This chapter reviews a number of related problems in the epistemology of testimony, and suggests some dilemmas for any theory of knowledge that tries to solve them. Here a common theme emerges: It can seem that any theory must make testimonial knowledge either too hard or too easy, and that therefore no adequate account of testimonial knowledge is possible. The chapter then puts forward a proposal for making progress. Specifically, an important function of the concept of knowledge is to govern (...) the acquisition and distribution of quality information within an epistemic community. Testimonial exchanges paradigmatically serve in the distribution role, but sometimes serve in the acquisition role. The resulting position, it is argued, explains why testimonial knowledge is sometimes easy to get, and sometimes much harder. (shrink)

Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.

This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning by (...) viewing meaning as a certain kind of information-carrying role. (shrink)

In 1958, Francis Crick distinguished the flow of information from the flow of matter and the flow of energy in the mechanism of protein synthesis. Crick’s claims about information flow and coding in molecular biology are viewed from the perspective of a new characterization of mechanisms and from the perspective of information as holding a key to distinguishing work in molecular biology from that of biochemistry in the 1950s–1970s . Flow of matter (...) from beginning to end does not occur in the protein synthesis mechanism; flow of information does. The flow of information and coding in molecular biological mechanisms are distinguished, on the one hand, from formal information theory, and, on the other, from information as used in cognitive neuroscience, where information and representation are often coupled. (shrink)

In his earlier writings, Fred Dretske proposed an anti-skeptical strategy that is based on a rejection of the view that knowledge is closed under known entailment. This strategy is seemingly congenial with a sensitivity condition for knowledge, which is often associated with Dretske’s epistemology. However, it is not obvious how Dretske’s early account meshes with the information-theoretic view developed in Knowledge and the Flow of Information. One aim of this paper is to elucidate the connections between these (...) accounts. First I argue that, contrary to an objection raised by Christoph Jäger, the information-theoretic account is compatible with Dretske’s anti-skeptical strategy based on the rejection of closure. This strategy invokes the notion of channel conditions, which are roughly speaking those conditions that are necessary and jointly sufficient for a signal to carry information. I propose an interpretation of the account that is based on the idea that a signal’s carrying information requires that the channel conditions are stable. It is shown that the resulting account incorporates both a sensitivity condition and a safety condition for knowledge. Finally, I demonstrate how this proposal allows for knowledge of modally robust propositions without making its acquisition too easy, as simple safety accounts do. I end with a suggestion concerning the direction that future research should take, based on the fact that in its present form the information-theoretic account does not capture inferential knowledge. (shrink)

Although the current literature on supertasks concentrates largely on their supposed physical implications (extending the tradition of Zeno’s classical paradoxes of movement), in this study I propose a new model of supertask that explores for the first time some of their information-related consequences and I defend these consequences from a possible criticism.

A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content (...) corresponding to the information producing it. This picture of knowledge captures most of what makes knowledge an important cpistcmological notion. It also avoids many of the problems infecting traditional justificational accounts of knowledge (knowledge as [justified, true belief those (unlike knowledge) having a content that can be either true or false (e.g., belief) – are described in terms of the way internal (presumably neural) structures acquire during learning a certain information-carrying role. The content of these structures (whether true or false) is identified with the kind of information they were developed to carry. (shrink)

In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the (...) issue of information closure and an investigation into some of the logical properties of Dretske’s account of information flow. (shrink)

That this is one of the most distinguished books in the excellent Bradford Books cognitive science/philosophy series is suggested by the March 1983 issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in which we find a precis of the book, some twenty commentaries, and Dretske's replies. Physicalists and anti-physicalists in psychology have both stressed the importance of "top-down" strategies and have debated, prospectively, about the likelihood that we eventually will have suitable reductions, or explanatory instantiations, of psychological generations in neurophysiological terms. Dretske (...) takes the more straightforward approach, starting with an avowedly physical notion of information and then trying to show how one can make, building on this foundation, a reasonable construal of knowledge, perception, and belief. Dretske starts with the following information-theoretic specification of a signal's information content: a signal r carries the information that s is F = the conditional probability of s's being F, given r, is l. Thus, to use Dretske's humble example, "My gas gauge carries the information that I still have some gas left, if and only if the conditional probability of my having some gas left, given the reading of the gauge, is l." The parenthetical clause makes the causal character of this analysis clear: the state of the source is related by physical laws to the occurrence of the signal--the gas in the tank causes the gauge reading. Insisting on the conditional probability of l has the advantage of preserving the properties of certainty, transitivity, and addition that we associate with knowledge. If the gas gauge does carry the information that my tank has gas, then my tank must have gas. If my statement that my gauge indicates gas carries the information that it does so indicate, then information flows intact from signal to signal. And finally, if the signal carries the information that s is F, and also carries the information that s is G, then it carries, at the same level of probability assigned each, the information that s is F and G. Now we can, eventually, say that K knows that s is F = K's belief that s is F is caused by the information that s is F. The "eventually" part is important, for what is most instructive and provoking about this book is the way in which Dretske lays out the steps in constructing viable construals of knowledge, perception, and belief out of the root notion of information.--Justin Leiber, The University of Houston. (shrink)

There is increasing evidence for the wide‐spread existence of functionally redundant genetic pathways in developmental processes. However, both their significance and manner of evolution are still matters of debate. I will argue here that redundancy of gene actions may, in fact, be a necessary requirement for the development and evolution of complex life forms. One can view development as a process that transmits information from the egg to the adult organism. Transmission of information is, however, always an error‐prone (...) process, which can only be safeguarded by including redundancies in the message. Molecular examples for well analysed redundant processes indicate that redundancies may best be understood within a conceptual framework of overlaps between different gene functions. (shrink)

In the global context, the economic-technological powers are also the political-cultural powers, which have the capacity to obtain the maximising benefits from the global flow of information. Meanwhile, the countries which are inferior in economics, technology, etc. feel unable to enjoy the fruits of the information society; they have to struggle for their right to communicate.

Minimal genetic pre-formationism is defended, in that primacy is ascribed to DNA in the structuring of molecules through molecular codes. This together with the importance of such codes for stability and variation in living systems makes DNA categorically different from other causal factors. It is argued that post-transcriptional and post-translational processing in protein synthesis does not rob DNA of this structuring role. Notions of structuring causal powers that may vary in degree, of arbitrary molecular codes that are more or less (...) realized, of partial templating and of genetic information as a subspecies of mechanistic information are brought in to support this and to rival causal and semantic notions of information. It is concluded that the primacy of genes in their structuring of molecules goes together with parity between genes and non-genetic causal factors in regulation of living systems. This is seen to hold independently of the radical reconceptualization of organism cum environment that has been suggested in developmental systems theory. (shrink)

The transferability problem—whether the results of an experiment will transfer to a treatment population—affects not only Randomized Controlled Trials but any type of study. The problem for any given type of study can also, potentially, be addressed to some degree through many different types of study. The transferability problem for a given RCT can be investigated further through another RCT, but the variables to use in the further experiment must be discovered. This suggests we could do better on the epistemological (...) problem of transferability by promoting, in the repeated process of formulating public health guidelines, feedback loops of information from the implementation setting back to researchers who are defining new studies. (shrink)

In this paper1, we develop an epistemic logic to specify and reason about the information flow on the underlying communication channels. By combining ideas from Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) and Interpreted Systems (IS), our semantics offers a natural and neat way of modelling multi-agent communication scenarios with different assumptions about the observational power of agents. We relate our logic to the standard DEL and IS..

Ethical selling has been found to have significant influence on sales performance and relational selling behaviors. However, sales ethics was mostly explored through a negative lens and we depart from this tradition by using a positive lens. Using broaden-and-build theory, this paper examines the influence of flow on ethical selling. The mediating role of information sharing is also examined. Results from a study of 192 pharmaceutical salespeople in India suggest that flow influences ethical selling behavior via (...) class='Hi'>information sharing. The findings imply that flow can serve as a driver for information sharing and ethical decision making among salespeople. The study contributes to the sales ethics literature by extending the application of positive psychology to the sales domain for the first time. (shrink)

Nancy is ultimately most concerned about how to determine the relevance of evidence to implementation of evidence-based policy guidelines, in other words, the transferability of study results to a population different from the one that was studied and in which procedures or conditions are not the same as those in the study. And she is concerned about the privileged position Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are given in the ranking schemes for evidence-based policy, because as she sees it RCTs do not (...) address this question while other methods do. RCTs are highly regarded because of their strength in ruling out confounding variables, but they can be weak on the transferability problem because the manipulations necessary for controlled experiment also guarantee that the setting and population are different from the situation and population targeted for application. However, both of these familiar points are simplifications that can be misleading. Some non-RCT type studies (e.g. soft interventions) can also be very good at ruling out confounding variables.1 And, as I will explain, the problems leading to the transferability problem – interacting variables and a difference between study and target populations – are present in any study, not unique to RCTs. In addition. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation into the logic of information flow. The basic perspective is that logic flows in virtue of constraints and that constraints classify channels connecting particulars In this paper we explore some logics intended to model reasoning in the case of idealized information flow, that is, where the constraints involved are exceptionless. We look at this as a step toward the far more challenging task of understanding the logic of imperfect information (...) class='Hi'>flow, that is where the constraints admit of exceptional connections. This paper continues and amplifies work presented by the same authors in [10]. (shrink)

Verbal narratives provide incomplete information and can be very long, yet readers and hearers often effortlessly fill in the gaps and make connections across long stretches of text, sometimes even finding this immersive. How is this done? In the last few decades, event-indexing situation modeling and complementary accounts of narrative emotion have suggested answers. Despite this progress, comparisons between real-life perception and narrative experience might underplay the way narrative processing modifies our world model, as well as the role of (...) the emotions that do not relate to characters. I reframe narrative experience in predictive processing and neural networks, capturing continuity between fiction, perception, and states like dreaming and imagination, enabled by the flexible instantiation of concepts. In this framework, narrative experience is more clearly revealed as a creative experience that can share some of the phenomenology of dreams. (shrink)

The article discusses the relation between two intuitive properties of time, namely its flow and branching. Both properties are introduced first in an informal way and compared. The conclusion of this informal analysis is that the two properties do not entail each other nor are they in contradiction. In order to verify this, we briefly introduced the branching temporal structures called branching space-time, branching continuation and their versions Minkowski branching structure and branching time with Instants. Two possible ways how (...) to formalize flow of time are given, one based on the definition of flow of time from temporal logics and the other based on relativistic physics. The latter is used to define flow of time with the use of linearly ordered points on worldines while respecting the ontological definiteness given by the difference of the past and the future. This is formalized in each of the branching models and it is concluded by comparing the resulting properties that branching and flow, even in the formal sense, do not entail each other. However, notions connected with flow of time represent a useful basis for semantics of the branching models. (shrink)

Presents a mathematically rigorous, philosophically sound foundation for a science of information.

Three physical theories explaining the flow of time are examined. One theory suggests that “flow” is associated with the manner of information transfer between registers within the brain. Different robotic systems are predicted to experience different types of flow. Here, human examples are found to support the theory and the model is modified suggesting that flow is a cognitive illusion. A second theory suggests that time is non-existent, that the universe is a complex quantum state (...) which, upon observation, the brain acquires “stills” and converts them to an illusion of motion and flow. Accordingly the brain should be able to generate a physiological illusion of temporality from stills. Experimental evidence is given that the temporality illusion so generated is not physiological; it is cognitive, lending no support to that theory. A third theory suggesting that the flow of time is really a myth is briefly reviewed. (shrink)

The paper outlines a new interpretation of informational privacy and of its moral value. The main theses defended are: (a) informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere, that is, of the forces that oppose the information flow within the space of information; (b) digital ICTs (information and communication technologies) affect the ontological friction by changing the nature of the infosphere (re-ontologization); (c) digital ICTs can therefore both decrease and protect informational privacy (...) but, most importantly, they can also alter its nature and hence our understanding and appreciation of it; (d) a change in our ontological perspective, brought about by digital ICTs, suggests considering each person as being constituted by his or her information and hence regarding a breach of one’s informational privacy as a form of aggression towards one’s personal identity. (shrink)

In this brief overview paper, we analyse information flow in the brain. Although Shannon’s information concept, in its pure algebraic form, has made a number of valuable contributions to neuroscience, information dynamics within the brain is not fully captured by its classical description. These additional dynamics consist of self-organisation, interplay of stability/instability, timing of sequential processing, coordination of multiple sequential streams, circular causality between bottom-up and top-down operations, and information creation. Importantly, all of these processes (...) are dynamic, hierarchically nested and correspond to continuous brain state change, even if the external environment remains constant. This is where metastable coordination comes into play. In a metastable regime of brain functioning, as a result of the simultaneous co-existence of tendencies for independence and cooperation, information is continuously created, preserved for some time and then dissipated through the formation of dynamical and nested spatio-temporal coalitions among simple neuronal assemblies and larger coupled conglomerates of them—so-called delocalised operational modules. (shrink)

Situation theory, and channel theory in particular, have been used to provide motivational accounts of the ternary relation semantics of relevant, substructural, and various non-classical logics. Among the constraints imposed by channel-theory, we must posit a certain existence criterion for situations which result from the composites of multiple channels (this is used in modeling information flow). In associative non-classical logics, it is relatively easy to show that a certain such condition is met, but the problem is trickier in (...) non-associative logics. Following Tedder (2017), where it was shown that the conjunction-conditional fragment of the logic B admits the existence of composite channels, I present a generalised ver- sion of the previous argument, appropriate to logics with disjunction, in the neighbourhood ternary relation semantic framework. I close by suggesting that the logic BB+(^I), which falls between Lavers' system BB+ and B+ , satisfies the conditions for the general argument to go through (and prove that it satisfies all but one of those conditions). (shrink)