Search results for 'frege-geach' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Gottlob Frege, P. T. Geach & Max Black (1951). On Concept and Object. Mind 60 (238):168-180.score: 2400.0
  2. P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.score: 660.0
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  3. P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.score: 660.0
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  4. Peter Geach (1958). Imperative and Deontic Logic. Analysis 18 (3):49-56.score: 660.0
    The author contends that moral utterances and imperatives have different logical features. He discusses r m hare's "language of morals" in terms of his distinction between plain imperatives and deontic utterances. (staff).
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  5. P. T. Geach (1979). Russell and Frege Again. Analysis 39 (3):159 - 160.score: 420.0
    ......Mathematics coincides with Frege's theory of Sinn and Bedeutung...argued that in cases where Frege would say we recognize over...successful.) With this sort of elucidation, then, I indeed proposed to...use of . . .', or between Frege's 'einen Sinn ausdruckeri.....
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  6. P. T. Geach (1956). On Frege's Way Out. Mind 65 (259):408-409.score: 360.0
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  7. P. T. Geach (1951). Frege's Grundlagen. Philosophical Review 60 (4):535-544.score: 360.0
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  8. C. J. F. Williams, G. E. M. Anscombe & P. T. Geach (1963). Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (52):270.score: 360.0
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  9. Peter Geach & Max Black (1952). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Philosophical Library.score: 360.0
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  10. Peter T. Geach (1981). La cuantificación de segundo orden de Frege. Teorema 11 (2-3):167-177.score: 360.0
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  11. Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.score: 240.0
    I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
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  12. Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.score: 240.0
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
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  13. Christopher Hom & Jeremy Schwartz (2013). Unity and the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24.score: 240.0
    The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but it (...)
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  14. Gottlob Frege (1980). Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Blackwell.score: 240.0
  15. Thorsten Sander (2014). A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism. Dialectica 68 (3):391-408.score: 240.0
    According to (cognitivist) judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument.
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  16. Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.score: 210.0
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  17. Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) (1997). The Frege Reader. Blackwell Publishers.score: 210.0
    This is the first single-volume edition and translation of Frege's philosophical writings to include his seminal papers as well as substantial selections from ...
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  18. Gottlob Frege (1895). The Frege-Hilbert Correspondence. In Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Christian Thiel, Albert Veraart, Brian McGuinness & Hans Kaal (eds.), Gottlob Frege: Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Blackwell. 33--51.score: 210.0
     
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  19. Mark Schroeder (2008). What is the Frege-Geach Problem? Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.score: 180.0
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of (...)
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  20. J. Skorupski (2012). The Frege-Geach Objection to Expressivism: Still Unanswered. Analysis 72 (1):9-18.score: 180.0
    I consider a recent attempt by Mark Schroeder in his book Being For to provide an expressivist semantics for the connectives, and I argue that it does not, as it claims, answer the ‘Frege-Geach objection&rsquo.
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  21. Matti Eklund (2009). The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.score: 180.0
    Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
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  22. John Eriksson (2009). Homage to Hare: Ecumenism and the Frege‐Geach Problem. Ethics 120 (1):8-35.score: 180.0
    The Frege‐Geach problem is probably the most serious worry for the prospects of any kind of metaethical expressivism. In a recent article, Ridge suggests that a new version of expressivism, a view he calls ecumenical expressivism, can avoid the Frege‐Geach problem.1 In contrast to pure expressivism, ecumenical expressivism is the view that moral utterances function to express not only desire‐like states of mind but also beliefs with propositional content. Whereas pure expressivists’ solutions to the Frege‐Geach problem usually have rested on (...)
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  23. Fred Feldman & P. T. Geach (1969). Geach and Relative Identity [with Rejoinder and Reply]. Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):547 - 561.score: 180.0
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  24. Gottlob Frege (1950). Frege Against the Formalists (II): A Translation of Part of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Philosophical Review 59 (2):202-220.score: 180.0
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  25. Gottlob Frege (1950). Frege Against the Formalists. III: A Translation of Part of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Philosophical Review 59 (3):332-345.score: 180.0
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  26. Gottlob Frege (1997). Some Items on Frege. Dialectica 51 (4).score: 180.0
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  27. Gottlob Frege (1988). Selection From the Frege-Russell Correspondence. In Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford University Press. 56--57.score: 180.0
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  28. Gottlob Frege (1983). White. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1979. Xm+ 288 P.. Index. Gottlob Frege. Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence. Abridged for the English Edition by Brian Mac Guinness and Translated by Hans Kaal. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. 1980. Xvm+ 214 P.. Index. [REVIEW] Revue Internationale de Philosophie 144:199.score: 180.0
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  29. P. T. Geach (1969). Geach and Relative Identity-Reply. Review of Metaphysics 22 (3):556-559.score: 180.0
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  30. Andrew Alwood (2010). Imperative Clauses and the Frege–Geach Problem. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (1):105-117.score: 150.0
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  31. Mark Eli Kalderon (2008). Moral Fictionalism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Reasonable Inference. Analysis 68 (298):133–143.score: 150.0
    CHANGE SLIDE Go through outline of talk CHANGE SLIDE It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims. Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral utterances; and, hence, that our (...)
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  32. James Gordon Finlayson (2005). Habermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):319–344.score: 150.0
  33. William Gustason (1972). Frege, Geach, and `the Concept Horse'. Mind 81 (321):125-130.score: 150.0
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  34. Stéphane Courtois (2008). Le cognitivisme moral de Habermas fait-il face au problème de Frege-Geach? Philosophiques 35 (2):561-579.score: 150.0
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  35. Zuzanna Kasprzyk & Katarzyna Kus (2009). The Frege-Geach Objection-Semantic Problems of Expressivism. Filozofia Nauki 17 (4):131.score: 150.0
     
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  36. William P. Alston & Jonathan Bennett (1984). Identity and Cardinality: Geach and Frege. Philosophical Review 93 (4):553-567.score: 144.0
    P. T. Geach, notoriously, holds the Relative Identity Thesis, according to which a meaningful judgment of identity is always, implicitly or explicitly, relative to some general term. ‘The same’ is a fragmentary expression, and has no significance unless we say or mean ‘the same X’, where ‘X’ represents a general term (what Frege calls a Begriffswort or Begriffsausdruck). (P. T. Geach, Mental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 69. I maintain that it makes no sense to judge whether (...)
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  37. Mark Schroeder, Finagling Frege.score: 120.0
    Michael Ridge claims to have ‘finessed’ the Frege-Geach Problem ‘on the cheap’. In this short paper I explain a couple of the reasons why this thought is premature.
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  38. N. G. E. Harris (1967). Geach on Frege's Assertion Sign. Analysis 27 (6):186 - 189.score: 120.0
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  39. Leonard Linsky (1953). Book Review:Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege Peter Geach, Max Black. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 20 (4):342-.score: 120.0
  40. Dave Beisecker (2011). The Force and Content of the Geach-Frege Problem. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):93-97.score: 120.0
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  41. William J. Callaghan (1978). "Logical Investigations," by Gottlob Frege, Edited with a Preface by P.T. Geach, Trans. P. T. Geach and R. H. Stoothof. Modern Schoolman 56 (1):91-91.score: 120.0
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  42. Alonzo Church (1953). Review: Peter Geach, Max Black, Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):92-93.score: 120.0
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  43. Max A. Freund (1982). Lesniewski, Quine y Geach: un análisis de sus demostraciones con respecto a la restricción del axioma V del sistema de Frege. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 52:177-180.score: 120.0
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  44. F. Kambartel (1968). Review: P. T. Geach, G. E. M. Anscombe, Frege. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):140-141.score: 120.0
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  45. Charles Parsons (1981). Review: Peter Geach, Max Black, Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 46 (4):870-871.score: 120.0
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  46. Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.score: 90.0
    Normative judgments involve two gradable features. First, the judgments themselves can come in degrees; second, the strength of reasons represented in the judgments can come in degrees. Michael Smith has argued that non-cognitivism cannot accommodate both of these gradable dimensions. The degrees of a non-cognitive state can stand in for degrees of judgment, or degrees of reason strength represented in judgment, but not both. I argue that (a) there are brands of noncognitivism that can surmount Smith’s challenge, and (b) any (...)
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  47. Graham Oddie & Dan Demetriou (2007). The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):485 - 498.score: 90.0
    According to John Mackie, moral talk is representational (the realists go that bit right) but its metaphysical presuppositions are wildly implausible (the non-cognitivists got that bit right). This is the basis of Mackie’s now famous error theory: that moral judgments are cognitively meaningful but systematically false. Of course, Mackie went on to recommend various substantive moral judgments, and, in the light of his error theory, that has seemed odd to a lot of folk. Richard Joyce has argued that Mackie’s approach (...)
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  48. Daniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.score: 90.0
    After presenting a simple expressivist account of reports of probabilistic judgements, I explore a classic problem for it, namely the Frege-Geach problem. I argue that it is a problem not just for expressivism but for any reasonable account of ascriptions of graded judgements. I suggest that the problem can be resolved by appropriately modelling imprecise credences.
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  49. Nicholas Unwin (2008). Divine Hoorays: Some Parallels Between Expressivism and Religious Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):659-684.score: 90.0
    Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God’s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on God’s. Ostensibly, such views are incompatible. However, we shall argue that a rapprochement is possible and beneficial to both sides. Expressivists need to explain the difference between reporting and expressing an attitude, and to address the Frege-Geach problem. Divine law theorists (...)
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  50. Nicholas Unwin (2001). Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):60-75.score: 90.0
    A difficulty is exposed in Allan Gibbard's solution to the embedding/Frege-Geach problem, namely that the difference between refusing to accept a normative judgement and accepting its negation is ignored. This is shown to undermine the whole solution.
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