Search results for 'inattentional blindness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Daniel Memmert & Philip Furley (2010). Beyond Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection: From Attentional Paradigms to Attentional Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1107-1109.
    Memmert tried to foster the development of attentional research by discussing four differences between attentional misdirection and inattentional blindness . Considering this goal, the comment was received in the intended way by the comments of 18 and 14 who make a number of highly valuable suggestions for further progress. As initially suggested by Memmert this dialog should help unravel the underlying attentional mechanisms of different paradigms. Therefore, we first discuss the suggested distinction between central and spatial IB by (...)
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  2.  13
    Daniel Memmert (2010). The Gap Between Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1097-1101.
    Kuhn and colleagues described a novel attentional misdirection approach to investigate overt and covert attention mechanisms in connection with inattentional blindness . This misdirection paradigm is valuable to study the temporal relationship between eye movements and visual awareness. Although, as put forth in this comment, the link between attentional misdirection and inattentional blindness needs to be developed further. There are at least four differences between the two paradigms which concern the conceptual aspects of the unexpected object (...)
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  3.  51
    D. Memmert (2006). The Effects of Eye Movements, Age, and Expertise on Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):620-627.
    Based on various stimuli, the findings for the inattentional blindness paradigm suggest that many observers do not perceive an unexpected object in a dynamic setting. In a first experiment, inattentional blindness was combined with eye tracking data from children. Observers who did not notice the unexpected object in the basketball game test by Simons and Chabris spent on average as much time looking at the unexpected object as those subjects who did perceive it. As such, individual (...)
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  4. Steve Most, Daniel J. Simons, Brian J. Scholl & Christopher Chabris (2000). Sustained Inattentional Blindness: The Role of Location in the Detection of Unexpected Dynamic Events. Psyche 6 (14).
    Attempts to understand visual attention have produced models based on location, in which attention selects particular regions of space, and models based on other visual attributes . Previous studies of inattentional blindness have contributed to our understanding of attention by suggesting that the detection of an unexpected object depends on the distance of that object from the spatial focus of attention. When the distance of a briefly flashed object from both fixation and the focus of attention is systematically (...)
     
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  5.  22
    Steven B. Most (2010). What's “Inattentional” About Inattentional Blindness? Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1102-1104.
    In a recent commentary, Memmert critiqued claims that attentional misdirection is directly analogous to inattentional blindness and cautioned against assuming too close a similarity between the two phenomena. One important difference highlighted in his analysis is that most lab-based inductions of IB rely on the taxing of attention through a demanding primary task, whereas attentional misdirection typically involves simply the orchestration of spatial attention. The present commentary argues that, rather than reflecting a complete dissociation between IB and attentional (...)
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  6.  18
    Aidan Moran & Nuala Brady (2010). Mind the Gap: Misdirection, Inattentional Blindness and the Relationship Between Overt and Covert Attention. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1105-1106.
    The present commentary addresses two issues arising from Memmert’s paper. First, can the ‘misdirection’ and ‘inattentional blindness’ paradigms provide important insights into the relationship between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ attentional processes? Second, what are the most fruitful directions for research that seeks to combine these attentional paradigms in ecologically valid settings? We argue that although Memmert’s paper postulates several important differences between the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms, it may not emphasise sufficiently strongly the significant insights into (...)
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  7.  21
    Beverly C. Butler & Raymond Klein (2009). Inattentional Blindness for Ignored Words: Comparison of Explicit and Implicit Memory Tasks. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):811-819.
    Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. . Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. (...)
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  8.  6
    Gustav Kuhn & Benjamin W. Tatler (2011). Misdirected by the Gap: The Relationship Between Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):432-436.
    In several of our articles we have drawn analogies between inattentional blindness paradigms and misdirection. Memmert however, has criticized this analogy and urged for caution in assuming too much of a close relationship between these two phenomena. Here we consider the points raised by Memmert and highlight some misunderstandings and omissions in his interpretation of our work, which substantially undermine his argument. Debating the similarities and differences between aspects of misdirection and inattentional blindness is valuable and (...)
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  9.  4
    Preston P. Thakral & Scott D. Slotnick (2010). Attentional Inhibition Mediates Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):636-643.
    Salient stimuli presented at unattended locations are not always perceived, a phenomenon termed inattentional blindness. We hypothesized that inattentional blindness may be mediated by attentional inhibition. It has been shown that attentional inhibition effects are maximal near an attended location. If our hypothesis is correct, inattentional blindness effects should similarly be maximal near an attended location. During central fixation, participants viewed rapidly presented colored digits at a peripheral location. An unexpected black circle was concurrently (...)
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  10.  11
    S. LO & S. YEH (2008). Dissociation of Processing Time and Awareness by the Inattentional Blindness Paradigm☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1169-1180.
    Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness . The inattentional blindness paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even (...)
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  11.  8
    S. LO & S. YEH (2008). Dissociation of Processing Time and Awareness by the Inattentional Blindness Paradigm☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1169-1180.
    Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness . The inattentional blindness paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even (...)
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  12.  10
    Vanessa Beanland, Rosemary A. Allen & Kristen Pammer (2011). Attending to Music Decreases Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1282-1292.
    This article investigates how auditory attention affects inattentional blindness , a failure of conscious awareness in which an observer does not notice an unexpected event because their attention is engaged elsewhere. Previous research using the attentional blink paradigm has indicated that listening to music can reduce failures of conscious awareness. It was proposed that listening to music would decrease IB by reducing observers’ frequency of task-unrelated thoughts . Observers completed an IB task that varied both visual and auditory (...)
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  13.  2
    Preston P. Thakral (2011). The Neural Substrates Associated with Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1768-1775.
    Inattentional blindness is the failure to perceive salient stimuli presented at unattended locations. Whereas the behavioral manifestation of inattentional blindness has been investigated, the neural basis of this phenomenon has remained elusive. In the current study, event-related fMRI was used to identify the neural substrates associated with inattentional blindness. During central fixation, participants named colored digits presented at a peripheral location. On a subset of trials, an unexpected checkerboard circle was presented at the same (...)
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  14. Cathleen Moore (2001). Inattentional Blindness: Perception or Memory and What Does It Matter? Psyche 7 (2).
    An extensive research program surrounding a phenomenon called inattentional blindness is reported by Mack and Rock in their book of the same name. The general conclusion that is drawn from the work is that no conscious perception can occur without attention. Because the bulk of the evidence surrounding inattentional blindness comes from memorial reports of displays, it is possible that inattentional blindness reflects a problem with memory, rather than a problem with perception. It is (...)
     
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  15.  12
    Anne M. Aimola Davies, Stephen Waterman, Rebekah C. White & Martin Davies (2013). When You Fail to See What You Were Told to Look For: Inattentional Blindness and Task Instructions. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):221-230.
    Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task (...)
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  16.  2
    Anne Richards, Emily M. Hannon & Melanie Vitkovitch (2012). Distracted by Distractors: Eye Movements in a Dynamic Inattentional Blindness Task. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):170-176.
    Inattentional Blindness occurs when observers engaged in resource-consuming tasks fail to see unexpected stimuli that appear in their visual field. Eye movements were recorded in a dynamic IB task where participants tracked targets amongst distractors. During the task, an unexpected stimulus crossed the screen for several seconds. Individuals who failed to report the unexpected stimulus were deemed to be IB. Being IB was associated with making more fixations and longer gaze times on distractor stimuli, being less likely to (...)
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  17. Glyn Humphreys (2000). Neuropsychological Analogies Of Inattentional Blindness. Psyche 6.
    I discuss the relations between the phenomenon of inattentional blindness and neuropsychological syndromes such as visual neglect, extinction and simultanagnosia. While there are similarities in the types of unconscious processing apparent in inattentional blindness and in these syndromes, there are also differences - for instance, grouping affects the reportability of stimuli in some neuropsychological syndromes but not necessarily in inattentional blindness. The reasons for such discrepancies, and the link between unconscious processing and underlying neural (...)
     
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  18. Daniel J. Simons & Christopher Chabris (1999). Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events. Perception 28 (9):1059-1074.
  19. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.
  20.  77
    Steve Most, Brian J. Scholl, E. Clifford & Daniel J. Simons (2005). What You See is What You Set: Sustained Inattentional Blindness and the Capture of Awareness. Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.
  21.  12
    Ula Cartwright-Finch & Nilli Lavie (2007). The Role of Perceptual Load in Inattentional Blindness. Cognition 102 (3):321-340.
  22. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (2003). Inattentional Blindness: An Overview. Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (5):180-184.
  23. Daniel J. Simons (2000). Attentional Capture and Inattentional Blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):147-155.
  24. Geraint Rees, C. Russell, Christopher D. Frith & Julia Driver (1999). Inattentional Blindness Versus Inattentional Amnesia for Fixated but Ignored Words. Science 286 (5449):2504-7.
  25.  2
    Anna Remington, Ula Cartwright-Finch & Nilli Lavie (2014). I Can See Clearly Now: The Effects of Age and Perceptual Load on Inattentional Blindness. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  26. Jean-Pierre Changeux & Stanislas Dehaene (2005). Ongoing Spontaneous Activity Controls Access to Consciousness: A Neuronal Model for Inattentional Blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.
    1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France.
     
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  27. Ira E. Hyman, Benjamin A. Sarb & Breanne M. Wise-Swanson (2014). Failure to See Money on a Tree: Inattentional Blindness for Objects That Guided Behavior. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  28.  13
    Paola Bressan & Silvia Pizzighello (2008). The Attentional Cost of Inattentional Blindness. Cognition 106 (1):370-383.
  29.  70
    Ralph D. Ellis (2001). Implications of Inattentional Blindness for "Enactive" Theories of Consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's (...)
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  30.  7
    Jan W. de Fockert & Andrew J. Bremner (2011). Release of Inattentional Blindness by High Working Memory Load: Elucidating the Relationship Between Working Memory and Selective Attention. Cognition 121 (3):400-408.
  31.  21
    Ken Nakayama (1999). Inattentional Blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):39.
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  32.  16
    Alva Noë (2007). Inattentional Blindness, Change Blindness and Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 504--511.
  33. Jochen Braun (2001). Inattentional Blindness: It's Great but Not Necessarily About Attention. Psyche 7 (6).
     
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  34.  3
    Timothy P. Schofield, J. David Creswell & Thomas F. Denson (2015). Brief Mindfulness Induction Reduces Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 37:63-70.
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  35. Jazmin L. Brown-Iannuzzi, Kelly M. Hoffman, B. Keith Payne & Sophie Trawalter (2014). The Invisible Man: Interpersonal Goals Moderate Inattentional Blindness to African Americans. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 143 (1):33-37.
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  36. K. Humphrey (1999). Arien Mack and Irvin Rock, Inattentional Blindness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:115-116.
     
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  37.  98
    Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or is Experience Limited to What's in Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep (...)
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  38.  28
    Carolyn Suchy-Dicey (2012). Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.
    Studies on so-called Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness have been taken to establish the claim that conscious perception of a stimulus requires the attentional processing of that stimulus. One might contend, against this claim, that the evidence only shows attention to be necessary for the subject to have access to the contents of conscious perception and not for conscious perception itself. This “Methodological Argument” is gaining ground among philosophers who work on attention and consciousness, such as Christopher (...)
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  39.  49
    Dolly Chugh & Max H. Bazerman (2007). Bounded Awareness: What You Fail to See Can Hurt You. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 6 (1):1-18.
    ObjectiveWe argue that people often fail to perceive and process stimuli easily available to them. In other words, we challenge the tacit assumption that awareness is unbounded and provide evidence that humans regularly fail to see and use stimuli and information easily available to them. We call this phenomenon “bounded awareness” (Bazerman and Chugh in Frontiers of social psychology: negotiations, Psychology Press: College Park 2005). Findings We begin by first describing perceptual mental processes in which obvious information is missed—that is, (...)
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  40.  1
    N. Srinivasan (2008). Interdependence of Attention and Consciousness. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier 65-75.
    Research on attention has been closely linked with possible advances in the study of consciousness. Various theories and models have been proposed for attention in the past 50 years. Behavioural, computational, and neuroscientfic approaches have been successful in improving our understanding of attentional processes. Given the current status of attention research, what can we say about the relationship between attention and consciousness? This paper discusses the possible relationships between attention and consciousness. Findings from cognitive science and neuroscience relevant to the (...)
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  41. Bence Nanay (2010). Attention and Perceptual Content. Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  42. Declan Smithies (2011). Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press 247--273.
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
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  43.  41
    Bence Nanay (2015). The History of Vision. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (3):259-271.
    One of the most influential ideas of twentieth-century art history and aesthetics is that vision has a history and it is the task of art history to trace how vision has changed. This claim has recently been attacked for both empirical and conceptual reasons. My aim is to argue for a new version of the history of vision claim: if visual attention has a history, then vision also has a history. And we have some reason to think that at least (...)
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  44.  48
    Aaron Allen Schiller (2012). The Primacy of Fact Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593.
    After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue (...)
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  45.  52
    Holley S. Hodgins & Kathryn C. Adair (2010). Attentional Processes and Meditation. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):872--878.
    Visual attentional processing was examined in adult meditators and non-meditators on behavioral measures of change blindness, concentration, perspective-shifting, selective attention, and sustained inattentional blindness. Results showed that meditators noticed more changes in flickering scenes and noticed them more quickly, counted more accurately in a challenging concentration task, identified a greater number of alternative perspectives in multiple perspectives images, and showed less interference from invalid cues in a visual selective attention task, but did not differ on a measure (...)
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  46.  68
    Diego Fernandez-Duque & Ian Thornton (2000). Change Detection Without Awareness: Do Explicit Reports Underestimate the Representation of Change in the Visual System? Visual Cognition 7 (1):323-344.
    Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity (...)
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  47.  57
    Rik Peels (2016). The Empirical Case Against Introspection. Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485.
    This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between (...)
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  48.  10
    Rick Grush (2007). A Plug for Generic Phenomenology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):504-505.
    I briefly sketch a notion of generic phenomenology, and what I call the wave-collapse illusion to the effect that transitions from generic to detailed phenomenology are not noticed as phenomenal changes. Change blindness and inattentional blindness can be analyzed as cases where certain things are phenomenally present, but generically so.
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  49.  26
    Ian Thornton & Diego Fernandez-Duque (2000). An Implicit Measure of Undetected Change. Spatial Vision 14 (1):21-44.
    b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the (...)
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  50. Alva Noë & Kevin J. O'Regan (2000). Perception, Attention, and the Grand Illusion. Psyche 6 (15).
    This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework (...)
     
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