Search results for 'four-dimensionalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Sarah Moss (2012). Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):671-686.score: 90.0
    I demonstrate that the theory of persistence defended in Sider [2001] does not accommodate our intuitions about counting sentences. I develop two theories that improve on Sider's: a contextualist theory and an error theory. I argue that the latter is stronger, simpler, and better fitted to some important ordinary language judgments than rival four-dimensionalist theories of persistence.
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  2. A. P. Taylor (2013). The Frustrating Problem For Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1097-1115.score: 90.0
    I argue that four-dimensionalism and the desire satisfaction account of well-being are incompatible. For every person whose desires are satisfied, there will be many shorter-lived individuals (‘person-stages’ or ‘subpersons’) who share the person’s desires but who do not exist long enough to see those desires satisfied; not only this, but in many cases their desires are frustrated so that the desires of the beings in whom they are embedded as proper temporal parts may be fulfilled. I call this the (...)
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  3. Enrique Romerales (2007). Persistence, Ontic Vagueness and Identity: Towards a Substantialist Four–Dimensionalism. [REVIEW] Metaphysica 9 (1):33-55.score: 90.0
    Four-dimensionalism, the stage theory version in particular, has been defended as the best solution for avoiding vagueness in regards to composition, persistence and identity. Stage theory is highly problematic by itself, and the two views usually packed with it, unrestricted composition and counterpart theory, are a heavy burden. However, dispensing with these two views, four-dimensionalism could avoid vague persistence by issuing a criterion that would establish sharp temporal boundaries for the existence of genuine entities (simples, molecules and living (...)
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  4. Michael C. Rea (2003). Four-Dimensionalism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 1-59.score: 90.0
    This article characterizes the varieties of four-dimensionalism and provides a critical overview of the main arguments in support of it.
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  5. Theodore Sider (1997). Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.score: 60.0
    Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...)
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  6. Josh Parsons (2000). Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist 83 (3):399-418.score: 60.0
    The following quotation, from Frank Jackson, is the beginning of a typical exposition of the debate between those metaphysicians who believe in temporal parts, and those who do not: The dispute between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism, or more precisely, that part of the dispute we will be concerned with, concerns what persistence, and correllatively, what change, comes to. Three-dimensionalism holds that an object exists at a time by being wholly present at that time, and, accordingly, that it persists if it (...)
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  7. M. Eddon (2010). Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):721-728.score: 60.0
    In ?Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?? Mark Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the four-dimensionalist (or perdurantist) explanation of coincidence to the three-dimensionalist (or endurantist) explanation. I argue that Moyer's formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead him to overlook the perdurantist's advantage. A more satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantist's treatment of this puzzle is clearly preferable.
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  8. Mikel Burley (2008). Harry Silverstein's Four-Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):559 – 568.score: 60.0
    In his article 'The Evil of Death' (henceforth: ED) Harry Silverstein argues that a proper refutation of the Epicurean view that death is not an evil requires the adoption of a particular revisionary ontology, which Silverstein, following Quine, calls 'four-dimensionalism'.1 In 'The Evil of Death Revisited' (henceforth: EDR) Silverstein reaffirms his earlier position and responds to several criticisms, including some targeted at his ontology. There remain, however, serious problems with Silverstein's argument, and I shall highlight five major ones below. (...)
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  9. Matthew Davidson (2004). Critical Notice of Theodore Sider, Four Dimensionalism. Philosophical Books 45 (1):17-33.score: 60.0
    This is a critical notice of Theodore Sider's book, _Four-Dimensionalism_.
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  10. Mark Moyer (2009). Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?∗. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):479-488.score: 60.0
    For those who think the statue and the piece of copper that compose it are distinct objects that coincide, there is a burden of explanation. After all, common sense says that different ordinary objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. A common argument in favour of four-dimensionalism (or ?perdurantism? or ?temporal parts theory?) is that it provides the resources for a superior explanation of this coincidence. This, however, is mistaken. Any explanatory work done by the four-dimensionalist (...)
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  11. Josh Parsons, Review of Four-Dimensionalism. [REVIEW]score: 60.0
    “The truth,” Quine says, “is that you can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river stage. You can bathe in two river stages which are stages of the same river, and this is what constitutes bathing in the same river twice. A river is a process through time, and the river stages are its momentary parts.” (Quine 1953, p. 65) Quine’s view is four-dimensionalism, and that is what Theodore Sider’s book is about. In Sider’s (...)
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  12. Patrick Stokes (2012). Is Narrative Identity Four-Dimensionalist? European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):e86-e106.score: 60.0
    The claim that selves are narratively constituted has attained considerable currency in both analytic and continental philosophy. However, a set of increasingly standard objections to narrative identity are also emerging. In this paper, I focus on metaphysically realist versions of narrative identity theory, showing how they both build on and differ from their neo-Lockean counterparts. But I also argue that narrative realism is implicitly committed to a four-dimensionalist, temporal-parts ontology of persons. That exposes narrative realism to the charge that the (...)
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  13. Ned Markosian (2004). Two Arguments From Sider's Four-Dimensionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):665–673.score: 60.0
    In this essay for a PPR book symposium on Theodore Sider's _Four-Dimensionalism, I focus on two of Sider's arguments for four-dimensionalism: (i) his argument from vagueness, and (ii) his argument from time travel. Concerning (i), I first show that Sider's argument commits him to certain strange consequences that many four-dimensionalists may not endorse, and then I discuss an objection that involves appealing to 'brutal composition', the view that there is no informative answer to Peter van Inwagen's 'special composition question'. (...)
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  14. Kristie Miller (2005). The Metaphysical Equivalence of Three and Four Dimensionalism. Erkenntnis 62 (1):91 - 117.score: 60.0
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
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  15. Katherine Hawley, Critical Study of Four-Dimensionalism, by Theodore Sider, Oxford University Press 2001, ISBN 0 19 924443 X, Hardback.score: 60.0
    Four-Dimensionalism is a thorough, lively and forceful defence of the claim that “necessarily, every spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment at which it exists” (59). The standard four-dimensionalist view is perdurance theory, according to which everyday things like boats are temporally extended. But Sider rejects perdurance theory, nicely disparaging it as the “worm view”, and he argues for the “stage view” version of fourdimensionalism instead. According to the stage view, everyday things like boats are instantaneous, and (...)
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  16. G. Nerlich (2003). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):288 – 290.score: 60.0
    Book Information Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. By Theodore Sider. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xxiv + 255. £30.
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  17. Theodore Sider (2004). Précis of Four-Dimensionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642–647.score: 60.0
    I defend the spatio-temporal ontology of Russell, Smart, Quine, and Lewis, including four-dimensionalism (the doctrine of temporal parts, on my usage) and eternalism (realism about past and future objects). Presentism (the main rival to eternalism) is mistaken because it is difficult to reconcile with special relativity, because it requires reality to have noncategorical fundamental features, and because the presentist's tensed language cannot express the fundamental facts of space-time structure. Three-dimensionalism (the rejection of temporal parts) is mistaken because it precludes (...)
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  18. Berit Brogaard (2000). Presentist Four-Dimensionalism. The Monist 83 (3):341-356.score: 60.0
    Four-dimensionalism is the thesis that everyday objects, such as you and me, are space-time worms that persist through time by having temporal parts none of which is identical to the object itself. Objects are aggregates or sums of such temporal parts. The main virtue of fourdimensionalism is that it solves—or does away with—the problem of identity through change.1 The main charge raised against it is that it is inconsistent with the thesis according to which there is change in the (...)
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  19. William F. Vallicella (2002). The Creation–Conservation Dilemma and Presentist Four-Dimensionalism. Religious Studies 38 (2):187-200.score: 60.0
    On traditional theism, God is not only a creator but also a conserver. The doctrine of conservation, however, appears to face a dilemma. Either conservation is continuous re-creation with consequences inimical to diachronic identity, or conservation is an operation upon a pre-existent entity, which, because it is pre-existent, is in no clear need of conservation. This article first makes a case for the dilemma, and then proposes a way between its horns. Safe passage is possible if we adopt presentist (...), i.e. the conjunction of presentism, according to which temporally present items alone exist, and four-dimensionalism, the doctrine that individuals are not continuants but wholes of temporal parts. (shrink)
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  20. Theodore Sider (2001). Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    Four-Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four-dimensionalism faces." "Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four-dimensionalism include novel arguments based (...)
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  21. Michael Rea (2003). Four-Dimensionalism. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 246-280.score: 60.0
    (Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics) Four dimensionalism, as it will be understood in this article, is a view about the ontological status of non-present objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist. There are no dinosaurs, though there were such things; there are no cities on Mars, though perhaps there will be such things.1 Four-dimensionalists, on the other hand, say that there are past or future objects (or both); and in saying this, they mean to put such things (...)
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  22. Theodore Sider (2004). Review: Précis of "Four-Dimensionalism&Quot;. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642 - 647.score: 60.0
    This is an overview of my book, Four-Dimensionalism. The spatiotemporal metaphysics of Russell, Smart, Quine and Lewis is a blend of separable components concerning time, persistence, mereology, and even semantics, unified by the theme that space and time are analogous: eternalism (past and future objects are just as real as current objects); the reducibility of tense (tensed utterances have tenseless truth conditions; 'now' is an indexical); four-dimensionalism: temporal parts exist; unrestricted composition (all objects, however scattered, have a mereological (...)
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  23. Ned Markosian (2004). Review: Two Arguments From Sider's "Four-Dimensionalism". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):665 - 673.score: 60.0
    In this essay for a PPR book symposium on Theodore Sider's _Four-Dimensionalism, I focus on two of Sider's arguments for four-dimensionalism: (i) his argument from vagueness, and (ii) his argument from time travel. Concerning (i), I first show that Sider's argument commits him to certain strange consequences that many four-dimensionalists may not endorse, and then I discuss an objection that involves appealing to 'brutal composition', the view that there is no informative answer to Peter van Inwagen's 'special composition question'. (...)
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  24. Mariusz Grygianiec (2007). 'Four-Dimensionalism' - analiza i interpretacja. Filozofia Nauki 1.score: 60.0
    There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past (...)
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  25. Thomas A. C. Reydon (2008). Species in Three and Four Dimensions. Synthese 164 (2):161 - 184.score: 54.0
    There is an interesting parallel between two debates in different domains of contemporary analytic philosophy. One is the endurantism–<span class='Hi'>perdurantism</span>, or three-dimensionalism vs. four-dimensionalism, debate in analytic metaphysics. The other is the debate on the species problem in philosophy of biology. In this paper I attempt to cross-fertilize these debates with the aim of exploiting some of the potential that the two debates have to advance each other. I address two issues. First, I explore what the case of species (...)
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  26. Ariel Meirav (2009). Properties That Four-Dimensional Objects Cannot Have. Metaphysica 10 (2):135-148.score: 54.0
    The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of additively cumulative properties, including mass, volume, and electrical charge. These properties add up over disjoint objects: for example, the mass of a whole composed of two disjoint objects is a sum of the individual masses of the objects. The difficulty with such properties for four-dimensionalism stems from the way this theory makes persistence depend on the existence of disjoint objects at disjoint times. I consider various possible responses (...)
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  27. Andrew Graham (2014). From Four‐ to Five‐Dimensionalism. Ratio 27 (1).score: 51.0
    Philosophers have long noticed the similarity of identity over time and identity across worlds. Despite this similarity, analogous views on these matters are not always taken equally seriously. Four-dimensionalism is one of the most well-known accounts of identity over time. There is a clear modal analogue of four-dimensionalism, on which objects are modally extended and their trans-world identity is a matter of having distinct modal parts located in different possible worlds. Yet this view, which we might call ‘five-dimensionalism,’ (...)
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  28. Mark Heller (2008). The Donkey Problem. Philosophical Studies 140 (1):83 - 101.score: 45.0
    The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefore encourage 4Dists to (...)
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  29. Jens Johansson (2009). Am I a Series? Theoria 75 (3):196-205.score: 45.0
    Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, (...)
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  30. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.score: 45.0
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
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  31. Kathrin Koslicki (2003). The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.score: 45.0
  32. Eric Yang (2009). Conservation, Discontinuous Time, and Causal Continuity. Religious Studies 45 (1):85-93.score: 45.0
    William Vallicella poses a dilemma for continuous-creation accounts of conservation, which he attempts to solve by conjoining presentism and four-dimensionalism. I claim that presentist four-dimensionalism fails to appreciate the real problem behind continuous creation and persistence, which is a presumption of the discontinuity of time. I will argue that if we assume that time is discontinuous, then, (1) presentist four-dimensionalism cannot alone account for persistence, and (2) created entities are also not in clear need of conservation in (...)
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  33. Jim Stone (2005). Why Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism Are Incompatible. Analysis 65 (288):329–333.score: 45.0
  34. Paul Hovda (2013). Tensed Mereology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):241-283.score: 45.0
    Classical mereology (CM) is usually taken to be formulated in a tenseless language, and is therefore associated with a four-dimensionalist metaphysics. This paper presents three ways one might integrate the core idea of flat plenitude, i.e., that every suitable condition or property has exactly one mereological fusion, with a tensed logical setting. All require a revised notion of mereological fusion. The candidates differ over how they conceive parthood to interact with existence in time, which connects to the distinction between endurance (...)
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  35. Eli Hirsch (2004). Comments on Theodore Sider's Four Dimensionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):658–664.score: 45.0
  36. Mark Heller (1993). Varieties of Four Dimensionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):47 – 59.score: 45.0
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  37. Hud Hudson (2000). Universalism, Four Dimensionalism, and Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):547-560.score: 45.0
  38. Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke & Diane Proudfoot (2001). Temporal Parts and Their Individuation. Analysis 61 (4):289–293.score: 45.0
    Ignoring the temporal dimension, an object such as a railway tunnel or a human body is a three-dimensional whole composed of three-dimensional parts. The four-dimensionalist holds that a physical object exhibiting identity across time—Descartes, for example—is a four-dimensional whole composed of 'briefer' four-dimensional objects, its temporal parts. Peter van Inwagen (1990) has argued that four-dimensionalism cannot be sustained, or at best can be sustained only by a counterpart theorist. We argue that different schemes of individuation of temporal parts are (...)
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  39. Thomas Sattig (2008). Identity in 4d. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):179 - 195.score: 45.0
    Four-dimensionalists offer a unified picture of various puzzles about identity over time, including the puzzle of fission, the puzzle of constitution and the puzzle of undetached parts. What unifies the four-dimensionalist approaches to these puzzles is the possibility of temporal overlap—the possibility for distinct continuants to share a common temporal part, or stage. I claim that the unified picture is inconsistent, if there are informative criteria of identity over time. I will show that while temporal overlap is compatible with four-dimensionalist (...)
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  40. Christopher Hughes (2005). More Fuss About Formulation: Sider (and Me) on Three- and Four-Dimensionalism. Dialectica 59 (4):463–480.score: 45.0
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  41. André Gallois (2004). Comments on Ted Sider: Four Dimensionalism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):648–657.score: 45.0
  42. Hud Hudson (2002). Review of Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (6).score: 45.0
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  43. Kristie Miller (2009). Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.score: 45.0
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  44. Jiri Benovsky (2006). A Modal Bundle Theory. Metaphysica 7 (2).score: 45.0
    If ordinary particulars are bundles of properties, and if properties are said to be universals, then three well-known objections arise : no particular can change, all particulars have all of their properties essentially (even the most insignificant ones), and there cannot be two numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible particulars. In this paper, I try to make a little headway on these issues and see how the objections can be met, if one accepts a certain view about persistence through time and (...)
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  45. Richard Cross (1999). Four-Dimensionalism and Identity Across Time: Henry of Ghent Vs. Bonaventure. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (3):393-414.score: 45.0
  46. Benjamin Hill (2003). Newton's de Gravitatione Et Aequipondio Fluidorum and Lockean Four-Dimensionalism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2):309 – 321.score: 45.0
  47. Pablo Rychter (2011). How Coincidence Bears on Persistence. Philosophia 39 (4):759-770.score: 45.0
    The ‘paradoxes of coincidence’ are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’). However, the recent work of Gilmore ( 2007 ) and McGrath ( 2007 ) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain (...)
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  48. Antony Eagle (2007). Reply to Stone on Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism. Analysis 67 (2):159 - 162.score: 45.0
    Recently, Jim Stone has argued that counterpart theory is incompatible with the existence of temporal parts. I demonstrate that there is no such incompatibility.
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  49. Christopher H. Conn (1999). Two Arguments for Lockean Four-Dimensionalism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (3):429 – 446.score: 45.0
  50. Jim Stone (2007). Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism: A Reply to Eagle. Analysis 67 (295):263–267.score: 45.0
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