Search results for 'historic injustice' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  53
    Daniel Butt (2006). Nations, Overlapping Generations and Historic Injustice. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4):357-367.
    This article considers the question of the responsibility that present day generations bear as a result of the actions of their ancestors. Is it morally significant that we share a national identity with those responsible for the perpetration of historic injustice? The article argues that we can be guilty of wrongdoing stemming from past wrongdoing if we are members of nations that are responsible for an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. This rests upon three claims: that the (...)
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  2. Daniel Butt (2009). ‘Victors’ Justice’? Historic Injustice and the Legitimacy of International Law. In Lukas H. Meyer (ed.), Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law. Cambridge Univeristy Press 163.
  3. Jeremy Waldron (1992). Superseding Historic Injustice. Ethics 103 (1):4-28.
    Analyzes the historic correlation of injustice and moral judgments. Universalizability in analyzing moral judgments; Role of payment of money in the embodiment of communal remembrance; Symbolic reparation.
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  4.  9
    Daniel Butt (2013). Historic Injustice and the Inheritance of Rights and Duties in East Asia. In Jun-Hyeok Kwak & Melissa Nobles (eds.), Inherited Responsibility and Historical Reconciliation in East Asia. Routledge 38-55.
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  5.  35
    Cara Nine (2008). Superseding Historic Injustice and Territorial Rights. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (1):79-87.
    Emotions situate actors in relationships and shape their social interactions. Culture defines both the qualities of individual identity and the constitution of social groups with distinctive values and practices. Emotions, then, are necessarily experienced and acted upon in culturally inflected forms that define not only the conventions of their articulation through individual and collective action, but also the very words that name them. This article develops theoretical arguments to support these claims and illustrates their application in a description of differing (...)
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  6. Waldron Jeremy (1993). Superseding Historic Injustice. Ethics 103.
     
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  7.  49
    Daniel Butt (2009). Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation and Restitution Between Nations. Oxford University Press.
    The history of international relations is characterized by widespread injustice. What implications does this have for those living in the present? Should contemporary states pay reparations to the descendants of the victims of historic wrongdoing? Many writers have dismissed the moral urgency of rectificatory justice in a domestic context, as a result of their forward-looking accounts of distributive justice. Rectifying International Injustice argues that historical international injustice raises a series of distinct theoretical problems, as a result (...)
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  8.  9
    Karin Edvardsson Björnberg (2015). Historic Injustices and the Moral Case for Cultural Repatriation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):461-474.
    It is commonly argued that cultural objects ought to be returned to their place of origin in order to remedy injustices committed in the past. In this paper, it is shown that significant challenges attach to this way of arguing. Although there is considerable intuitive appeal in the idea that if somebody wrongs another person then she ought to compensate for that injustice, the principle is difficult to apply to wrongdoings committed many decades or centuries ago. It is not (...)
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  9.  9
    Michael Murphy (2011). Apology, Recognition, and Reconciliation. Human Rights Review 12 (1):47-69.
    The article examines the role of apology in a process of reconciling with historic injustice. As with so many other facets of the politics of reconciliation, official apologies are controversial, at times strenuously resisted, and their purpose and significance not always well understood. The article, therefore, seeks to articulate the key moral and practical resources that official apologies can bring to bear in a process of national reconciliation and to defend these symbolic acts against some of the more (...)
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  10.  35
    Ori J. Herstein (2008). Historic Justice and the Non-Identity Problem: The Limitations of the Subsequent-Wrong Solution and Towards a New Solution. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 27 (5):505 - 531.
    The "non-identity argument" has been applied to reject the validity of claims for historic justice, often generating highly unintuitive conclusions. George Sher has suggested a solution to this problem, explaining the harm to descendants of historically wronged peoples as deriving not from the historic wrongs but from the failure to provide rectification to the previous generation for harm they suffered. That generation was likewise owed rectification for harm they suffered from failure to provide rectification to the generation preceding (...)
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  11.  84
    Annabelle Lever (2009). Is Judicial Review Undemocratic? Perspectives on Politics 7 (4):897-915.
    This paper examines Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review. Waldron’s arguments, it shows, exaggerate the importance of voting to our judgements about the legitimacy and democratic credentials of a society and its government. Moreover, Waldron is insufficiently sensitive to the ways that judicial review can provide a legitimate avenue of political activity for those seeking to rectify historic injustice. While judicial review is not necessary for democratic government, the paper concludes that Waldron is wrong to believe that (...)
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  12. Annabelle Lever (2009). Is Compulsory Voting Justified? Public Reason 1 (1):57-74.
    This paper examines Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review. Waldron’s arguments, it shows, exaggerate the importance of voting to our judgements about the legitimacy and democratic credentials of a society and its government. Moreover, Waldron is insufficiently sensitive to the ways that judicial review can provide a legitimate avenue of political activity for those seeking to rectify historic injustice. While judicial review is not necessary for democratic government, the paper concludes that Waldron is wrong to believe that (...)
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  13.  6
    Jens Meierhenrich (2006). A Question of Guilt. Ratio Juris 19 (3):314-342.
    . This article inquires into the social function of guilt, especially collective guilt, and the implications thereof for collective violence and collective memory. The focus is on the relationship between collective violence and collective memory in countries that have experienced cultural trauma, defined as a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric. Analyzing the dynamics—the mechanisms and processes—of remembering and forgetting such trauma, I argue that the idea of collective guilt is essential for making sense (...)
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  14.  1
    Kees Quist & Wouter Veraart (2009). The Soviet Union Did Not Have a Legal System. Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 1:37-49.
    This interview with Jeremy Waldron covers three topics. Firstly, we dealt with the methodology debate, that is, the discussion about how to proceed in analyzing the nature of law. Does the question ‘What is law?’ require a descriptive analysis of the concept of law or, rather, a normative exercise in political philosophy? Secondly, we spoke about the role of law in response to historic injustice, especially in relation to the restitution of property rights. On this topic Waldron vindicates (...)
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  15. Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel (forthcoming). Epistemic Injustice in Medicine and Healthcare. In Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Gaile Pohlhaus (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice. Routledge
    We survey several ways in which the structures and norms of medicine and healthcare can generate epistemic injustice.
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  16. Ian James Kidd (forthcoming). Epistemic Injustice and Religion. In Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Gaile Pohlhaus (eds.), The Routledge Handbook to Epistemic Injustice. Routledge
    I consider several ways in which religious persons, communities, and traditions may be sources and subjects of epistemic injustice.
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  17.  39
    Andrew Peet (forthcoming). Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation. Synthese:1-23.
    This paper argues that underlying social biases are able to affect the processes underlying linguistic interpretation. The result is a series of harms systematically inflicted on marginalised speakers. It is also argued that the role of biases and stereotypes in interpretation complicates Miranda Fricker's proposed solution to epistemic injustice.
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  18.  96
    Gaile Pohlhaus (2012). Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance. Hypatia 27 (4):715-735.
    I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird (...)
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  19. Ian James Kidd (2015). Doing Science an Injustice: Midgley on Scientism. In Ian James Kidd & Elizabeth McKinnell (eds.), Science and the Self: Animals, Evolution, and Ethics: Essays in Honour of Mary Midgley. Routledge 151-167.
    In this chapter, I offer an account of Midgley‘s critique of scientism that converges on the claim that, among its many faults, scientism is objectionable because it does science an injustice.
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  20.  2
    Stephanie E. Hastings & Joan E. Finegan (2011). The Role of Ethical Ideology in Reactions to Injustice. Journal of Business Ethics 100 (4):689 - 703.
    Forsyth (J Pers Soc Psychol 39(1): 175-184, 1980) argued that ethical ideology includes the two orthogonal dimensions of relativism and idealism. Relativists determine morality by looking at the complexities of the situation rather than relying on universal moral rules, while idealists believe that positive consequences can always be obtained without harming others. This study examined the role of ethical ideology as a moderator between justice and constructive and deviant reactions to injustice. Students with work experience (N = 200) completed (...)
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  21.  4
    Natàlia Cugueró-Escofet, Marion Fortin & Miguel-Angel Canela (2013). Righting the Wrong for Third Parties: How Monetary Compensation, Procedure Changes and Apologies Can Restore Justice for Observers of Injustice. Journal of Business Ethics 122 (2):1-16.
    People react negatively not only to injustices they personally endure but also to injustices that they observe as bystanders at work—and typically, people observe more injustices than they personally experience. It is therefore important to understand how organizations can restore observers’ perceptions of justice after an injustice has occurred. In our paper, we employ a policy capturing design to test and compare the restorative power of monetary compensation, procedure changes and apologies, alone and in combination, from the perspective (...)
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  22.  35
    Patrick Bondy (2010). Argumentative Injustice. Informal Logic 30 (3):263-278.
    The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too much or little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to distrust our inclinations to trust or distrust members of stereotyped groups.
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  23.  28
    Paul Bou-Habib (2011). Racial Profiling and Background Injustice. Journal of Ethics 15 (1/2):33 - 46.
    Racial profiling appears to be morally more troubling when the racial group that is the object of the profile suffers from background injustice. This article examines two accounts of this intuition. The responsibility-based account maintains that racial profiling is morally more problematic if the higher offender rate within the profiled group is the result of social injustices for which other groups in society are responsible. The expressive harm based account maintains that racial profiling is more problematic if it makes (...)
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  24.  26
    Maria Paola Ferretti (2012). Social Injustice, Essays in Political Theory. International Review of Sociology 22 (3).
    There are many situations and policies that strike us as unjust and make us look for alternatives. Yet in the absence of a clear definition, we may end up by equating injustice with everything that is evil in the world.
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  25.  21
    Katherine Hawley (2011). Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Philosophical Inquiry. Oxford University Press, Usa 283-91.
    In this chapter I explore how epistemic injustice (as discussed by Miranda Fricker) can arise in connection with knowledge how. I attempt to bypass the question of whether knowledge how is a type of propositional knowledge, and instead focus on some distinctive ways in which knowledge how is sometimes sought, identified or ignored.
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  26.  6
    Yonca Hurol, Hülya Yüceer & Hacer Başarır (2015). Ethical Guidelines for Structural Interventions to Small-Scale Historic Stone Masonry Buildings. Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (6):1447-1468.
    Structural interventions to historic stone masonry buildings require that both structural and heritage values be considered simultaneously. The absence of one of these value systems in implementation can be regarded as an unethical professional action. The research objective of this article is to prepare a guideline for ensuring ethical structural interventions to small-scale stone historic masonry buildings in the conservation areas of Northern Cyprus. The methodology covers an analysis of internationally accepted conservation documents and national laws related to (...)
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  27.  26
    Rodney C. Roberts (2003). The Morality of a Moral Statute of Limitations on Injustice. Journal of Ethics 7 (1):115-138.
    This paper addresses the question of whether astatute of limitations on injustice is morallyjustified. Rectificatory justice calls for theascription of a right to rectification once aninjustice has been perpetrated. To claim amoral statute of limitations on injustice is toclaim a temporal limit on the moral legitimacyof rights to rectification. A moral statute oflimitations on injustice establishes an amountof time following injustice after which claimsof rectification can no longer be valid. Such astatute would put a time limit (...)
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  28.  16
    Endla Lõhkivi, Katrin Velbaum & Jaana Eigi (2013). Epistemic Injustice in Research Evaluation: A Cultural Analysis of the Humanities and Physics in Estonia. Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):108-132.
    This paper explores the issue of epistemic injustice in research evaluation. Through an analysis of the disciplinary cultures of physics and humanities, we attempt to identify some aims and values specific to the disciplinary areas. We suggest that credibility is at stake when the cultural values and goals of a discipline contradict those presupposed by official evaluation standards. Disciplines that are better aligned with the epistemic assumptions of evaluation standards appear to produce more "scientific" findings. To restore epistemic justice (...)
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  29.  31
    Rodney C. Roberts (2007). Another Look at a Moral Statute of Limitations on Injustice. Journal of Ethics 11 (2):177 - 192.
    This paper addresses the question of whether a statute of limitations on injustice is morally justified. Rectificatory justice calls for the ascription of a right to rectification once an injustice has been perpetrated. To claim a moral statute of limitations on injustice is to claim a temporal limit on the moral legitimacy of rights to rectification. A moral statute of limitations on injustice (hereafter MSOL) establishes an amount of time following injustice after which claims of (...)
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  30.  6
    W. F. Bynum (1984). Charles Lyell's "Antiquity of Man" and Its Critics. Journal of the History of Biology 17 (2):153 - 187.
    It should be clear that Lyell's scientific contemporaries would hardly have agreed with Robert Munro's remark that Antiquity of Man created a full-fledged discipline. Only later historians have judged the work a synthesis; those closer to the discoveries and events saw it as a compilation — perhaps a “capital compilation,”95 but a compilation none the less. Its heterogeneity made it difficult to judge as a unity, and most reviewers, like Forbes, concentrated on the first part of Lyell's trilogy. The chapters (...)
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  31.  5
    Yan Liu & Christopher M. Berry (2013). Identity, Moral, and Equity Perspectives on the Relationship Between Experienced Injustice and Time Theft. Journal of Business Ethics 118 (1):73-83.
    Time theft is a costly burden on organizations. However, there is limited knowledge about why time theft occurs. To advance this line of research, this conceptual paper looks at the association between organizational injustice and time theft from identity, moral, and equity perspectives. This paper proposes that organizational injustice triggers time theft through decreased organizational identification. It also proposes that moral disengagement and equity sensitivity moderate this process such that organizational identification is less likely to mediate among employees (...)
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  32. Ian James Kidd (forthcoming). Epistemic Injustice and Illness. Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    This paper analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker’s account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim (...)
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  33. Donald W. Shriver (2005). Honest Patriots: Loving a Country Enough to Remember its Misdeeds. Oxford University Press Usa.
    In Honest Patriots, renowned public theologian and ethicist Donald W. Shriver, Jr. argues that we must acknowledge and repent of the morally negative events in our nation's past. The failure to do so skews the relations of many Americans to one another, breeds ongoing hostility, and damages the health of our society. Yet our civic identity today largely rests on denials, forgetfulness, and inattention to the memories of neighbors whose ancestors suffered great injustices at the hands of some dominant majority. (...)
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  34.  28
    Annaleigh Curtis (2013). Review of The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. [REVIEW] Hypatia.
  35.  23
    S. E. Marshall (2003). Epistemic Injustice The Third Way? Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):174-177.
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  36. Miranda Fricker (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press.
    Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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  37. Matthew Congdon (2015). Epistemic Injustice in the Space of Reasons. Episteme 12 (1):75-93.
    In this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, (...)
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  38.  37
    Adam Morton (2004). Inequity/Iniquity: Card on Balancing Injustice and Evil. Hypatia 19 (4):199-203.
    Card argues that we should not give injustice priority over evil. I agree. But I think Card sets us up for some difficult balancings, for example of small evils against middle sized injustices. I suggest some ways of staying off the tightrope.
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  39.  12
    Timothy Waligore (2016). Rawls, Self-Respect, and Assurance How Past Injustice Changes What Publicly Counts as Justice. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (1):42-66.
    This article adapts John Rawls’s writings, arguing that past injustice can change what we ought to publicly affirm as the standard of justice today. My approach differs from forward-looking approaches based on alleviating prospective disadvantage and backward-looking historical entitlement approaches. In different contexts, Rawls’s own concern for the ‘social bases of self-respect’ and equal citizenship may require public endorsement of different principles or specifications of the standard of justice. Rawls’s difference principle focuses on the least advantaged socioeconomic group. I (...)
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  40. Miranda Fricker (2009). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Epistemic Injustice explores a form of injustice which has so far been largely ignored in English-language philosophy: epistemic injustice - that is to say, a wrong suffered in one's capacity as a knower. Miranda Fricker distinguishes two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In connection with both, she argues that our testimonial sensibility needs to incorporate a corrective, anti-prejudicial virtue that can be used to promote a more veridical and a more (...)
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  41. Miranda Fricker (2010). Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway on Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):164-178.
    In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential (...)
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  42. Miranda Fricker (2003). Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):154-173.
    The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form (...)
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  43.  59
    Rebecca Kukla (2014). Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice. Hypatia 29 (2):440-457.
    I explore how gender can shape the pragmatics of speech. In some circumstances, when a woman deploys standard discursive conventions in order to produce a speech act with a specific performative force, her utterance can turn out, in virtue of its uptake, to have a quite different force—a less empowering force—than it would have if performed by a man. When members of a disadvantaged group face a systematic inability to produce a specific kind of speech act that they are entitled (...)
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  44.  40
    Gloria Origgi (2012). Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust. Social Epistemology 26 (2):221-235.
    Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice are cases of identity injustice in which hearers rely on stereotypes to assess the credibility of their interlocutors. I try here to broaden the analysis of (...)
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  45.  51
    José Medina (2011). The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary. Social Epistemology 25 (1):15-35.
    This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack (...)
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  46.  28
    Rudolf Schüssler (2011). Climate Justice: A Question of Historic Responsibility? Journal of Global Ethics 7 (3):261-278.
    The paper argues against the assumption that citizens of industrialized countries bear responsibility for greenhouse emissions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. An array of arguments for such a historic responsibility is refuted. The crucial role of the assumption of a liability for bona fide misappropriation in a state of nature (Lockean strict liability) is pointed out.
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  47. David Coady (2010). Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice. Episteme 7 (2):101-113.
    I describe two concepts of epistemic injustice. The first of these concepts is explained through a critique of Alvin Goldman's veritistic social epistemology. The second is closely based on Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there is a tension between these two forms of epistemic injustice and tentatively suggest some ways of resolving the tension.
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  48. Carl Knight (2013). Benefiting From Injustice and Brute Luck. Social Theory and Practice 39 (4):581-598.
    Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favoured by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to (...)
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  49.  2
    Lauren Freeman (2015). Confronting Diminished Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Injustice in Pregnancy by Challenging a “Panoptics of the Womb”. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (1):44-68.
    This paper demonstrates how the problematic kinds of epistemic power that physicians have can diminish the epistemic privilege that pregnant women have over their bodies and can put them in a state of epistemic powerlessness. This result, I argue, constitutes an epistemic injustice for many pregnant women. A reconsideration of how we understand and care for pregnant women and of the physician–patient relationship can provide us with a valuable context and starting point for helping to alleviate the knowledge/power problems (...)
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  50. Jeff Spinner-Halev (2007). From Historical to Enduring Injustice. Political Theory 35 (5):574 - 597.
    Advocates of remedying historical injustices urge political communities to take responsibility for their past, but their arguments are ambiguous about whether all past injustices need remedy, or just those regarding groups that suffer from current injustice. This ambiguity leaves unanswered the challenge of critics who argue that contemporary injustices matter, not those in the past. I argue instead for a focus on injustices that have roots in the past, and continue to the present day, what I call enduring (...). Instead of focusing on finding the party responsible for the injustice, I argue that we use history to help us understand why some injustices endure, which I suggest is partly due to the limitations of liberal justice. I conclude with a conception of responsibility for repairing enduring injustice that deemphasizes searching for the causal agent, and instead focuses on how to repair the injustice, which I explain through an expansive conception of shared space. (shrink)
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