Search results for 'inattentional blindness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Steve Most, Daniel J. Simons, Brian J. Scholl & Christopher Chabris (2000). Sustained Inattentional Blindness: The Role of Location in the Detection of Unexpected Dynamic Events. Psyche 6 (14).score: 45.0
  2. Steve Most, Brian J. Scholl, E. Clifford & Daniel J. Simons (2005). What You See is What You Set: Sustained Inattentional Blindness and the Capture of Awareness. Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.score: 45.0
  3. Eric Schwitzgebel (2007). Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or is Experience Limited to What's in Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.score: 45.0
    According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep (...)
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  4. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (2003). Inattentional Blindness: An Overview. Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (5):180-184.score: 45.0
  5. Arien Mack & Irvin Rock (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.score: 45.0
  6. Daniel J. Simons & Christopher Chabris (1999). Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events. Perception 28 (9):1059-1074.score: 45.0
  7. Daniel J. Simons (2000). Attentional Capture and Inattentional Blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):147-155.score: 45.0
  8. Jochen Braun (2001). Inattentional Blindness: It's Great but Not Necessarily About Attention. Psyche 7 (6).score: 45.0
  9. Geraint Rees, C. Russell, Christopher D. Frith & Julia Driver (1999). Inattentional Blindness Versus Inattentional Amnesia for Fixated but Ignored Words. Science 286 (5449):2504-7.score: 45.0
  10. D. Memmert (2006). The Effects of Eye Movements, Age, and Expertise on Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):620-627.score: 45.0
  11. Cathleen Moore (2001). Inattentional Blindness: Perception or Memory and What Does It Matter? Psyche 7 (2).score: 45.0
  12. Ralph D. Ellis (2001). Implications of Inattentional Blindness for "Enactive" Theories of Consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.score: 45.0
    Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's (...)
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  13. Carolyn Suchy-Dicey (2012). Inductive Parsimony and the Methodological Argument. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):605-609.score: 45.0
    Studies on so-called Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness have been taken to establish the claim that conscious perception of a stimulus requires the attentional processing of that stimulus. One might contend, against this claim, that the evidence only shows attention to be necessary for the subject to have access to the contents of conscious perception and not for conscious perception itself. This “Methodological Argument” is gaining ground among philosophers who work on attention and consciousness, such as Christopher (...)
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  14. Jean-Pierre Changeux & Stanislas Dehaene (2005). Ongoing Spontaneous Activity Controls Access to Consciousness: A Neuronal Model for Inattentional Blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.score: 45.0
    1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France.
     
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  15. Beverly C. Butler & Raymond Klein (2009). Inattentional Blindness for Ignored Words: Comparison of Explicit and Implicit Memory Tasks. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):811-819.score: 45.0
  16. Dolly Chugh & Max H. Bazerman (2007). Bounded Awareness: What You Fail to See Can Hurt You. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 6 (1):1-18.score: 45.0
    ObjectiveWe argue that people often fail to perceive and process stimuli easily available to them. In other words, we challenge the tacit assumption that awareness is unbounded and provide evidence that humans regularly fail to see and use stimuli and information easily available to them. We call this phenomenon “bounded awareness” (Bazerman and Chugh in Frontiers of social psychology: negotiations, Psychology Press: College Park 2005). Findings We begin by first describing perceptual mental processes in which obvious information is missed—that is, (...)
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  17. Daniel Memmert (2010). The Gap Between Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1097-1101.score: 45.0
  18. Daniel Memmert & Philip Furley (2010). Beyond Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection: From Attentional Paradigms to Attentional Mechanisms. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1107-1109.score: 45.0
  19. Aidan Moran & Nuala Brady (2010). Mind the Gap: Misdirection, Inattentional Blindness and the Relationship Between Overt and Covert Attention. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1105-1106.score: 45.0
  20. S. LO & S. YEH (2008). Dissociation of Processing Time and Awareness by the Inattentional Blindness Paradigm☆. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1169-1180.score: 45.0
  21. Steven B. Most (2010). What's “Inattentional” About Inattentional Blindness? Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1102-1104.score: 45.0
  22. Preston P. Thakral & Scott D. Slotnick (2010). Attentional Inhibition Mediates Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):636-643.score: 45.0
  23. Alva Noë (2007). Inattentional Blindness, Change Blindness and Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 504--511.score: 45.0
  24. Anne M. Aimola Davies, Stephen Waterman, Rebekah C. White & Martin Davies (2013). When You Fail to See What You Were Told to Look For: Inattentional Blindness and Task Instructions. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):221-230.score: 45.0
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  25. Vanessa Beanland, Rosemary A. Allen & Kristen Pammer (2011). Attending to Music Decreases Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1282-1292.score: 45.0
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  26. Paola Bressan & Silvia Pizzighello (2008). The Attentional Cost of Inattentional Blindness. Cognition 106 (1):370-383.score: 45.0
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  27. Ula Cartwright-Finch & Nilli Lavie (2007). The Role of Perceptual Load in Inattentional Blindness. Cognition 102 (3):321-340.score: 45.0
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  28. Jan W. de Fockert & Andrew J. Bremner (2011). Release of Inattentional Blindness by High Working Memory Load: Elucidating the Relationship Between Working Memory and Selective Attention. Cognition 121 (3):400-408.score: 45.0
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  29. K. Humphrey (1999). Arien Mack and Irvin Rock, Inattentional Blindness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6:115-116.score: 45.0
     
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  30. Gustav Kuhn & Benjamin W. Tatler (2011). Misdirected by the Gap: The Relationship Between Inattentional Blindness and Attentional Misdirection. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):432-436.score: 45.0
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  31. Ken Nakayama (1999). Inattentional Blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):39.score: 45.0
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  32. Anne Richards, Emily M. Hannon & Melanie Vitkovitch (2012). Distracted by Distractors: Eye Movements in a Dynamic Inattentional Blindness Task. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):170-176.score: 45.0
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  33. Preston P. Thakral (2011). The Neural Substrates Associated with Inattentional Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1768-1775.score: 45.0
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  34. Ellen K. Levy (2012). An Artistic Exploration of Inattention Blindness†. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 5:174-174.score: 35.0
  35. Declan Smithies (2011). Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. 247--273.score: 30.0
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
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  36. Bence Nanay (2010). Attention and Perceptual Content. Analysis 70 (2):263-270.score: 30.0
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  37. Aaron Allen Schiller (2012). The Primacy of Fact Perception. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):575 - 593.score: 30.0
    After outlining an enactive account of fact perception, I consider J. L. Austin's discussion of the argument from illusion. From it I draw the conclusion that when fact perception is primary the objects perceived are those involved in the fact. A consideration of Adelson's checkershadow illusion shows that properties as basic as luminance are perceived in the contexts of facts as well. I thus conclude that when facts are perceived they structure our perception of objects and properties. I then argue (...)
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  38. Jakob Hohwy (2012). Attention and Conscious Perception in the Hypothesis Testing Brain. Frontiers in Psychology 3 (96).score: 30.0
    Conscious perception and attention are difficult to study, partly because their relation to each other is not fully understood. Rather than conceiving and studying them in isolation from each other it may be useful to locate them in an independently motivated, general framework, from which a principled account of how they relate can then transpire. Accordingly, these mental phenomena are here reviewed through the prism of the increasingly influential predictive coding framework. On this framework, conscious perception can be seen as (...)
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  39. Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.score: 18.0
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal (...)
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  40. Dirk Kindermann (2013). Relativism, Sceptical Paradox, and Semantic Blindness. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):585-603.score: 18.0
    Abstract Relativism about knowledge attributions is the view that a single occurrence of ‘S knows [does not know] that p’ may be true as assessed in one context and false as assessed in another context. It has been argued that relativism is equipped to accommodate all the data from speakers’ use of ‘know’ without recourse to an error theory. This is supposed to be relativism’s main advantage over contextualist and invariantist views. This paper argues that relativism does require the attribution (...)
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  41. N. Gangopadhyay (2010). Experiential Blindness Revisited: In Defense of a Case of Embodied Cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 11:396-407.score: 18.0
    The sensorimotor theory (Noe¨, 2004, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams & Aizawa, 2008; Aizawa, 2007) that the cases described by Noe¨ as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noe¨’s sensorimotor theory (...)
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  42. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2013). Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors. Acta Analytica 28 (2):161-177.score: 18.0
    The semantic blindness objection to contextualism challenges the view that there is no incompatibility between (i) denials of external-world knowledge in contexts where radical-deception scenarios are salient, and (ii) affirmations of external-world knowledge in contexts where such scenarios are not salient. Contextualism allegedly attributes a gross and implausible form of semantic incompetence in the use of the concept of knowledge to people who are otherwise quite competent in its use; this blindness supposedly consists in wrongly judging that there (...)
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  43. Mickey Gjerris (forthcoming). Willed Blindness: A Discussion of Our Moral Shortcomings in Relation to Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics:1-16.score: 18.0
    This article describes how we seem to live in a willed blindness towards the effects that our meat production and consumption have on animals, the environment and the climate. A willed blindness that cannot be explained by either lack of knowledge or scientific uncertainty. The blindness enables us to see ourselves as moral beings although our lack of reaction to the effects of our actions tells another story. The article describes the consequences of intensive meat production and (...)
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  44. Irina M. Harris & Paul E. Dux (2005). Orientation-Invariant Object Recognition: Evidence From Repetition Blindness. Cognition 95 (1):73-93.score: 18.0
    The question of whether object recognition is orientation-invariant or orientation-dependent was investigated using a repetition blindness (RB) paradigm. In RB, the second occurrence of a repeated stimulus is less likely to be reported, compared to the occurrence of a different stimulus, if it occurs within a short time of the first presentation. This failure is usually interpreted as a difficulty in assigning two separate episodic tokens to the same visual type. Thus, RB can provide useful information about which representations (...)
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  45. Steven B. Most Lingling Wang, Briana L. Kennedy (2012). When Emotion Blinds: A Spatiotemporal Competition Account of Emotion-Induced Blindness. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 18.0
    Emotional visual scenes are such powerful attractors of attention that they can disrupt perception of other stimuli that appear soon afterwards, an effect known as emotion-induced blindness. What mechanisms underlie this impact of emotion on perception? Evidence suggests that emotion-induced blindness may be distinguishable from closely related phenomena such as the orienting of spatial attention to emotional stimuli or the central resource bottlenecks commonly associated with the attentional blink. Instead, we suggest that emotion-induced blindness reflects relatively early (...)
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  46. Jarod L. Md Roland, Carl D. Bs Hacker, Jonathan D. Md Breshears, Charles M. PhD Gaona, R. Edward Md Hogan, Harold Burton, Maurizio Md Corbetta & Eric C. Md Leuthardt (2013). Brain Mapping in a Patient with Congenital Blindness – A Case for Multimodal Approaches. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 18.0
    Recent advances in basic neuroscience research across a wide range of methodologies have contributed significantly to our understanding of human cortical electrophysiology and functional brain imaging. Translation of this research into clinical neurosurgery has opened doors for advanced mapping of functionality that previously was prohibitively difficult, if not impossible. Here we present the case of a unique individual with congenital blindness and medically refractory epilepsy who underwent neurosurgical treatment of her seizures. Pre-operative evaluation presented the challenge of accurately and (...)
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  47. Steven M. Silverstein, Yushi Wang & Brian P. Keane (2012). Cognitive and Neuroplasticity Mechanisms by Which Congenital or Early Blindness May Confer a Protective Effect Against Schizophrenia. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 18.0
    Several authors have noted that there are no reported cases of people with schizophrenia who were born blind or who developed blindness shortly after birth, suggesting that congenital or early (C/E) blindness may serve as a protective factor against schizophrenia. By what mechanisms might this effect operate? Here, we hypothesize that C/E blindness offers protection by strengthening cognitive functions whose impairment characterizes schizophrenia, and by constraining cognitive processes that exhibit excessive flexibility in schizophrenia. After briefly summarizing evidence (...)
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  48. Brian P. Keane Steven M. Silverstein, Yushi Wang (2012). Cognitive and Neuroplasticity Mechanisms by Which Congenital or Early Blindness May Confer a Protective Effect Against Schizophrenia. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 18.0
    Several authors have noted that there are no reported cases of people with schizophrenia who were born blind or who developed blindness shortly after birth, suggesting that congenital or early (C/E) blindness may serve as a protective factor against schizophrenia. By what mechanisms might this effect operate? Here, we hypothesize that C/E blindness offers protection by strengthening cognitive functions whose impairment characterizes schizophrenia, and by constraining cognitive processes that exhibit excessive flexibility in schizophrenia. After briefly summarizing evidence (...)
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  49. Michael Osterheider Steffen Landgraf (2013). “To See or Not to See: That is the Question.” The “Protection-Against-Schizophrenia” (PaSZ) Model: Evidence From Congenital Blindness and Visuo-Cognitive Aberrations. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 18.0
    The causes of schizophrenia are still unknown. For the last one hundred years, though, both “absent” and “perfect” vision have been associated with a lower risk for schizophrenia. Hence, vision itself and aberrations in visual functioning may be fundamental to the development and etiological explanations of the disorder. In this paper, we present the “Protection-Against-Schizophrenia” (PaSZ) model, which grades the risk for developing schizophrenia as a function of an individual’s visual capacity. We review two vision perspectives: (1) “Absent” vision or (...)
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