Search results for 'h-consciousness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Piotr Boltuc (2010). Sloman and H-Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):23-26.score: 48.0
  2. Nicholas Boltuc & Peter Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. AAAI Press, Merlo Park, CA.score: 45.0
    We should eventually understand how exactly first person phenomenal consciousness is generated. When we do, we should be able to enginner one for robots. This is the engineering thesis in machine consciousness.
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  3. Daniel L. Schacter (1989). On the Relation Between Memory and Consciousness: Dissociable Interactions and Conscious Experience. In (H. Roediger & F. In Henry L. I. Roediger & Fergus I. M. Craik (eds.), Varieties of Memory and Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 39.0
  4. Brian J. Garrett (2003). Bermudez on Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.score: 36.0
    I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.
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  5. Calvin S. Hall (1955). Book Review:Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Third Conference H. A. Abramson. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 22 (1):68-.score: 36.0
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  6. A. M. Frazier (1977). F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Religious Consciousness. Idealistic Studies 7 (3):239-251.score: 36.0
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  7. Calvin S. Hall (1953). Book Review:Problems of Consciousness H. A. Abramson. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 20 (3):243-.score: 36.0
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  8. E. F. Kaelin (1980). A Review of Henri Ey.Consciousness, Trans. John H. Floodstrom. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1978. Pp. [XXXIV], 446. $22.50. [REVIEW] Human Studies 3 (1):279-290.score: 36.0
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  9. J. Smythies (2003). Space, Time and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):47-56.score: 36.0
  10. John Perry (2001). Time, Consciousness and the Knowledge Argument. In The Importance of Time: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.score: 33.0
  11. C. Lehner (1997). What It Feels Like to Be in a Superposition, and Why: Consciousness and the Interpretation of Everett's Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 110 (2):191-216.score: 33.0
    This paper attempts an interpretation of Everett's relative state formulation of quantum mechanics that avoids the commitment to new metaphysical entities like ‘worlds’ or ‘minds’. Starting from Everett's quantum mechanical model of an observer, it is argued that an observer's belief to be in an eigenstate of the measurement (corresponding to the observation of a well-defined measurement outcome) is consistent with the fact that she objectively is in a superposition of such states. Subjective states corresponding to such beliefs are constructed. (...)
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  12. Gareth B. Matthews (1977). Consciousness and Life. Philosophy 52 (January):13-26.score: 33.0
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  13. Blake H. Dournaee (2010). Comments on “The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI”. Minds and Machines 20 (2):303-309.score: 33.0
    In their joint paper entitled The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and BIO-AI (Boltuc et al. Replication of the hard problem of conscious in AI and Bio- AI: An early conceptual framework 2008), Nicholas and Piotr Boltuc suggest that machines could be equipped with phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective consciousness that satisfies Chalmer’s hard problem (We will abbreviate the hard problem of consciousness as H-consciousness ). The claim is that if we knew the inner workings (...)
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  14. William M. Richards (1984). Self-Consciousness and Agency. Synthese 61 (November):149-71.score: 33.0
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  15. Kenneth R. Merrill (1970). Comments on Professor H.D. Lewis, Self-Identity and Memory. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1 (1-2):230-236.score: 33.0
  16. James G. Hart & Tomis Kapitan (eds.) (1999). The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.score: 33.0
     
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  17. Robert H. Wozniak (ed.) (1884/1993). Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: Functionalism, the Critique of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.score: 30.0
    While John B. Watson articulated the intellectual commitments of behaviorism with clarity and force, wove them into a coherent perspective, gave the perspective a name, and made it a cause, these commitments had adherents before him. To document the origins of behaviorism, this series collects the articles that set the terms of the behaviorist debate, includes the most important pre-Watsonian contributions to objectivism, and reprints the first full text of the new behaviorism. Contents: Functionalism, the Critque of Introspection, and the (...)
     
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  18. Christian Etzrodt (2008). The Foundation of an Interpretative Sociology: A Critical Review of the Attempts of George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz. [REVIEW] Human Studies 31 (2):157 - 177.score: 27.0
    George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz proposed foundations for an interpretative sociology from opposite standpoints. Mead accepted the objective meaning structure a priori. His problem became therefore the explanation of the individuality and creativity of human actors in his social behavioristic approach. In contrast, Schutz started from the subjective consciousness of an isolated actor as a result of a phenomenological reduction. He was concerned with the problem of explaining the possibility of this isolated actor’s perceiving other actors in their existence, (...)
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  19. James M. Edie (1970). William James and Phenomenology. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):481-526.score: 27.0
    This is a study of all the recent literature on william james written from a phenomenological perspective with the purpose of showing that william james made fundamental contributions to the phenomenological theory of the intentionality of consciousness, To the phenomenological theory of self-Identity, And to the phenomenological conception of noetic freedom as the basic concept of ethical theory.
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  20. B. D. Josephson & V. S. Ramachandran (eds.) (1980). Consciousness and the Physical World: Edited Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Symposium on Consciousness Held at the University of Cambridge in January 1978. Pergamon Press.score: 27.0
    Edited proceedings of an interdisciplinary symposium on consciousness held at the University of Cambridge in January 1978. Includes a foreword by Freeman Dyson. Chapter authors: G. Vesey, R.L. Gregory, H.C. Longuet-Higgins, N.K. Humphrey, H.B. Barlow, D.M. MacKay, B.D. Josephson, M. Roth, V.S. Ramachandran, S. Padfield, and (editorial summary only) E. Noakes. -/- Page numbering convention: 'go to page n' accesses the pair of scanned pages 2n and 2n+1. A text-format version of the book (OCR generated with occasional errors) is available (...)
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  21. Gabriela Silva (2012). Platón y C.H. Whiteley: El rol de la conciencia en la acción humana. Apuntes Filosóficos 20 (38).score: 27.0
    Resumen Existe la posibilidad de hallar una conexión entre las perspectivas de C. H. Whiteley y Platón en lo que se refiere a la acción humana, cuando prestamos atención a la noción de conciencia que se tanto uno como otro manejan; el primero, en su obra Mind in Action. An essay in Philosofical Psychology, y, el segundo, en su diálogo tardío Filebo. A pesar de las diferencias que naturalmente podemos encontrar entre dos autores tan lejanos uno del otro, cronológicamente hablando, (...)
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  22. John Warren White (ed.) (1974/1985). Frontiers of Consciousness: The Meeting Ground Between Inner and Outer Reality. Julian Press.score: 27.0
    Transpersonal psychology: Dean, S. R. The ultraconscious mind. Arasteh, A. R. Final integration in the adult personality.--The nature of madness: First, E. Visions, voyages, and new interpretations of madness. Van Dusen, W. Hallucinations as the world of spirits.--Biofeedback: White, J. The yogi in the lab. Kiefer, D. EEG alpha feedback and subjective states of consciousness.--Meditation research: Griffith, F. F. Meditation research: its personal and social implications. Kiefer, D. Intermeditation notes: reports from inner space.--Psychic research: Honorton, C. Tracing ESP through altered (...)
     
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  23. H. Sidky (2009). A Shaman's Cure: The Relationship Between Altered States of Consciousness and Shamanic Healing. Anthropology of Consciousness 20 (2):171-197.score: 24.0
    This study, which is based upon ethnographic data collected between 1999 and 2008 in Nepal, examines the connection between the shaman's altered states of consciousness (ASC; i.e., what goes on inside the healer's mind/brain) and therapeutic changes that take place in the patient's mind/body. Unlike other studies that primarily emphasize the shaman's internal psychological state, this article attempts to explain the role of the healer's ASC and elucidate how desired therapeutic changes depend upon patient–healer interactions. This question is explored in (...)
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  24. William H. Calvin (1998). Competing for Consciousness: A Darwinian Mechanism at an Appropriate Level of Explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):389-404.score: 24.0
    Treating consciousness as awareness or attention greatly underestimates it, ignoring the temporary levels of organization associated with higher intellectual function (syntax, planning, logic, music). The tasks that require consciousness tend to be the ones that demand a lot of resources. Routine tasks can be handled on the back burner but dealing with ambiguity, groping around offline, generating creative choices, and performing precision movements may temporarily require substantial allocations of neocortex. Here I will attempt to clarify the appropriate levels of explanation (...)
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  25. V. Hope (1973). Speaking of Sensations. Mind 82 (April):183-190.score: 24.0
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  26. Piotr Boltuc (2012). The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (2):187-207.score: 24.0
    I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views (...)
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  27. M. R. Haight (1980). A Study Of Self-Deception. Sussex: Harvester Press.score: 24.0
  28. William G. Lycan (1975). Reply to Morick on Intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (June):697-699.score: 24.0
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  29. D. R. Cousin (1940). Perceptual Assurance, Part II. Mind 49 (April):150-170.score: 24.0
     
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  30. Christopher Mole (2008). Attention and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.score: 21.0
    According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important (...)
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  31. David J. Chalmers (2000). What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 17--39.score: 21.0
    The search for neural correlates of consciousness (or NCCs) is arguably the cornerstone in the recent resurgence of the science of consciousness. The search poses many difficult empirical problems, but it seems to be tractable in principle, and some ingenious studies in recent years have led to considerable progress. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning the nature and location of neural correlates of consciousness. A few of these include.
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  32. David J. Chalmers (1997). Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):3-46.score: 21.0
    This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Second, I respond to nonreductive critiques, including those that argue that the problems of consciousness are harder than I have suggested, or that my framework for addressing them is flawed. Third, I address positive (...)
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  33. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.score: 21.0
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
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  34. John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.score: 21.0
    My goal is to try to understand the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. My basic methodological assumption is that embodied agents, through their sensory-motor, affective, and cognitive activities directed at objects, engage in intentional relations with these objects. Furthermore, I assume that intentional relations can be viewed from a first- and a third-person perspective. What is called primary consciousness is the first-person perspective of the agent engaged in a current intentional relation. While primary consciousness posits an implicit.
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  35. David Papineau (2003). Theories of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 353.score: 21.0
    My target in this paper is "theories of consciousness". There are many theories of consciousness around, and my view is that they are all misconceived. Consciousness is not a normal scientific subject, and needs handling with special care. It is foolhardy to jump straight in and start building a theory, as if consciousness were just like electricity or chemical valency. We will do much better to reflect explicitly on our methodology first. When we do this, we will see that theories (...)
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  36. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.score: 21.0
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
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  37. Alva Noë & Evan Thompson (2004). Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):3-28.score: 21.0
    In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness (or NCC) has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness (Metzinger, 2000a). A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we … need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness.… For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive.… No (...)
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  38. Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.score: 21.0
    It is widely assumed that ‘consciousness’ (and its cognates) is multiply ambiguous within the consciousness literature. Some alleged senses of the term are access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, state consciousness, creature consciousness, introspective consciousness, self consciousness, to name a few. In the paper I argue for two points. First, there are few if any good reasons for thinking that such alleged senses are genuine: ‘consciousness’ is best viewed as univocal within the literature. The second point is that researchers would do best (...)
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  39. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1995). Zombies and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-21.score: 21.0
    Todd Moody’s Zombie Earth thought experiment is an attempt to show that ‘conscious inessentialism’ is false or in need of qualification. We defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that zombie thought experiments highlight the need to explain why consciousness evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in consciousness studies.
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  40. Evan Thompson (2001). Empathy and Consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):1-32.score: 21.0
    This article makes five main points. (1) Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. (2) The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. (3) Empathy is the precondi- tion (the condition of possibility) of the science of consciousness. (4) Human empathy.
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  41. Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (2012). Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview. In Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the distinctive way in which (...)
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  42. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality and Consciousness. In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.score: 21.0
    Intentionality is usually defined as the directedness of the mind toward something other than itself. My desire for a cold beer is directed at the cold beer in front of me. Much of consciousness is intentional, my conscious experiences are usually directed at something. However, conscious experiences typically have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like for me to see the deep blue of the Pacific Ocean and to feel the warm water lapping over my feet, and to (...)
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  43. Katalin Balog (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT Theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.score: 21.0
    In this commentary I criticize David Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory of consciousness (HOT). This is one of the best articulated philosophical accounts of consciousness available. The theory is, roughly, that a mental state is conscious in virtue of there being another mental state, namely, a thought to the effect that one is in the first state. I argue that this account is open to the objection that it makes “HOT-zombies” possible, i.e., creatures that token higher order mental states, but (...)
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  44. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). Myth and Mind: The Origin of Consciousness in the Discovery of the Sacred. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):289-337.score: 21.0
    By accepting that the formal structure of human language is the key to understanding the uniquity of human culture and consciousness and by further accepting the late appearance of such language amongst the Cro-Magnon, I am free to focus on the causes that led to such an unprecedented threshold crossing. In the complex of causes that led to human being, I look to scholarship in linguistics, mythology, anthropology, paleontology, and to creation myths themselves for an answer. I conclude that prehumans (...)
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  45. Max Velmans (2007). The Co-Evolution of Matter and Consciousness. Velmans, Prof Max (2007) the Co-Evolution of Matter and Consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] 44 (2):273-282.score: 21.0
    Theories about the evolution of consciousness relate in an intimate way to theories about the distribution of consciousness, which range from the view that only human beings are conscious to the view that all matter is in some sense conscious. Broadly speaking, such theories can be classified into discontinuity theories and continuity theories. Discontinuity theories propose that consciousness emerged only when material forms reached a given stage of evolution, but propose different criteria for the stage at which this occurred. Continuity (...)
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  46. Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 33-56.score: 21.0
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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  47. Mark H. Bickhard (2005). Consciousness and Reflective Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):205-218.score: 21.0
    An interactive process model of the nature of representation intrinsically accounts for multiple emergent properties of consciousness, such as being a contentful experiential flow, from a situated and embodied point of view. A crucial characteristic of this model is that content is an internally related property of interactive process, rather than an externally related property as in all other contemporary models. Externally related content requires an interpreter, yielding the familiar regress of interpreters, along with a host of additional fatal problems. (...)
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  48. Francisco J. Varela (1999). Present-Time Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140.score: 21.0
    My purpose in this article is to propose an explicitly naturalized account of the experience of present nowness on the basis of two complementary sources: phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience. What I mean by naturalization, and the role cognitive neuroscience plays will become clear as the paper unfolds, but the main intention is to use the consciousness of present time as a study case for the phenomenological framework presented by Depraz in this Special Issue.
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  49. Igor Aleksander, Susan Stuart & Tom Ziemke (2008). Assessing Artificial Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):95-110.score: 21.0
    While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. 1 The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include (...)
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