Search results for 'immune self' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Bartlomiej Swiatczak (2012). Immune System, Immune Self. Introduction. Avant 3 (1):12-18.score: 234.0
    The idea that the immune system distinguishes between self and non-self was one of the central assumptions of immunology in the second half of 20th century. This idea influenced experimental design and data interpretation. However, in the face of new evidence there is a need for a new conceptual framework in immunology.
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  2. Alfred I. Tauber (2012). From the Immune Self to Moral Agency. Comments. Avant 3 (1):101-105.score: 192.0
    Author comments on the changes in the philosophy of immunology that have occurred since the publication of his book The Immune Self: Theory or Metaphor?, as well as on the dangers, misunderstandings and expectations in this area. Finally, he presents his account of moral agency in the context of his own works discussing this question.
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  3. Alfred I. Tauber & Scott H. Podolsky (1994). Frank Macfarlane Burnet and the Immune Self. Journal of the History of Biology 27 (3):531 - 573.score: 150.0
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  4. Henri Atlan (1998). Paradigms in Immunology and Modern, Post-Modern, Post-Post-Modern, _ Philosophy. A Review of Alfred I. Tauber, the Immune Self: Theory or Metaphor? [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 13 (1):125-131.score: 150.0
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  5. [deleted]Marcello Costantini (2014). Bodily Self and Immune Self: Is There a Link? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.score: 150.0
  6. David L. Hull (1997). The Immune Self. International Studies in Philosophy 29 (4):145-146.score: 150.0
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  7. Richard L. Kradin (1994). The Immune Self: A Selectionist Theory of Recognition, Learning, and Remembering Within the Immune System. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 38 (4):605-623.score: 150.0
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  8. Howard Schweber (1995). Alfred Tauber, The Immune Self Theory or Metaphor? Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 15 (3):216-218.score: 150.0
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  9. Alfred I. Tauber (1999). The Elusive Immune Self: A Case of Category Errors. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 42 (4):459-474.score: 150.0
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  10. Lisa Weasel (2001). Dismantling the Self/Other Dichotomy in Science: Towards a Feminist Model of the Immune System. Hypatia 16 (1):27-44.score: 126.0
    : Despite the development of a vast body of literature pertaining to feminism and science, examples of how feminist philosophies might be applied to scientific theories and practice have been limited. Moreover, most scientists remain unfamiliar with how feminism pertains to their work. Using the example of the immune system, this paper applies three feminist epistemologies--feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism--to assess competing claims of immune function within a feminist context.
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  11. Andrea Christofidou (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity. Philosophy 75 (294):539-570.score: 108.0
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to.
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  12. James M. Dow, Shoegenstein on Self-Ascription, Immunity to Error and I-as-Subject.score: 108.0
    Contemporary accounts of the self-ascription of experiences are wedded to two basic dogmas. The first is that self-ascription is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM). The second dogma is that there is distinction between awareness of oneself qua subject and awareness of oneself qua object (the SCS/SCO distinction). In this paper, I urge that these dogmas are groundless. First, I illustrate that claims about immunity to error through misidentification are usually based upon (...)
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  13. Bartlomiej Swiatczak (2013). Immune Balance: The Development of the Idea and its Applications. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology:1-32.score: 102.0
    It has long been taken for granted that the immune system’s capacity to protect an individual from infection and disease depends on the power of the system to distinguish between self and nonself. However, accumulating data have undermined this fundamental concept. Evidence against the self/nonself discrimination model left researchers in need of a new overarching framework able to capture the immune system’s reactivity. Here, I highlight that along with the self/nonself model, another powerful representation of (...)
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  14. Helen Frowe (2012). Self-Defence and the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):530-546.score: 84.0
    The reductivist view of war holds that the moral rules of killing in war can be reduced to the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. Noam Zohar objects to reductivism on the grounds that the account of individual self-defence that best supports the rules of war will inadvertently sanction terrorist killings of non-combatants. I argue that even an extended account of self-defence—that is, an account that permits killing at least some innocent people to save one's own life—can (...)
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  15. Andrea Christo Fidou (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Double Immunity. Philosophy 75:539.score: 84.0
    It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to ‘I’ and, at worst, subject to error. Central to my thesis is that, first, ‘I’ is immune to error through misidentification absolutely, and that if (...)
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  16. Alfred I. Tauber (1994). A Typology of Nietzsche's Biology. Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):25-44.score: 84.0
    Friedrich Nietzsche''s will to power, and the philosophical ediface built on this foundation, is formulated on a biologicism that is indebted to a particular post-Darwinian vision of the organism. Of the various models that attempt to formulate a comprehensive organismal biology, Nietzsche unknowingly grasped that of Elie Metchnikoff, who authored the theoretical foundation of modern immunology. Metchnikoff regarded the organism as a disharmonious entity, in constant inner strife between competing cellular activities. Immune functions were responsible for mediating harmonization, which (...)
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  17. Andy Hamilton (2009). Memory and Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. [REVIEW] Synthese 171 (3):409 - 417.score: 80.0
    In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of “I” which he termed “I”-as-subject, contrasting them with “I”-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein’s characterisation to the case of memory-judgments, discusses the significance of IEM for self-consciousness—developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else—and refutes a common objection to (...)
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  18. Wilfried Allaerts (1999). The Biological Function Paradigm Applied to the Immunological Self-Non-Self Discrimination: Critique of Tauber's Phenomenological Analysis. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 30 (1):155-171.score: 78.0
    Biological self reference idioms in brain-centered or nervous-system-centered self determination of the consious Self reveal an interesting contrast with biological self-determination by immunological self/non-self discrimination. This contrast is both biological and epistemological. In contrast to the consciousness conscious of itself, the immunological self-determination imposes a protective mechanism against self-recognition (Coutinho et al. 1984), which adds to a largely unconscious achievement of the biological Self (Popper 1977; Medawar 1959). The latter viewpoint is (...)
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  19. Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang (2011). Self-Consciousness and Immunity. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.score: 66.0
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, (...)
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  20. Dorit Bar-On (2004). Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 66.0
    Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; (...)
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  21. Uwe Steinhoff (2013). Helen Frowe’s “Practical Account of Self-Defence”: A Critique. Public Reason 5 (1):87-96.score: 66.0
    Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In (...)
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  22. Thomas Pradeu & Edgardo D. Carosella (2006). The Self Model and the Conception of Biological Identity in Immunology. Biology and Philosophy 21 (2):235-252.score: 66.0
    The self/non-self model, first proposed by F.M. Burnet, has dominated immunology for 60 years now. According to this model, any foreign element will trigger an immune reaction in an organism, whereas endogenous elements will not, in normal circumstances, induce an immune reaction. In this paper we show that the self/non-self model is no longer an appropriate explanation of experimental data in immunology, and that this inadequacy may be rooted in an excessively strong metaphysical conception (...)
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  23. Warwick Anderson & Ian R. Mackay (2013). Fashioning the Immunological Self: The Biological Individuality of F. Macfarlane Burnet. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Biology 47 (1):1-29.score: 66.0
    During the 1940s and 1950s, the Australian microbiologist F. Macfarlane Burnet sought a biologically plausible explanation of antibody production. In this essay, we seek to recover the conceptual pathways that Burnet followed in his immunological theorizing. In so doing, we emphasize the influence of speculations on individuality, especially those of philosopher Alfred North Whitehead; the impact of cybernetics and information theory; and the contributions of clinical research into autoimmune disease that took place in Melbourne. We point to the influence of (...)
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  24. Shaun Gallagher (2000). Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. 203--239.score: 62.0
  25. Alexandre Billon (2011). My Own Truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth. In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. springer.score: 54.0
    emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence (...)
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  26. William S. Larkin, Content Skepticism and Reliable Self-Knowledge.score: 54.0
    Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint.
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  27. Jeremy Cushing, Self-Knowledge in a Natural World.score: 54.0
    In this dissertation, I reconcile our knowledge of our own minds with philosophical naturalism. Philosophers traditionally hold that our knowledge of our own minds is especially direct and authoritative in comparison with other domains of knowledge. I introduce the subject in the first chapter. In the second and third chapters, I address the idea that we know our own minds directly. If self-knowledge is direct, it must not be grounded on anything more epistemically basic. This creates a puzzle for (...)
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  28. Thomas Pradeu (2012). The Limits of the Self: Immunology and Biological Identity. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    The Limits of the Self, will be essential reading for anyone interested in the definition of biological individuality and the understanding of the immune system.
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  29. Alfred I. Tauber (2008). The Immune System and its Ecology. Philosophy of Science 75 (2):224-245.score: 54.0
    In biology, the ‘ecological orientation' rests on a commitment to examining systems, and the conceptual challenge of defining that system now employs techniques and concepts adapted from diverse disciplines (i.e., systems philosophy, cybernetics, information theory, computer science) that are applied to biological simulations and model building. Immunology has joined these efforts, and the question posed here is whether the discipline will remain committed to its theoretical concerns framed by the notions of protecting an insular self, an entity demarcated from (...)
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  30. Avital Simhony (forthcoming). Berlin and Bosanquet: True Self and Positive Freedom. European Journal of Political Theory:1474885114531239.score: 54.0
    Is the Idealist conception of positive freedom doomed as politically dangerous? Decidedly yes, Berlin famously argues. The danger lies with manipulating positive freedom into a political tool of tyranny, coercing individuals to be free. The vehicle of manipulation is a conception of a divided self that underpins positive freedom. For, Berlin argues, conceptions of freedom derive directly from views of what constitutes a self. He cites the British Idealists as evidence for his criticism. The case for Green’s immunity (...)
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  31. Frédérique de Vignemont (2011). A Self for the Body. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.score: 50.0
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (...)
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  32. Maarten Boudry & Johan Braeckman (2012). How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-Validating Belief Systems. Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):341-364.score: 50.0
    This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly susceptible to (...)
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  33. B. Plytycz & R. Seljelid (2000). The Essence of Immunity--Self-Nonself Discrimination. Dialogue and Universalism 10 (11).score: 50.0
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  34. Anne Newstead (2006). Evans's Anti-Cartesian Argument: A Critical Evaluation. Ratio 19 (June):214-228.score: 48.0
    In chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans claimed to have an argument that would present "an antidote" to the Cartesian conception of the self as a purely mental entity. On the basis of considerations drawn from philosophy of language and thought, Evans claimed to be able to show that bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness. The apparent basis for this claim is the datum that sometimes judgements about one’s position based on body sense are (...)
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  35. Javier Vidal (2012). Anscombe, la expresión de autoconciencia y la regla de autorreferencia. Revista de Filosofia 68:133-154.score: 48.0
    “The First Person” is the paper where G. E. M. Anscombe supports the thesis that “I” is not a referring word. Mainly I deal with her argument against the indexical view of “I” from the scenario of the “A” user, who refers to himself as the person who is under the special observation of the “A” user. On the one hand, I put forward that a use of “A” might have a guaranteed reference in a semantic sense: a referential use (...)
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  36. Eileen Crist & Alfred I. Tauber (2000). Selfhood, Immunity, and the Biological Imagination: The Thought of Frank MacFarlane Burnet. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 15 (4):509-533.score: 46.0
    The language of self and nonself has had a prominent place inimmunology. This paper examines Frank Macfarlane Burnet's introductionof the language of selfhood into the science. The distinction betweenself and nonself was an integral part of Burnet's biological outlook– of his interest in the living organism in its totality, itsactivities, and interactions. We show the empirical and conceptualwork of the language of selfhood in the science. The relation betweenself and nonself tied into Burnet's ecological vision of host-parasiteinteraction. The idiom (...)
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  37. Kristina Musholt (2013). Self-Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.score: 44.0
    Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of (...)
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  38. David M. Rosenthal (2003). Unity of Consciousness and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.score: 38.0
    The so-called unity of consciousness consists in the compelling sense we have that all our conscious mental states belong to a single conscious subject. Elsewhere I have argued that a mental state's being conscious is a matter of our being conscious of that state by having a higher-order thought (HOT) about it. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, this HOT model affords a natural explanation of our sense that our conscious states all belong to a single conscious subject. HOTs often (...)
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  39. Madison Powers, Ruth Faden & Yashar Saghai (2012). Liberty, Mill and the Framework of Public Health Ethics. Public Health Ethics 5 (1):6-15.score: 36.0
    In this article, we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a (...)
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  40. Peter Todd (2008). Unconscious Mental Factors in Hiv Infection. Mind and Matter 6 (2):193-206.score: 36.0
    Multiple drug resistant strains of HIV and continuing difficulties with vaccine development highlight the importance of psychologi- cal interventions which aim to in uence the psychosocial and emo- tional factors empirically demonstrated to be significant predictors of immunity, illness progression and AIDS mortality in seropositive persons. Such data have profound implications for psychological interventions designed to modify psychosocial factors predictive of enhanced risk of exposure to HIV as well as the neuroendocrine and immune mechanisms mediating the impact of such (...)
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  41. Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff (forthcoming). Is Depressive Rumination Rational? In T. W. Hung (ed.), Reason and Rationality. Elsevier.score: 36.0
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
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  42. José Luis Bermúdez (2003). 'I'-Thoughts and Explanation: Reply to Garrett. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):432–436.score: 36.0
    Brian Garrett has criticized my diagnosis of the paradox of self-consciousness. In reply, I focus on the classification of 'I'-thoughts, and show how the notion of immunity to error through misidentification can be used to characterize 'I'-thoughts, even though an important class of 'I'-thoughts (those whose expression involves what Wittgenstein called the use of 'I' as object) are not themselves immune to error through misidentification. 'I'-thoughts which are susceptible to error through misidentification are dependent upon those which are (...)
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  43. F. de Vignemont & P. Fourneret (2004). The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical Review of the "Who" System. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.score: 36.0
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in (...)
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  44. Luara Ferracioli (forthcoming). Immigration, Self-Determination and the Brain Drain. Review of International Studies.score: 36.0
    This article focuses on two questions regarding the movement of persons across international borders: (1) do states have a right to unilaterally control their borders; and (2) if they do, are migration arrangements simply immune to moral considerations? Unlike open borders theorists, I answer the first question in the affirmative. However, I answer the second question in the negative. More specifically, I argue that states have a negative duty to exclude prospective immigrants whose departure could be expected to contribute (...)
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  45. Thomas Sturm (2014). 'Kant Our Contemporary'? Kitcher on the Fruitfulness of Kant's Theory of the Cognitive Subject. Kantian Review 19 (1):135-141.score: 36.0
    In chapter 15 of Kant's Thinker, Patricia Kitcher claims that we can treat Kant as , and that his theory of apperception new. I question this with respect to two of her four chosen topics. First, I address her attempt to show that Kant's theory of apperceptive self-knowledge is immune to sceptical doubts of the sort Barry Stroud presents. Second, I turn to her argument that this theory is superior to current accounts of the special authority of (...)-knowledge. Over and above specific weaknesses, it seems that Kitcher's considerations generally lack sufficient reflection on how philosophical arguments of the past can be relevant to current agendas. (shrink)
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  46. James Mensch, The Phenomenology of Self-Makin: Towards a Hegelian Dialectic.score: 36.0
    James Mensch, 1970 No philosophical activity is immune from the question of its grounds, its origin, its arche. Philosophizing is not carried out in a vacuum. The philosopher in any inclusive view cannot be seen to be a being set apart from the world about which he philosophizes. He is distinct neither from the world nor its history considered in its totality. A truth so obvious requires only a brief meditative reflection: A philosopher sits writing at his desk. (...)
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  47. Cheryl K. Chen (2011). Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):21-38.score: 34.0
    Abstract: Some first person statements, such as ‘I am in pain’, are thought to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM): I cannot be wrong that I am in pain because—while I know that someone is in pain—I have mistaken that person for myself. While IEM is typically associated with the self-ascription of psychological properties, some philosophers attempt to draw anti-Cartesian conclusions from the claim that certain physical self-ascriptions are also IEM. In this paper, I will examine (...)
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  48. Annalisa Coliva (2002). Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.score: 34.0
    John Campbell (1999) has recently maintained that the phenomenon of thought insertion as it is manifested in schizophrenic patients should be described as a case in which the subject is introspectively aware of a certain thought and yet she is wrong in identifying whose thought it is. Hence, according to Campbell, the phenomenon of thought insertion might be taken as a counterexample to the view that introspection-based mental selfascriptions are logically immune to error through misidentification (IEM, hereafter). Thus, if (...)
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  49. Joel Smith (2006). Which Immunity to Error? Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.score: 34.0
    A self-ascription is a thought or sentence in which a predicate is self-consciously ascribed to oneself. Self-ascriptions are best expressed using the first-person pronoun. Mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of mental predicates (predicates that designate mental properties), non-mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of non-mental predicates (predicates that designate non-mental properties). It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person (...)
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