Search results for 'frege-geach' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Gottlob Frege, P. T. Geach & Max Black (1951). On Concept and Object. Mind 60 (238):168-180.
  2. Gottlob Frege (1952). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Edited by Peter Geach and Max Black. Blackwell.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  3. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
  4. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
  5.  63
    Peter Geach (1958). Imperative and Deontic Logic. Analysis 18 (3):49-56.
    The author contends that moral utterances and imperatives have different logical features. He discusses r m hare's "language of morals" in terms of his distinction between plain imperatives and deontic utterances. (staff).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  6.  11
    Peter Geach & Max Black (1952). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Philosophical Library.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  7.  62
    P. T. Geach (1979). Russell and Frege Again. Analysis 39 (3):159 - 160.
    ......Mathematics coincides with Frege's theory of Sinn and Bedeutung...argued that in cases where Frege would say we recognize over...successful.) With this sort of elucidation, then, I indeed proposed to...use of . . .', or between Frege's 'einen Sinn ausdruckeri.....
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  27
    C. J. F. Williams, G. E. M. Anscombe & P. T. Geach (1963). Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (52):270.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  9.  9
    P. T. Geach (1965). Ontologia E Conoscenza Matematica: Un Saggio Su Gottlob Frege. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 62 (10):276-277.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  62
    P. T. Geach (1956). On Frege's Way Out. Mind 65 (259):408-409.
  11.  3
    P. T. Geach & G. E. M. Anscombe (1968). Frege. Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):140-141.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  14
    P. T. Geach (1951). Frege's Grundlagen. Philosophical Review 60 (4):535-544.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. P. T. Geach (1976). DUMMETT, M. "Frege: Philosophy of Language". [REVIEW] Mind 85:436.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14.  3
    Peter T. Geach (1981). La cuantificación de segundo orden de Frege. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 11 (2-3):167-177.
    No categories
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Gottlob Frege (1951). On Concept and Object. Translation: P. T. Geach. Mind 60:168.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Peter T. Geach (1985). Dummett on Frege: A Review Discussion. The Thomist 49 (1):116.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  68
    Gottlob Frege (1980). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Blackwell.
  18. Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
    I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  19. Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  20. Christopher Hom & Jeremy Schwartz (2013). Unity and the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24.
    The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21.  92
    Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) (1997). The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishers.
    This is the first single-volume edition and translation of Frege's philosophical writings to include his seminal papers as well as substantial selections from ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   77 citations  
  22.  45
    Mark Douglas Warren (2015). Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.
    Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  21
    Thorsten Sander (2014). A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism. Dialectica 68 (3):391-408.
    According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Gottlob Frege & Gottfried Gabriel (2000). Gottlob Frege Werk Und Wirkung : Mit den Unveröffentlichten Vorschlägen Für Ein Wahlgesetz von Gottlob Frege.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  18
    Jack Woods (forthcoming). The Frege-Geach Problem. In David Plunkett & Tristram McPherson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge 1-23.
  26. Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
  27. Gottlob Frege (1895). The Frege-Hilbert Correspondence. In Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Christian Thiel, Albert Veraart, Brian McGuinness & Hans Kaal (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Blackwell 33--51.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Mark Schroeder (2008). What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  29. J. Skorupski (2012). The Frege-Geach Objection to Expressivism: Still Unanswered. Analysis 72 (1):9-18.
    I consider a recent attempt by Mark Schroeder in his book Being For to provide an expressivist semantics for the connectives, and I argue that it does not, as it claims, answer the ‘Frege-Geach objection&rsquo.
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  30.  70
    John Eriksson (2009). Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem. Ethics 120 (1):8-35.
    The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  31. Matti Eklund (2009). The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
    Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  32.  49
    Fred Feldman & P. T. Geach (1969). Geach and Relative Identity [with Rejoinder and Reply]. Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):547 - 561.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  37
    Gottlob Frege (1950). Frege Against the Formalists (II): A Translation of Part of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Philosophical Review 59 (2):202-220.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  5
    P. T. Geach (1979). On Teaching Logic: P. T. Geach. Philosophy 54 (207):5-17.
    In medieval writers an important distinction was drawn between two applications of the term ‘ logica ’: there was logica utens , the practice of thinking logically about this or that subject-matter, and there was logica docens , the construction of logical theory. Of course the English word ‘logic’ and its derivative ‘logical’ have a corresponding twofold meaning, and we ignore the distinction at the risk of serious confusion. ‘Logical thought’ may mean thinking that is being commended as orderly, consistent, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  2
    Hans Georg Steiner, G. Frege, M. E. Szabo & E. D. Klemke (1971). Frege Und Die Grundlagen der Geometrie. Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):155-155.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  16
    Gottlob Frege (1950). Frege Against the Formalists. III: A Translation of Part of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Philosophical Review 59 (3):332-345.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  2
    Gottlob Frege (1950). Frege Against the Formalists, I, II, III. Philosophical Review 59:77.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. P. T. Geach (1969). Geach and Relative Identity-Reply. Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):556-559.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Stéphane Courtois (2008). Le cognitivisme moral de Habermas fait-il face au problème de Frege-Geach? Philosophiques 35 (2):561-579.
    L’article cherche à fournir une défense de la théorie discursive de la morale de Habermas contre une critique importante formulée récemment par J. G. Finlayson, lequel soutient que Habermas rejetterait ce qu’il appelle le « cognitivisme métaéthique » et qu’un tel rejet le confronterait au problème de Frege-Geach. L’article démontre en détail que cette critique est non fondée. Il montre de plus que la seule forme de cognitivisme rejetée par Habermas est le descriptivisme moral en ce que cette (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. René Descartes, G. E. M. Anscombe & P. T. Geach (1964). Philosophical Writings. A Selection Translated and Edited by Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach, with Introd. By Alexandre Koyré. --. [REVIEW] Nelson.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Gottlob Frege & Richard Schmitt (2003). Frege’s Letters to Wittgenstein About the Tractatus. The Bertrand Russell Society Quarterly 120.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Gottlob Frege (1988). Selection From the Frege-Russell Correspondence. In Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford University Press 56--57.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Gottlob Frege (1983). White. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979. Xm+ 288 P.. Index. Gottlob Frege. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Abridged for the English Edition by Brian Mac Guinness and Translated by Hans Kaal. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. 1980. Xvm+ 214 P.. Index. [REVIEW] Revue Internationale de Philosophie 144:199.
  44. Peter Geach (1995). Cambridge Philosophers III: McTaggart: Peter Geach. Philosophy 70 (274):567-579.
    McTaggart′s father and mother were both members of a prosperous Wiltshire family, the Ellises: in fact they were first cousins, and this inbreeding may account for his premature death from a circulatory disease to which several Ellises succumbed. The Ellises were of yeoman stock, and had enriched themselves by West Indian enterprises; they had risen in the social scale via the practice of law. It is rather reminiscent of the The Forsyte Saga , a saga, as Galsworthy said, of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Luke Gormally, P. T. Geach & G. E. M. Anscombe (1994). Moral Truth and Moral Tradition Philosophical Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Nicholas Unwin, Quasi-Realism, Negation, and the Frege-Geach Problem.
    Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I show, however, that simple negated contexts provide a fundamental difficulty, since accepting the negation of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Mark Eli Kalderon (2008). Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. Analysis 68 (298):133–143.
    CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  48. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.
  49.  49
    James Gordon Finlayson (2005). Habermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):319–344.
  50.  4
    M. E. Kalderon (2008). Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. Analysis 68 (2):133-143.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000