Search results for 'inattentional blindness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Steve Most, Brian J. Scholl, E. Clifford & Daniel J. Simons (2005). What You See is What You Set: Sustained Inattentional Blindness and the Capture of Awareness. Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.score: 150.0
  2. Steve Most, Daniel J. Simons, Brian J. Scholl & Christopher Chabris (2000). Sustained Inattentional Blindness: The Role of Location in the Detection of Unexpected Dynamic Events. Psyche 6 (14).score: 150.0
  3. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.score: 150.0
  4. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (2003). Inattentional Blindness: An Overview. Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (5):180-184.score: 150.0
  5. Daniel J. Simons & Christopher Chabris (1999). Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events. Perception 28 (9):1059-1074.score: 150.0
  6. Jochen Braun (2001). Inattentional Blindness: It's Great but Not Necessarily About Attention. Psyche 7 (6).score: 150.0
  7. Daniel J. Simons (2000). Attentional Capture and Inattentional Blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):147-155.score: 150.0
  8. Geraint Rees, C. Russell, Christopher D. Frith & Julia Driver (1999). Inattentional Blindness Versus Inattentional Amnesia for Fixated but Ignored Words. Science 286 (5449):2504-7.score: 150.0
  9. Ralph D. Ellis (2001). Implications of Inattentional Blindness for "Enactive" Theories of Consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.score: 150.0
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's (...)
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  10. D. Memmert (2006). The Effects of Eye Movements, Age, and Expertise on Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):620-627.score: 150.0
  11. Cathleen Moore (2001). Inattentional Blindness: Perception or Memory and What Does It Matter? Psyche 7 (2).score: 150.0
  12. Beverly C. Butler & Raymond Klein (2009). Inattentional Blindness for Ignored Words: Comparison of Explicit and Implicit Memory Tasks. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):811-819.score: 150.0
  13. Jean-Pierre Changeux & Stanislas Dehaene (2005). Ongoing Spontaneous Activity Controls Access to Consciousness: A Neuronal Model for Inattentional Blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.score: 150.0
    1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France.
     
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  14. Daniel Memmert & Philip Furley (2010). Beyond Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection: From Attentional Paradigms to Attentional Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1107-1109.score: 150.0
  15. Steven B. Most (2010). What's “Inattentional” About Inattentional Blindness? Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1102-1104.score: 150.0
  16. Daniel Memmert (2010). The Gap Between Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1097-1101.score: 150.0
  17. Aidan Moran & Nuala Brady (2010). Mind the Gap: Misdirection, Inattentional Blindness and the Relationship Between Overt and Covert Attention. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1105-1106.score: 150.0
  18. S. LO & S. YEH (2008). Dissociation of Processing Time and Awareness by the Inattentional Blindness Paradigm☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1169-1180.score: 150.0
  19. Preston P. Thakral & Scott D. Slotnick (2010). Attentional Inhibition Mediates Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):636-643.score: 150.0
  20. Anne M. Aimola Davies, Stephen Waterman, Rebekah C. White & Martin Davies (2013). When You Fail to See What You Were Told to Look For: Inattentional Blindness and Task Instructions. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):221-230.score: 150.0
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  21. Ula Cartwright-Finch & Nilli Lavie (2007). The Role of Perceptual Load in Inattentional Blindness. Cognition 102 (3):321-340.score: 150.0
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  22. Ken Nakayama (1999). Inattentional Blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):39.score: 150.0
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  23. Alva Noë (2007). Inattentional Blindness, Change Blindness and Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 504--511.score: 150.0
  24. Vanessa Beanland, Rosemary A. Allen & Kristen Pammer (2011). Attending to Music Decreases Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1282-1292.score: 150.0
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  25. Paola Bressan & Silvia Pizzighello (2008). The Attentional Cost of Inattentional Blindness. Cognition 106 (1):370-383.score: 150.0
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  26. Jan W. de Fockert & Andrew J. Bremner (2011). Release of Inattentional Blindness by High Working Memory Load: Elucidating the Relationship Between Working Memory and Selective Attention. Cognition 121 (3):400-408.score: 150.0
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  27. Gustav Kuhn & Benjamin W. Tatler (2011). Misdirected by the Gap: The Relationship Between Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):432-436.score: 150.0
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  28. Preston P. Thakral (2011). The Neural Substrates Associated with Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1768-1775.score: 150.0
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  29. K. Humphrey (1999). Arien Mack and Irvin Rock, Inattentional Blindness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:115-116.score: 150.0
     
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  30. Anne Richards, Emily M. Hannon & Melanie Vitkovitch (2012). Distracted by Distractors: Eye Movements in a Dynamic Inattentional Blindness Task. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):170-176.score: 150.0
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  31. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or is Experience Limited to What's in Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.score: 90.0
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep (...)
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  32. Carolyn Suchy-Dicey (2012). Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.score: 90.0
    Studies on so-called Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness have been taken to establish the claim that conscious perception of a stimulus requires the attentional processing of that stimulus. One might contend, against this claim, that the evidence only shows attention to be necessary for the subject to have access to the contents of conscious perception and not for conscious perception itself. This “Methodological Argument” is gaining ground among philosophers who work on attention and consciousness, such as Christopher (...)
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  33. Dolly Chugh & Max H. Bazerman (2007). Bounded Awareness: What You Fail to See Can Hurt You. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 6 (1):1-18.score: 90.0
    ObjectiveWe argue that people often fail to perceive and process stimuli easily available to them. In other words, we challenge the tacit assumption that awareness is unbounded and provide evidence that humans regularly fail to see and use stimuli and information easily available to them. We call this phenomenon “bounded awareness” (Bazerman and Chugh in Frontiers of social psychology: negotiations, Psychology Press: College Park 2005). Findings We begin by first describing perceptual mental processes in which obvious information is missed—that is, (...)
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  34. Ellen K. Levy (2012). An Artistic Exploration of Inattention Blindness†. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 5:174-174.score: 84.0
  35. Declan Smithies (2011). Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 247--273.score: 60.0
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
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  36. Bence Nanay (2010). Attention and Perceptual Content. Analysis 70 (2):263-270.score: 60.0
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  37. Aaron Allen Schiller (2012). The Primacy of Fact Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593.score: 60.0
    After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue (...)
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  38. Jakob Hohwy (2012). Attention and Conscious Perception in the Hypothesis Testing Brain. Frontiers in Psychology 3 (96).score: 60.0
    Conscious perception and attention are difficult to study, partly because their relation to each other is not fully understood. Rather than conceiving and studying them in isolation from each other it may be useful to locate them in an independently motivated, general framework, from which a principled account of how they relate can then transpire. Accordingly, these mental phenomena are here reviewed through the prism of the increasingly influential predictive coding framework. On this framework, conscious perception can be seen as (...)
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  39. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). The History of Vision. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.score: 60.0
    According to an influential view within art history, the way the ancient Greeks saw the world was importantly different from the way we now see the world and part of what art history should study is exactly how human vision has changed in the course of history. If the ancients did see the world differently from the way we do now, then in order to understand and evaluate their art, we need to understand how they perceived it (and how this (...)
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  40. Jonathan Cohen (2002). The Grand Grand Illusion Illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):141-157.score: 30.0
    In recent years, a pair of intriguing phenomena has caused researchers working on vision and visual attention to reevaluate many of their assumptions. These phenomena, which have come to be called change blindness (CB) and inattentional blindness (IB), have led many to the conclusion that ordinary perceivers labor under a ``grand illusion'' concerning perception - an illusion that is..
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  41. Alva Noë & Kevin J. O'Regan (2000). Perception, Attention, and the Grand Illusion. Psyche 6 (15).score: 30.0
    This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework (...)
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  42. Alva Noë (2001). Experience and the Active Mind. Synthese 61 (1):41-60.score: 30.0
    This paper investigates a new species of skeptical reasoning about visual experience that takes its start from developments in perceptual science (especially recent work on change blindness and inattentional blindness). According to this skepticism, the impression of visual awareness of the environment in full detail and high resolution is illusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends on misguided assumptions about the character of perceptual experience, about whether perceptual experiences are 'internal' states, and about how best to (...)
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  43. Diego Fernandez-Duque & Ian Thornton (2000). Change Detection Without Awareness: Do Explicit Reports Underestimate the Representation of Change in the Visual System? Visual Cognition 7 (1):323-344.score: 30.0
    Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity (...)
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  44. Jason Ford (2008). Attention and the New Sceptics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):59-86.score: 30.0
    In response to new research into the phenomena of inattentional blindness and change- blindness, several philosophers and vision researchers have proposed a novel form of scepticism: they contend that we do not have the conscious experience that we think we have. I will show that this claim is not supported by the evidence usually cited in support of it, and I expose what I believe to be the underlying error motivating this position: the belief that consciousness is (...)
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  45. Paul Coates (2003). Review of Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?. [REVIEW] Human Nature Review 3:176-182.score: 30.0
    A cluster of experiments on “Change Blindness”, “Inattentional Blindness” and associated phenomena appear to demonstrate extremely counter intuitive results. According to one plausible characterisation, these results show that we consciously take in far less of the visual world than it seems we are aware of. It is worth briefly summarising the results of two recent sets of experiments, in order to give a flavour of this work. In ‘Gorillas in our Midst’ (Simons, D. and Chabris, C., Perception, (...)
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  46. Ian Thornton & Diego Fernandez-Duque (2000). An Implicit Measure of Undetected Change. Spatial Vision 14 (1):21-44.score: 30.0
    b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the (...)
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  47. Jason Ford (2009). Saving Time: How Attention Explains the Utility of Supposedly Superfluous Representations. Cognitive Critique 1 (1):101-114.score: 30.0
    I contend that Alva Noë’s Enactive Approach to Perception fails to give an adequate account of the periphery of attention. Noë claims that our peripheral experience is not produced by the brain’s representation of peripheral items, but rather by our mastery of sensorimotor skills and contingencies. I offer a two-pronged assault on this account of the periphery of attention. The first challenge comes from Mack and Rock’s work on inattentional blindness, and provides robust empirical evidence for the semantic (...)
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  48. Rick Grush (2007). A Plug for Generic Phenomenology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):504-505.score: 30.0
    I briefly sketch a notion of generic phenomenology, and what I call the wave-collapse illusion to the effect that transitions from generic to detailed phenomenology are not noticed as phenomenal changes. Change blindness and inattentional blindness can be analyzed as cases where certain things are phenomenally present, but generically so.
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  49. Francisco Pereira Gandarillas (2011). Contenido Perceptual, Conceptos y Conciencia Fenoménica. Análisis Filosófico 31 (2):165-192.score: 30.0
    Algunos defensores del conceptualismo perceptual intentan bloquear el argumento noconceptualista de la riqueza de contenido afirmando que no hay percepción consciente sin atención. Para justificar esta afirmación los conceptualistas normalmente apelan a experimentos psicológicos, tales como la ceguera al cambio y la ceguera inatencional. En este artículo argumentaré que esta estrategia es insuficiente. Además sostendré, en base a recientes consideraciones teóricas y empíricas, que hay buenas razones para pensar que probablemente hay una forma de conciencia fenoménica visual más allá de (...)
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