Search results for 'foundationalist epistemology' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Non-Foundationalist Epistemology (2013). Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 244.score: 300.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Naturalizing Of Epistemology (2002). The Sciences and Epistemology. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2012). Foundationalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. 37.score: 114.0
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Sonam Thakchoe (2012). Candrakīrti’s Theory of Perception: A Case for Non-Foundationalist Epistemology in Madhyamaka. Acta Orientalia Vilnensia 11 (1):93-125.score: 108.0
    Some argue that Candrakīrti is committed to rejecting all theories of perception in virtue of the rejection of the foundationalisms of the Nyāya and the Pramāṇika. Others argue that Candrakīrti endorses the Nyāya theory of perception. In this paper, I will propose an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception for Candrakīriti. I will show that Candrakrti’s works provide us sufficient evidence to defend a typical Prāsagika’s account of perception that, I argue, complements his core non-foundationalist ontology.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson (2011). Grounds and Limits: Reichenbach and Foundationalist Epistemology. Synthese 181 (1):113 - 124.score: 108.0
    From 1929 onwards, C. I. Lewis defended the foundationalist claim that judgements of the form 'x is probable' only make sense if one assumes there to be a ground y that is certain (where x and y may be beliefs, propositions, or events). Without this assumption, Lewis argues, the probability of x could not be anything other than zero. Hans Reichenbach repeatedly contested Lewis's idea, calling it "a remnant of rationalism". The last move in this debate was a challenge (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.score: 102.0
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Catherine Elgin (2005). Non-Foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability. In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 156--67.score: 96.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.score: 90.0
    Both traditional and naturalistic epistemologists have long assumed that the examination of human psychology has no relevance to the prescriptive goal of traditional epistemology, that of providing first-person guidance in determining the truth. Contrary to both, I apply insights about the psychology of human perception and concept-formation to a very traditional epistemological project: the foundationalist approach to the epistemic regress problem. I argue that direct realism about perception can help solve the regress problem and support a foundationalist (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ronald C. Pine, Intelligent Inference and the Web of Belief : In Defense of a Post-Foundationalist Epistemology.score: 90.0
    Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1996.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Renan Springer de Freitas (2004). Darwin and the Collapse of the Modern Project of Foundationalist Epistemology. Scientiae Studia 2 (3):313-325.score: 90.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2007). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.score: 84.0
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Yves Bouchard (2007). The Foundationalism–Coherentism Opposition Revisited: The Case for Complementarism. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 12 (4):325-336.score: 78.0
    In this paper, I show the complementarity of foundationalism and coherentism with respect to any efficient system of beliefs by means of a distinction between two types of proposition drawn from an analogy with an axiomatic system. This distinction is based on the way a given proposition is acknowledged as true, either by declaration (F-proposition) or by preservation (C-proposition). Within such a perspective, i.e., epistemological complementarism, not only can one see how the usual opposition between foundationalism and coherentism is irrelevant, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Chris Tucker (2006). Hermeneutics as A...Foundationalism? Dialogue 45 (04):627-46.score: 78.0
    It is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed. Hermeneutics, as I will argue, is a descriptive claim about human cognition, and foundationalism is a normative claim about how beliefs ought to be related to one another. Once the positions are stated in this way, their putative incompatibility vanishes. Also, to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. John Kekes (1983). An Argument Against Foundationalism. Philosophia 12 (March):273-281.score: 72.0
    This paper argues against foundationalism not on the familiar ground that a person may be mistaken about the object of any of his cognitive states, But on the new ground that a person may be mistaken in identifying any mental states as cognitive. The argument is claimed to hold against all version of foundationalism.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Christian Lee (2005). On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:251-259.score: 72.0
    Contemporary foundationalists prefer Moderate Foundationalism over Strong Foundationalism. In this paper, we assess two arguments against the former which have been recently defended by Timothy McGrew. Three theses are central to the discussion: that only beliefs can be probabilifying evidence, that justification is internal, in McGrew’s sense of the term, and that only beliefs can be nonarbitrary justifying reasons.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Drew Christie (1989). Contemporary "Foundationalism" and the Death of Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 20 (2):114–126.score: 72.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Andrew D. Cling (1985). Foundationalism and Permanence in Descartes' Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):145-156.score: 72.0
  18. Frederik Herzberg (2014). The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence. Synthese 191 (4):701-723.score: 72.0
    This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Stephen Jacobson (1992). Alston on Iterative Foundationalism and Cartesian Epistemology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):133 - 144.score: 72.0
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Robert Lockie (forthcoming). The Epistemology of Neo-Gettier Epistemology. South African Journal of Philosophy.score: 72.0
    The paper begins by drawing a number of ‘levels’ distinctions in epistemology. It notes that a theory of knowledge must be an attempt to obtain knowledge (about knowledge). It is suggested that we can make sense of much of the work found in analytic theory of knowledge by seeing three (tacit) framework assumptions as underpinning this work. First, that to have philosophical knowledge of knowledge requires us to have an analysis. Second, that much of what we require from a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jane Duran (1995). Chisholmian Foundationalism and the Naturalization of Epistemology. Crítica 27 (81):55 - 78.score: 72.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Jared A. Miller (2009). Phenomenology's Negative Dialectic: Adorno's Critique of Husserl's Epistemological Foundationalism. Philosophical Forum 40 (1):99-125.score: 66.0
    The recent eruption of scholarship surrounding the nature and tenability of foundationalism in the work of Edmund Husserl offers the impetus and opportunity to (re)examine Theodor Adorno’s Metacritique of Epistemology. In that text, Adorno attempts an immanent critique of phenomenology designed to expose the antinomies that vitiate not only Husserl’s philosophy but any foundationalist epistemology. A detailed analysis of Adorno’s arguments and Husserl’s texts reveals that while Adorno successfully locates a hidden contradiction within Husserl’s notion of ‘perceptual (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Scott F. Aikin (2008). Meta-Epistemology and the Varieties of Epistemic Infinitism. Synthese 163 (2):175 - 185.score: 66.0
    I will assume here the defenses of epistemic infinitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that infinitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the infinitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justification, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure infinitisms. Further, I will argue that impure infinitisms have the dialectical advantage.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Daniel OBrien, The Epistemology of Perception. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 66.0
  25. Andrew McGonigal (2003). Traditional Epistemology Reconsidered A Reply to Eflin. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):69-77.score: 66.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Kenneth R. Westphal (1987). Sextus Empiricus Contra René Descartes. Philosophy Research Archives 13:91-128.score: 66.0
    It has become a veritable industry to defend Descartes against the charge of circularity and, to a lesser extent, to argue that he successfully responds to the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus. Since one of Sextus’ main skeptical ploys is to press the charge of circularity against any view, and because Descartes does reply to Sextus, it is worthwhile to criticize these efforts in the same paper. I argue that Descartes did not successfully respond to Sextus’ skeptical arguments. I argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Scott F. Aikin (2007). Prospects for Skeptical Foundationalism. Metaphilosophy 38 (5):578-590.score: 66.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). Hegel, Russell, and the Foundations of Philosophy. In Angelica Nuzzo (ed.), Hegel and the Analytical Tradition. Continuum.score: 66.0
    Though philosophical antipodes, Hegel and Russell were profound philosophical revolutionaries. They both subjected contemporaneous philosophy to searching critique, and they addressed many important issues about the character of philosophy itself. Examining their disagreements is enormously fruitful. Here I focus on one central issue raised in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: the tenability of the foundationalist model of rational justification. I consider both the general question of the tenability of the foundationalist model itself, and the specific question of the tenability (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Sonam Thakchoe (2013). Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag Tsang's Charge Against Tsongkhapa's Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Journal of Indian Philosophy 41 (5):535-561.score: 60.0
    Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramāṇa—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsaṅgika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramāṇa (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsaṅgika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramāṇa in the Prāsaṅgika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika’s (...), and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsaṅgika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. James B. Freeman (2000). The Place of Informal Logic in Philosophy. Informal Logic 20 (2).score: 60.0
    We argue that informal logic is epistemological. Two central questions concern premise acceptability and connection adequacy. Both may be explicated in tenns of justification, a central epistemological concept. That some premises are basic parallels a foundationalist account of basic beliefs and epistemic support. Some epistemological accounts of these concepts may advance the analysis of premise acceptability and connection adequacy. Infonnallogic has implications for other aspects of philosophy. If causal interpretations are acceptable premises and thus justified, does the world have (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Irwin Goldstein (1996). Ontology, Epistemology, and Private Ostensive Definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.score: 54.0
    People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Peter Tramel (2008). Haack's Foundherentism is a Foundationalism. Synthese 160 (2):215 - 228.score: 54.0
    Susan Haack has always maintained that her unquestionably important foundherentist theory of epistemic justification is not a foundationalism. In a 1997 Synthese exchange, Laurence BonJour questioned her right to this claim, and she dug in and defended it. What was at stake is of timeless importance to epistemology: it goes directly to the question, “What is foundationalism?” I inquire with greater care than either Haack or BonJour took in 1997, and I find decisively in favor of the view that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Peter Kung (2010). On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian Confirmation. Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.score: 54.0
    Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case Pr(H|E) > Pr(H). I argue using Keynes' and Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Kenneth Hobson (2008). Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification. Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.score: 54.0
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism. In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism.score: 54.0
    In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Linda Radzik (2000). Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):633-649.score: 54.0
    What makes a norm a genuinely authoritative guide to action? For many theorists, the answer takes a foundationalist form, analogous to foundationalism in epistemology. They say that there is at least one norm that is justified in itself. On most versions, the norm is said to be incorrigibly authoritative. All other norms are justified in virtue of their connection with it. This essay argues that all such foundationalist theories of normative authority fail because they cannot give an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Xinli Wang & 王 新力 (2008). 西方当代认识论之最新发展 (New Trents in Epistemology). In Jiyuan Yu Zhiwei Zhang (ed.), 西方人文社科前沿述评-哲学卷 (Series on Western Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences - Philosophy). 中国人民大学出版社 (China Renmin University Press).score: 54.0
    内容提要:本文综合评述当代认识论的现状以及主干近10 年来主要发展趋势和最新理论贡献。它首先介绍一些必要的理论背景:盖梯尔难题,闭合原则,内在论与外在论之争(第2节),然后分6 节集中讨论、评述:(i) 温和基础主义的兴起及发展(第3 节) ; (ii) 对认知怀疑论的最新表述及回应(第4 节) ; (iii) 认知无限辨明论(第5 节) ;(iv) 认知语境主义的兴起,其理论贡献,以及存在的问题;(v) 德性认识论的二个模型,它们的优点,和现有的问题。最后简单讨论当代认识论面临的危机与机遇。 -/- Abstract: This article surveys the current state of affairs and some important new developments of epistemology in the past 10 years. It first introduces some necessary theoretical background (the Gettier problem, the closure principle, and internalism vs. externalism), and then focuses on (i) the rise and development of modest forms of foundationalism, (ii) recent debates on epistemic skepticism, (iii) epistemic infinitism, (iv) epistemic (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. David-Hillel Ruben (1976). Epistemological Empiricism: The Duality of Beliefs and Experiences Reconsidered. The Monist 59 (July):392-403.score: 54.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Christian Coseru (forthcoming). “Buddhist ‘Foundationalism’ and the Phenomenology of Perception,” Philosophy East and West 59:4 (October 2009): 409-439. [REVIEW] Philosophy East and West.score: 54.0
    In this essay, which draws on a set of interrelated issues in the phenomenology of perception, I call into question the assumption that Buddhist philosophers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition pursue a kind of epistemic foundationalism. I argue that the embodied cognition paradigm, which informs recent efforts within the Western philosophical tradition to overcome the Cartesian legacy, can be also found– albeit in a modified form–in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. In seeking to ground epistemology in the phenomenology of cognition, the (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Michael K. Shim (2005). The Duality of Non-Conceptual Content in Husserl's Phenomenology of Perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):209-229.score: 50.0
    Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn F.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.score: 48.0
    This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.score: 48.0
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. K. Kappel (2006). The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):131 - 147.score: 48.0
    The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results for our use (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald R. Perlis & Ned Block (1992). Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.score: 48.0
    When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
    Direct download (21 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science. Synthese 101 (3):305-45.score: 48.0
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. W. E. S. McNeill (2012). Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World, by Jack C. Lyons. Mind 120 (480):1271-1276.score: 48.0
    I give a brief precis of Lyons' book. I discuss the problem of delineating basic from non-basic beliefs. I argue that one of Lyons' possible solutions doesn't work - his definition of a perceptual module does not allow us to decide which beliefs are basic. And I argue that another possible solution undermines some of Lyons' motivation. The intuitive understanding of belief may not generate the Clairvoyancy troubles he fears.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. D. J. MacDermid (2004). Is Davidson's Epistemology Coherent? Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):101-130.score: 48.0
    My concern in this paper is with a simple question: Does Donald Davidson's case for an anti-foundationalist epistemology cohere well with his stance on conceptual schemes? After rehearsing Davidson's central anti-foundationalist argument in Section 2, I consider the objection that his argument rests on a premise which is defensible only if we invoke the so-called "dualism of scheme and content", Davidson's opposition to which is the subject of Section 3. Then, in Section 4, I explain why, despite (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Thomas Oberdan (1998). The Vienna Circle's 'Anti-Foundationalism'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):297-308.score: 48.0
    Uebel has recently claimed that, contrary to popular opinion, none of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists were proponents of epistemological foundationalism. According to the considerations of the current discussion, however, Uebel's conclusion is erroneous, especially with respect to the work of Moritz Schlick. The chief reason Uebel offers to support his conclusion is that current attempts to portray Schlick's epistemology as foundationalist fail to overcome its ‘ultimate incoherence’. In contrast, it is argued that current (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Christopher Hoyt (2007). Wittgenstein and Religious Dogma. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61 (1):39 - 49.score: 48.0
    It is well understood that Wittgenstein defends religious faith against positivistic criticisms on the grounds of its logical independence. But exactly how are we to understand the nature of that independence? Most scholars take Wittgenstein to equate language-games with belief-systems, and thus to assert that religions are logical schemes founded on their own basic beliefs and principles of inference. By contrast, I argue that on Wittgenstein’s view, to have religious faith is to hold fast to a certain picture of the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Nicholas Everitt (2003). Review: Epistemic Justification. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):572-575.score: 48.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000