Search results for 'foreknowledge' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jochen Brunow, Schreiben fur den Film, Carsten Colpe, Das Siegel der Propheten, William Lane Craig, Divine Foreknowledge & Human Freedom (1991). Actes du XI• Congres International d'Archeologie Chretienne, Lyon, Vienne, Grenoble, Geneve Et Aoste (21-28 Septembre 1986),(Studi di Antichita Cristiana XLI; Collection de I'Ecole Fran~ Aise de Rome 123), Voi. I. [REVIEW] Bijdragen, Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie En Theologie 52 (2):235.score: 30.0
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  2. Norman M. Swartz, Foreknowledge and Free Will. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free (...)
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  3. Jason Wyckoff (2010). On the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Sophia 49 (3):333-41.score: 24.0
    I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t 1 what an agent S will do at t 2 , is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom (...)
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  4. John Fischer (2011). Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past. Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.score: 24.0
    I seek to clarify the notion of the fixity of the past appropriate to Pike’s regimentation of the argument for the incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. Also, I discuss Alvin Plantinga’s famous example of Paul and the Ant Colony in light of Pike’s argument.
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  5. Endre Begby (2005). Leibniz on Determinism and Divine Foreknowledge. Studia Leibnitiana 37 (1):83-98.score: 24.0
    Nach Michael J. Murrays Aufsatz „Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom" ist Leibniz nicht als Kompatibilist zu verstehen. Die göttliche Vorhersehung beruhe nicht darauf, dass menschliche Handlungen mechanischen Gesetzen von Ursache und Wirkung (causa efficiens) gehorchen, sondern auf den für diese Handlungen spezifischen geistigen Gesetzen (causa finalis, moralische Gesetze, etc.). In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich, dass Murray die Tragweite des Grundsatzes vom hinreichenden Grund in Leibniz' Philosophie nicht richtig versteht. Des Weiteren zeige ich, dass die (...)
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  6. Tina Talsma (2013). Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.score: 24.0
    The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David (...)
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  7. Benjamin H. Arbour (2013). Future Freedom and the Fixity of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):189-207.score: 24.0
    Unlike versions of open theism that appeal to the alethic openness of the future, defenders of limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT) affirm that some propositions concerning future contingents are presently true. Thus, there exist truths that are unknown to God, so God is not omniscient simpliciter. LFOT requires modal definitions of divine omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable. Defenders of LFOT have yet to provide an adequate response to Richard Purtill’s argument that fatalism (...)
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  8. Patrick Todd (2014). Against Limited Foreknowledge. Philosophia 42 (2):523-538.score: 24.0
    Theological fatalists contend that if God knows everything, then no human action is free, and that since God does know everything, no human action is free. One reply to such arguments that has become popular recently— a way favored by William Hasker and Peter van Inwagen—agrees that if God knows everything, no human action is free. The distinctive response of these philosophers is simply to say that therefore God does not know everything. On this view, what the fatalist arguments in (...)
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  9. Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio (forthcoming). In Defense of the Timeless Solution to the Problem of Human Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-24.score: 24.0
    In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this (...)
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  10. Raphael van Riel (2014). Prophets Against Ockhamism. Or: Why the Hard Fact/Soft Fact Distinction is Irrelevant to the Problem of Foreknowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):119-135.score: 24.0
    In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a (...)
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  11. Patrick Todd & John Martin Fischer (2013). The Truth About Foreknowledge. Faith and Philosophy 30 (3):286-301.score: 24.0
    In this paper we critically evaluate Trenton Merricks’s recent attempt to provide a “new” way of defending compatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human freedom. We take issue with Merricks’s claim that his approach is fundamentally different from Ockhamism. We also seek to highlight the implausibility of Merricks’s rejection of the assumption of the fixity of the past, and we also develop a critique of the Merricks’s crucial notion of “dependence.”.
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  12. T. Ryan Byerly (2014). Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.score: 24.0
    Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim (...)
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  13. Jeff Speaks (2011). Foreknowledge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments. Faith and Philosophy 28 (3):269-293.score: 21.0
    Most arguments against God’s existence aim to show that it is incompatible with various apparent features of the world, such as the existence of evil or of human free will. In response, theists have sought to show that God’s existence is compatible with these features of the world. However, the fact that the proposition that God exists is necessary if possible introduces some underappreciated difficulties for these arguments.
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  14. Nelson Pike (1984). Fischer on Freedom and Foreknowledge. Philosophical Review 93 (October):599-614.score: 21.0
  15. Kadri Vihvelin (2000). Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.score: 21.0
    The traditional debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists was based on the assumption that if determinism deprives us of free will and moral responsibility, it does so by making it true that we can never do other than what we actually do. All parties to the debate took for granted the truth of a claim now widely known as "the principle of alternate possibilities": someone is morally responsible only if he could have done otherwise. In a famous paper, Harry Frankfurt argued (...)
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  16. Ishtiyaque Haji (2005). Foreknowledge, Freedom, and Obligation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):321-339.score: 21.0
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  17. Christopher Menzel (1991). Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 5:475-507.score: 21.0
    Suppose we believe that God created the world. Then surely we want it to be the case that he intended, in some sense at least, to create THIS world. Moreover, most theists want to hold that God didn't just guess or hope that the world would take one course or another; rather, he KNEW precisely what was going to take place in the world he planned to create. In particular, of each person P, God knew that P was to exist. (...)
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  18. O. W. Lacy, Natalie Lewinger & John F. Adamson (1953). Foreknowledge as a Factor Affecting Perceptual Defense and Alertness. Journal of Experimental Psychology 45 (3):169.score: 21.0
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  19. Erik Carlson (2002). Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action. Erkenntnis 57 (1):71-89.score: 18.0
    In Section 1, I rehearse some arguments for the claim that morality should be ``action-guiding'', and try to state the conditions under which a moral theory is in fact action-guiding. I conclude that only agents who are cognitively and conatively ``ideal'' are in general able to use a moral theory as a guide to action. In Sections 2 and 3, I discuss whether moral ``actualism'' implies that morality cannot be action-guiding even for ideal agents. If actualism is true, an ideal (...)
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  20. David P. Hunt (2004). Providence, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Loops: A Reply to Robinson. Religious Studies 40 (4):485-491.score: 18.0
    In a number of earlier papers I have attempted to defend the providential utility of simple foreknowledge as a via media between the accounts of divine providence offered by Molinists, on the one hand, and ‘open theists’, on the other. In the current issue of this journal, Michael Robinson argues that my response to one of the standard difficulties for simple foreknowledge – that its providential employment would generate explanatory loops – is inadequate. In the following paper I (...)
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  21. William Lane Craig (1987). Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb's Paradox. Philosophia 17 (3):331-350.score: 18.0
    Newcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation. It is also clear that in the context (...)
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  22. Vance G. Morgan (1994). Foreknowledge and Human Freedom in Augustine. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:223-242.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I consider Augustine’s attempted solution of the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will. I focus on two distinct notions of God’s relationship to time as they relate to this problem. In Confessions XI, Augustine develops an understanding of time and foreknowledge that cIearly offers a possible solution to the foreknowledge/free will problem. I then turn to On Free Will 3 .1-4, where Augustine conspicuously declines to use a solution similar to the one in (...)
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  23. Michael D. Robinson (2000). Why Divine Foreknowledge? Religious Studies 36 (3):251-275.score: 18.0
    Christian theism has traditionally claimed that God knows the future. But why is divine foreknowledge important? In this essay, I argue that divine foreknowledge is valuable to Christian theism and that a hefty theological price must be paid if it is rejected. I also attempt to show that the range of knowledge available to God in theological models that deny divine foreknowledge is significantly less than claimed by proponents of these views. In particular, I argue that the (...)
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  24. Michael D. Robinson (2004). Divine Providence, Simple Foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. Religious Studies 40 (4):471-483.score: 18.0
    In this essay, I challenge David P. Hunt's defence of the utility of simple foreknowledge for divine providence against the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. This principle asserts that circular causal loops are impossible. Hunt agrees with this principle but maintains that so long as the deity does not use simple foreknowledge in such a way that causal loops unfold, the Metaphysical Principle in not violated. I argue that Hunt's position still allows for the possibility of such causal loops and this (...)
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  25. J. Westphal (2012). The Logic of the Compatibility of God's Foreknowledge and Human Freewill. Analysis 72 (4):746-748.score: 18.0
    A central argument for the view that God's necessary omniscience [( Bgf p )] precludes freewill is unsound, because the necessity of the consequence is not the necessity of the consequent, and nor is Bgf true. God's belief in some particular proposition f about what I will do is not necessary, as I might do something that makes ~ f true. Fischer and Tognazzini claim that this counterargument argument assumes that I must freely do the something that makes f true. (...)
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  26. T. Merricks (2011). Foreknowledge and Freedom. Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.score: 18.0
    The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” (Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks” (Philosophical Review 120 [2011]: 97–115), John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd raise a number of (...)
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  27. Michael Tooley (2000). Freedom and Foreknowledge. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):212-224.score: 18.0
    In her book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski suggests that among the strongest ways of supporting the thesis that libertarian free will is incompatible with divine foreknowledge is what she refers to as the Accidental Necessity argument. Zagzebski contends, however, that at least three satisfactory responses to that argument are available.I argue that two of the proposed solutions are open to strong objections, and that the third, although it may very well handle the specific versions (...)
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  28. John Sanders (1997). Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God. Faith and Philosophy 14 (1):26-40.score: 18.0
    This paper examines the question of whether the theory of simply foreknowledge (SF) provides God with greater providential control than does the theory of present knowledge (PK). It is claimed by the proponents of SF that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be able to provide the sort of providential aid commonly thought by theists to be given by God. To see whether this is the case I first distinguish two different versions of how God’s foreknowledge is (...)
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  29. Patrick Todd (2013). Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence: A New Argument for Incompatibilism About Foreknowledge and Freedom. Philosophical Review 122 (4):619-639.score: 18.0
    The most promising way of responding to arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (in one way or another) invokes a claim about the order of explanation: God knew (or believed) that you would perform a given action because you would, in fact, perform it, and not the other way around. Once we see this result, many suppose, we'll see that divine foreknowledge ultimately poses no threat to human freedom. This essay argues that matters are (...)
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  30. Peter A. Graham (2008). Warfield on Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 25 (1):75-78.score: 18.0
    Warfield (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarilyexistent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As supportfor this latter premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consensus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for (...)
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  31. John Sanders (1997). ``Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 14 (1):26-40.score: 18.0
    This paper examines the question of whether the theory of simply foreknowledge (SF) provides God with greater providential control than does the theory of present knowledge (PK). It is claimed by the proponents of SF that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be able to provide the sort of providential aid commonly thought by theists to be given by God. To see whether this is the case I first distinguish two different versions of how God’s foreknowledge is (...)
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  32. Ted A. Warfield (2000). On Freedom and Foreknowledge. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):255-259.score: 18.0
    William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have critically discussed my argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I reply to their commentaries.
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  33. Linda Zagzebski (1991). The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    A compelling contribution to the field, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge will appeal to students and scholars of theistic philosophy and the philosophy ...
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  34. Gregor Betz (2006). Prediction or Prophecy? The Boundaries of Economic Foreknowledge and Their Socio-Political Consequences. DUV.score: 18.0
    Gregor Betz explores the following questions: Where are the limits of economics, in particular the limits of economic foreknowledge? Are macroeconomic forecasts credible predictions or mere prophecies and what would this imply for the way economic policy decisions are taken? Is rational economic decision making possible without forecasting at all?
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  35. Jeffrey Green & Katherin Rogers (2012). Time, Foreknowledge, and Alternative Possibilities. Religious Studies 48 (2):151 - 164.score: 18.0
    In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are 'ontologically necessary'. In defending Anselmian freedom we (...)
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  36. L. Nathan Oaklander (1995). Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of Zagzebski. Religious Studies 31 (1):101 - 103.score: 18.0
    One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, "The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge," Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a four-dimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of (...)
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  37. David J. Anderson & Joshua L. Watson (2010). The Mystery of Foreknowledge. Philo 13 (2):136-150.score: 18.0
    Many have attempted to respond to arguments for the incompatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge by claiming that God’s beliefs about the future are explained by what the world is like at that future time. We argue that this response adequately advances the discussion only if the theist is able to articulate a model of foreknowledge that is both clearly possible and compatible with freedom. We investigate various models the theist might articulate and argue that all of these (...)
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  38. Joseph Corabi & Rebecca Germino (2013). Prophecy, Foreknowledge, and Middle Knowledge. Faith and Philosophy 30 (1):72-92.score: 18.0
    Largely following on the heels of Thomas Flint’s book-length defense of Molinism a number of years ago, a debate has emerged about the ability of Molinism to explain God’s purported ability to successfully prophesy the occurrence of human free choices, as well as about the merits of other theories of divine providence and foreknowledge in this respect. After introducing the relevant issues, we criticize Alexander Pruss’s recent attempt to show that non-Molinist views which countenance only simple foreknowledge fare (...)
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  39. Barry A. David (2001). Divine Foreknowledge in De Civitate Dei 5.9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75 (4):479-495.score: 18.0
    It is commonly agreed that Augustine's discussion of divine foreknowledge in DcD 5.9 is distinguished by its anti-Ciceronian polemic, but no one has analyzed the philosophical structure of this polemic to determine if it is compelling. I argue that Augustine's presentation has significant philosophical merit for two reasons. First, Augustine's rigorous application of the principle, shared with Cicero, that "nothing occurs unless it is preceded by an efficient cause" is capable of answeringforcefully one of the chief difficulties that Cicero (...)
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  40. Ted A. Warfield (2000). ``On Freedom and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics&Quot. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):255-259.score: 18.0
    William Hasker and Anthony Brueckner have critically discussed my argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I reply to their commentaries.
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  41. Charles T. Hughes (1997). Belief, Foreknowledge, and Theological Fatalism. Faith and Philosophy 14 (3):378-387.score: 18.0
    David Hunt has recently developed a new strategy, called the “dispositional omniscience scenario,” or (OOS), which is designed to defeat theological fatalism by showing the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human (libertarian) free agency. But I argue that Hunt fails to establish his compatibility claim because (DOS) is based on a defective analysis of dispositional belief that is too weak to sustain any divine foreknowledge of future free actions.
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  42. Michael Rota (2010). The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):165 - 186.score: 18.0
    In this paper I defend the eternity solution to the problem of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. After motivating the problem, I sketch the basic contours of the eternity solution. I then consider several objections which contend that the eternity solution falsely implies that we have various powers (e.g., to change God’s beliefs, or to affect the past) which, according to the objector, we do not in fact have.
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  43. Michael Tooley (2010). Time, Truth, Actuality, and Causation: On the Impossibility of Divine Foreknowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):143 - 163.score: 18.0
    In this essay, my goal is, first, to describe the most important contemporary philosophical approaches to the nature of time, and then, secondly, to discuss the ways in which those different accounts bear upon the question of the possibility of divine foreknowledge. I shall argue that different accounts of the nature of time give rise to different objections to the idea of divine foreknowledge, but that, in addition, there is a general argument for the impossibility of divine (...) that is independent of one’s account of the nature of time. (shrink)
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  44. William P. Alston (1985). Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1-2):19-32.score: 15.0
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  45. Brian Leftow (1991). Timelessness and Foreknowledge. Philosophical Studies 63 (3):309 - 325.score: 15.0
  46. Mark D. Linville (1993). Divine Foreknowledge and the Libertarian Conception of Human Freedom. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (3):165 - 186.score: 15.0
  47. William Hasker (2001). The Foreknowledge Conundrum. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 50 (1/3):97-114.score: 15.0
  48. J. Westphal (2011). The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Freewill. Analysis 71 (2):246-252.score: 15.0
  49. Kadri Vihvelin (2008). Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.score: 15.0
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  50. Nelson Pike (1977). Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom and Possible Worlds. Philosophical Review 86 (2):209-216.score: 15.0
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