Search results for 'free action' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  91
    Alicia Finch (2013). On Behalf of the Consequence Argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):151-170.
    The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. (...)
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  2.  31
    Abraham I. Melden (1961). Free Action. Routledge.
  3.  46
    Randolph Clarke (1997). On the Possibility of Rational Free Action. Philosophical Studies 88 (1):37-57.
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  4. John R. Searle (2000). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):3-22.
    Commentary on John Searle's Article John Searle presents a philosopher's view of how conscious experience and free action relate to brain function. That view demands an examination by a neuroscientist who has experimentally investigated this issue.
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  5. Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain: Commentary on John Searle's Article (with Reply From Searle). Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):59-65.
    Commentary on John Searle's Article John Searle presents a philosopher's view of how conscious experience and free action relate to brain function. That view demands an examination by a neuroscientist who has experimentally investigated this issue.
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  6.  45
    Raimo Tuomela (1992). On the Structural Aspects of Collective Action and Free-Riding. Theory and Decision 32 (2):165-202.
    1. One of the main aims of this paper is to study the possibilities for free-riding type of behavior in various kinds of many-person interaction situations. In particular it will be of interest to see what kinds of game-theoretic structures, defined in terms of the participants' outcome-preferences, can be involved in cases of free-riding. I shall also be interested in the related problem or dilemma of collective action in a somewhat broader sense. By the dilemma of collective (...)
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  7.  51
    L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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  8. Ishtiyaque Haji (2004). Active Control, Agent-Causation and Free Action. Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.
    Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.
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  9.  8
    Tomas Ekenberg (2005). Free Will and Free Action in Anselm of Canterbury. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (4):301 - 318.
    Free Will and Free Action in Anselm of Canterbury.
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  10. Paul H. Benson (1984). Freedom and Criticism: An Account of Free Action. Dissertation, Princeton University
    This essay attempts to develop an account of the abilities which free action involves. I argue that the notion of ability which is especially relevant for the purpose of understanding free action is correctly given a compatibilist interpretation. More importantly, it turns out that persons who act freely have the ability to do otherwise than they do. Acting with the ability to do otherwise is not a distinctive mark of free action, however, since anyone (...)
     
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  11.  47
    Andrei A. Buckareff (1999). Can Agent-Causation Be Rendered Intelligible?: An Essay on the Etiology of Free Action. Dissertation, Texas A&M University
    The doctrine of agent-causation has been suggested by many interested in defending libertarian theories of free action to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary to make the notion of incompatibility freedom intelligible. In the present essay the conceptual viability of the doctrine of agent-causation will be assessed. It will be argued that agent-causation is, insofar as it is irreducible to event-causation, mysterious at best, totally unintelligible at worst. First, the arguments for agent-causation made by such eighteenth-century luminaries as Samuel (...)
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  12.  72
    John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing (...)
  13. Gary Watson (1987). Free Action and Free Will. Mind 96 (April):154-72.
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  14.  40
    John Ladd (1952). Free Will and Voluntary Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (March):392-405.
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  15. Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni & Jessica L. Alquist (2011). Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture. Neuroethics 4 (1):1-11.
    Free will can be understood as a novel form of action control that evolved to meet the escalating demands of human social life, including moral action and pursuit of enlightened self-interest in a cultural context. That understanding is conducive to scientific research, which is reviewed here in support of four hypotheses. First, laypersons tend to believe in free will. Second, that belief has behavioral consequences, including increases in socially and culturally desirable acts. Third, laypersons can reliably (...)
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  16. Chris Tucker (2007). Agent Causation and the Alleged Impossibility of Rational Free Action. Erkenntnis 67 (1):17 - 27.
    Galen Strawson has claimed that "the impossibility of free will and ultimate moral responsibility can be proved with complete certainty." Strawson, I take it, thinks that this conclusion can be established by one argument which he has developed. In this argument, he claims that rational free actions would require an infinite regress of rational choices, which is, of course, impossible for human beings. In my paper, I argue that agent causation theorists need not be worried by Strawson's argument. (...)
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  17.  15
    Paul H. Benson (1987). Ordinary Ability and Free Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (June):307-335.
  18.  12
    A. A. Howsepian (2004). A Libertarian-Friendly Theory of Compatibilist Free Action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):453-480.
  19. David A. Sipfle (1969). Free Action and Determinism. Ratio 11 (June):62-68.
     
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  20.  65
    Randolph Clarke (1996). Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):19-48.
  21. Harry Frankfurt (1986). Three Concepts of Free Action: II. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press
     
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  22.  8
    E. S. C. (1962). Free Action. Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):166-167.
  23.  23
    Paul Benson (1990). The Moral Importance of Free Action. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):1-18.
  24.  10
    Carlo Filice (1988). Non-Substantial Streams of Consciousness and Free Action. International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):1-11.
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  25.  9
    W. J. Norman (1991). Taking "Free Action" Too Seriously. Ethics 101 (3):505-520.
  26.  4
    Peter Baumann (2003). Coercion and the Varieties of Free Action. Ideas Y Valores 122:31-49.
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  27.  4
    David Blumenfeld (1972). Free Action and Unconscious Motivation. The Monist 56 (3):426-443.
  28.  9
    Edward Sankowski (1980). Free Action, Social Institutions, and the Definition of 'Art'. Philosophical Studies 37 (1):67 - 79.
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  29.  12
    G. N. A. Vesey (1962). Free Action. By A. I. Melden. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1961. Pp. X+226. Price 20s.). Philosophy 37 (141):280-.
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  30.  13
    James P. Sterba (1981). How to Complete the Compatibilist Account of Free Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (June):508-523.
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  31. Elizabeth Asmis (1990). Free Action and the Swerve. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8:275-291.
  32.  11
    Milton Fisk (1986). Free Action and Historical Materialism. Noûs 20 (2):157-177.
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  33.  7
    Edward Sankowski (1985). Causation, Social Manipulability, and Free Action. Philosophia 15 (1-2):85-94.
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  34.  1
    Alexander Reid (2000). Free Action or Resistance: Cultural Critique in the Classroom. Theory and Event 4 (3).
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  35. Elizabeth Asmis (1990). Free Action and the Swerve: Review of Walter G. Englert, "Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action". [REVIEW] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8:275.
     
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  36.  0
    S. C. E. (1962). Free Action. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 16 (1):166-167.
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  37. Laura W. Ekstrom (1998). Protecting Incompatibilist Free Action. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (3):281-91.
     
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  38.  0
    Ronald W. Hepburn (1962). Free Action. Philosophical Books 3 (2):14-15.
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  39. Janet A. Kournay (1979). How to Complete the Compatibilist Account of Free Action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 53:124.
     
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  40. Alfred Mele (2007). Free Action, Moral Responsibility, and Alternative Possibilities: Frankfurt-Style Cases Revisited. In F. Castellani & J. Quitterer (eds.), Agency and Causation in the Human Sciences. Mentis Verlag
  41. C. W. K. Mundle (1963). MELDEN, A. I. - "Free Action". [REVIEW] Mind 72:450.
     
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  42. A. C. Stoop (1962). ELDEN, A. I.: "Free Action". [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:247.
     
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  43. G. N. A. Vesey (1962). MELDEN, A. I.-"Free Action". [REVIEW] Philosophy 37:280.
     
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  44.  25
    Daniel von Wachter, Libet's Experiment Provides No Evidence Against Strong Libertarian Free Will Because It Investigates the Wrong Kind of Action.
    While other philosophers have pointed out that Libet’s experiment is compatible with compatibilist free will and also with some kinds of libertarian free will, this article ar- gues that it is even compatible with strong libertarian free will, i.e. a person’s ability to initiate causal processes. It is widely believed that Libet’s experiment has shown that all our actions have preceding unconscious causes. This article argues that Libet’s claim that the actions he invest- igated are voluntary is (...)
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  45.  87
    Andreas Glaeser (2009). The Institutional Foundations of Free Action. [REVIEW] Sociological Theory 27 (1):81 - 85.
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  46.  76
    Richard Holton (2011). Response to 'Free Will as Advanced Action Control for Human Social Life and Culture' by Roy F. Baumeister, A. William Crescioni and Jessica L. Alquist. [REVIEW] Neuroethics 4 (1):13-16.
  47. Nicholas Denyer (1981). Time, Action & Necessity: A Proof of Free Will. Duckworth.
     
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  48. Patrick Neil O'Sullivan (1977). Intentions, Motives and Human Action: An Argument for Free Will. University of Queensland Press.
     
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  49. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  50. Alfred Mele (2007). Free Will: Action Theory Meets Neuroscience. In C. Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate
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