Search results for 'inclinations' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Natural Law, Natural Inclinations & Douglas Flippen (1986). John F. Crosby. New Scholasticism 60 (3).score: 30.0
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  2. Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.score: 14.0
    Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to (...)
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  3. Sean Greenberg (2005). From Canon to Dialectic to Antinomy: Giving Inclinations Their Due. Inquiry 48 (3):232 – 248.score: 12.0
    In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is a natural dialectic with respect to morality (4:405), a different claim from those advanced in the first and second Critiques. Förster's challenge may therefore be reformulated as the problem of explaining why practical (...)
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  4. Jeff Greenberg, Daniel Sullivan, Spee Kosloff & Sheldon Solomon (2006). Souls Do Not Live by Cognitive Inclinations Alone, but by the Desire to Exist Beyond Death as Well. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):474-475.score: 12.0
    Bering's analysis is inadequate because it fails to consider past and present adult soul beliefs and the psychological functions they serve. We suggest that a valid folk psychology of souls must consider features of adult soul beliefs, the unique problem engendered by awareness of death, and terror management findings, in addition to cognitive inclinations toward dualistic and teleological thinking.
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  5. Gregory B. Sadler (2007). Freedom, Inclinations of the Will, and Virtue in Anselm's Moral Th Eory. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:91-108.score: 12.0
    Freedom, justice, and inclinations of the will have significant roles in St. Anselm’s moral theory, as does, I argue, virtues and vices, which can be understoodin relation to freedom and justice and as inclinations of the will. The first section of the paper discusses the relationship between freedom, justice, and the will inAnselm’s works. The second part explores Anselm’s distinctions between different aspects of the human will, as will-as-instrument, will-as-use, and will-as-inclination, then examines his further distinction of the (...)
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  6. Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). If Intuitions Must Be Evidential Then Philosophy is in Big Trouble. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):35-53.score: 9.0
    Many philosophers claim that intuitions are evidential. Yet it is hard to see how introspecting one's mental states could provide evidence for such synthetic truths as those concerning, for example, the abstract and the counterfactual. Such considerations have sometimes been taken to lead to mentalism---the view that philosophy must concern itself only with matters of concept application or other mind-dependent topics suited to a contemplative approach---but this provides us with a poor account of what it is that philosophers take themselves (...)
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  7. Anna Greco (2009). Natural Inclinations, Specialization, and the Philosopher-Rulers in Plato's Republic. Ancient Philosophy 29 (1):17-43.score: 9.0
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  8. Cornelius B. Pratt & Gerald W. McLaughlin (1989). Ethical Inclinations of Public Relations Majors. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 4 (1):68 – 91.score: 9.0
    Four primary ethical behaviors are explored in five situations among 258 undergraduate students, mostly in public relations (PR), in two mid?Atlantic public universities. Student self?reported ethical beliefs are found to be multidimensional, with data suggesting interpretations based on theories of reasoned action.
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  9. Douglas Flippen (1986). Natural Law and Natural Inclinations. New Scholasticism 60 (3):284-316.score: 9.0
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  10. Germain Grisez (1987). Natural Law and Natural Inclinations. New Scholasticism 61 (3):307-320.score: 9.0
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  11. Dwight Vate (1963). Kant's Ethics: Universality and the Inclinations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):3-7.score: 9.0
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  12. Barry Gower (1987). Planets and Probability: Daniel Bernouilli on the Inclinations of the Planetary Orbits. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 18 (4):441-454.score: 9.0
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  13. Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro (2005). Is Moral Worth Compatible with Cooperating Inclinations? Princípios 12 (17-18):05-18.score: 9.0
    la82 12.00 Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;} Algumas passagens bastante controversas dos Fundamentos da Metafísica dos Costumes sáo comumente interpretados como se Kant propusesse a tese de que as ações náo podem ter qualquer valor moral quando estiverem acompanhadas de inclinações ( Neigungen ) favoráveis a (...)
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  14. Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro (2010). Is Moral Worth Compatible with Cooperating Inclinations? Princípios 12 (17-18):05-18.score: 9.0
    Algumas passagens bastante controversas dos Fundamentos da Metafísica dos Costumes sáo comumente interpretados como se Kant propusesse a tese de que as ações náo podem ter qualquer valor moral quando estiverem acompanhadas de inclinações ( Neigungen ) favoráveis a tais ações. O que resulta dessa interpretaçáo é uma retrato de Kant como um severo defensor de uma moralidade em que sentimentos de compaixáo e assemelhados nada acrescentam ao valor moral de uma açáo, e em vez disso, o solapam. Neste artigo, (...)
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  15. Saju Chackalackal (2005). Kant on Inclinations:Alien'orHuman'? Journal of Dharma 30 (1):117.score: 9.0
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  16. R. Mary Hayden (1990). Natural Inclinations and Moral Absolutes. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:130-150.score: 9.0
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  17. John I. Jenkins (1993). Good and the Object of Natural Inclinations in St. Thomas Aquinas. Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3:62-96.score: 9.0
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  18. M. H. Kramer (2006). Incentives, Interests, and Inclinations: Legal Positivism Redefended. American Journal of Jurisprudence 51 (1):165-178.score: 9.0
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  19. Paul Hoffman (2012). Reasons, Causes, and Inclinations. In Martin Pickavé & Lisa Shapiro (eds.), Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 156.score: 9.0
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  20. Matthew Levering (2006). Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer, Pinckaers, McAleer. The Thomist 70 (2):155-201.score: 9.0
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  21. Alexander Meiklejohn (1948). Inclinations and Obligations. Berkeley, Univ. Of California Press.score: 9.0
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  22. Alexander Meiklejohn (1948). Testkey Sbie Inclinations and Obligations Updated 2006-05-11. Berkeley, Univ. Of California Press.score: 9.0
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  23. Luiza Palanciuc (2010). Jean-Claude Milner, Înclinatiile criminale ale Europei democratice/ Criminal Inclinations of a Democratic Europe. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 3 (8):134-139.score: 9.0
    Jean-Claude Milner, Les penchants criminels de l'Europe democratique Paris, Editions Verdier, Collection ́ Le sÈminaire de JÈrusalem a, 2003, 157 p.
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  24. Howard Pearce (2003). The Dream of Ascent and the Noise of Earth: Paradoxical Inclinations in Euripides's Bacchae, Shakespeare's The Tempest, and Stevens's" Of Modern Poetry". Analecta Husserliana 78:307-324.score: 9.0
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  25. R. Queraltomoreno (1994). The Metaphysical Theory of Inclinations and the Open Universe in the Philosophy of Popper, Karl. Pensamiento 50 (197):235-252.score: 9.0
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  26. G. E. Stevens (1985). Ethical Inclinations of Tomorrow's Managers. Journal of Business Ethics 4 (7):291-296.score: 9.0
     
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  27. A. Vendemiati (1997). Natural Inclinations and the Good. Parallel Readings of Aristotle's' Politica'by Thomas Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 89 (2-3):299-316.score: 9.0
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  28. Hossein Yahyazadeh (2010). The Effects of Family Factors on Drug Abuse Inclinations. Social Research 2 (5):123-142.score: 9.0
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  29. T. Ryan Byerly (2012). It Seems Like There Aren't Any Seemings. Philosophia 40 (4):771-782.score: 6.0
    Abstract I argue that the two primary motivations in the literature for positing seemings as sui generis mental states are insufficient to motivate this view. Because of this, epistemological views which attempt to put seemings to work don’t go far enough. It would be better to do the same work by appealing to what makes seeming talk true rather than simply appealing to seeming talk. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8 Authors T. Ryan Byerly, Department of Philosophy, Baylor (...)
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  30. Jason Brennan (2008). What If Kant Had Had a Cognitive Theory of the Emotions? In Valerio Hrsg v. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Walter de Gruyter. 1--219.score: 5.0
    Emotional cognitivists, such as the Stoics and Aristotle, hold that emotions have cognitive content, whereas noncognitivists, like Plato and Kant, believe the emotions to be nonrational bodily movements. I ask, taking Martha Nussbaum's account of cognitivism, what if Kant had become convinced of a cognitive theory of the emotions, what changes would this require in his moral philosophy. Surprisingly, since this represents a radical shift in his psychology, it changes almost nothing. I show that Kant's account of continence, virtue, the (...)
     
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  31. Arthur L. Miller & Richard Sheldon (1969). Magnitude Estimation of Average Length and Average Inclination. Journal of Experimental Psychology 81 (1):16.score: 5.0
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  32. Paolo Palmieri (2011). A History of Galileo's Inclined Plane Experiment and its Philosophical Implications. Edwin Mellen Press.score: 5.0
     
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  33. N. J. Wade (1972). Effect of Forward Head Inclination on Visual Orientation During Lateral Body Tilt. Journal of Experimental Psychology 96 (1):203.score: 5.0
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  34. Tamar Schapiro (2009). The Nature of Inclination. Ethics 119 (2):229–256.score: 4.0
    There is a puzzle in the very notion of passive motivation ("passion" or "inclination"). To be motivated is not simply to be moved from the outside. Motivation is in some sense self-movement. But how can an agent be passive with respect to her own motivation? How is passive motivation possible? In this paper I defend the ancient view that inclination stems from a motivational source independent of reason, a motivational source that is both agential and nonrational.
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  35. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.score: 3.0
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. (...)
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  36. Barbara Herman (1981). On the Value of Acting From the Motive of Duty. Philosophical Review 90 (3):359-382.score: 3.0
    Richard Henson attempts to take the sting out of this view of Kant on moral worth by arguing (i) that attending to the phenomenon of the overdetermination of actions leads one to see that Kant might have had two distinct views of moral worth, only one of which requires the absence of cooperating inclinations, and (ii) that when Kant insists that there is moral worth only when an action is done from the motive of duty alone, he need not (...)
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  37. Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action. In Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge University Press.score: 3.0
    Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral value, are not mere acts, but actions: (...)
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  38. Timothy Williamson (2004). Philosphical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism About Judgement. Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.score: 3.0
    1. What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for (...)
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  39. Markku Roinila (2011). Leibniz on Emotions and the Human Body. In Breger Herbert, Herbst Jürgen & Erdner Sven (eds.), Natur und Subjekt (IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress Vorträge). Leibniz Geschellschaft.score: 3.0
    Descartes argued that the passions of the soul were immediately felt in the body, as the animal spirits, affected by the movement of the pineal gland, spread through the body. In Leibniz the effect of emotions in the body is a different question as he did not allow the direct interaction between the mind and the body, although maintaining a psychophysical parallelism between them. -/- In general, he avoids discussing emotions in bodily terms, saying that general inclinations, passions, pleasures (...)
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  40. Simon Blackburn, Human Reasons.score: 3.0
    In this paper I contemplate two phenomena that have impressed theorists concerned with the domain of reasons and of normativity. One is the much-discussed ‘externality’ of reasons. Reasons are just there, anyway. They exist whether or not agents take any notice of them. They do not only exist in the light of contingent desires or mere inclinations. They are ‘external’ not ‘internal’. They bear on us, even when through ignorance or wickedness we take no notice of them. They thus (...)
     
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  41. Jonathan Webber (2006). Virtue, Character and Situation. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):193-213.score: 3.0
    Philosophers have recently argued that traditional discussions of virtue and character presuppose an account of behaviour that experimental psychology has shown to be false. Behaviour does not issue from global traits such as prudence, temperance, courage or fairness, they claim, but from local traits such as sailing-in-rough-weather-with-friends-courage and office-party-temperance. The data employed provides evidence for this view only if we understand it in the light of a behaviourist construal of traits in terms of stimulus and response, rather than in the (...)
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  42. Margaret P. Gilbert (2006). Rationality in Collective Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.score: 3.0
    Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the (...)
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  43. Thomas Mormann (2007). Carnap's Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):127 - 146.score: 3.0
    Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally (...)
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  44. Richard Kraut (2007). Nature in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. Social Philosophy and Policy 24 (2):199-219.score: 3.0
    Aristotle's doctrine that human beings are political animals is, in part, an empirical thesis, and posits an inclination to enter into cooperative relationships, even apart from the instrumental benefits of doing so. Aristotle's insight is that human cooperation rests on a non-rational propensity to trust even strangers, when conditions are favorable. Turning to broader questions about the role of nature in human development, I situate Aristotle's attitude towards our natural propensities between two extremes: he rejects both the view that we (...)
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  45. David Bain (2013). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.score: 3.0
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue (...)
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  46. Henry E. Allison (2007). Comments on Guyer. Inquiry 50 (5):480 – 488.score: 3.0
    Guyer argues for four major theses. First, in his early, pre-critical discussions of morality, Kant advocated a version of rational egoism, in which freedom, understood naturalistically as a freedom from domination by both one's own inclinations and from other people, rather than happiness, is the fundamental value. From this point of view, the function of the moral law is to prescribe rules best suited to the preservation and maximization of such freedom, just as on the traditional eudaemonistic account it (...)
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  47. Paul Muench (1993). The Analogy Between Psychoanalysis and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophical Methods. Dissertation, University of Oxfordscore: 3.0
    Wittgenstein’s analogy between psychoanalysis and his later philosophical methods is explored and developed. Historical evidence supports the claim that Wittgenstein characterized an early version of his general remarks on philosophy (§§89-133 in the Philosophical Investigations) as a sustained comparison with psychoanalysis. A non-adversarial, therapeutic interpretation is adopted towards Wittgenstein which emphasizes his focus on dissolving the metaphysical puzzlement of particular troubled individuals. A “picture” of Freudian psychoanalysis is sketched which highlights several features of Freud’s therapeutic techniques and his conception of (...)
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  48. Andrew Cullison (2010). What Are Seemings? Ratio 23 (3):260-274.score: 3.0
    We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. Many think that these seeming states can yield justified beliefs. Very few have seriously explored what these seeming states are. I argue that seeming states are not plausibly analyzed in terms of beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions to believe, or inclinations to believe. Given that the main candidates for analyzing seeming states are unsatisfactory, I argue for a brute view of seemings that treats seeming states as irreducible propositional (...)
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  49. Andreas Kemmerling, Glamorous Self Knowledge – What's It Good For?score: 3.0
    We have self-knowledge of various sorts: knowledge of things we have done or suffered, for example, and some knowledge of who we are: of our character-traits, our temper, our inclinations, weaknesses, feelings, addictions, worries, lusts and so on. Most of this knowledge is human knowledge of the regular kind, nothing exciting about it, epistemologically speaking.
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  50. David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.score: 3.0
    Suppose that we want to frame a conception of reasons that isn't relativized to the inclinations of particular agents. That is, we want to identify particular things that count as reasons for acting simpliciter and not merely as reasons for some agents rather than others, depending on their inclinations. One way to frame such a conception is to name some features that an action can have and to say that they count as reasons for someone whether or not (...)
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