Search results for 'function of consciousness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jean E. Burns (1991). Does Consciousness Perform a Function Independently of the Brain? Frontier Perspectives, Center for Frontier Sciences, Temple University 2 (1):19-34.score: 506.0
    Even if all of the content of conscious experience is encoded in the brain, there is a considerable difference between the view that consciousness does independent processing and the view that it does not. If all processing is done by the brain, then conscious experience is unnecessary and irrelevant to behavior. If consciousness performs a function, then its association with particular aspects of brain processing reflect its functional use in determining behavior. However, if consciousness does perform (...)
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  2. Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.score: 432.0
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function (...)
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  3. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1995). Zombies and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-21.score: 411.0
    Todd Moody’s Zombie Earth thought experiment is an attempt to show that ‘conscious inessentialism’ is false or in need of qualification. We defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that zombie thought experiments highlight the need to explain why consciousness evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in consciousness studies.
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  4. Antti Revonsuo (2000). The Reinterpretation of Dreams: An Evolutionary Hypothesis of the Function of Dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):877-901.score: 387.0
    Several theories claim that dreaming is a random by-product of REM sleep physiology and that it does not serve any natural function. Phenomenal dream content, however, is not as disorganized as such views imply. The form and content of dreams is not random but organized and selective: during dreaming, the brain constructs a complex model of the world in which certain types of elements, when compared to waking life, are underrepresented whereas others are over represented. Furthermore, dream content is (...)
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  5. Ilya B. Farber (2005). How a Neural Correlate Can Function as an Explanation of Consciousness: Evidence From the History of Science Regarding the Likely Explanatory Value of the NCC Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):77-95.score: 363.0
    A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain (...)
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  6. Hakwan Lau (2009). Volition and the Function of Consciousness. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):537-552.score: 357.0
    People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals (...)
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  7. Richard Brown (2009). Review of 'Consciousness and its Function' by David Rosenthal. [REVIEW] Philosopher's Digest.score: 348.0
    David Rosenthal is a well-known defender of a particular kind of theory of consciousness known as the higher-order thought theory (HOTT). Higher-order theories are united by what Rosenthal calls the Transitivity Principle (TP), which states that a mental state is conscious iff one is conscious of oneself, in some suitable way, as being in that mental state. Since there are various ways to implement TP and HOTT commits one to the view that any mental state could occur unconsciously it (...)
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  8. Michael Tye (1996). The Function of Consciousness. Noûs 30 (3):287-305.score: 342.0
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  9. Harald Walach & Stefan Schmidt (2005). Repairing Plato's Life Boat with Ockham's Razor: The Important Function of Research in Anomalies for Consciousness Studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):52-70.score: 330.0
    Scientific progress is achieved not only by continuous accumulation of knowledge but also by paradigm shifts. These shifts are often necessitated by anomalous findings that cannot be incorporated in accepted models. Two important methodological principles regulate this process and complement each other: Ockham's Razor as the principle of parsimony and Plato's Life Boat as the principle of the necessity to 'save the appearances' and thus incorporate conflicting phenomenological data into theories. We review empirical data which are in conflict with some (...)
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  10. Craig DeLancey (1996). Emotion and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.score: 330.0
  11. J. D. Schmahmann, C. M. Anderson, N. Newton & R. Ellis (2002). The Function of the Cerebellum in Cognition, Affect and Consciousness: Empirical Support for the Embodied Mind. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):273-309.score: 321.0
    Editors’ note: These four interrelated discussions of the role of the cerebellum in coordinating emotional and higher cognitive functions developed out of a workshop presented by the four authors for the 2000 Conference of the Cognitive Science Society at the University of Pennsylvania. The four interrelated discussions explore the implications of the recent explosion of cerebellum research suggesting an expanded cerebellar role in higher cognitive functions as well as in the coordination of emotional functions with learning, logical thinking, perceptual (...), and action planning. (shrink)
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  12. Thomas W. Polger (1995). Zombies and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-321.score: 312.0
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  13. Benny Shanon (1998). What is the Function of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (3):295-308.score: 312.0
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  14. Stuart R. Hameroff (1999). A/T Evolution and Function of Consciousness—Va Introduction. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates. Mit Press. 3--245.score: 312.0
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  15. J. F. Richard (1999). Object, Limits and Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):2-3.score: 312.0
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  16. David J. Cole (2002). The Function of Consciousness. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins. 287-305.score: 297.0
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  17. Joseph E. Bogen (2001). An Experimental Disconnection Approach to a Function of Consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 111 (3):135-136.score: 297.0
  18. Robert S. Lockhart (1989). Consciousness and the Function of Remembered Episodes. In Henry L. I. Roediger & Fergus I. M. Craik (eds.), Varieties of Memory and Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum. 423--429.score: 297.0
  19. Thomas C. Dalton (2000). The Developmental Roots of Consciousness and Emotional Experience. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):55-89.score: 294.0
    Charles Darwin is generally credited with having formulated the first systematic attempt to explain the evolutionary origins and function of the expression of emotions in animals and humans. His ingenious theory, however, was burdened with popular misconceptions about human phylogenetic heritage and bore the philosophical and theoretical deficiencies of the brain science of his era that his successors strove to overcome. In their attempts to rectify Darwin?s errors, William James, James Mark Baldwin and John Dewey each made important contributions (...)
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  20. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2013). Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.score: 288.0
    Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity (...)
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  21. M. A. Persinger & S. A. Koren (2007). A Theory of Neurophysics and Quantum Neuroscience: Implications for Brain Function and the Limits of Consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 117 (2):157-175.score: 288.0
  22. Peter Mott (1982). On the Function of Consciousness. Mind 91 (July):423-9.score: 288.0
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  23. David M. Black (2001). Psychoanalysis and the Function of Consciousness. In Anthony Molino & Christine Ware (eds.), Where Id Was: Challenging Normalization in Psychoanalysis. Disseminations, Psychoanalysis in Contexts. Wesleyan University Press. 47-57.score: 288.0
  24. Natika Newton (2001). The Function of the Cerebellum in Cognition, Affect and Consciousness: Empirical Support for the Embodied Mind--Introduction. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):273-276.score: 288.0
  25. Kunjumon Vadakkan (2010). Framework of Consciousness From Semblance of Activity at Functionally LINKed Postsynaptic Membranes. Frontiers in Consciousness Research 1 (1):1-12.score: 283.7
    Consciousness is seen as a difficult “binding” problem. Binding, a process where different sensations evoked by an item are associated in the nervous system, can be viewed as a process similar to associative learning. Several reports that consciousness is associated with some form of memory imply that different forms of memories have a common feature contributing to consciousness. Based on a proposed synaptic mechanism capable of explaining different forms of memory, we developed a framework for consciousness. (...)
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  26. Antti Revonsuo & Katja Valli (2000). Dreaming and Consciousness: Testing the Threat Simulation Theory of the Function of Dreaming. Psyche 6 (8).score: 279.0
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  27. K. Konno, Y. Katayama & T. Yamamoto (2002). Consciousness and the Intercortical Correlation Function of Electroencephalograms. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.score: 279.0
     
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  28. Ezequiel Morsella, Stephen C. Krieger & John A. Bargh (2009). The Primary Function of Consciousness: Why Skeletal Muscles Are Voluntary Muscles. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.score: 279.0
  29. Keith Oatley (1988). On Changing One's Mind: A Possible Function of Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press. 369--389.score: 279.0
  30. Robert van Gulick (1994). Deficit Studies and the Function of Phenomenal Consciousness. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.score: 279.0
     
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  31. John E. Stewart (2007). The Future Evolution of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):58-92.score: 276.0
    What is the potential for improvements in the functioning of consciousness? The paper addresses this issue using global workspace theory. According to this model, the prime function of consciousness is to develop novel adaptive responses. Consciousness does this by putting together new combinations of knowledge, skills and other disparate resources that are recruited from throughout the brain. The paper's search for potential improvements in consciousness is aided by studies of a developmental transition that enhances functioning (...)
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  32. Ronald J. Pekala & Levine R. L. Wenger C. F. (1985). Individual Differences in Phenomenological Experience: States of Consciousness as a Function of Absorption. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48:125-32.score: 270.0
  33. Yu Guangyuan (1981). The Function of Consciousness on Matter. Contemporary Chinese Thought 12 (3):38-54.score: 270.0
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  34. Guven Guzeldere, Owen J. Flanagan & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons From Blindsight. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. Mit Press.score: 270.0
  35. David Navon (1991). The Function of Consciousness or of Information? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):690-691.score: 270.0
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  36. Terry D. Palmer & Ashley K. Ramsey (2012). The Function of Consciousness in Multisensory Integration. Cognition 125 (3):353-364.score: 270.0
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  37. Gy Yu (1981). The Function of Consciousness on Matter+ How Consciousness Acts on the Material World. Chinese Studies in Philosophy 12 (3):38-54.score: 270.0
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  38. Pierre Jacob (1995). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Function: What is the Right Order of Explanation? Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 55 (1):195-200.score: 261.0
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  39. David Rosenthal, The Function and Facilitation of Consciousness.score: 261.0
  40. Eric Russert Kraemer (1984). Consciousness and the Exclusivity of Function. Mind 93 (April):271-5.score: 261.0
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  41. Petra Stoerig & Alan Cowey (1993). Blindsight and Perceptual Consciousness: Neuropsychological Aspects of Striate Cortical Function. In B. Gulyas, D. Ottoson & P. Rol (eds.), Functional Organization of the Human Visual Cortex. Pergamon Press.score: 261.0
  42. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.score: 258.0
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition (...)
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  43. Axel Cleeremans (2006). Computational Correlates of Consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology: Progress in Brain Research. Elsevier.score: 258.0
    Over the past few years numerous proposals have appeared that attempt to characterize consciousness in terms of what could be called its computational correlates: Principles of information processing with which to characterize the differences between conscious and unconscious processing. Proposed computational correlates include architectural specialization (such as the involvement of specific regions of the brain in conscious processing), properties of representations (such as their stability in time or their strength), and properties of specific processes (such as resonance, synchrony, interactivity, (...)
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  44. Prof Max Velmans (2011). Can Evolutionary Theory Explain the Existence of Consciousness? A Review of Humphrey, N. (2010) Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. London: Quercus, ISBN 9781849162371. Journal of Consciousness Studies.score: 258.0
    This review summarises why it is difficult for Darwinian evolutionary theory to explain the existence and function of consciousness. It then evaluates whether Humphrey's book Soul Dust overcomes these problems. According to Humphrey, consciousness is an illusion constructed by the brain to enhance reproductive fitness by motivating creatures that have it to stay alive. Although the review entirely accepts that consciousness gives a first-person meaning to existence, it concludes that Humphrey does not give a convincing account (...)
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  45. Athena Demertzi & Mario Stanziano, Reaching Across the Abyss: Recent Advances in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Their Potential Relevance to Disorders of Consciousness.score: 258.0
    Disorders of consciousness (DOC) raise profound scientific, clinical, ethical, and philosophical issues. Growing knowledge on fundamental principles of brain organization in healthy individuals offers new opportunities for a better understanding of residual brain function in DOCs. We here discuss new perspectives derived from a recently proposed scheme of brain organization underlying consciousness in healthy individuals. In this scheme, thalamo-cortical networks can be divided into two, often antagonistic, global systems: (i) a system of externally oriented, sensory-motor networks (the (...)
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  46. William H. Calvin (1998). Competing for Consciousness: A Darwinian Mechanism at an Appropriate Level of Explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):389-404.score: 255.0
    Treating consciousness as awareness or attention greatly underestimates it, ignoring the temporary levels of organization associated with higher intellectual function (syntax, planning, logic, music). The tasks that require consciousness tend to be the ones that demand a lot of resources. Routine tasks can be handled on the back burner but dealing with ambiguity, groping around offline, generating creative choices, and performing precision movements may temporarily require substantial allocations of neocortex. Here I will attempt to clarify the appropriate (...)
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  47. Jon B. Eisenberg (2008). Schiavo on the Cutting Edge: Functional Brain Imaging and its Impact on Surrogate End-of-Life Decision-Making. Neuroethics 1 (2):75-83.score: 255.0
    The article addresses the potential impact of functional brain imaging (functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron-emission tomography) on surrogate end-of-life decision-making in light of varying state-law definitions of consciousness, some of which define awareness behaviorally and others functionally. The article concludes that, in light of admonitions by neuroscientists that functional brain imaging cannot yet replace behavioral evaluation to determine the existence of consciousness, state legislatures, courts and drafters of written advance healthcare directives should consider treating behavior, not (...), as the touchstone for end-of-life decision-making. (shrink)
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  48. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts, Sergio Bagnato, Cristina Boccagni & Giuseppe Galardi (2012). Toward Operational Architectonics of Consciousness: Basic Evidence From Patients with Severe Cerebral Injuries. Cognitive Processing 13 (2):111-131.score: 252.0
    Although several studies propose that the integrity of neuronal assemblies may underlie a phenomenon referred to as awareness, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated dynamics and functional interactions among neuronal assemblies as a function of consciousness expression. In order to address this question EEG operational architectonics analysis (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2008) was conducted in patients in minimally conscious (MCS) and vegetative states (VS) to study the dynamics of neuronal assemblies and operational synchrony among them as (...)
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  49. Jacob Berger (2013). Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. 137-145.score: 249.0
    In his (2011) paper “There It Is” and his (2014) précis “There It Was,” Benj Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can be explained by intentional psychology and can justify beliefs, whereas bad cases of perception are defective and so cannot justify beliefs. Importantly, Hellie also affords consciousness a central role in rationality insofar as only those good cases of perception within consciousness can play a justificatory function. In (...)
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