Search results for 'hard problem' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Massimo Pigliucci (2013). What Hard Problem? Philosophy Now (99).score: 240.0
    The philosophical study of consciousness is chock full of thought experiments: John Searle’s Chinese Room, David Chalmers’ Philosophical Zombies, Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room, and Thomas Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ among others. Many of these experiments and the endless discussions that follow them are predicated on what Chalmers famously referred as the ‘hardproblem of consciousness: for him, it is ‘easy’ to figure out how the brain is capable of perception, information integration, attention, reporting (...)
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  2. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2013). Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem. In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. 259--269.score: 240.0
    According to David Chalmers, the hard problem of consciousness consists of explaining how and why qualitative experience arises from physical states. Moreover, Chalmers argues that materialist and reductive explanations of mentality are incapable of addressing the hard problem. In this chapter, I suggest that Chalmers’ hard problem can be usefully distinguished into a ‘how question’ and ‘why question,’ and I argue that evolutionary biology has the resources to address the question of why qualitative experience (...)
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  3. Blake H. Dournaee (2010). Comments on “The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI”. Minds and Machines 20 (2):303-309.score: 240.0
    In their joint paper entitled The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and BIO-AI (Boltuc et al. Replication of the hard problem of conscious in AI and Bio- AI: An early conceptual framework 2008), Nicholas and Piotr Boltuc suggest that machines could be equipped with phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective consciousness that satisfies Chalmer’s hard problem (We will abbreviate the hard problem of consciousness as H-consciousness ). The claim is (...)
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  4. Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier (forthcoming). Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi.score: 240.0
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett (2012; 1996, 2001; 1991) and Patricia Churchland (1996; 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no (...)
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  5. Matteo Colombo (2014). Neural Representationalism, the Hard Problem of Content and Vitiated Verdicts. A Reply to Hutto & Myin (2013). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):257-274.score: 240.0
    Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks of (...)
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  6. Daniel Kostić (forthcoming). Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi:1-7.score: 240.0
    I argue that the hard problem of consciousness occurs only in very limited contexts. My argument is based on the idea of explanatory perspectivalism, according to which what we want to know about a phenomenon determines the type of explanation we use to understand it. To that effect the hard problem arises only in regard to questions such as how is it that concepts of subjective experience can refer to physical properties, but not concerning questions such (...)
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  7. Philip Goff (2012). Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.score: 210.0
    Realism about cognitive or semantic phenomenology, the view that certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or understanding, is increasingly being taken seriously in analytic philosophy. The principle aim of this paper is to argue that it is extremely difficult to be a physicalist about cognitive phenomenology. The general trend in later 20th century/early 21st century philosophy of mind has been to account for the content of thought in terms of facts outside the head of the thinker (...)
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  8. Tom McClelland (forthcoming). The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky? Topoi:1-14.score: 204.0
    Phenomenal consciousness presents a distinctive explanatory problem. Some regard this problem as ‘hard’, which has troubling implications for the science and metaphysics of consciousness. Some regard it as ‘easy’, which ignores the special explanatory difficulties that consciousness offers. Others are unable to decide between these two uncomfortable positions. All three camps assume that the problem of consciousness is either easy or hard. I argue against this disjunction and suggest that the problem may be ‘tricky’—that (...)
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  9. Torin Alter (forthcoming). The Hard Problem of Consciousness. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness.
     
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  10. Bernard Molyneux (2011). On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.score: 180.0
    I show that the recursive structure of Leibniz's Law requires agents to perform infinitely many operations to psychologically identify the referents of phenomenal and physical concepts, even though the referents of ordinary concepts (e.g. Hesperus and Phosphorus) can be identified in a finite number of steps. The resulting problem resembles the hard problem of consciousness in the fact that it appears (and indeed is) unsolvable by anyone for whom it arises, and in the fact that it invites (...)
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  11. Vadim V. Vasilyev (2009). The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Two Arguments for Interactionism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):514-526.score: 180.0
    The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers's "hard problem of consciousness". It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its colloraries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these considerations a version of "local interactionism" (compatible with causal (...)
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  12. Peter Lloyd, Berkeley Revisited: The Hard Problem Considered Easy.score: 180.0
    The philosophical mind-body problem, which Chalmers has named the 'Hard Problem', concerns the nature of the mind and the body. Physicalist approaches have been explored intensively in recent years but have brought us no consensual solution. Dualistic approaches have also been scrutinised since Descartes, but without consensual success. Mentalism has received little attention, yet it offers an elegantly simple solution to the hard problem.
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  13. Greg P. Hodes (2005). What Would It "Be Like" to Solve the Hard Problem?: Cognition, Consciousness, and Qualia Zombies. Neuroquantology 3 (1):43-58.score: 180.0
    David Chalmers argues that consciousness -- authentic, first-person, conscious consciousness -- cannot be reduced to brain events or to any physical event, and that efforts to find a workable mind-body identity theory are, therefore, doomed in principle. But for Chalmers and non-reductionist in general consciousness consists exclusively, or at least paradigmatically, of phenomenal or qualia-consciousness. This results in a seriously inadequate understanding both of consciousness and of the “hard problem.” I describe other, higher-order cognitional events which must be (...)
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  14. Wayne Wright (2007). Explanation and the Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301 - 330.score: 180.0
    This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the 'sense of understanding' that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case (...)
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  15. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2001). Color Realism: Toward a Solution to the "Hard Problem". Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):140-145.score: 180.0
    This article was written as a commentary on a target article by Peter W. Ross entitled "The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism" [Consciousness and Cognition 10(1), 42-58 (2001)], and is published together with it, and with other commentaries and Ross's reply. If you or your library have the necessary subscription you can get PDF versions of the target article, all the commentaries, and Ross's reply to the commentaries here. However, I do not think that it is by any means (...)
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  16. Ken Wilber, The Hard Problem and Integral Psychology.score: 180.0
    Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the "mind" side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be (...)
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  17. Dan Zahavi (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenality: A Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (Supplement):63-92.score: 180.0
    In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers, 1996, 4, 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled (...)
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  18. Axel Cleeremans (1998). The Other Hard Problem: How to Bridge the Gap Between Subsymbolic and Symbolic Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):22-23.score: 180.0
    The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut about fixed-features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connectionism, and show how their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learning, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition.
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  19. Gregory R. Peterson (2009). A Hard Problem Indeed. Zygon 44 (1):19-29.score: 180.0
    Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem provides a rich source of reflection on the question of meaning and ethics within the context of philosophical naturalism. I affirm the title's claim that the quest to find meaning in a purely physical universe is indeed a hard problem by addressing three issues: Flanagan's claim that there can be a scientific/empirical theory of ethics (eudaimonics), that ethics requires moral glue, and whether, in the end, Flanagan solves the hard (...)
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  20. George A. Mashour & Eric LaRock (2008). Inverse Zombies, Anesthesia Awareness, and the Hard Problem of Unconsciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1163-1168.score: 180.0
    Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are (...)
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  21. Vadim V. Vasilyev (2009). “The Hard Problem of Consciousness” and Two Arguments for Interactionism. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):514-526.score: 180.0
    The paper begins with a restatement of Chalmers’s “hard problem of consciousness.” It is suggested that an interactionist approach is one of the possible solutions of this problem. Some fresh arguments against the identity theory and epiphenomenalism as main rivals of interactionism are developed. One of these arguments has among its corollaries a denial of local supervenience, although not of the causal closure principle. As a result of these considerations a version of “local interactionism” (compatible with causal (...)
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  22. Bruce MacLennan, Why the `Hard Problem' is Hard.score: 180.0
    I take the `hard problem' of consciousness to be to understand the relation between our subjective experience and the brain processes that cause it; that is, to reconcile our everyday feeling of consciousness with the scienti c worldview (MacLennan, 1995). This problem is hard because consciousness has unique epistemological characteristics, which must be accommodated by any attempted solution. I will summarize these characteristics; more detail can be found in Searle (1992, chs. 4, 5) and Chalmers (1995, (...)
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  23. Guido Melchior (2014). Skepticism: The Hard Problem for Indirect Sensitivity Accounts. Erkenntnis 79 (1):45-54.score: 180.0
    Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. (...)
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  24. Thomas W. Polger & Owen J. Flanagan, Explaining the Evolution of Consciousness: The Other Hard Problem.score: 156.0
    Recently some philosophers interested in consciousness have begun to turn their attention to the question of what evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism. The issue has been pressed in recent dicussions involving David Chalmers, Todd Moody, Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger, Daniel Dennett, and others. The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the problems that face anyone who wants to give an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. We begin by framing the problem (...)
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  25. Brian Talbot (2012). The Irrelevance of Folk Intuitions to the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):644-650.score: 156.0
    Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system – System One – that will generate the same data (...)
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  26. Teed Rockwell, The Hard Problem is Dead: Long Live the Hard Problem.score: 156.0
    I have assumed that consciousness exists, and that to redefine the problem as that of explaining how certain cognitive and behavioral functions are performed is unacceptable. . . .Like many people (materialists and dualists alike), I find this premise obvious, although I can no more "prove" it than I can prove that I am conscious. . . .there is no denying that such arguments - on either side - ultimately come down to a bedrock of intuition at some point. (...)
     
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  27. Teed Rockwell, Commentary on a Hard Problem Thought Experiment.score: 156.0
    In the seventh paragraph of the post, you say "This question [which machine, if any or both, is conscious/] seems to be in principle unfalsifiable, and yet genuinely meaningful." (I'm assuming that you mean that any answer to it is unfalsifiable.) My neo-Carnapian intuitions diagnoses the problem right at this point. Forget about attributions of meaningless and all that stuff. Replace it in your statement with more pragmatically-oriented evaluative notions: theoretically fruitless, arbitray without even being helpful for any theoretical, (...)
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  28. Andrés Vaccari (2013). Artifact Dualism, Materiality, and the Hard Problem of Ontology: Some Critical Remarks on the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program. Philosophy and Technology 26 (1):7-29.score: 156.0
    This paper critically examines the forays into metaphysics of The Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts Program (henceforth, DNP). I argue that the work of DNP is a valuable contribution to the epistemology of certain aspects of artifact design and use, but that it fails to advance a persuasive metaphysic. A central problem is that DNP approaches ontology from within a functionalist framework that is mainly concerned with ascriptions and justified beliefs. Thus, the materiality of artifacts emerges only as the (...)
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  29. John L. Pollock, An Easy “Hard Problem” for Decision-Theoretic Planning.score: 156.0
    This paper presents a challenge problem for decision-theoretic planners. State-space planners reason globally, building a map of the parts of the world relevant to the planning problem, and then attempt to distill a plan out of the map. A planning problem is constructed that humans find trivial, but no state-space planner can solve. Existing POCL planners cannot solve the problem either, but for a less fundamental reason.
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  30. Raphael van Riel (2014). Prophets Against Ockhamism. Or: Why the Hard Fact/Soft Fact Distinction is Irrelevant to the Problem of Foreknowledge. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):119-135.score: 156.0
    In this paper, a cognate of the problem of divine foreknowledge is introduced: the problem of the prophet’s foreknowledge. The latter cannot be solved referring to Ockhamism—the doctrine that divine foreknowledge could, at least in principle, be compatible with human freedom because God’s beliefs about future actions are merely soft facts, rather than hard facts about the past. Under the assumption that if Ockhamism can solve the problem of divine foreknowledge then it should also yield a (...)
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  31. Fabian Schlotterbeck & Oliver Bott (2013). Easy Solutions for a Hard Problem? The Computational Complexity of Reciprocals with Quantificational Antecedents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (4):363-390.score: 156.0
    We report two experiments which tested whether cognitive capacities are limited to those functions that are computationally tractable (PTIME-Cognition Hypothesis). In particular, we investigated the semantic processing of reciprocal sentences with generalized quantifiers, i.e., sentences of the form Q dots are directly connected to each other, where Q stands for a generalized quantifier, e.g. all or most. Sentences of this type are notoriously ambiguous and it has been claimed in the semantic literature that the logically strongest reading is preferred (Strongest (...)
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  32. Marcus Arvan (1998). Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth. Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesisscore: 150.0
    The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances." (Nagel, in Dennett, 1991, p. 372).
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  33. Robert J. Howell, The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Scholarpedia.score: 150.0
  34. David Brooks (2000). How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable Inexplicability. Psyche 6 (4):5-20.score: 150.0
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  35. J. Cottingham (2012). The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World * by Owen Flanagan. Analysis 72 (1):196-198.score: 150.0
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  36. Dimitris Platchias (2008). Experiencing a Hard Problem? Teorema (3):115-30.score: 150.0
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  37. Henry P. Stapp (1997). Science of Consciousness and the Hard Problem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (2-3):171-93.score: 150.0
    Quantum theory can be regarded as a rationally coherent theory of the interaction of mind and matter and it allows our conscious thoughts to play a causally e cacious and necessary role in brain dynamics It therefore provides a natural basis created by scientists for the science of consciousness As an illustration it is explained how the interaction of brain and consciousness can speed up brain processing and thereby enhance the survival prospects of conscious organisms as compared to similar organisms (...)
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  38. Benjamin W. Libet (1996). Solutions to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):33-35.score: 150.0
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  39. J. McFadden (2002). The Conscious Electromagnetic Information (Cemi) Field Theory: The Hard Problem Made Easy? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):45-60.score: 150.0
  40. Henry P. Stapp (1995). The Hard Problem: A Quantum Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):194-210.score: 150.0
    This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. While this document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor The Regents of the University of California, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe (...)
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  41. James Behuniak (2011). The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World – By Owen Flanagan. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (2):323-327.score: 150.0
  42. Naomi M. Eilan (2000). Primitive Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39.score: 150.0
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  43. D. Bilodeau (1996). Physics, Machines, and the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):386-401.score: 150.0
  44. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2006). What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):576 - 588.score: 150.0
    Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.
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  45. Steven Horst (1999). Evolutionary Explanation and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):39-48.score: 150.0
  46. F. Varela (1995). Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.score: 150.0
  47. D. C. Dennett (2009). The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. Philosophical Review 118 (3):402-406.score: 150.0
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  48. Jonathan Shear (ed.) (1997). Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press.score: 150.0
    In this book philosophers, physicists, psychologists, neurophysiologists, computer scientists, and others address this central topic in the growing discipline...
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  49. William S. Robinson (1996). The Hardness of the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):14-25.score: 150.0
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  50. Bruce Edmonds, Understanding Observed Complex Systems – the Hard Complexity Problem.score: 150.0
    bruce@edmonds.name http://bruce.edmonds.name Abstract. Two kinds of problem are distinguished: the first of finding processes which produce complex outcomes from the interaction of simple parts, and the second of finding which process resulted in an observed complex outcome. The former I call the easy complexity problem and the later the hard complexity problem. It is often assumed that progress with the easy problem will aid process with the hard problem. However this assumes that the (...)
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