Search results for 'fitting attitudes analysis of value' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen (2004). The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value. Ethics 114 (3):391-423.score: 1602.0
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have (...)
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  2. K. Bykvist (2009). No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails. Mind 118 (469):1-30.score: 1282.0
    Understanding value in terms of fitting attitudes is all the rage these days. According to this fitting attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis for short) what is good is what it is fitting to favour in some sense. Many aspects of the FA-analysis have been discussed. In particular, a lot of discussion has been concerned with the wrong-reason objection: it can be fitting to have an attitude towards something for reasons that (...)
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  3. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2006). Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.score: 1065.0
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind (...)
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  4. Johan E. Gustafsson (2013). Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476–491.score: 1063.2
    Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these (...)
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  5. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2013). Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.score: 997.0
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; (...)
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  6. Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.score: 975.0
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour (...)
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  7. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2008). Value Relations. Theoria 74 (1):18-49.score: 891.0
    Abstract: The paper provides a general account of value relations. It takes its departure in a special type of value relation, parity, which according to Ruth Chang is a form of evaluative comparability that differs from the three standard forms of comparability: betterness, worseness and equal goodness. Recently, Joshua Gert has suggested that the notion of parity can be accounted for if value comparisons are interpreted as normative assessments of preference. While Gert's basic idea is attractive, the (...)
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  8. Jens Johansson (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247 - 256.score: 867.0
    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person —can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In (...)
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  9. Jonas Olson (2009). Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):365 - 378.score: 844.6
    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is (...)
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  10. Stephane Lemaire (2012). The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons. Dialogue 51 (1):31-53.score: 824.8
    ABSTRACT: Confronted with the , several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an (...) of final value and because it is relativistic. (shrink)
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  11. Andrew Reisner (2009). Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.score: 799.4
    In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final (...)
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  12. Andrew Reisner, Fittingness, Value and Trans-World Attitudes.score: 739.0
    This paper introduces a case, Causal Entanglement (CE), in which there is a valuable state of affairs that it is not fitting to favour, at least for any actual individual. I discuss whether CE is a counterexample to the fitting attitude analysis of final value (FA). I discuss the proponent of FA can account for the value in CE by appealing to attitudes that it is fitting for individuals who are not in the (...)
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  13. Antti Kauppinen (2014). Fittingness and Idealization. Ethics 124 (3):572-588.score: 684.0
    This note explores how ideal subjectivism in metanormative theory can help solve two important problems for Fitting Attitude analyses of value. The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is that there may be sufficient reason for attitude Y even if the object is not Y-able. The many-kinds-of-fittingness problem is that the same attitude can be fitting in many ways. Ideal subjectivism addresses both by maintaining that an attitude is W-ly fitting if and only if endorsed by any W-ly ideal subject. (...)
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  14. Stephen M. Campbell (2013). An Analysis of Prudential Value. Utilitas 25 (03):334-54.score: 650.8
    This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of the related concepts of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential (...) and the attitudes of concern, love, pity, and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life. (shrink)
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  15. Chris Heathwood (2008). Fitting Attitudes and Welfare. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.score: 586.0
    The purpose of this paper is to present a new argument against so-called fitting attitude analyses of intrinsic value, according to which, roughly, for something to be intrinsically good is for there to be reasons to want it for its own sake. The argument is indirect. First, I submit that advocates of a fitting-attitude analysis of value should, for the sake of theoretical unity, also endorse a fitting-attitude analysis of a closely related but (...)
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  16. Mark Schroeder (2010). Value and the Right Kind of Reason. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.score: 571.2
    Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms (...)
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  17. Richard Rowland (2013). Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences. Utilitas 25 (3):405-416.score: 542.4
    In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind (...)
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  18. Cathryn M. Button, Malcolm J. Grant & Brent Snook (2011). A Judgement Analysis of Social Perceptions of Attitudes and Ability. Thinking and Reasoning 15 (4):319-336.score: 535.2
    A judgement analysis of people's social inferences of attitudes and ability was conducted. University students were asked to infer the liberalness ( N = 60; Study 1) or intelligence ( N = 40; Study 2) of targets seen in pictures. Multiple regression analyses revealed that attractiveness was the most important cue for predicting inferences of liberalness, while an ethnic cue (i.e., being Asian) was the most important cue for judgements about intelligence. Results also showed that a single-cue model (...)
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  19. Johan Brännmark (2009). Goodness, Values, Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329 - 343.score: 517.0
    Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still (...)
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  20. Stephen Finlay (2004). The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement. Journal of Ethics 8 (3):205-223.score: 472.8
    Analyses of moral value judgements must meet a practicality requirement: moral speech acts characteristically express pro- or con-attitudes, indicate that speakers are motivated in certain ways, and exert influence on others' motivations. Nondescriptivists including Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard claim that no descriptivist analysis can satisfy this requirement. I argue first that while the practicality requirement is defeasible, it indeed demands a connection between value judgement and motivation that resembles a semantic or conceptual rather than merely (...)
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  21. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). On for Someone's Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397 - 411.score: 468.0
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us (rather than value simpliciter ), has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers , which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of (...)
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  22. Francesco Orsi (2013). Fitting Attitudes and Solitary Goods. Mind 122 (487):687-698.score: 454.4
    In this paper I argue that Bykvist’s recent challenges to the fitting-attitude account of value (FA) can be successfully met. The challenge from solitary goods claims that FA cannot account for the value of states of affairs which necessarily rule out the presence of favouring subjects. I point out the modal reasons why FA can account for solitary goods by appealing to contemplative attitudes. Bykvist’s second challenge, the ‘distance problem’, questions the ability of FA to match (...)
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  23. T. Gregory Garvey (2000). The Value of Opacity: A Bakhtinian Analysis of Habermas's Discourse Ethics. Philosophy and Rhetoric 33 (4):370-390.score: 446.4
    The article focuses on the value of opacity in communication. Jurgen Habermas's and M.M. Bakhtin's attitudes toward transparent or undistorted communication define almost antithetical approaches to the relationship between public discourse and autonomy. Habermas, both in his theory of communicative action and in his discourse ethics, assumes that transparent communication is possible and actually makes transparency a necessary condition for the legitimation of social norms. Yet, there is a sense in which the same kind of transparency that offers (...)
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  24. Paul Croll, Gaynor Attwood, Carol Fuller & Kathryn Last (2008). The Structure and Implications of Children's Attitudes to School. British Journal of Educational Studies 56 (4):382 - 399.score: 444.0
    The paper reports a study of children's attitudes to school based on a questionnaire survey of 845 pupils in their first year of secondary school in England, together with interviews with a sample of the children. A clearly structured set of attitudes emerged from a factor analysis which showed a distinction between instrumental and affective aspects of attitudes but also dimensions within these, including a sense of teacher commitment and school as a difficult environment. Virtually all (...)
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  25. M. J. Zimmerman (2011). Partiality and Intrinsic Value. Mind 120 (478):447-483.score: 435.0
    The fitting-attitudes analysis of value, which states that something's being good consists in its being the fitting object of some pro-attitude, has recently been the focus of intense debate. Many objections have been levelled against this analysis. One objection to it concerns the ‘challenge from partiality’, according to which it can be fitting to display partiality toward objects of equal value. Several responses to the challenge have been proposed. This paper criticizes these (...)
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  26. Heath White (2009). Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (3):339-364.score: 432.0
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  27. Kyoko Fukukawa, William E. Shafer & Grace Meina Lee (2007). Values and Attitudes Toward Social and Environmental Accountability: A Study of MBA Students. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 71 (4):381 - 394.score: 420.8
    Efforts to promote corporate social and environmental accountability (SEA) should be informed by an understanding of stakeholders’ attitudes toward enhanced accountability standards. However, little is known about current attitudes on this subject, or the determinants of these attitudes. To address this issue, this study examines the relationship between personal values and support for social and environmental accountability for a sample of experienced MBA students. Exploratory factor analysis of the items comprising our measure of support for SEA (...)
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  28. Michael J. Zimmerman (2010). Responsibility, Reaction, and Value. Journal of Ethics 14 (2):103-115.score: 414.4
    Many writers accept the following thesis about responsibility: (R) For one to be responsible for something is for one to be such that it is fitting that one be the object of some reactive attitude with respect to that thing. This thesis bears a striking resemblance to a thesis about value that is also accepted by many writers: (V) For something to be good (or neutral, or bad) is for it to be such that it is fitting (...)
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  29. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2007). Analysing Personal Value. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405 - 435.score: 414.2
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too (and not only to impersonal values, which is the standard analysandum) if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake (where “favour” is a place-holder for different pro-responses that are called for by the (...) bearer). One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than the reason part, the analysis admits that personal value is recognizable as a value not only by the person for whom it has personal value, but for everyone else too. We thereby avoid facing two completely different notions of value, viz., one pertaining to impersonal value, and another to personal value. The analysis also elucidates why we are (at least pro tanto) justified in our concern for objects that are valuable for us; if value just is, as it is suggested, the existence of reasons for such a concern, the justification is immediately forthcoming. (shrink)
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  30. Ryan Tanner (2008). Ouch, That Doesn't Fit There. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:419-426.score: 411.0
    According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents (...)
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  31. P. Lehoux, M. Hivon, B. Williams-Jones, F. A. Miller & D. R. Urbach (2012). How Do Medical Device Manufacturers' Websites Frame the Value of Health Innovation? An Empirical Ethics Analysis of Five Canadian Innovations. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (1):61-77.score: 410.4
    While every health care system stakeholder would seem to be concerned with obtaining the greatest value from a given technology, there is often a disconnect in the perception of value between a technology’s promoters and those responsible for the ultimate decision as to whether or not to pay for it. Adopting an empirical ethics approach, this paper examines how five Canadian medical device manufacturers, via their websites, frame the corporate “value proposition” of their innovation and seek to (...)
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  32. Anne L. Davis & Hannah R. Rothstein (2006). The Effects of the Perceived Behavioral Integrity of Managers on Employee Attitudes: A Meta-Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 67 (4):407 - 419.score: 405.0
    Perceived behavioral integrity involves the employee’s perception of the alignment of the manager’s words and deeds. This meta-analysis examined the relationship between perceived behavioral integrity of managers and the employee attitudes of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, satisfaction with the leader and affect toward the organization. Results indicate a strong positive relationship overall (average r = 0.48, p<0.01). With only 12 studies included, exploration of moderators was limited, but preliminary analysis suggested that the gender of the employees and (...)
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  33. Ting Ren (2013). Sectoral Differences in Value Congruence and Job Attitudes: The Case of Nursing Home Employees. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 112 (2):213-224.score: 405.0
    Drawing on a survey of nursing staff of nursing homes in a Midwestern state in the United States, the study examines how the relationships between employee—organization value congruence and job attitudes vary between nonprofit and for-profit organizational types. Statistical comparison of the levels of employee value congruence and job attitudes does not suggest significant difference between the two types of employees. Although value congruence is found positively associated with nursing home employees' job satisfaction and organizational (...)
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  34. Richard Yetter Chappell (2012). Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.score: 390.0
    This paper draws on the 'Fitting Attitudes' analysis of value to argue that we should take the concept of fittingness (rather than value) as our normative primitive. I will argue that the fittingness framework enhances the clarity and expressive power of our normative theorising. Along the way, we will see how the fittingness framework illuminates our understanding of various moral theories, and why it casts doubt on the Global Consequentialist idea that acts and (say) eye (...)
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  35. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Incommensurability and Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.score: 390.0
    This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the 'fitting attitudes' analysis of value.
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  36. Peggy F. Barlett, Linda Lobao & Katherine Meyer (1999). Diversity in Attitudes Toward Farming and Patterns of Work Among Farm Women: A Regional Comparison. [REVIEW] Agriculture and Human Values 16 (4):343-354.score: 388.0
    Attention to diversity in women's attitudes toward farming and in women's patterns of farm work activity expands our understanding of the linkage between agrarian structure, regional history, and the behavior and values of individual farm women. We combine several disciplinary and methodological approaches to reveal patterns in work and values in a Southern case and then verify the existence of similar patterns in the Midwest. Two divergent conceptions of women's relationship to farm and marital partnership were found in a (...)
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  37. Daniel Jacobson, Fitting Attitude Theories of Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 384.4
  38. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account Of. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.score: 378.4
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  39. Maureen L. Ambrose, Anke Arnaud & Marshall Schminke (2008). Individual Moral Development and Ethical Climate: The Influence of Person–Organization Fit on Job Attitudes. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 77 (3):323 - 333.score: 371.6
    This research examines how the fit between employees moral development and the ethical work climate of their organization affects employee attitudes. Person-organization fit was assessed by matching individuals' level of cognitive moral development with the ethical climate of their organization. The influence of P-O fit on employee attitudes was assessed using a sample of 304 individuals from 73 organizations. In general, the findings support our predictions that fit between personal and organizational ethics is related to higher levels of (...)
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  40. Joshua Gert (2010). Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values. Philosophical Topics 38 (1):87-105.score: 360.0
    Response-dispositional accounts of value defend a biconditional in which the possession of an evaluative property is said to covary with the disposition to cause a certain response. In contrast, a fitting-attitude account of the same property would claim that it is such as to merit or make fitting that same response. This paper argues that even for secondary qualities, response-dispositional accounts are inadequate; we need to import a normative notion such as appropriateness even into accounts of such (...)
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  41. Johan Hattingh (2004). On the Ethical Analysis of Value Issues in Public Decision-Making. South African Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):213-225.score: 354.6
    The nature, methodology, importance and implications of an ethical analysis of value issues pertaining to public decision-making is not evident. In this paper I would like to address these issues by posing the following questions: - Why is it important to focus on values in any process of public decision-making? - What is the nature of an ethical analysis of the value issues involved? - What is the basis, if any, for ethical analysis that moves (...)
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  42. P. Maria Joseph Christie, Ik-Whan G. Kwon, Philipp A. Stoeberl & Raymond Baumhart (2003). A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Ethical Attitudes of Business Managers: India Korea and the United States. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 46 (3):263 - 287.score: 352.8
    Culture has been identified as a significant determinant of ethical attitudes of business managers. This research studies the impact of culture on the ethical attitudes of business managers in India, Korea and the United States using multivariate statistical analysis. Employing Geert Hofstede''s cultural typology, this study examines the relationship between his five cultural dimensions (individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term orientation) and business managers'' ethical attitudes. The study uses primary data collected from 345 business (...)
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  43. Jack P. Freer (1984). Chronic Vegetative States: Intrinsic Value of Biological Process. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (4):395-408.score: 352.8
    has been put forth by Rolston, which leads to respect for the irreversibly comatose by virtue of the residual biological (objective) life. By comparing objective and subjective life, he develops a naturalistic principle which he contrasts with the humanistic norm of contemporary medical ethics. He claims there are clinical applications which would necessarily follow. A critique of this viewpoint is presented here, which begins with an analysis of what might be of value in spontaneous objective life. A measure (...)
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  44. Karin U. Katz, Mikhail G. Katz & Taras Kudryk (2014). Toward a Clarity of the Extreme Value Theorem. Logica Universalis 8 (2):193-214.score: 351.0
    We apply a framework developed by C. S. Peirce to analyze the concept of clarity, so as to examine a pair of rival mathematical approaches to a typical result in analysis. Namely, we compare an intuitionist and an infinitesimal approaches to the extreme value theorem. We argue that a given pre-mathematical phenomenon may have several aspects that are not necessarily captured by a single formalisation, pointing to a complementarity rather than a rivalry of the approaches.
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  45. Jack Dowie (1996). The Research-Practice Gap and the Role of Decision Analysis in Closing It. Health Care Analysis 4 (1):5-18.score: 349.6
    Current hypotheses for the existence of the ‘research-practice gap’ focus on weaknesses in research dissemination on the one hand and practitioner attitudes and motivations on the other. It is suggested that the gap has more fundamental origins in the cognitive and value mismatch between researchers and practitioners. To narrow the gap both cultures need to use a common framework (map and language) that is located at a level of analysis between their typical modes and makes explicit provision (...)
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  46. Justin D'Arms (2013). Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):3-13.score: 344.0
    “Sentiment” is a term of art, intended to refer to object-directed, irruptive states, that occur in relatively transient bouts involving positive or negative affect, and that typically involve a distinctive motivational profile. Not all the states normally called “emotions” are sentiments in the sense just characterized. And all the terms for sentiments are sometimes used in English to refer to longer lasting attitudes. But this discussion is concerned with boutish affective states, not standing attitudes. That poses some challenges (...)
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  47. Tenzin Wangmo, Violet Handtke & Bernice Simone Elger (forthcoming). Disclosure of Past Crimes: An Analysis of Mental Health Professionals' Attitudes Towards Breaching Confidentiality. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry:1-12.score: 343.8
    Ensuring confidentiality is the cornerstone of trust within the doctor–patient relationship. However, health care providers have an obligation to serve not only their patient’s interests but also those of potential victims and society, resulting in circumstances where confidentiality must be breached. This article describes the attitudes of mental health professionals (MHPs) when patients disclose past crimes unknown to the justice system. Twenty-four MHPs working in Swiss prisons were interviewed. They shared their experiences concerning confidentiality practices and attitudes towards (...)
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  48. Jay David Atlas, Aboutness, Fiction, and Quantifying Into Intentional Contexts: A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on The..score: 338.4
    A Linguistic Analysis of Prior, Quine, and Searle on Propositional Attitudes, Martinich on Fictional Reference, Taglicht on the Active/Passive Mood Distinction in English, etc.
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  49. Emiliano Lorini (2013). On the Epistemic Foundation for Iterated Weak Dominance: An Analysis in a Logic of Individual and Collective Attitudes. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):863-904.score: 336.6
    This paper proposes a logical framework for representing static and dynamic properties of different kinds of individual and collective attitudes. A complete axiomatization as well as a decidability result for the logic are given. The logic is applied to game theory by providing a formal analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (IDWDS), or iterated weak dominance for short. The main difference between the analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance (...)
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