This paper defends a distinctly liberal approach to public health ethics and replies to possible objections. In particular, I look at a set of recent proposals aiming to revise and expand liberalism in light of public health's rationale and epidemiological findings. I argue that they fail to provide a sociologically informed version of liberalism. Instead, they rest on an implicit normative premise about the value of health, which I show to be invalid. I then make explicit (...) the unobvious, republican background of these proposals. Finally, I expand on the liberal understanding of freedom as non-interference and show its advantages over the republican alternative of freedom as non-domination within the context of public health. The views of freedom I discuss in the paper do not overlap with the classical distinction between negative and positive freedom. In addition, my account differentiates the concepts of freedom and autonomy and does not rule out substantive accounts of the latter. Nor does it confine political liberalism to an essentially procedural form. (shrink)
A clear understanding of the concept of health plays a key role in defining what health care should comprise and in developing adequate strategies for overcoming the current "health care crisis". This volume is the result of an international and interdisciplinary cooperation between medicine and philosophy on the current debate on the concept of health.Besides offering a critical analysis of the WHO definition and a review of both ancient and contemporary conceptions of health, the cooperative (...) effort of physicians and philosophers presented in this book works through the challenges which any definition of health faces, if it is to be both truly personalist, and at the same time operational.The overall purpose of this book is to capture the essentials of human health and to propose the outlines for a personalist understanding of this concept, i.e., a conception that does justice to the personal nature of human beings by introducing dimensions that are essential to personal life and well-being, such as the realms of rationality, affectivity and freedom, the realms of meaning, values, morality, and spirituality, the realms of social and interpersonal relations. To grasp the uniqueness of the human person is not yet to grasp the specific nature of personal health. But it is certainly a first step, and it becomes evident that every theory of human health presupposes a theory of the person. Accordingly, the debate presented in this book is no less a debate about the nature of the human person than it is a debate about the nature of health.The investigations offered in this volume intend to provide an impetus for new conceptions of personhood and human health. The phenomenological approach has the advantage of advocating a systematic conception of the total person which combines surface experiences (subjective experiences of well-being) with deeper dimensions of the person (value and being). An adequate conception of the human person has enormous implications not only for our understanding of what constitutes the health and well-being of the person, but also for our conception of what health care should comprise. Hence, answering the philosophical questions, such as those raised in this volume about health, is crucial for the solution of political problems such as how to legislate health care policy. (shrink)
This paper argues that the medical conception of health as absence of disease is a value-free theoretical notion. Its main elements are biological function and statistical normality, in contrast to various other ideas prominent in the literature on health. Apart from universal environmental injuries, diseases are internal states that depress a functional ability below species-typical levels. Health as freedom from disease is then statistical normality of function, i.e., the ability to perform all typical physiological functions with (...) at least typical efficiency. This conception of health is as value-free as statements of biological function. The view that health is essentially value-laden, held by most writers on the topic, seems to have one of two sources: an assumption that health judgments must be practical judgments about the treatment of patients, or a commitment to "positive" health beyond the absence of disease. I suggest that the assumption is mistaken, the commitment possibly misdescribed. (shrink)
Although the value of health is universally agreed upon, its definition is not. Both the WHO and the UN define health in terms of well-being. They advocate a globally shared responsibility that all of us — states, international organizations, pharmaceutical corporations, civil society, and individuals — bear for the health (that is, the well-being) of the world's population. In this paper I argue that this current well-being conception of health is troublesome. Its problem resides precisely (...) in the fact that the well-being conception of health, as an all-encompassing label, does not properly distinguish between the different realities of health and the different demands of justice, which arise in each case. In addressing responsibilities related to the right to health, we need to work with a more differentiated vocabulary, which can account for these different realities. A crucial distinction to bear in mind, for the purposes of moral deliberation and the crafting of political and legal institutions, is the difference between basic and non-basic health needs. This distinction is crucial because we have presumably more stringent obligations and rights in relation to human needs that are basic, as they justify stronger moral claims, than those grounded on non-basic human needs. It is important to keep this moral distinction in mind because many of the world's problems regarding the right to health relate to basic health needs. By conflating these needs with less essential ones, we risk confusing different types of moral claims and weakening the overall case for establishing duties regarding the right to health. There is, therefore, a practical need to reevaluate the current normative conception of health so that it distinguishes, within the broad scope of well-being, between what is basic and what is not. My aim here is to shed light onto this distinction and to show the need for this differentiation. I do so, first, by providing, on the basis of David Miller's concept of basic needs, an account of basic health needs and, secondly, by mounting a defense of the basic needs approach to the right to health, arguing against James Griffin who opposes the basic needs approach. (shrink)
Analyses of biological concepts of disease and social conceptions of health indicate that they are structurally interdependent. This in turn suggests the need for a bridge theory of illness. The main features of such a theory are an emphasis on the logical properties of value terms, close attention to the features of the experience of illness, and an analysis of this experience as action failure, drawing directly on the internal structure of action. The practical applications of this theory (...) are outlined for a number of problems in each of the three main practical areas, clinical work, teaching and research. In each case the resources of the theory suggest new models and generate new results. The full practical significance of the theory, however, is shown to consist in the way in which it ties together biological and social theories into an integrated picture of the conceptual structure of medicine as a whole. It is argued, finally, that practical efficiency of this kind is a test of theory not only in the philosophy of medicine but also in general philosophy. (shrink)
Variants on two approaches to the concept of health have dominated the philosophy of medicine, here referred to as ‘reductionist’ and ‘relativis’. These two approaches share the basic assumption that the concept of health cannot be both based on an empirical biological foundation and be evaluative, and thus adopt either the view that it is ‘objective’ or evaluative. It is here argued that there are a subset of value concepts that are formed in recognition of certain fundamental (...) facts about living organisms, among which is the concept of health. These are not yet moral concepts, but they are ‘normative’ or ‘evaluative’. The view is defended that health, so understood, is a fundamental concept in the process of medical diagnosis and treatment. Keywords: health, value, objectivity, function CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
Most writers now recognize that mental health policy and the mental health system are extremely resistant to real changes that reflect genuine biopsychosocial paradigms of mental disorder. Writers bemoaning the intransigence of the mental health system tend to focus on a small analytical level, only to find themselves mired in the rationalities of the existing system. Problems are acknowledged to be system-wide, yet few writers have used a method of analysis appropriate for systemic problems. Drawing upon the (...) General System Theory (GST) analytical perspective, this article advances a systematic approach to understand the mental health system and to facilitate the development of reform strategies that recognize the system's complexity and changing nature. The article first discusses the failure of major reform efforts in the mental health system and the limitations of mainstream analysis of mental health politics and policies with respect to the objectives of analysis and reform. This article describes how systems thinking has thus far influenced the study of the mental health policy and politics system, and argues that a systemic perspective is profitable for reconceiving the mental health system, enabling a fresh basis for the development of reform strategies. The mental health system should be seen as a social system influenced by larger political and economic dimensions, not just as a 'delivery system' scientifically constructed by neutral experts. Furthermore, the policy planning process should be viewed as part and parcel of a mental health system modeled as complex and dynamic. The systemic perspective outlined here should help both to clarify the value-based objectives that we hold for the system and, consequently, to plan for the strategic reforms that have so far eluded us. (shrink)
Health and illness are key concepts of medicine but they also have essential significance for each and every one of our lives. For this reason, social value systems are inevitably integrated into medicine through the concept of health and illness. In turn, medical knowledge and medico-scientific notions are perpetually incorporated into societal perceptions of health and illness. Generally, such integration usually occurs via an extended concept of health and illness, which is to be discussed in (...) the following. To a certain extent, medical and societal notions of health are mutually co-determined. The underlying dynamics deserve a closer look because if health and illness are societal and medical concepts alike this fundamentally impacts on the epistemological and the practical dimension of diagnosis and prognosis as discussed in this volume of Medicine Studies. (shrink)
To what extent is possession of truth considered a good thing in the Republic ? Certain passages of the dialogue appear to regard truth as a universal good, but others are more circumspect about its value, recommending that truth be withheld on occasion and falsehood disseminated. I seek to resolve this tension by distinguishing two kinds of truths, which I label 'philosophical' and 'non-philosophical'. Philosophical truths, I argue, are considered unqualifiedly good to possess, whereas non-philosophical truths are regarded (...) as worth possessing only to the extent that possession conduces to good behaviour in those who possess them. In the non-philosophical arena it is an open question, to be determined on a case-by-case basis, whether falsehood is more efficacious in furthering this practical aim than truth. (shrink)
This study is focused on cultural phenomena of contemporary Europe: the creation of a new religious identity without cultural precedent in European cultural history. It will concentrate on non-Asian Buddhist converts, who have adopted religious world views different from those of their ethnic heritage and the mainstream culture they live in and who use Buddhism as the value-source for their children's upbringing. The parents who, to a certain degree, master Buddhist practice and are attached to this particular religious culture, (...) accumulate a specific religious capital which develops when there are higher levels of religious participation, knowledge and experience, including social networks. The aim of my study is to illustrate how accumulated religious capital and value models affect parental choice regarding children's education. How are these values transmitted within the families of different Buddhist streams? What is the role of the local Buddhist community in family life? (shrink)
Some environmental ethicists believe that nature as whole has intrinsic value. One reason they do is because they are struck by the extent to which nature and natural processes give rise to so much that has intrinsic value. The underlying thought is that the value-producing work that nature performs, its instrumentality, imbues nature with a value that is more than merely instrumental. This inference, from instrumental value to a noninstrumental value (such as intrinsic (...) class='Hi'>value or systemic value), has been criticized. After all, it seems to rely on the bizarre idea that a thing’s instrumental value could be a basis for it’s intrinsic value. This idea, however, is not as easy to dismiss as many might think. Review of the obvious arguments that might be deployed to defeat it shows that they have to be rejected, suggesting that a thing’s instrumental value could be, and arguably is, a basis for it’s intrinsic value. Defending this apparently bizarre idea provides a way of justifying the claim that nature as a whole has intrinsic value. (shrink)
In the Netherlands, the policy of supporting the efforts of ethnic-cultural minorities to express and preserve their cultural distinctiveness, is nowadays considered as problematic because it might interfere with their integration into the wider society. The primary aim is now to reduce these groups' unemployment rate and to stimulate their participation in the wider society. In this article I consider how the notion of the intrinsic value of cultures, if sensible, might affect the policy regarding ethnic-cultural minorities. I develop (...) a theory of intrinsic value of culture, as an analogy of the theory of intrinsic value of non-human natural entities. My conclusion is that the dominant cultural group in the Netherlands should preserve clearly deviant minority cultures which have considerable intrinsic value. (shrink)
In this paper I would like to address the problem of the aesthetic value of damaged nature. A variety of arguments have been offered in order to ground the view that we cannot perceive damaged nature as beautiful, at least as soon as we are aware of its damaged condition. These arguments are usually offered in tandem with a view about what the correct appreciation of nature involves and, hence, are often supported by this view. I will try to (...) show that none of these arguments are compelling and that there seems to be a way of explaining how damaged nature can be beautiful without disposing of the intuition that the awareness of its damaged condition penetrates our perception. (shrink)
There is a widespread conviction amongst nature lovers, environmental activists, and many writers on environmental ethics that the value of the natural world is not restricted to its utility to humankind, but contains an independent intrinsic worth as weIl. Most contemporary value theories, however, are psychologically based and thus ill-suited to characterize such natural intrinsic value. The theory of “value asrichness” presented in this paper attempts to articulate a plausible nonpsychological theory of value that accomodates (...) environmentalist convictions as weIl as more traditional value concems. It has implications not only for our care for and preservation of nature, but also for the enrichment of human lives. (shrink)
Racist beliefs express value judgments. According to an influential view, value judgments are subjective, and not amenable to rational adjudication. In contrast, we argue that the value judgments expressed in, for example, racist beliefs, are false and objectively so. Our account combines a naturalized, philosophical account of meaning inspired by Donald Davidson, with a prominent social-psychological theory of values pioneered by the social-psychologist Milton Rokeach. We use this interdisciplinary approach to show that, just as with beliefs expressing (...) descriptive judgments, beliefs expressing value judgments have empirical content, or can be inferentially linked to beliefs that do; the truth or falsity of that content can be objectively assigned; and that assignment is amenable to rational assessment. While versions of this objective view of value judgments have been defended by moral realists of various metaphysical stripes, our argument has the virtue of appealing, instead, to accounts that are as naturalistically informed as possible. And, unlike the influential subjective view of value judgments, and racist beliefs more particularly, our arguments are better able to account for instances where rational, persuasive strategies have been effective in reducing the ubiquity of racism in American culture. (shrink)
This paper employs data from a sample of the CEOs and top managers of seventy-nine U.S. companies and non-profit organizations to test hypotheses concerning the effects of the salience of organizational values on the accuracy of top managers’ perceptions of their CEOs’ values and their propensities to project their own values onto their CEOs. Results provide evidence that the salience of organizational values is positively related to both accuracy in subordinates’ perceptions of their superiors’ values and projection of the subordinates’ (...) values onto their superiors. This initially counterintuitive result is explained with reference to contemporary views of projection as a heuristic rather than as a non-normative bias that results in the cognitive distortion of reality. (shrink)
This chapter examines the different ways in which psychiatry is a value-laden science, the epistemic problems this causes, and the ways in which the problems caused by value-ladenness can be overcome.
This essay distinguishes personal from generic fame and accurate from inaccurate fame, and claims that only accurate personal fame could possess intrinsic value. Nevertheless, three common arguments why accurate personal fame might possess intrinsic value are shown to be unsound. After rejecting two Aristotelian arguments to the effect that no sort of fame possesses value, the author suggests that fame is valueless if one assumes a modern axiology in which the good life consists of self-regulation and self-expression.
Imperialism seems to be deeply antithetical to democracy. Yet, at least one form of imperialism – what I call “hands-off imperialism" – seems to be perfectly compatible with the kind of self-governance commonly thought to be the hallmark of democracy. The solution to this puzzle is to recognize that democracy involves more than self-governance. Rather, it involves what I call self-rule. Self-rule is an example of what Philip Pettit has called a modally demanding value. Modally demanding values are, roughly, (...) values the instantiation of which depends not only on what actually happens, but on what would happen in certain non-actual circumstances. Self-rule is the modally demanding counterpart of self-governance, since it requires, not merely that the members of a state actually govern themselves, but that they would continue to do so across a range of non-actual situations. Moreover, the value of self-rule (and hence democracy) is not reducible to the value of self-governance. Understanding the modally demanding character of democracy allows us to appreciate what is democratically objectionable about occupation by a foreign power, even if there is no prospect of the foreign power intervening in the governance of the occupied state by its members. (shrink)
In the summer of 1997, I was asked by a leading Japanese newspaper what I thought was the most important thing that had happened in the twentieth century. I found this to be an unusually thought-provoking question, since so many things of gravity have happened over the last hundred years. The European empires, especially the British and French ones that had so dominated the nineteenth century, came to an end. We witnessed two world wars. We saw the rise and fall (...) of fascism and Nazism. The century witnessed the rise of communism, and its fall (as in the former Soviet bloc) or radical transformation (as in China). We also saw a shift from the economic dominance of the West to a new economic balance much more dominated by Japan and East and Southeast Asia. Even though that region is going through some financial and economic problems right now, this is not going to nullify the shift in the balance of the world economy that has occurred over many decades (in the case of Japan, through nearly the entire century). The past hundred years are not lacking in important events. (shrink)
Computer science is an engineering science whose objective is to determine how to best control interactions among computational objects. We argue that it is a fundamental computer science value to design computational objects so that the dependencies required by their interactions do not result in couplings, since coupling inhibits change. The nature of knowledge in any science is revealed by how concepts in that science change through paradigm shifts, so we analyze classic paradigm shifts in both natural and computer (...) science in terms of decoupling. We show that decoupling pervades computer science both at its core and in the wider context of computing at large, and lies at the very heart of computer science’s value system. (shrink)
In recent years, scholars studying the writing of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey have attempted to use his ethical ideas to construct a viable environmental ethics. This endeavor has found limited success and generated some intriguing debates, but has been found wanting in many areas important to environmental ethicists of the twenty-first century. In particular, the humanist motivations behind many of his ethical writings stand in the way of a philosophy that takes nonhumans seriously. However, there is much environmental (...) philosophers can learn from Dewey, not from his ethics, but from his ontological writings. A concept of the contingency of existence, found in Dewey, in particular in Experience and Nature, can be the foundation for a robust, if dark, ecological philosophy. (shrink)
A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain and mind. Drawing on (...) work in the history and philosophy of science, I argue that this assumption - along with the related claim that even a correct NCC theory would fail to explain consciousness - is grounded in an inadequate conception of the way in which scientific explanations develop. Examination of parallel developments in 20th century biology reveals that, under the right circumstances, seemingly crude correspondences can play an essential role in scientific discovery and can sometimes become central to our everyday understanding of the phenomena in question. A proper understanding of this process clarifies the value of NCC theories and sheds light on the standards by which they should be evaluated. In closing, I describe two specific criteria for evaluating NCC proposals: intertheoretic bridge potential and detailed mapping. (shrink)
This article explores the nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate reputation using qualitative research approach. Specifically, the relationship between CSR and corporate reputation is examined from the viewpoint of value theory. This paper brings up for discussion the various value priorities lying in the background of CSR actions. The aim is to form categories of value priorities around CSR and reputation, based on qualitative research approach. The main concepts in this paper – CSR, reputation and (...)value – are also defined. This paper further discusses the theory of value structure and content, which identifies certain principal values among different cultures. The data consist of eight interviews with employees of a newspaper company. The results suggest that value priorities play an influential role in CSR actions, influencing to the essence of certain reputation stories in the corporate context. (shrink)
This article examines the normative structure of the concept of health and tries to suggest an account of it in a phenomenological-hermeneutic framework. It is argued that the concept of health has a logical priority to illness, though the latter has an experiential priority. The fundamental feature of the concept of health as discussed in the literature is initially recognized in the notion of ‘norm’, in both the bio-statistical and normative-ideal sense. An analysis of this body of (...) literature reveals some weaknesses in bio-statistical definitions of health as well as in those normative ones which endorse a value-relativity thesis. An approach based on the analogical structure of language is then advanced. In this framework, the notion of biological normativeness proposed by G. Canguilhem is connected with an analysis of the language of health through etymologies. It is argued that health can be characterized as an analogy of ‘plenitude’, which is the common ideal reference of the various health-concepts. The analogical structuring of language allows the recognition of different levels of meaning, and therefore of different kinds of normativeness (biological, mental, social, moral). Some hints of a theory of health deriving from this framework are then given. Keywords: analogy, health, hermeneutics, norm, plenitude CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
Conventional and well-established guidelines for the ethical conduct of clinical research are necessary but not sufficient for addressing research dilemmas related to public health research. There is a particular need for a public health ethics framework when, in the face of an epidemic, research is urgently needed to promote the common good. While there is limited experience in the use of a public health ethics framework, the value and potential of such an approach is increasingly being (...) appreciated. Here we use two examples of adolescent women as potential candidates for participation in microbicide trials to illustrate how ethical decisions for public health research can be enhanced by drawing on both traditional research ethics guidance, and the emerging framework for public health ethics. (shrink)
Written by a former corporate manager pursuing counseling as a 2nd career, this article offers pointed views on managed mental health care. Values of practitioners that are a mismatch for managed care are noted, and more specific disadvantages and advantages are examined. Loss of client confidentiality is addressed and procedures and technologies for its reclamation are noted. Negative effects on therapy are acknowledged and potential for better accountability and research are pointed out. Economic disadvantages of a small provider's practice (...) as well as opportunities for creating new value and additional income are reviewed. The relatively sudden emergence of managed care is credited with a natural time lag preceding regulatory responses. Acknowledging that most new practitioners have little choice about the clients they serve, the article concludes that it would be shortsighted to rule managed care out of one's practice. (shrink)
While every health care system stakeholder would seem to be concerned with obtaining the greatest value from a given technology, there is often a disconnect in the perception of value between a technology’s promoters and those responsible for the ultimate decision as to whether or not to pay for it. Adopting an empirical ethics approach, this paper examines how five Canadian medical device manufacturers, via their websites, frame the corporate “value proposition” of their innovation and seek (...) to respond to what they consider the key expectations of their customers. Our analysis shows that the manufacturers’ framing strategies combine claims that relate to valuable socio-technical goals and features such as prevention, efficiency, sense of security, real-time feedback, ease of use and flexibility, all elements that likely resonate with a large spectrum of health care system stakeholders. The websites do not describe, however, how the innovations may impact health care delivery and tend to obfuscate the decisional trade-offs these innovations represent from a health care system perspective. Such framing strategies, we argue, tend to bolster physicians’ and patients’ expectations and provide a large set of stakeholders with powerful rhetorical tools that may influence the health policy arena. Because these strategies are difficult to counter given the paucity of evidence and its limited use in policymaking, establishing sound collective health care priorities will require solid critiques of how certain kinds of medical devices may provide a better (i.e., more valuable) response to health care needs when compared to others. (shrink)
Peter Lamarque's splendid and informative book, The Philosphy of Literature , deserves a much fuller response than I can give in this brief note. It is brimful with insights into the nature of literature, and into the debates between philosophers interested in literature, and I cannot imagine anyone failing to learn from it. The question I propose to take up is by no means the most important that Lamarque raises, nor am I even certain that I can add anything useful (...) to his own discussion of it. Yet I find myself puzzled by it, and hope that it may repay further thought. (shrink)
This article aims to contribute to the application of ethical frameworks to public health policy. In particular, the article considers the use of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics stewardship model, as an applied framework for the evaluation of evidence within public health policymaking. The ‘Stewardship framework’ was applied to a policy proposal to restrict marketing of food and beverages to children. Reflections on applying the stewardship model as a framework are provided. The article concludes that the questions used (...) to apply the stewardship model usefully introduced ethical considerations into the evidence review. However, the real value will likely come from the type of policy process within which the framework is used, identifying competing value positions and capturing local value requirements. (shrink)
Abstract Private security contractors are just the tip of an outsourcing iceberg. Across the three Ds of defense, diplomacy, and development, American foreign policy has been privatized. The Obama administration inherited a government that had been hollowed out to an unprecedented extent, and in many realms it had and has no choice but to depend on contractors to conduct what used to be state business. This essay examines the reasons for and unintended negative consequences of this outsourcing of American power. (...) It argues that turning the clock back and returning everything to in-house assignments is both undesirable and impossible. Instead, government must pursue contracting in ways that do not undermine the public interest. It can do this by identifying the things that should never be outsourced and ensuring that the letter and spirit of the Federal Funding Transparency and Accountability Act is upheld. Greater transparency in contractor?government relations will foster private security contractor compliance with ethical norms while bolstering our capacity for self-government. Transparency is thus both an end in itself and a means to sustainable democratic deliberation. While tension can exist between national security and open government, that tension is often overestimated. (shrink)
This article tries to present a broad view on the values and ethicalissues that are at stake in efforts to rationalize health policy on thebasis of economic evaluations (like cost-effectiveness analysis) andrandomly controlled clinical trials. Though such a rationalization isgenerally seen as an objective and `value free' process, moral valuesoften play a hidden role, not only in the production of `evidence', butalso in the way this evidence is used in policy making. For example, thedefinition of effectiveness of medical (...) treatment or health care serviceis heavily dependent on dominant individual or social views about thegoals of the particular treatment or service. There is also a concernthat a reliance on EBM in health policy will occur at the expense ofwidely shared social values like equity and solidarity. Moreover, thereis a concern that when economic considerations and rational proceduresbecome more influential, various `outside' groups third parties likeinsurance companies and policy makers will get a stronger influence onmedical practice which may lead to a change in the patient-providerrelationship. The authors conclude that social values and patientpreference should be explicitly addressed when health policy making isbased on economic and other scientific evidence. (shrink)
For organizational development that is future-oriented, enterprises increasingly need qualified, motivated and efficient workers who are able and willing to contribute actively to technical and organizational innovations. Furthermore, customers and consumers are increasingly interested in healthy products and services. Therefore, health has become a (potential) business value of strategic importance. In interaction with all relevant stakeholders, an approach was developed for companies that want to manage their health impact in a proactive and preventive manner. The approach was (...) termed Integral Health Management (IHM). IHM forms a strategic approach for reducing the costs of sickness absence and working disability, while the productivity and resilience of the company and its employees are increased. This brings the company direct economic benefits. Finally, it is of prime interest for employees to remain physically and mentally healthy and employable. The IHM approach distinguishes seven lines of development: (1) health as a strategic company interest; (2) the realization of a healthy primary process; (3) a safe and sound physical (work) environment; (4) an inspiring social (work) environment; (5) vital people; (6) a sound relationship with the immediate organizational environment and local community, and (7) healthy products and/or services. The inter-relationships between the seven development lines are essential for combining an improvement of the business impact on health with a strategic interest of companies and organizations. The seven lines of IHM development can easily be linked to the European Foundation for Quality Management''s European Excellence Model. (shrink)
The pursuit of health is one of the most basic and prevalent concerns of humanity. In order to better attain and preserve health, a fundamental and unified description of the concept is required. Using Paul Tillich's ontological framework, I introduce a complete characterization of health and disease is that is useful to the philosophy of medicine and for health-care workers. Health cannot be understood merely as proper functioning of the physical body or of the separated (...) levels of body, mind, and soul. Rather, the multidimensional unity that is the essence of human life requires a new understanding of health as balanced self-integration within the multiple human dimensions. The ontological description of health and disease has concrete implications for how health-care workers should approach healing. It calls for a multidimensional approach to healing in which particular healing is needed and helpful if it considers the other realms of the human. It reveals the importance of accepting limited health as well as the value of faith understood as an ultimate concern because of its ability to wholly integrate the person. (shrink)
Discussions concerning whether there is a natural right to health care may occur in various forms, resulting in policy recommendations for how to implement any such right in a given society. But health care policies may be judged by international standards including the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The rights enumerated in the UDHR are grounded in traditions of moral theory, a philosophical analysis of which is necessary in order to adjudicate the value of (...) specific policies designed to enshrine rights such as a right to health care. We begin with an overview of the drafting of the UDHR and highlight the primary influence of natural law theory in validating the rights contained therein. We then provide an explication of natural law theory by reference to the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as elucidate the complementary "capabilities approach" of Martha Nussbaum. We conclude that a right to health care ought to be guaranteed by the state. (shrink)
Competing contemporary theories of health, the reductionist (purportedly value-free) and the relativist (purportedly value-based) theories, both rest upon an understanding of value as grounded in desiring, a subjective state. Both can be classified as subjectivist theories. An alternative set of theories, those resting on an understanding of value as grounded in desirability (or goodness) of an objective goal, can be classified as objectivist theories. The ultimate goal of all living things is life, the standard by (...) which states or functions can be measured, and thereby defined as healthy or disease states. While disease can be classified in a taxonomy of biological dysfunctions without remainder, health is a richer concept that includes not only biological values, but also moral values, both leading to the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Keywords: axiology, function, health, objectivity, value CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
Assessing the normative status of concepts of health and disease involves one in questions regarding the relationship between fact and value. Some have argued that Christopher Boorse's conception of health and disease lacks such a valuational element because it cannot account for types of harms which, while disvalued, do not have evolutionarily dysfunctional consequences. I take Boorse's account and incorporate some Humean-like sociobiological assumptions in order to respond to this challenge. The possession of moral sentiments, I argue, (...) offers an evolutionary advantage (thus falling within Boorse's definition of normal functional abilities). However, this does not amount to emotivism: on the contrary, these sentiments can be the basis of a value system. This value structure introduces the concept of sympathizing with a fellow being's suffering as the basis of a normative dimension to disease. For example, it holds the disvalue of disease to lie in the fact that disease involves suffering and functional limitations.The naturalistic Humean type of account presented here thus jumps the normative-descriptive divide. When Boorse's account is extended to include social sentiments and behaviors, a conception of health emerges which is broader than Boorse's or Kass's, but narrower than the WHO's. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: Introduction. -- Acknowledgments. -- The Author. -- 1 Ethical Theories and Bioethics in a Global Perspective. -- Theories of Ethics. -- Are Theories of Ethics Global? -- Can Theories of Ethics Encourage People to Do the Right Thing? -- 2 Autonomy and Informed Consent in Global Perspective. -- Ethical Principles and Practical Issues of Informed Consent. -- Does Informed Consent Really Matter to Patients? -- Is Informed Consent a Universal Principle or a Cultural Value? -- (...) 3 Withholding or Withdrawing Treatment and Physician-Assisted Suicide. -- Withholding or Withdrawing Treatment at the End of Life. -- Assisting Patients in Committing Suicide. -- 4 Ethical Issues in Reproductive Health. -- Ethics of Abortion in Different Times, Places, and Cultures. -- Current Ethical Issues in Abortion. -- Assisted Reproductive Technology and Stem Cell Research. -- Emergency Contraception. -- Ethics of Imposing Conditions on Funding. -- 5 Ethical Issues of Female Genital Mutilation. -- The Facts About FGM. -- FGM as a Challenge to Ethical Relativism. -- Ethics of FGM for Adult Women. -- 6 Ethical Issues of Research with Human Subjects. -- Background Information and the Belmont Report. -- Autonomy and Voluntary Informed Consent. -- Beneficence and Cost-Benefit Analysis. -- Issues of Justice and Fairness for Human Subjects. -- 7 The Right to Health Care, and Ethical Obligations to Provide Care. -- Is There an Ethical Right to Health Care? -- Ethical Obligations of Health Care Professionals. -- Ethical Obligations of for-Profit Health Care Providers. -- 8 Ethical Issues in Rationing and Allocation of Limited Resources. -- Levels of Allocating Resources. -- Methods of Rationing Health Resources. -- Comparative Effectiveness Research and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. -- 9 Ethical Issues of Health Insurance and Health System Reform. -- Ethical Issues in Financing Health Services and Designing Insurance Systems. -- Fundamental Values of Health Systems. -- 10 Ethical Issues in the Movement of Patients Across National Borders. -- Ethical Duties to Provide Health Care to Undocumented Aliens. -- Ethical Issues in Medical Tourism. -- 11 Ethical Issues in the Movement of Health Care Professionals Across National Borders. -- Ethical Issues in the Migration of Health Professionals. -- Proposed Solutions and Their Ethical Implications. -- Fair Treatment of Health Care Workers from Other Countries. -- 12 Corruption and Informal Payments in Health Systems. -- Payment of Informal Fees by Patients and Their Families. -- Is Corruption Bad for Your (and Other People's) Health? -- References. -- Index. (shrink)
The widespread application of technology in health care has imposed a broad range of challenges. The field of health technology assessment (HTA) is developed in order to face some of these challenges. However, this strategy has not been as successful as one could hope. One of the reasons for this is that social and ethical considerations have not been integrated in the HTA process. Nowadays however, such considerations have been included in many HTAs. Still, the conclusions and recommendations (...) of the HTAs are not followed. The reason for this may be that the methods for integrating ethics for HTA are not sufficiently developed, or that they are not adequate. This article presents a supplementary approach to the ethical inquiry in HTA. It is argued that a value analysis is crucial in order to address the ethical issues of health care technology in a fruitful way and to make viable decisions about such technology. (shrink)
Values-Based Medicine (VBM) is the theory and practice of clinical decision-making for situations in which legitimately different values are in play. VBM is thus to values what Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is to facts. The theoretical basis of VBM is a branch of analytic philosophy called philosophical value theory. As a set of practical tools, VBM has been developed to meet the challenges of value diversity as they arise particularly in psychiatry. These challenges are illustrated in this paper by (...) a case study of the differential diagnosis between delusion and religious experience. In a traditional model of scientific medicine, such challenges would be expected to become less pressing with advances in medical science. Philosophical value theory suggests, to the contrary, that scientific progress, through opening up an ever-wider range of choices, will increasingly bring the full range and diversity of human values into play not just in psychiatry but in all areas of medicine. The future, then, for medicine, is an integrated model in which VBM and EBM are equal partners in a genuinely human discipline. (shrink)
A number of philosophers of medicine have attempted to provide analyses of health and disease in which the role that values play in those concepts is restricted. There are three ways in which values can be restricted in the concepts of health and disease. They can be: (i) eliminated, (ii) tamed or (iii) corralled. These three approaches correspond, respectively, to the work of Boorse, Lennox, and Wakefield. The concern of each of these authors is that if unrestricted values (...) are allowed to infect our concepts of health and disease, then anything could be construed as healthy or diseased. They believe that, if at all possible, such a result should be avoided. Unfortunately, as I argue, this result is unavoidable and such attempts to limit values in these concepts are destined to fail. I argue for this position by showing how each of these three attempts to provide value-restricted analyses of health and disease fail as analyses of the concepts of health and disease and that they fail because of their attempts to restrict the role of values in their accounts. I also show how, despite their best efforts, each of these analyses are, themselves, value-driven and value-laden. This leads to the conclusion that values infect our concepts of health and disease at all levels. (shrink)
BackgroundIncrease in global health research undertaken in resource poor settings in the last decade though a positive development has raised ethical concerns relating to potential for exploitation. Some of the suggested strategies to address these concerns include calls for providing universal standards of care, reasonable availability of proven interventions and more recently, promoting the overall social value of research especially in clinical research. Promoting the social value of research has been closely associated with providing fair benefits to (...) various stakeholders involved in research. The debate over what constitutes fair benefits; whether those that addresses micro level issues of justice or those focusing on the key determinants of health at the macro level has continued. This debate has however not benefited from empirical work on what stakeholders consider fair benefits. This study explores practical experiences of stakeholders involved in global health research in Kenya, over what benefits are fair within a developing world context.Methods and resultsWe conducted in-depth interviews with key informants drawn from within the broader health research system in Kenya including researchers from the mainstream health research institutions, networks and universities, teaching hospitals, policy makers, institutional review boards, civil society organisations and community representative groups.The range of benefits articulated by stakeholders addresses both micro and macro level concerns for justice by for instance, seeking to engage with interests of those facilitating research, and the broader systemic issues that make resource poor settings vulnerable to exploitation. We interpret these views to suggest a need for global health research to engage with current crises that face people in these settings as well as the broader systemic issues that produce them.ConclusionGlobal health research should provide benefits that address both the micro and macro level issues of justice in order to forestall exploitation. Embracing the two is however challenging in terms of how the various competing interests/needs should be balanced ethically, especially in the absence of structures to guide the process. This challenge should point to the need for greater dialogue to facilitate value clarification among stakeholders. (shrink)
Abstract This study suggests a distinct concept of value as a reason for action, and examines its validity and development in children aged 6?7, 9?10, and 12?13. In the distinct meaning suggested here, value refers to perception of a behaviour as intrinsically (non?contingently) desirable yet not strictly obligatory. Values are thus distinguished from morality, conventions and personal preferences by the dimensions of (1) intrinsic versus contingent validity and (2) obligatory versus non?obligatory nature. The study reveals that many 6? (...) to 7?year?old children already demonstrate a distinct concept of value, as defined here, and that this distinction develops with age. Subjects also distinguished between values and other reasons for action in terms of the most frequent type of reasons they gave for their perceptions, i.e. short? and long?term utility as opposed to the welfare of others or social norms. It is suggested that the child's concept of values is based on his or her perceptions of a child's development, entailing increasing control over the environment, and that these very perceptions affect the child's actual behaviour and development. (shrink)
Teaching an eight-week calm abiding meditation course to staff in a Child and Youth Mental Health Service located in a regional Australian city presented a curious meeting of Buddhism with Western culture. This meeting highlighted both the potential benefits and challenges of teaching meditation in the workplace and the value of qualitative methods for contributing to the development of meditation research. The thematic analysis of weekly participant responses to emailed reflective questions and follow-up interviews indicated that workplace meditation (...) training can precipitate sustainable changes in attitudes and behaviour beyond the workplace. Participants reported being less reactive and better able to manage emotions, having heightened self-awareness, self-acceptance and acceptance of others and of circumstances; and, in the longer term, were better able to make healthier lifestyle choices. The analysis is contextualized by a rich description of the course and salient concerns and conditions evident in contemporary Buddhist teachings and studies of mindfulness meditation. (shrink)
Light is strangely absent from most accounts of the environment. From photosynthesis to vitamin D, however, light is central to human well-being. Human circadian rhythms are keyed the alternation of dark and light. Erosion of the ozone layer makes skin cancer a growing threat from excess ultraviolet radiation. Light plays a significant role in health and illness. In changing historical circumstances, light continues to evoke and to express significant issues of value.
This article explores the transformation of ethics in a globalizing technological society. After describing some basic features of this society, particularly the primacy it gives to a special type of technical rationality, three specific influences on traditional ethics are examined: (1) a change concerning the notion of value, (2) the decreasing relevance of the concept of axiological hierarchy, and (3) the new internal architecture of ethics as a net of values. These three characteristics suggest a new pragmatic understanding of (...) ethics. From a pragmatic perspective, the process of introducing ethical values into contemporary society can be regarded as a beneficial Trojan horse, a metaphor that will be developed further. (shrink)
However, strange though it may seem, personal celebrity (as well as fame, popularity etc.) is hardly included in the list of those resources. This happens despite the increasing role of this phenome-non in modern life and the fact that the aspiration for it affects value aims of a growing number of people. What is more, it begins to influence the changes of social relations and stratification. The subject of the present article is the investigation of the influence of the (...) personal celebrity factor on the social life of modern society, the analysis of characteristics of celebrities as a special stratum, and reasons for the rapid increase in the importance of social role of personal celebrity in the last century. (shrink)
I present and evaluate various criticisms against the view that architecture and architectural value are to be understood solely in terms of internal space. I conclude that the architectural value of a building should not be limited to its internal spatial effects because the value of other elements, such as (non-spatial) function, materials, ornamentation, and so on cannot all be reduced to spatial values.
A discussion of respects in which climate change is expected to affect larger-scale bioethical issues, with some focus on the moral value of community understood as relationships of identity and solidarity.
Neurodiversity has remained a controversial concept over the last decade. In its broadest sense the concept of neurodiversity regards atypical neurological development as a normal human difference. The neurodiversity claim contains at least two different aspects. The first aspect is that autism, among other neurological conditions, is first and foremost a natural variation. The other aspect is about conferring rights and in particular value to the neurodiversity condition, demanding recognition and acceptance. Autism can be seen as a natural variation (...) on par with for example homosexuality. The broad version of the neurodiversity claim, covering low-functioning as well as high-functioning autism, is problematic. Only a narrow conception of neurodiversity, referring exclusively to high-functioning autists, is reasonable. We will discuss the effects of DSM categorization and the medical model for high functioning autists. After a discussion of autism as a culture we will analyze various possible strategies for the neurodiversity movement to claim extra resources for autists as members of an underprivileged culture without being labelled disabled or as having a disorder. We will discuss their vulnerable status as a group and what obligation that confers on the majority of neurotypicals. (shrink)
The concept of âhumane healthcareâ cannot and may not be limited to a personal virtue. For elucidating its meaning and making it functional as a critical ethical criterion for healthcare as a social institution, it is necessary to reflect on the social, cultural, and historical conditions in which modern healthcare finds its offspring and its further development. Doing this is the object and aim of social ethics. Social ethics in itself covers a broad area of different approaches. A main division (...) can be made between a liberal and a communitarian approach. This article focuses on the latter and concentrates on one of its representatives, Charles Taylor. The paper starts with two clarifying paragraphs: one about the terms humane and human, a second about the scope of social ethics. Next, because the term humane presupposes a certain view of man, attention will be paid to the lack of consensus in this respect within modernity, using some reflections of Taylor. In his view, resigning in this lack is a threat for one of the main motives behind modernity: the pursuit of a good and meaningful life. In the following section Taylor's analysis is applied to contemporary healthcare, by means of two examples. At the end the question is raised how to promote humane healthcare? In a short and conclusive sketch, three suggestions are offered for further research: scrutiny of goals and meanings within healthcare and culture, the broadening of the concept of autonomy and the upholding of human dignity as an intrinsic and imperative value. (shrink)
The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the fetus is a person, whether the fetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate “requires a different strategy.” Hence his “future of value” strategy, which is summarized as follows: (1) A normal fetus has a future of value. (2) Depriving a normal fetus of a future of value imposes a (...) misfortune on it. (3) Imposing a misfortune on a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. (4) Therefore, depriving a normal fetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. (5) Killing a normal fetus deprives it of a future of value. (6) Therefore, killing a normal fetus is prima facie wrong. In this paper, I argue that Marquis’s strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person—a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal fetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value. (shrink)
Having the ambition to contribute to the practical value of the theory on corporate social performance (CSP), this paper approaches the question whether CSP can contribute to the competitive advantage of firms. We adopted an explorative case-study methodology to explore the variety of positive and negative effects of CSP on the competitiveness of organizations. As this study aimed at identifying as great variety of these effects as possible, we selected a diversified group of respondents. Data was thus collected through (...) embedded units of analysis in a petrochemical company, and triangulated with the opinions of experts on CSP. Overall, we found various positive and negative effects of CSP on the competitiveness of organizations. CSP is therefore not an innocent adventure for executives, but rather a strategy for achieving corporate objectives. If not carefully implemented, the CSP strategy may harm the competitive advantage of the firm, as our results have suggested. (shrink)
There is no way literally to measure health, because health is multi-dimensional, and there is no metric whereby one person who is healthier than a second with respect to one dimension but less healthy with respect to another counts as healthier, less healthy or equally healthy overall. Health analysts instead measure how good or bad health states are in some regard. If these values are measures of health states, then identical health states must have (...) identical values. But in different circumstances, the same health state may have different values. It may be better or worse. Uniform values can nevertheless be assigned to kinds of health states, either as a weighted average of the values of their tokens or as the value of the performance in a standard environment of the capacity the health state constitutes. These uniform values are not well suited for some of the purposes for which summary measures of population health have been intended, and a set of non-evaluative indicators may be an attractive alternative. (shrink)
European animal disease policy seems to find its justification in a “harm to other” principle. Limiting the freedom of animal keepers—e.g., by culling their animals—is justified by the aim to prevent harm, i.e., the spreading of the disease. The picture, however, is more complicated. Both during the control of outbreaks and in the prevention of notifiable, animal diseases the government is confronted with conflicting claims of stakeholders who anticipate running a risk to be harmed by each other, and who ask (...) for government intervention. In this paper, we first argue that in a policy that aims to prevent animal diseases, the focus shifts from limiting “harm” to weighing conflicting claims with respect to “risks of harm.” Therefore, we claim that the harm principle is no longer a sufficient justification for governmental intervention in animal disease prevention. A policy that has to deal with and distribute conflicting risks of harm needs additional value assumptions that guide this process of assessment and distribution. We show that currently, policies are based on assumptions that are mainly economic considerations. In order to show the limitations of these considerations, we use the interests and position of keepers of backyard animals as an example. Based on the problems they faced during and after the recent outbreaks, we defend the thesis that in order to develop a sustainable animal disease policy other than economic assumptions need to be taken into account. (shrink)
In this paper I present a criticism of Sarah Moss‘ recent proposal to use scoring rules as a means of reaching epistemic compromise in disagreements between epistemic peers that have encountered conflict. The problem I have with Moss‘ proposal is twofold. Firstly, it appears to involve a double counting of epistemic value. Secondly, it isn‘t clear whether the notion of epistemic value that Moss appeals to actually involves the type of value that would be acceptable and unproblematic (...) to regard as epistemic. (shrink)
The foundations of the health sciences need to be re-conceptualized. The mechanistic biomedical model seemingly so successful in the past is now criticized for its failure to explain what health is and how it can be maintained. The world's major health problems no longer seem to be under control. Towards a New Science of Health presents a radical alternative to current biomedical thinking. This unique and controversial book is the first to offer serious practical ideas for (...) the renewal of the health sciences. It provides both a radical spirit of inquiry which draws on a broad knowledge base and a variety of approaches, and a science which will build on innovative research. Presenting an overview of all major paradigms in the health sciences, their historical development, sociocultural background and value, the book provides a framework for innovative thinking in health. Drawing on a range of disciplinary perspectives and focusing on a variety of approaches systems theory, human experience, and biography, the healing process and social relations the authors aim to bridge the gap between personal experience and scientific knowledge. (shrink)
Stevens and the phenomenology of value : philosophical poetry and the demands of modernity -- Harmonium as a modernist text -- Ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds : the parts negation plays in developing a new poetic -- How Stevens uses the grammar of as -- Aspectual thinking -- Stevens' tragic mode : why the angel must disappear in Angel surrounded by paysans -- Aspect-seeing and its implications in The rock.
The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour (...) to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely motivated by a mistaken belief that appropriate responses to value must consist in preferring and/or promoting. A pluralist approach to value analysis obviates the need for reduction: the final value of a thing or person can be given an independent interpretation in terms of the appropriate thing- or person-oriented responses: admiration, love, respect, protection, care, cherishing, etc. (shrink)
It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgements are similar in such a way that they should be analysed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgements share four important features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgements can be analysed in accordance with the same dispositional scheme which corresponds to the analogy between secondary (...) qualities and values. However, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgements differ as regards their fundamental structures. This scheme is mistaken as regards ethical value judgements, but it is able to account for aesthetic value judgements. This implies that aesthetic value judgements are autonomous in relation to ethical value judements and that aestheticians, not moral philosophers, are the true heirs of this renowned analogy. (shrink)
An enduring question in political and legal philosophy concerns whether we have a general moral obligation to follow the law. In this paper, I argue that Philip Soper’s intuitively appealing effort to give new life to the idea of legal obligation by characterising it as a duty of deference is ultimately unpersuasive. Soper claims that people who understand what a legal system is and admit that it is valuable must recognise that they would be morally inconsistent to deny that they (...) owe deference to state norms. However, if the duty of deference stemmed from people’s decision to regard the law as valuable as Soper argues, then people who do not admit the value of the state would have no duty as such to defer to its norms. And, more importantly, people who admit the value of the state would have a duty not to defer to particular norms, namely those norms which violate the values that ground their preference for a state. This critique of Soper operates within his parameters by accepting his claim that moral consistency generates reasons to act. Even on those terms, Soper’s defence of legal obligation as a duty of deference is unpersuasive. (shrink)
The article reviews recent developments in England in the law of necessity as a defence to crime and calls for its further extension. It argues that the defence of necessity presents the criminal law with difficult questions of competing values and the ordering of harms. English law has taken a nuanced position on the respective roles of the courts and the legislature in the ordering of harms, although the development of the law has been pragmatic rather than coherently theorised. The (...) law has granted necessity some scope as an exculpatory principle in the law of general defences, but it has also respected the primacy of the legislature as the legitimate arbiter of many of the competitions of value that necessity throws up. The recognition of necessity has not been in the form of a single unified defence of that name. Rather it has taken the form of a number of defences, based on a principle of necessity, but with different nomenclature and different rationales. This approach to necessity is defended as right in terms of principle and policy. Any further development of necessity as a general defence should be restricted to two contexts, namely those of emergencies, and of conflicts of duty, where a danger of death or serious injury is present. (shrink)
Informational semantics were first developed as an interpretation of the model-theory of substructural (and especially relevant) logics. In this paper we argue that such a semantics is of independent value and that it should be considered as a genuine alternative explication of the notion of logical consequence alongside the traditional model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical accounts. Our starting point is the content-nonexpansion platitude which stipulates that an argument is valid iff the content of the conclusion does not exceed the combined (...) content of the premises. We show that this basic platitude can be used to characterise the extension of classical as well as non-classical consequence relations. The distinctive trait of an informational semantics is that truth-conditions are replaced by information-conditions. The latter leads to an inversion of the usual order of explanation: Considerations about logical discrimination (how finely propositions are individuated) are conceptually prior to considerations about deductive strength. Because this allows us to bypass considerations about truth, an informational semantics provides an attractive and metaphysically unencumbered account of logical consequence, non-classical logics, logical rivalry and pluralism about logical consequence. (shrink)
. In this post-Enron era, we have heard much talk about the need for integrity. Today’s employees perceive it as being in short supply. A recent survey by the Walker Consulting Firm found that less than half of workers polled thought their senior leaders were people of high integrity. To combat the perceived lack of corporate integrity, companies are stressing their probity. This stress is problematic because executives tend to instrumentalize the value of integrity. This paper argues that integrity (...) needs to be better defined because the current mode of talking about the subject is misleading. The paper considers three traditions’ understanding of the idea of integrity, argues that integrity is intrinsically valuable, and concludes with some reflections on the way in which integrity, properly understood, functions as a business asset. (shrink)
