 122 (487):687-698.score: 180.0
    In this paper I argue that Bykvist’s recent challenges to the fitting-attitude account of value (FA) can be successfully met. The challenge from solitary goods claims that FA cannot account for the value of states of affairs which necessarily rule out the presence of favouring subjects. I point out the modal reasons why FA can account for solitary goods by appealing to contemplative attitudes. Bykvist’s second challenge, the ‘distance problem’, questions the ability of FA to match facts about (...)
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  5. Chris Heathwood (2008). Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.score: 176.0
    The purpose of this paper is to present a new argument against so-called fitting attitude analyses of intrinsic value, according to which, roughly, for something to be intrinsically good is for there to be reasons to want it for its own sake. The argument is indirect. First, I submit that advocates of a fitting-attitude analysis of value should, for the sake of theoretical unity, also endorse a fitting-attitude analysis of a closely related but distinct concept: the concept (...)
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  6. Joshua Gert (2010). Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.score: 164.0
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such descriptive (...)
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  7. Jason Turner (2010). Fitting Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Noûs 44 (1):1-9.score: 162.0
    The Property Theory of attitudes holds that the contents of mental states --- especially de se states --- are properties. The "nonexistence problem" for the Property Theory holds that the theory gives the wrong consequences as to which worlds "fit" which mental states: which worlds satisfy desires, make beliefs true, and so on. If I desire to not exist, since there is no world where I have the property of not existing, my desire is satisfied in no worlds. In (...)
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  8. Graham Oddie, Fitting Attitudes, Value Bearers, Unappreciated Goods.score: 150.0
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  9. Cain Todd (2012). Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts. Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).score: 150.0
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  10. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2013). Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.score: 124.0
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent (...)
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  11. K. Bykvist (2009). No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails. Mind 118 (469):1-30.score: 100.0
    Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with (...)
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  12. Mark Schroeder (2010). Value and the Right Kind of Reason. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.score: 90.0
    Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms of (...)
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  13. Mark Alfano (2009). A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Moral Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (3).score: 90.0
    In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” and (...)
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  14. Sebastian Lutz (2010). Concept Formation in Ethical Theories: Dealing with Polar Predicates. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2010 (August):1-8.score: 90.0
    In "A Danger of Definition: Polar Predicates in Metaethics," Mark Alfano (2009) concludes that the response-dependence theory of Prinz and others and the fitting-attitudes theory first articulated by Brentano are false because they imply empirically false statements. He further concludes that these statements cannot be avoided by revising the definitions of the terms 'good' and 'bad' used in the two theories. I strengthen Alfano's first conclusion by arguing that the two theories are false even if they imply empirically (...)
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  15. Johan E. Gustafsson (2013). Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476–491.score: 84.0
    Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, also (...)
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  16. Maureen L. Ambrose, Anke Arnaud & Marshall Schminke (2008). Individual Moral Development and Ethical Climate: The Influence of Person–Organization Fit on Job Attitudes. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 77 (3):323 - 333.score: 80.0
    This research examines how the fit between employees moral development and the ethical work climate of their organization affects employee attitudes. Person-organization fit was assessed by matching individuals' level of cognitive moral development with the ethical climate of their organization. The influence of P-O fit on employee attitudes was assessed using a sample of 304 individuals from 73 organizations. In general, the findings support our predictions that fit between personal and organizational ethics is related to higher levels of (...)
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  17. Antti Kauppinen (2014). Fittingness and Idealization. Ethics 124 (3):572-588.score: 74.0
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. A (...)
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  18. Michael J. Zimmerman (2010). Responsibility, Reaction, and Value. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):103-115.score: 72.0
    Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting that (...)
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  19. Andrew Reisner (forthcoming). Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly.score: 72.0
    Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.
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  20. Jonas Olson (2009). Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365 - 378.score: 72.0
    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for (...)
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  21. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.score: 66.0
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if (...)
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  22. Richard Rowland (2013). Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences. Utilitas 25 (3):405-416.score: 66.0
    In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of (...)
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  23. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). On for Someone's Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397 - 411.score: 64.0
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us (rather than value simpliciter ), has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers , which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s-sake (...) can be identified. Moreover, it is argued that one of these kinds is particularly difficult to include in an analysis of value simpliciter but not in an analysis of value for. (shrink)
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  24. Nathaniel Sharadin (2013). Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7:1-8.score: 64.0
    Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called "right" and "wrong" kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder's two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong kinds of reasons.
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  25. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.score: 60.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  26. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2008). Value Relations. Theoria 74 (1):18-49.score: 60.0
    Abstract: The paper provides a general account of value relations. It takes its departure in a special type of value relation, parity, which according to Ruth Chang is a form of evaluative comparability that differs from the three standard forms of comparability: betterness, worseness and equal goodness. Recently, Joshua Gert has suggested that the notion of parity can be accounted for if value comparisons are interpreted as normative assessments of preference. While Gert's basic idea is attractive, the way he develops (...)
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  27. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 60.0
    The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the `right' kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the `wrong' kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the `right' (...)
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  28. Alexandre Erler (2011). Does Memory Modification Threaten Our Authenticity? Neuroethics 4 (3):235-249.score: 60.0
    One objection to enhancement technologies is that they might lead us to live inauthentic lives. Memory modification technologies (MMTs) raise this worry in a particularly acute manner. In this paper I describe four scenarios where the use of MMTs might be said to lead to an inauthentic life. I then undertake to justify that judgment. I review the main existing accounts of authenticity, and present my own version of what I call a “true self” account (intended as a complement, rather (...)
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  29. Daniel Jacobson, Fitting Attitude Theories of Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 60.0
  30. Macalester Bell (2011). Globalist Attitudes and the Fittingness Objection. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):449-472.score: 56.0
    Some attitudes typically take whole persons as their objects. Shame, contempt, disgust and admiration have this feature, as do many tokens of love and hate. Objectors complain that these ‘globalist attitudes’ can never fit their targets and thus can never be all-things-considered appropriate. Those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. The fittingness objection depends on an inaccurate view of the person-assessments at the heart of the globalist attitudes. Once we understand the nature (...)
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  31. Richard Rowland (2014). Dissolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. Philosophical Studies:1-20.score: 54.0
    According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue (...)
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  32. G. F. Schueler (1991). Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit. Mind 100 (400):277-81.score: 50.0
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  33. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account Of. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 50.0
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  34. Demian Whiting (2007). Inappropriate Attitudes, Fitness to Practise and the Challenges Facing Medical Educators. Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (11):667-670.score: 50.0
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  35. David J. Prottas (2008). Perceived Behavioral Integrity: Relationships with Employee Attitudes, Well-Being, and Absenteeism. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2):313 - 322.score: 44.0
    Relationships between the behavioral integrity of managers as perceived by employees and employee attitudes (job satisfaction and life satisfaction), well-being (stress and health), and behaviors (absenteeism) were tested using data from the 2002 National Study of the Changing Workforce (n = 2,820). Using multivariate and univariate analysis, perceived behavioral integrity (PBI) was positively related to job and life satisfaction and negatively related to stress, poor health, and absenteeism. The effect size for the relationship with job satisfaction was medium-to-large while (...)
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  36. David J. Prottas (2013). Relationships Among Employee Perception of Their Manager's Behavioral Integrity, Moral Distress, and Employee Attitudes and Well-Being. Journal of Business Ethics 113 (1):51-60.score: 44.0
    Hypothesized relationships among reports by employees of moral distress, their perceptions of their manager’s behavioral integrity (BI), and employee reports of job satisfaction, stress, job engagement, turnover likelihood, absenteeism, work-to-family conflict, health, and life satisfaction were tested using data from the 2008 National Study of the Changing Workforce (n = 2,679). BI was positively related to job satisfaction, job engagement, health, and life satisfaction and negatively to stress, turnover likelihood, and work-to-family conflict, while moral distress was inversely related to those (...)
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  37. Sashi Sekhar (2013). Employee and Organizational Environmental Values Fit and its Relationship to Sustainability-Relevant Attitudes, Commitment and Turnover Intentions. Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 24:124-131.score: 40.0
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  38. Ryan Tanner (2008). Ouch, That Doesn't Fit There. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:419-426.score: 40.0
    According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents of FA analyses deny (...)
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  39. Conor McHugh, Fitting Belief.score: 36.0
    Beliefs can be correct or incorrect, and this standard of correctness is widely thought to be fundamental to epistemic normativity. But how should this standard be understood, and in what way is it so fundamental? I argue that we should resist understanding correctness for belief as either a prescriptive or an evaluative norm. Rather, we should understand it as an instance of the distinct normative category of fittingness for attitudes. This yields an attractive account of epistemic reasons.
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  40. Arto Laitinen (2014). Against Representations with Two Directions of Fit. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):179-199.score: 34.0
    The idea that there are representations with a double direction of fit has acquired a pride of place in contemporary debates on the ontology of institutions. This paper will argue against the very idea of anything at all having both directions of fit. There is a simple problem which has thus far gone unnoticed. The suggestion that there are representations with both directions of fit amounts to a suggestion that, in cases of discrepancy between a representation and the world, both (...)
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  41. Matthew Carey Jordan (2013). Divine Commands or Divine Attitudes? Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):159-70.score: 32.0
    In this essay, I present three arguments for the claim that theists should reject divine command theory (DCT) in favor of divine attitude theory (DAT). First, DCT (but not DAT) implies that some cognitively normal human persons are exempt from the dictates of morality. Second, it is incumbent upon us to cultivate the skill of moral judgment, a skill that fits nicely with the claims of DAT but which is superfluous if DCT is true. Third, an attractive and widely shared (...)
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  42. Richard Yetter Chappell (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.score: 30.0
    This paper draws on the 'Fitting Attitudes' analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye colours are normatively (...)
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  43. Jonathan Way (2012). Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason. Ethics 122 (3):489-515.score: 30.0
    According to fitting-attitudes accounts of value, the valuable is what there is sufficient reason to value. Such accounts face the famous wrong kind of reason problem. For example, if an evil demon threatens to kill you unless you value him, it may appear that you have sufficient reason to value the demon, although he is not valuable. One solution to this problem is to deny that the demon’s threat is a reason to value him. It is instead a (...)
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  44. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Incommensurability and Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.score: 30.0
    This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the 'fitting attitudes' analysis of value.
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  45. M. J. Zimmerman (2011). Partiality and Intrinsic Value. Mind 120 (478):447-483.score: 30.0
    The fitting-attitudes analysis of value, which states that something's being good consists in its being the fitting object of some pro-attitude, has recently been the focus of intense debate. Many objections have been levelled against this analysis. One objection to it concerns the ‘challenge from partiality’, according to which it can be fitting to display partiality toward objects of equal value. Several responses to the challenge have been proposed. This paper criticizes these and other responses and (...)
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  46. Eugene C. Hargrove (1987). Foundations of Wildlife Protection Attitudes. Inquiry 30 (1 & 2):3 – 31.score: 30.0
    The history of ideas normally invoked by animal liberationists and their opponents cannot account for our basic wildlife protection attitudes, which actually developed out of the worldwide species?classification project begun by Linnaeus in the eighteenth century. These attitudes, formed in terms of a pre?evolutionary and pre?ecological belief in fixed and immutable species, were weakened to some degree by the rise of evolutionary theory and ecological science, since evolution provides a mechanism for the replacement of extinct species and depicts (...)
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  47. Stephane Lemaire (2012). The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons. Dialogue 51 (1):31-53.score: 30.0
    ABSTRACT: Confronted with the , several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an analysis of (...)
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  48. Demian Whiting (2009). Should Doctors Ever Be Professionally Required to Change Their Attitudes? Clinical Ethics 4 (2):67-73.score: 30.0
    The General Medical Council instructs doctors not to allow their personal beliefs to interfere with their practice. But if attitudes can threaten to impact negatively on a doctor's practice then the question arises: should doctors ever be professionally required to change their attitudes? In this paper I suggest that doctors should be required to amend their attitudes if two conditions are met, namely: (1) the doctor has an attitude that if neglected by the doctor will (or is (...)
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  49. Joseph Hilgard, Christopher R. Engelhardt & Bruce D. Bartholow (2013). Individual Differences in Motives, Preferences, and Pathology in Video Games: The Gaming Attitudes, Motives, and Experiences Scales (GAMES). Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 30.0
    A new measure of individual habits and preferences in video game use is developed in order to better study the risk factors of pathological game use (i.e., excessively frequent or prolonged use, sometimes called “game addiction”). This measure was distributed to internet message boards for game enthusiasts and to college undergraduates. An exploratory factor analysis identified 9 factors: Story, Violent Catharsis, Violent Reward, Social Interaction, Escapism, Loss-Sensitivity, Customization, Grinding, and Autonomy. These factors demonstrated excellent fit in a subsequent confirmatory factor (...)
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