Search results for 'higher-order causation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  54
    Robert C. Koons (1998). Teleology as Higher-Order Causation: A Situation-Theoretic Account. Minds and Machines 8 (4):559-585.
    Situation theory, as developed by Barwise and his collaborators, is used to demonstrate the possibility of defining teleology (and related notions, like that of proper or biological function) in terms of higher order causation, along the lines suggested by Taylor and Wright. This definition avoids the excessive narrowness that results from trying to define teleology in terms of evolutionary history or the effects of natural selection. By legitimating the concept of teleology, this definition also provides promising new avenues for (...)
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  2.  40
    John L. Tienson (2002). Higher-Order Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):89-101.
    We have a familiar idea of levels of description or levels of theory in science: microphysics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the various social sciences. It is clear that philosophers - such as Terry Horgan - who want to be nonreductive materialists with regard to the mental must hold that this is not mere description; there must be genuine higher-level causes, and hence, genuine higher-level properties, in particular mental properties and causes. But there appears to be a deep problem (...)
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  3.  9
    Cei Maslen (2008). A Higher-Order Problem of Causal Relevance? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:149-157.
    Robb & Heil describe a higher-order version of the popular Causal Exclusion Problem. In particular, they ask whether the argument that led to a change in focus from event causation to causal relevance of properties can be iterated, leading us to focus on the causal relevance of properties of those properties, or properties of properties of those properties, and so on. In this paper, I investigate this curious higher-order problem and argue that the appeal of both the (...)
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  4.  45
    Suzanne Bliss & Jordi Fernández (2010). Program Explanation and Higher-Order Properties. Acta Analytica 25 (4):393-411.
    Our aim in this paper is to evaluate Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit’s ‘program explanation’ framework as an account of the autonomy of the special sciences. We argue that this framework can only explain the autonomy of a limited range of special science explanations. The reason for this limitation is that the framework overlooks a distinction between two kinds of properties, which we refer to as ‘higher-level’ and ‘higher-order’ properties. The program explanation framework can account for the autonomy of special (...)
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  5. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and (...)
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  6. Maria Lasonen‐Aarnio (2014). Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
    Recent authors have drawn attention to a new kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process – for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving (...)
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  7. Susanne Bobzien (2015). I—Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness, or Vagueness is Higher-Order Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):61-87.
    Most descriptions of higher-order vagueness in terms of traditional modal logic generate so-called higher-order vagueness paradoxes. The one that doesn't is problematic otherwise. Consequently, the present trend is toward more complex, non-standard theories. However, there is no need for this. In this paper I introduce a theory of higher-order vagueness that is paradox-free and can be expressed in the first-order extension of a normal modal system that is complete with respect to single-domain Kripke-frame semantics. This is the (...)
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  8.  87
    Peter Fritz & Jeremy Goodman (forthcoming). Higher-Order Contingentism, Part 1: Closure and Generation. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-51.
    This paper is a study of higher-order contingentism — the view, roughly, that it is contingent what properties and propositions there are. We explore the motivations for this view and various ways in which it might be developed, synthesizing and expanding on work by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the view makes sense by its own lights, or whether articulating the view requires drawing distinctions among possibilities that, according (...)
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  9. Rocco J. Gennaro (2012). The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. MIT Press.
    Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and (...)
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  10. Allan Hazlett (2012). Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility. Episteme 9 (3):205-223.
    This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. (...)
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  11. Susanne Bobzien (2013). Higher-Order Vagueness and Borderline Nestings: A Persistent Confusion. Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):1-43.
    ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness are the result of a confusion between higher-order vagueness and the distribution of the objects of a Sorites series into extensionally non-overlapping non-empty classes.
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  12.  58
    Frank Jackson (1998). Causal Roles and Higher-Order Properties. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):657-661.
    I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that fill some specified wide or distal roles.
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  13. Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and (...)
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  14. Elia Zardini (2013). Higher-Order Sorites Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):25-48.
    The naive theory of vagueness holds that the vagueness of an expression consists in its failure to draw a sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. The naive theory is contrasted with the nowadays dominant approach to vagueness, holding that the vagueness of an expression consists in its presenting borderline cases of application. The two approaches are briefly compared in their respective explanations of a paramount phenomenon of vagueness: our ignorance of any sharp boundary between positive and negative cases. These (...)
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  15. David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Sometimes we get evidence of our own epistemic malfunction. This can come from finding out we’re fatigued, or have been drugged, or that other competent and well-informed thinkers disagree with our beliefs. This sort of evidence seems to seems to behave differently from ordinary evidence about the world. In particular, getting such evidence can put agents in a position where the most rational response involves violating some epistemic ideal.
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  16. Susanne Bobzien (2012). If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in play (...)
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  17. Jonathan Matheson (2009). Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 6 (3):269-279.
    Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher - order evidence made by Thomas Kelly.
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  18. David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of Higher-Order Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
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  19. David J. Alexander (2013). The Problem of Respecting Higher-Order Doubt. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (18).
    This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with (...)
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  20. Susanne Bobzien (2010). Higher-Order Vagueness, Radical Unclarity, and Absolute Agnosticism. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (10):1-30.
    The paper presents a new theory of higher-order vagueness. This theory is an improvement on current theories of vagueness in that it (i) describes the kind of borderline cases relevant to the Sorites paradox, (ii) retains the ‘robustness’ of vague predicates, (iii) introduces a notion of higher-order vagueness that is compositional, but (iv) avoids the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. The theory’s central building-blocks: Borderlinehood is defined as radical unclarity. Unclarity is defined by means of competent, rational, informed (...)
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  21. Crispin Wright (2009). The Illusion of Higher-Order Vagueness. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press
    It is common among philosophers who take an interest in the phenomenon of vagueness in natural language not merely to acknowledge higher-order vagueness but to take its existence as a basic datum— so that views that lack the resources to account for it, or that put obstacles in the way, are regarded as deficient just on that score. My main purpose in what follows is to loosen the hold of this deeply misconceived idea. Higher-order vagueness is no basic (...)
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  22.  22
    Beau Madison Mount (2015). Higher‐Order Abstraction Principles. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):228-236.
    I extend theorems due to Roy Cook on third- and higher-order versions of abstraction principles and discuss the philosophical importance of results of this type. Cook demonstrated that the satisfiability of certain higher-order analogues of Hume's Principle is independent of ZFC. I show that similar analogues of Boolos's new v and Cook's own ordinal abstraction principle soap are not satisfiable at all. I argue, however, that these results do not tell significantly against the second-order versions of these principles.
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  23. Susanne Bobzien (2011). In Defense of True Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese 180 (3):317-335.
    ABSTRACT: Stewart Shapiro recently argued that there is no higher-order vagueness. More specifically, his thesis is: (ST) ‘So-called second-order vagueness in ‘F’ is nothing but first-order vagueness in the phrase ‘competent speaker of English’ or ‘competent user of “F”’. Shapiro bases (ST) on a description of the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and two accounts of ‘borderline case’ and provides several arguments in its support. We present the phenomenon (as Shapiro describes it) and the accounts; then discuss Shapiro’s arguments, (...)
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  24.  28
    Stephan Krämer (2014). Semantic Values in Higher-Order Semantics. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):709-724.
    Recently, some philosophers have argued that we should take quantification of any (finite) order to be a legitimate and irreducible, sui generis kind of quantification. In particular, they hold that a semantic theory for higher-order quantification must itself be couched in higher-order terms. Øystein Linnebo has criticized such views on the grounds that they are committed to general claims about the semantic values of expressions that are by their own lights inexpressible. I show that Linnebo’s objection rests on (...)
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  25. Gregory Minissale (2009). Enacting Higher Order Thoughts: Velazquez and Las Meninas. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):165-89.
    This paper bridges art history and consciousness studies and investigates the network of gazes and frames in Las Meninas and how this engages with a system of higher-order thoughts and reflexive operations.
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  26. Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States : An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins
  27.  54
    Susanne Bobzien (2014). Higher-Order Vagueness and Numbers of Distinct Modalities. Disputatio (39):131-137.
    This paper shows that the following common assumption is false: that in modal-logical representations of higher-order vagueness, for there to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum, the number of possible distinct modalities in a modal system must be infinite. (Open access journal).
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  28. S. Gibbons & C. Legg (2013). Higher-Order One–Many Problems in Plato's Philebus and Recent Australian Metaphysics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):119 - 138.
    We discuss the one?many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one?many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, subkind and part, and (...)
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  29.  92
    Neil Mehta (2013). Is There a Phenomenological Argument for Higher-Order Representationalism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.
    In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied (...)
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  30.  22
    Peter Pagin (forthcoming). Tolerance and Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese:1-34.
    The idea of higher-order vagueness is usually associated with conceptions of vagueness that focus on the existence of borderline cases. What sense can be made of it within a conception of vagueness that focuses on tolerance instead? A proposal is offered here. It involves understanding ‘definitely’ not as a sentence operator but as a predicate modifier, and more precisely as an intensifier, that is, an operator that shifts the predicate extension along a scale. This idea is combined with the (...)
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  31. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Supervaluationism and Fara's Argument Concerning Higher-Order Vagueness. In Paul Egré & Klinedinst Nathan (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use, Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan
    This paper discusses Fara's so-called 'Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness' concerning supervaluationism. In the paper I argue that supervaluationism is not committed to global validity, as it is largely assumed in the literature, but to a weaker notion of logical consequence I call 'regional validity'. Then I show that the supervaluationist might solve Fara's paradox making use of this weaker notion of logical consequence. The paper is discussed by Delia Fara in the same volume.
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  32.  54
    Benjamin Kozuch (2014). Prefrontal Lesion Evidence Against Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.
    According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious only when represented by another mental state. Higher-order theories must predict there to be some brain areas (or networks of areas) such that, because they produce (the right kind of) higher-order states, the disabling of them brings about deficits in consciousness. It is commonly thought that the prefrontal cortex produces these kinds of higher-order states. In this paper, I first argue that this is likely correct, (...)
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  33.  24
    Sam Coleman (2015). Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. (...)
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  34.  8
    Hamid Vahid (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution. New Content is Available for International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order (...)
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  35.  27
    Graham Oddie (1991). Supervenience, Goodness, and Higher-Order Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):20 – 47.
    Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility. The problem is that they face a dilemma: either the relation of supervenience entails reducibility or it is mysterious. Recently higher-order universals have been invoked to avoid the dilemma. This article develops a higher-order framework in which this claim can be assessed. It is shown that reducibility can be avoided, but only at the cost of a rather radical metaphysical proposal.
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  36.  94
    Isabel Gois (2010). A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.
    Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: (...)
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  37.  77
    Graham Oppy (2008). Higher-Order Ontological Arguments. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1066-1078.
    This paper discusses recent work on higher-order ontological arguments, including work on arguments due to Gödel, Maydole and Pruss. After setting out a range of these arguments, the paper seeks to highlight the principal difficulties that these kinds of arguments confront. One important aim of the paper is to cast light on Gödel's ontological argument by way of an examination of a range of related higher-order arguments.
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  38.  3
    Hamid Vahid (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-Order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 19 Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order (...)
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  39.  3
    Gábor Sági (2002). Ultraproducts and Higher Order Formulas. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 48 (2):261-275.
    Which ultraproducts preserve the validity of formulas of higher order logics? To answer this question, we will introduce natural topologies on ultraproducts. We will show, that ultraproducts preserving certain higher order formulas can be characterized in terms of these topologies. As an application of the above results, we provide a constructive, purely model theoretic characterization for classes definable by second order existential formulas.
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  40. Thomas Kelly (2010). Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press 183--217.
    My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture.
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  41. Mariusz Tabaczek (2013). The Metaphysics of Downward Causation: Rediscovering the Formal Cause. Zygon 48 (2):380-404.
    The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find (...)
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  42. Richard Brown & Pete Mandik (2012). On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, Or: What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P? Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...)
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  43.  52
    Stefan Schubert & Erik J. Olsson (2012). On the Coherence of Higher-Order Beliefs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):112-135.
    Let us by ‘first-order beliefs’ mean beliefs about the world, such as the belief that it will rain tomorrow, and by ‘second-order beliefs’ let us mean beliefs about the reliability of first-order, belief-forming processes. In formal epistemology, coherence has been studied, with much ingenuity and precision, for sets of first-order beliefs. However, to the best of our knowledge, sets including second-order beliefs have not yet received serious attention in that literature. In informal epistemology, by contrast, sets of the latter kind (...)
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  44.  11
    Shane Maxwell Wilkins (2015). The Infinitely Iterated Labyrinth: Conceivability and Higher-Order Knowledge. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):509-516.
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  45. Delia Graff Fara (2003). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press
    Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicate—a series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is some sense (...)
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  46.  3
    Nicholas L. Cassimatis, Paul Bello & Pat Langley (2008). Ability, Breadth, and Parsimony in Computational Models of Higher‐Order Cognition. Cognitive Science 32 (8):1304-1322.
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  47.  18
    Sebastian Ebert (2013). Moment Characterization of Higher-Order Risk Preferences. Theory and Decision 74 (2):267-284.
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  48.  9
    William J. Talbott (forthcoming). A Non-Probabilist Principle of Higher-Order Reasoning. Synthese:1-47.
    The author uses a series of examples to illustrate two versions of a new, nonprobabilist principle of epistemic rationality, the special and general versions of the metacognitive, expected relative frequency principle. These are used to explain the rationality of revisions to an agent’s degrees of confidence in propositions based on evidence of the reliability or unreliability of the cognitive processes responsible for them—especially reductions in confidence assignments to propositions antecedently regarded as certain—including certainty-reductions to instances of the law of excluded (...)
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  49. Susanne Bobzien, A Model-Theoretic Account of Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness.
    ABSTRACT: Paper currently being revised.
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  50.  10
    Michel Denuit & Béatrice Rey (2014). Benchmark Values for Higher Order Coefficients of Relative Risk Aversion. Theory and Decision 76 (1):81-94.
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