Search results for 'imprecise probabilities' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Lyle C. Gurrin, Peter D. Sly & Paul R. Burton (2002). Using Imprecise Probabilities to Address the Questions of Inference and Decision in Randomized Clinical Trials. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 8 (2):255-268.score: 90.0
    Randomized controlled clinical trials play an important role in the development of new medical therapies. There is, however, an ethical issue surrounding the use of randomized treatment allocation when the patient is suffering from a life threatening condition and requires immediate treatment. Such patients can only benefit from the treatment they actually receive and not from the alternative therapy, even if it ultimately proves to be superior. We discuss a novel new way to analyse data from such clinical trials based (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2007). Human Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities: Modus Ponens and Denying the Antecedent. In Proceedings of the 5 T H International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. 347--356.score: 67.0
    The modus ponens (A -> B, A :. B) is, along with modus tollens and the two logically not valid counterparts denying the antecedent (A -> B, ¬A :. ¬B) and affirming the consequent, the argument form that was most often investigated in the psychology of human reasoning. The present contribution reports the results of three experiments on the probabilistic versions of modus ponens and denying the antecedent. In probability logic these arguments lead to conclusions with imprecise probabilities. (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Brian Weatherson, Decision Making with Imprecise Probabilities.score: 60.0
    Orthodox Bayesian decision theory requires an agent’s beliefs representable by a real-valued function, ideally a probability function. Many theorists have argued this is too restrictive; it can be perfectly reasonable to have indeterminate degrees of belief. So doxastic states are ideally representable by a set of probability functions. One consequence of this is that the expected value of a gamble will be imprecise. This paper looks at the attempts to extend Bayesian decision theory to deal with such cases, and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner (2010). Ambiguity Aversion: The Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 172 (1):37 - 55.score: 54.0
    Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Seamus Bradley (2012). Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities. In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer.score: 54.0
  6. Steffen Andersen, John Fountain, Glenn W. Harrison, Arne Risa Hole & E. Elisabet Rutström (2012). Inferring Beliefs as Subjectively Imprecise Probabilities. Theory and Decision 73 (1):161-184.score: 48.0
    We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a subjective probability distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a parameter to be estimated from observed choices in a well-defined experimental task and to estimate that parameter as a random coefficient. The experimental task consists of a series of standard lottery choices in which the subject is assumed to use conventional risk attitudes to select one lottery or the other and then a series of betting choices in (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jake Chandler (forthcoming). Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp. Erkenntnis:1-14.score: 45.0
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler (2013). Demystifying Dilation. Erkenntnis:1-38.score: 45.0
    Dilation occurs when an interval probability estimate of some event E is properly included in the interval probability estimate of E conditional on every event F of some partition, which means that one’s initial estimate of E becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Critics maintain that dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, two points are often overlooked: (1) knowing that E is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Peter Walley (1991). Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. Chapman & Hall.score: 45.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Kathleen M. Whitcomb (2005). Quasi-Bayesian Analysis Using Imprecise Probability Assessments And The Generalized Bayes' Rule. Theory and Decision 58 (2):209-238.score: 42.0
    The generalized Bayes’ rule (GBR) can be used to conduct ‘quasi-Bayesian’ analyses when prior beliefs are represented by imprecise probability models. We describe a procedure for deriving coherent imprecise probability models when the event space consists of a finite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. The procedure is based on Walley’s theory of upper and lower prevision and employs simple linear programming models. We then describe how these models can be updated using Cozman’s linear programming formulation of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark Schervish & Jay Kadane, Forecasting with Imprecise/Indeterminate Probabilities [IP] – Some Preliminary Findings.score: 36.0
    Part 1 Background on de Finetti’s twin criteria of coherence: Coherence1: 2-sided previsions free from dominance through a Book. Coherence2: Forecasts free from dominance under Brier (squared error) score. Part 2 IP theory based on a scoring rule.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Barry Lam (2013). Vagueness and Ambivalence. Acta Analytica 28 (3):359-379.score: 33.0
    What is the proper attitude toward what is expressed by a vague sentence in the face of borderline evidence? Some call this attitude “ambivalence” and distinguish it from uncertainty. It has been argued that Classical Epistemicism conjoined with classical probability theory fails to characterize this attitude, and that we must therefore abandon classical logic or classical probabilities in the presence of vagueness. In this paper, I give a characterization of ambivalence assuming a supervaluationist semantics for vague terms that does (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Nils‐Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich (2014). Unsharp Sharpness. Theoria 80 (1):100-103.score: 33.0
    In a recent, thought-provoking paper Adam Elga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like Levi's (1980, 1988), Gärdenfors and Sahlin's (1982), and Kyburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against Elga's objection.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. F. P. A. Coolen (2006). On Nonparametric Predictive Inference and Objective Bayesianism. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):21-47.score: 31.0
    This paper consists of three main parts. First, we give an introduction to Hill’s assumption A (n) and to theory of interval probability, and an overview of recently developed theory and methods for nonparametric predictive inference (NPI), which is based on A (n) and uses interval probability to quantify uncertainty. Thereafter, we illustrate NPI by introducing a variation to the assumption A (n), suitable for inference based on circular data, with applications to several data sets from the literature. This includes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Katie Steele (2007). Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief From “Risk-Averse” Preferences. Synthese 158 (2):189 - 205.score: 26.0
    I focus my discussion on the well-known Ellsberg paradox. I find good normative reasons for incorporating non-precise belief, as represented by sets of probabilities, in an Ellsberg decision model. This amounts to forgoing the completeness axiom of expected utility theory. Provided that probability sets are interpreted as genuinely indeterminate belief (as opposed to “imprecise” belief), such a model can moreover make the “Ellsberg choices” rationally permissible. Without some further element to the story, however, the model does not explain (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Peter Milne (2008). Bets and Boundaries: Assigning Probabilities to Imprecisely Specified Events. Studia Logica 90 (3):425 - 453.score: 26.0
    Uncertainty and vagueness/imprecision are not the same: one can be certain about events described using vague predicates and about imprecisely specified events, just as one can be uncertain about precisely specified events. Exactly because of this, a question arises about how one ought to assign probabilities to imprecisely specified events in the case when no possible available evidence will eradicate the imprecision (because, say, of the limits of accuracy of a measuring device). Modelling imprecision by rough sets over an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Brad Armendt (2014). Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):758-768.score: 24.0
    Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Laure Cabantous (2007). Ambiguity Aversion in the Field of Insurance: Insurers' Attitude to Imprecise and Conflicting Probability Estimates. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 62 (3):219-240.score: 24.0
    This article presents the results of a survey designed to test, with economically sophisticated participants, Ellsberg’s ambiguity aversion hypothesis, and Smithson’s conflict aversion hypothesis. Based on an original sample of 78 professional actuaries (all members of the French Institute of Actuaries), this article provides empirical evidence that ambiguity (i.e. uncertainty about the probability) affect insurers’ decision on pricing insurance. It first reveals that premiums are significantly higher for risks when there is ambiguity regarding the probability of the loss. Second, it (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Adam Elga (2010). Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (05).score: 21.0
    Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Moisés Goldszmidt & Judea Pearl (1996). Qualitative Probabilities for Default Reasoning, Belief Revision, and Causal Modeling. Artificial Intelligence 84:57-112.score: 21.0
    This paper presents a formalism that combines useful properties of both logic and probabilities. Like logic, the formalism admits qualitative sentences and provides symbolic machinery for deriving deductively closed beliefs and, like probability, it permits us to express if-then rules with different levels of firmness and to retract beliefs in response to changing observations. Rules are interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximations of conditional probabilities which impose constraints over the rankings of worlds. Inferences are supported by a unique priority ordering (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Teddy Seidenfeld & Mark Schervish, Extending Bayesian Theory to Cooperative Groups: An Introduction to Indeterminate/Imprecise Probability Theories [IP] Also See Www.Sipta.Org.score: 21.0
    Pi(AS) = Pi(A)Pi(S) for i = 1, 2. But the Linear Pool created a group opinion P3 with positive dependence. P3(A|S) > P3(A).
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Takashi Hayashi & Ryoko Wada (2010). Choice with Imprecise Information: An Experimental Approach. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 69 (3):355-373.score: 21.0
    This article provides an experimental analysis of attitude toward imprecise and variable information. Imprecise information is provided in the form of a set of possible probability values, such that it is virtually impossible for the subjects to guess or estimate, which one in the set is true or more likely to be true. We investigate how geometric features of such information pieces affect choices. We find that the subjects care about more features than the pairs of best-case and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Alan Hájek & Michael Smithson (2012). Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 187 (1):33-48.score: 18.0
    We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required . Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Peter Baumann (2008). Single-Case Probabilities and the Case of Monty Hall: Levy's View. Synthese 162 (2):265 - 273.score: 18.0
    In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Igor Douven & Jos Uffink (2012). Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle. Synthese 184 (1):109-114.score: 18.0
    A recent argument by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio purports to show that we can uphold the principle that competently forming conjunctions is a knowledge-preserving operation only at the cost of a rampant skepticism about the future. A key premise of their argument is that, in light of quantum-mechanical considerations, future contingents never quite have chance 1 of being true. We argue, by drawing attention to the order of magnitude of the relevant quantum probabilities, that the skeptical threat of Hawthorne and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jarosław Pykacz (2006). “Solution” of the EPR Paradox: Negative, or Rather Fuzzy Probabilities? [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 36 (3):437-442.score: 18.0
    Negative probabilities were several times proposed in the literature as a way to reconcile violation of Bell-type inequalities with the premise of local realism. It is argued that instead of using negative probabilities that have no physical meaning one can use for this purpose fuzzy probabilities that have sound and unambiguous interpretation.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Isaac Levi (1985). Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment. Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.score: 18.0
    Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Rohan Sud (2014). A Forward Looking Decision Rule for Imprecise Credences. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.score: 18.0
    Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Andrei Y. Khrennikov & Elena R. Loubenets (2004). On Relations Between Probabilities Under Quantum and Classical Measurements. Foundations of Physics 34 (4):689-704.score: 18.0
    We show that the so-called quantum probabilistic rule, usually introduced in the physical literature as an argument of the essential distinction between the probability relations under quantum and classical measurements, is not, as it is commonly accepted, in contrast to the rule for the addition of probabilities of mutually exclusive events. The latter is valid under all experimental situations upon classical and quantum systems. We discuss also the quantum measurement situation that is similar to the classical one, described by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Matthew R. Kelley & Robert J. Lemke (forthcoming). Gender Differences When Subjective Probabilities Affect Risky Decisions: An Analysis From the Television Game Show Cash Cab. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision:1-18.score: 18.0
    This study uses the television show Cash Cab as a natural experiment to investigate gender differences in decision making under uncertainty. As expected, men are much more likely to accept the end-of-game gamble than are women, but men and women appear to weigh performance variables differently when relying on subjective probabilities. At best men base their risky decisions on general aspects of their previous “good” play (not all of which is relevant at the time the decision is made) and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Christopher Schwand, Rudolf Vetschera & Lea M. Wakolbinger (2010). The Influence of Probabilities on the Response Mode Bias in Utility Elicitation. Theory and Decision 69 (3):395-416.score: 18.0
    The response mode bias, in which subjects exhibit different risk attitudes when assessing certainty equivalents versus indifference probabilities, is a well-known phenomenon in the assessment of utility functions. In this empirical study, we develop and apply a cardinal measure of risk attitudes to analyze not only the existence, but also the strength of this phenomenon. Since probability levels involved in decision problems are already known to have a strong impact on behavior, we use this approach to study the impact (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Robert B. Griffiths (2003). Probabilities and Quantum Reality: Are There Correlata? [REVIEW] Foundations of Physics 33 (10):1423-1459.score: 18.0
    Any attempt to introduce probabilities into quantum mechanics faces difficulties due to the mathematical structure of Hilbert space, as reflected in Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal for a quantum logic. The (consistent or decoherent) histories solution is provided by its single framework rule, an approach that includes conventional (Copenhagen) quantum theory as a special case. Mermin's Ithaca interpretation addresses the same problem by defining probabilities which make no reference to a sample space or event algebra (“correlations without correlata”). (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. John M. Myers (2006). Conditional Probabilities and Density Operators in Quantum Modeling. Foundations of Physics 36 (7):1012-1035.score: 18.0
    Motivated by a recent proof of free choices in linking equations to the experiments they describe, I clarify some relations among purely mathematical entities featured in quantum mechanics (probabilities, density operators, partial traces, and operator-valued measures), thereby allowing applications of these entities to the modeling of a wider variety of physical situations. I relate conditional probabilities associated with projection-valued measures to conditional density operators identical, in some cases but not in others, to the usual reduced density operators. While (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Daniel Jeremy Singer (forthcoming). Sleeping Beauty Should Be Imprecise. Synthese:1-14.score: 18.0
    The traditional solutions to the Sleeping Beauty problem say that Beauty should have either a sharp 1/3 or sharp 1/2 credence that the coin flip was heads when she wakes. But Beauty’s evidence is incomplete so that it doesn’t warrant a precise credence, I claim. Instead, Beauty ought to have a properly imprecise credence when she wakes. In particular, her representor ought to assign R(Heads)=[0,1/2]. I show, perhaps surprisingly, that this solution can account for the many of the intuitions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Mohamed A. Amer (1985). Extension of Relatively |Sigma-Additive Probabilities on Boolean Algebras of Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (3):589 - 596.score: 18.0
    Contrary to what is stated in Lemma 7.1 of [8], it is shown that some Boolean algebras of finitary logic admit finitely additive probabilities that are not σ-additive. Consequences of Lemma 7.1 are reconsidered. The concept of a C-σ-additive probability on B (where B and C are Boolean algebras, and $\mathscr{B} \subseteq \mathscr{C}$ ) is introduced, and a generalization of Hahn's extension theorem is proved. This and other results are employed to show that every S̄(L)-σ-additive probability on s̄(L) can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Hugues Leblanc (1962/2006). Statistical and Inductive Probabilities. Dover Publications.score: 18.0
    This evenhanded treatment addresses the decades-old dispute among probability theorists, asserting that both statistical and inductive probabilities may be treated as sentence-theoretic measurements, and that the latter qualify as estimates of the former. Beginning with a survey of the essentials of sentence theory and of set theory, the author examines statistical probabilities, showing that statistical probabilities may be passed on to sentences, and thereby qualify as truth-values. An exploration of inductive probabilities follows, demonstrating their reinterpretation as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Susanna Rinard (2013). Against Radical Credal Imprecision. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.score: 17.0
    A number of Bayesians claim that, if one has no evidence relevant to a proposition P, then one's credence in P should be spread over the interval [0, 1]. Against this, I argue: first, that it is inconsistent with plausible claims about comparative levels of confidence; second, that it precludes inductive learning in certain cases. Two motivations for the view are considered and rejected. A discussion of alternatives leads to the conjecture that there is an in-principle limitation on formal representations (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Bas van Fraassen (1976). Probabilities of Conditionals. In C. Hooker (ed.), Foundations of probability theory, statistical inference, and statistical theories of science.score: 16.0
  39. Jordan Howard Sobel (2009). Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.score: 16.0
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability kinematics’ or ’Jeffrey-conditioning’ is, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Giuseppe Attanasi & Aldo Montesano (2012). The Price for Information About Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity. Theory and Decision 73 (1):125-160.score: 16.0
    In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker’s risk and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes (1998). Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities. Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.score: 16.0
    We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Rob Lawlor (2006). Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):149 - 166.score: 15.0
    In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each.Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2009). Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.score: 15.0
    Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Wayne C. Myrvold (forthcoming). Probabilities in Statistical Mechanics. In Christopher Hitchcock & Alan Hájek (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.score: 15.0
    This chapter will review selected aspects of the terrain of discussions about probabilities in statistical mechanics (with no pretensions to exhaustiveness, though the major issues will be touched upon), and will argue for a number of claims. None of the claims to be defended is entirely original, but all deserve emphasis. The first, and least controversial, is that probabilistic notions are needed to make sense of statistical mechanics. The reason for this is the same reason that convinced Maxwell, Gibbs, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. J. Franklin (2001). Resurrecting Logical Probability. Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.score: 15.0
    The logical interpretation of probability, or ``objective Bayesianism''''– the theory that (some) probabilitiesare strictly logical degrees of partial implication – is defended.The main argument against it is that it requires the assignment ofprior probabilities, and that any attempt to determine them by symmetryvia a ``principle of insufficient reason'''' inevitably leads to paradox.Three replies are advanced: that priors are imprecise or of little weight, sothat disagreement about them does not matter, within limits; thatit is possible to distinguish reasonable from (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Brad Armendt, Pragmatic Interests and the Strength of Belief.score: 15.0
    Does the strength with which we hold a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Might we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p, yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than we do in the other? In order for that to happen, a doxastic state, a belief state, must have a certain sort of complexity, a context-sensitivity that yields, in the presence of one set of stakes, (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Dylan Dodd (2013). Roger White's Argument Against Imprecise Credences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):69-77.score: 15.0
    According to the Imprecise Credence Framework (ICF), a rational believer's doxastic state should be modelled by a set of probability functions rather than a single probability function, namely, the set of probability functions allowed by the evidence ( Joyce [2005] ). Roger White ( [2010] ) has recently given an arresting argument against the ICF, which has garnered a number of responses. In this article, I attempt to cast doubt on his argument. First, I point out that it's not (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Andrei Khrennikov (2005). The Principle of Supplementarity: A Contextual Probabilistic Viewpoint to Complementarity, the Interference of Probabilities and Incompatibility of Variables in Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Physics 35 (10):1655-1693.score: 15.0
  49. Gert de Cooman & Peter Walley (2002). A Possibilistic Hierarchical Model for Behaviour Under Uncertainty. Theory and Decision 52 (4):327-374.score: 15.0
    Hierarchical models are commonly used for modelling uncertainty. They arise whenever there is a `correct' or `ideal' uncertainty model but the modeller is uncertain about what it is. Hierarchical models which involve probability distributions are widely used in Bayesian inference. Alternative models which involve possibility distributions have been proposed by several authors, but these models do not have a clear operational meaning. This paper describes a new hierarchical model which is mathematically equivalent to some of the earlier, possibilistic models and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Horacio Arlo-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner, Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg Phenomenon.score: 15.0
    The "Ellsberg phenomenon" has played a significant role in research on imprecise probabilities. Fox and Tversky [5] have attempted to explain this phenomenon in terms of their "comparative ignorance" hypothesis. We challenge that explanation and present empirical work suggesting an explanation that is much closer to Ellsberg's own diagnosis.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000