Search results for 'inductive risk' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Matthew J. Brown (2013). Values in Science Beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):829-839.
    Proponents of the value ladenness of science rely primarily on arguments from underdetermination or inductive risk, which share the premise that we should only consider values where the evidence runs out or leaves uncertainty; they adopt a criterion of lexical priority of evidence over values. The motivation behind lexical priority is to avoid reaching conclusions on the basis of wishful thinking rather than good evidence. This is a real concern, however, that giving lexical priority to evidential considerations (...)
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  2.  14
    Stephen John (2015). Inductive Risk and the Contexts of Communication. Synthese 192 (1):79-96.
    In recent years, the argument from inductive risk against value free science has enjoyed a revival. This paper investigates and clarifies this argument through means of a case-study: neonicitinoid research. Sect. 1 argues that the argument from inductive risk is best conceptualised as a claim about scientists’ communicative obligations. Sect. 2 then shows why this argument is inapplicable to “public communication”. Sect. 3 outlines non-epistemic reasons why non-epistemic values should not play a role in public communicative (...)
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  3.  21
    Andrea Scarantino (2010). Inductive Risk and Justice in Kidney Allocation. Bioethics 24 (8):421-430.
    How should UNOS deal with the presence of scientific controversies on the risk factors for organ rejection when designing its allocation policies? The answer I defend in this paper is that the more undesirable the consequences of making a mistake in accepting a scientific hypothesis, the higher the degree of confirmation required for its acceptance. I argue that the application of this principle should lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that ‘less than perfect’ Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) matches (...)
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  4.  3
    Rumour Risk (2000). Part III Mediating Technologies of Risk. In Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck & Joost van Loon (eds.), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory. Sage 136.
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  5. Roger Stanev (forthcoming). Inductive Risk and Values in Composite Outcome Measures. In Kevin Elliot & Ted Richards (eds.), Exploring Inductive Risk. Oxford University Press
    The use of composite outcomes is becoming widespread in clinical trials. By combining individual outcome measures into a composite, researchers claim a composite can increase statistical precision and trial efficiency, expediting the trial by reducing sample size and cost, and consequently enabling researchers to answer questions that could not otherwise be answered. Another rationale given for using a composite is that it provides a measure of the net effect of the intervention that is more patient-relevant than any single outcome measure. (...)
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  6. Heather Douglas (2000). Inductive Risk and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and (...)
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  7.  97
    Daniel Steel (2010). Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
    Critics of the ideal of value‐free science often assume that they must reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. I argue that this assumption is mistaken and that the distinction can be used to clarify and defend the argument from inductive risk, which challenges the value‐free ideal. I develop the idea that the characteristic feature of epistemic values is that they promote, either intrinsically or extrinsically, the attainment of truths. This proposal is shown to answer common objections (...)
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  8.  37
    Daniel Steel (2013). Acceptance, Values, and Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):818-828.
    The argument from inductive risk attempts to show that practical and ethical costs of errors should influence standards of evidence for accepting scientific claims. A common objection charges that this argument presupposes a behavioral theory of acceptance that is inappropriate for science. I respond by showing that the argument from inductive risk is supported by a nonbehavioral theory of acceptance developed by Cohen, which defines acceptance in terms of premising. Moreover, I argue that theories designed to (...)
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  9.  50
    Ingo Brigandt (2015). Social Values Influence the Adequacy Conditions of Scientific Theories: Beyond Inductive Risk. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):326-356.
    The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive (...). It maintains that the more severe the social consequences of erroneously accepting a theory would be, the more evidence is needed before the theory may be accepted. However, an implication of this position is that increasing evidence makes the impact of social values converge to zero; and I argue for a stronger role for social values. On this position, social values may determine a theory’s conditions of adequacy, which among other things can include co.. (shrink)
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  10.  11
    Justin B. Biddle (2016). Inductive Risk, Epistemic Risk, and Overdiagnosis of Disease. Perspectives on Science 24 (2):192-205.
    Philosophers interested in the role of values in science have focused much attention on the argument from inductive risk. In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of authors argued that value judgments play an ineliminable role in the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses. No hypothesis is ever verified with certainty, and so a decision to accept or reject a hypothesis depends upon whether the evidence is sufficiently strong. But whether the evidence is sufficiently strong depends upon the consequences (...)
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  11. of Choice Involving Risk (1979). The 1952 Allais Theory of Choice Involving Risk. In Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.), Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel 25.
     
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  12.  14
    Kayo Sakamoto & Masanori Nakagawa (2007). Risk Context Effects in Inductive Reasoning: An Experimental and Computational Modeling Study. In D. C. Richardson B. Kokinov (ed.), Modeling and Using Context. Springer 425--438.
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  13.  22
    Justin B. Biddle & Anna Leuschner (2015). Climate Skepticism and the Manufacture of Doubt: Can Dissent in Science Be Epistemically Detrimental? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):261-278.
    The aim of this paper is to address the neglected but important problem of differentiating between epistemically beneficial and epistemically detrimental dissent. By “dissent,” we refer to the act of objecting to a particular conclusion, especially one that is widely held. While dissent in science can clearly be beneficial, there might be some instances of dissent that not only fail to contribute to scientific progress, but actually impede it. Potential examples of this include the tobacco industry’s funding of studies that (...)
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  14. Boaz Miller (2014). Science, Values, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2):253-270.
    Philosophers have recently argued, against a prevailing orthodoxy, that standards of knowledge partly depend on a subject’s interests; the more is at stake for the subject, the less she is in a position to know. This view, which is dubbed “Pragmatic Encroachment” has historical and conceptual connections to arguments in philosophy of science against the received model of science as value free. I bring the two debates together. I argue that Pragmatic Encroachment and the model of value-laden science reinforce each (...)
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  15.  24
    Kristen Intemann (2015). Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
    While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...)
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  16.  23
    Stephen John (2015). The Example of the IPCC Does Not Vindicate the Value Free Ideal: A Reply to Gregor Betz. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (1):1-13.
    In a recent paper, Gregor Betz has defended the value-free ideal: “the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic values”against the methodological critique, by reference to the work of the International Panel on Climate Change . This paper argues that Betz’s defence is unsuccessful. First, Betz’s argument is sketched, and it is shown that the IPCC does not avoid the need to “translate” claims. In Section 2, it is argued that Betz mischaracterises the force of the methodological (...)
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  17.  29
    Ahmed Y. Tawfik (2004). Inductive Reasoning and Chance Discovery. Minds and Machines 14 (4):441-451.
    This paper argues that chance (risk or opportunity) discovery is challenging, from a reasoning point of view, because it represents a dilemma for inductive reasoning. Chance discovery shares many features with the grue paradox. Consequently, Bayesian approaches represent a potential solution. The Bayesian solution evaluates alternative models generated using a temporal logic planner to manage the chance. Surprise indices are used in monitoring the conformity of the real world and the assessed probabilities. Game theoretic approaches are proposed to (...)
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  18.  2
    Giovanni B. Moneta (1991). Ambiguity, Inductive Systems, and the Modeling of Subjective Probability Judgements. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):267 – 285.
    Gambles which induce the decision-maker to experience ambiguity about the relative likelihood of events often give rise to ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-avoidance, which imply violation of additivity and Savage's axioms. The inability of the subjective Bayesian theory to account for these empirical regularities has determined a dichotomy between normative and descriptive views of subjective probability. This paper proposes a framework within which the two perspectives can be reconciled. First, a formal definition of ambiguity is given over a continuum ranging from ignorance (...)
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  19.  58
    Hugh LaFollette (2005). Living on a Slippery Slope. Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):475 - 499.
    Our actions, individually and collectively, inevitably affect others, ourselves, and our institutions. They shape the people we become and the kind of world we inhabit. Sometimes those consequences are positive, a giant leap for moral humankind. Other times they are morally regressive. This propensity of current actions to shape the future is morally important. But slippery slope arguments are a poor way to capture it. That is not to say we can never develop cogent slippery slope arguments. Nonetheless, given their (...)
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  20.  48
    Steve G. Hoffman (2006). How to Punch Someone and Stay Friends: An Inductive Theory of Simulation. Sociological Theory 24 (2):170 - 193.
    One way to study ontology is to assess how people differentiate real activities from others, and a good case is how groups organize simulation. However, social scientists have tended to discuss simulation in more limited ways, either as a symptom of postmodernism or as an instrumental artifact. Missing is how groups organize simulations to prepare for the future. First, I formulate a definition of simulation as a group-level technique, which includes the qualities of everyday ontology, playfulness, risk and consequence (...)
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  21. John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
    Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its (...)
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  22.  41
    Kevin C. Elliott (2013). Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
    In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, (...)
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  23.  4
    Stephen John (2016). From Social Values to P‐Values: The Social Epistemology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (2).
    In this article I ask two questions prompted by the phenomenon of ‘politically patterned’ climate change denial. First, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to cognitive experts’ testimony? Building on work in philosophy of science on inductive risk, I argue they can. Second, can an individual's political commitments provide her with good reasons not to defer to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's testimony? I argue that they cannot, because of the (...)
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  24.  37
    P. D. Magnus (2008). Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):303 – 315.
    It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively (...)
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  25. Lara Buchak (2016). Revisiting Risk and Rationality: A Reply to Pettigrew and Briggs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):841-862.
    I have claimed that risk-weighted expected utility maximizers are rational, and that their preferences cannot be captured by expected utility theory. Richard Pettigrew and Rachael Briggs have recently challenged these claims. Both authors argue that only EU-maximizers are rational. In addition, Pettigrew argues that the preferences of REU-maximizers can indeed be captured by EU theory, and Briggs argues that REU-maximizers lose a valuable tool for simplifying their decision problems. I hold that their arguments do not succeed and that my (...)
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  26.  89
    N. Athanassoulis & A. Ross (2010). A Virtue Ethical Account of Making Decisions About Risk. Journal of Risk Research 13 (2):217.
    Abstract -/- Most discussions of risk are developed in broadly consequentialist terms, focusing on the outcomes of risks as such. This paper will provide an alternative account of risk from a virtue ethical perspective, shifting the focus to the decision to take the risk. Making ethical decisions about risk is, we will argue, not fundamentally about the actual chain of events that the decision sets in process, but about the reasonableness of the decision to take the (...)
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  27. Colleen Murphy & Paolo Gardoni (2010). Assessing Capability Instead of Achieved Functionings in Risk Analysis. Journal of Risk Research 13 (2):137-147.
    A capability approach has been proposed to risk analysis, where risk is conceptualized as the probability that capabilities are reduced. Capabilities refer to the genuine opportunities of individuals to achieve valuable doings and beings, such as being adequately nourished. Such doings and beings are called functionings. A current debate in risk analysis and other fields where a capability approach has been developed concerns whether capabilities or actual achieved functionings should be used. This paper argues that in (...) analysis the consequences of hazardous scenarios should be conceptualized in terms of capabilities, not achieved functionings. Furthermore, the paper proposes a method for assessing capabilities, which considers the levels of achieved functionings of other individuals with similar boundary conditions. The capability of an individual can then be captured statistically based on the variability of the achieved functionings over the considered population. (shrink)
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  28.  20
    Robin Pope & Reinhard Selten (2010/2011). Risk in a Simple Temporal Framework for Expected Utility Theory and for SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory’, Risk and Decision Analysis, 2(1), 5-32. Selten Co-Author. Risk and Decision Analysis 2 (1).
    The paper re-expresses arguments against the normative validity of expected utility theory in Robin Pope (1983, 1991a, 1991b, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007). These concern the neglect of the evolving stages of knowledge ahead (stages of what the future will bring). Such evolution is fundamental to an experience of risk, yet not consistently incorporated even in axiomatised temporal versions of expected utility. Its neglect entails a disregard of emotional and financial effects on well-being before a particular (...) is resolved. These arguments are complemented with an analysis of the essential uniqueness property in the context of temporal and atemporal expected utility theory and a proof of the absence of a limit property natural in an axiomatised approach to temporal expected utility theory. Problems of the time structure of risk are investigated in a simple temporal framework restricted to a subclass of temporal lotteries in the sense of David Kreps and Evan Porteus (1978). This subclass is narrow but wide enough to discuss basic issues. It will be shown that there are serious objections against the modification of expected utility theory axiomatised by Kreps and Porteus (1978, 1979). By contrast the umbrella theory proffered by Pope that she has now termed SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, offers an epistemically consistent framework within which to construct particular models to deal with particular decision situations. A model by Caplin and Leahy (2001) will also be discussed and contrasted with the modelling within SKAT (Pope, Leopold and Leitner 2007). (shrink)
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  29.  14
    James Franklin (2005). Risk-Driven Global Compliance Regimes in Banking and Accounting: The New Law Merchant. Law, Probability and Risk 4 (4):237-250.
    Powerful, technically complex international compliance regimes have developed recently in certain professions that deal with risk: banking (the Basel II regime), accountancy (IFRS) and the actuarial profession. The need to deal with major risks has acted as a strong driver of international co-operation to create enforceable international semilegal systems, as happened earlier in such fields as international health regulations. This regulation in technical fields contrasts with the failure of an international general-purpose political and legal regime to develop. We survey (...)
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  30.  37
    Lara Buchak (2013). Risk and Rationality. OUP Oxford.
    Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.
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  31.  32
    Yu-Shan Chen & Ching-Hsun Chang (2013). Greenwash and Green Trust: The Mediation Effects of Green Consumer Confusion and Green Perceived Risk. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 114 (3):489-500.
    The paper explores the influence of greenwash on green trust and discusses the mediation roles of green consumer confusion and green perceived risk. The research object of this study focuses on Taiwanese consumers who have the purchase experience of information and electronics products in Taiwan. This research employs an empirical study by means of the structural equation modeling. The results show that greenwash is negatively related to green trust. Therefore, this study suggests that companies must reduce their greenwash (...)
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  32.  72
    Bryan W. Husted (2005). Risk Management, Real Options, Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2):175 - 183.
    The relationship of corporate social responsibility to risk management has been treated sporadically in the business society literature. Using real options theory, I develop the notion of corporate social responsibility as a real option its implications for risk management. Real options theory allows for a strategic view of corporate social responsibility. Specifically, real options theory suggests that corporate social responsibility should be negatively related to the firm’s ex ante downside business risk.
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  33.  11
    Saurabh Mishra & Sachin B. Modi (2013). Positive and Negative Corporate Social Responsibility, Financial Leverage, and Idiosyncratic Risk. Journal of Business Ethics 117 (2):431-448.
    Existing research on the financial implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) for firms has predominantly focused on positive aspects of CSR, overlooking that firms also undertake actions and initiatives that qualify as negative CSR. Moreover, studies in this area have not investigated how both positive and negative CSR affect the financial risk of firms. As such, in this research, the authors provide a framework linking both positive and negative CSR to idiosyncratic risk of firms. While investigating these relationships, (...)
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  34. Ulrich Beck (2012). World Risk Society. In Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis, Stig Andur Pedersen & Vincent F. Hendricks (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology. Wiley-Blackwell
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  35.  15
    Hoje Jo & Haejung Na (2012). Does CSR Reduce Firm Risk? Evidence From Controversial Industry Sectors. Journal of Business Ethics 110 (4):441-456.
    In this paper, we examine the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm risk in controversial industry sectors. We develop and test two competing hypotheses of risk reduction and window dressing. Employing an extensive U.S. sample during the 1991-2010 period from controversial industry firms, such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and others, we find that CSR engagement inversely affects firm risk after controlling for various firm characteristics. To deal with endogeneity issue, we adopt a system equation approach (...)
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  36.  44
    Michèle Cohen, Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (2011). An Experimental Investigation of Imprecision Attitude and its Relation with Risk Attitude and Impatience. Theory and Decision 71 (1):81-110.
    We report in this paper the result of three experiments on risk, ambiguity and time attitude. The first two differed by the population considered (students vs. general population) while the third one used a different protocol and concerned students and portfolio managers. We find quite a lot of heterogeneity at the individual level. Of principal interest was the elicitation of risk, time and ambiguity attitudes and the relationship among these (model free) measures. We find that on the student (...)
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  37.  71
    Robert Smithson (forthcoming). The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv029.
    Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the (...)
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  38.  84
    Govind C. Persad (2009). Risk, Everyday Intuitions, and the Institutional Value of Tort Law. Stan. L. Rev 62:1445.
    This Note offers a normative critique of cost-benefit analysis, one informed by deontological moral theory, in the context of the debate over whether tort litigation or a non-tort approach is the appropriate response to mass harm. The first Part argues that the difference between lay and expert intuitions about risk and harm often reflects a difference in normative judgments about the existing facts, rather than a difference in belief about what facts exist, which makes the lay intuitions more (...)
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  39. Allison Ross & Nafsika Athanassoulis (2010). The Social Nature of Engineering and its Implications for Risk Taking. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (1):147-168.
    Making decisions with an, often significant, element of risk seems to be an integral part of many of the projects of the diverse profession of engineering. Whether it be decisions about the design of products, manufacturing processes, public works, or developing technological solutions to environmental, social and global problems, risk taking seems inherent to the profession. Despite this, little attention has been paid to the topic and specifically to how our understanding of engineering as a distinctive profession might (...)
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  40.  30
    Jeffrey Goodman & Daniel Flage (2012). On 'Deduction' and the Inductive/Deductive Distinction. Studies in Logic 5 (3).
    The definitions of ‘deduction’ found in virtually every introductory logic textbook would encourage us to believe that the inductive/deductive distinction is a distinction among kinds of arguments and that the extension of ‘deduction’ is a determinate class of arguments. In this paper, we argue that that this approach is mistaken. Specifically, we defend the claim that typical definitions of ‘deduction’ operative in attempts to get at the induction/deduction distinction are either too narrow or insufficiently precise. We conclude by presenting (...)
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  41.  43
    Chechen Liao, Hong-Nan Lin & Yu-Ping Liu (2010). Predicting the Use of Pirated Software: A Contingency Model Integrating Perceived Risk with the Theory of Planned Behavior. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 91 (2):237 - 252.
    As software piracy continues to be a threat to the growth of national and global economies, understanding why people continue to use pirated software and learning how to discourage the use of pirated software are urgent and important issues. In addition to applying the theory of planned behavior (TPB) perspective to capture behavioral intention to use pirated software, this paper considers perceived risk as a salient belief influencing attitude and intention toward using pirated software. Four perceived risk components (...)
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  42.  32
    Duncan Pritchard (2015). Risk. Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
    In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti-risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal (...)
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  43.  20
    Gary E. Marchant, Douglas J. Sylvester & Kenneth W. Abbott (2008). Risk Management Principles for Nanotechnology. NanoEthics 2 (1):43-60.
    Risk management of nanotechnology is challenged by the enormous uncertainties about the risks, benefits, properties, and future direction of nanotechnology applications. Because of these uncertainties, traditional risk management principles such as acceptable risk, cost–benefit analysis, and feasibility are unworkable, as is the newest risk management principle, the precautionary principle. Yet, simply waiting for these uncertainties to be resolved before undertaking risk management efforts would not be prudent, in part because of the growing public concerns about (...)
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  44.  38
    Jennifer Kuzma & John C. Besley (2008). Ethics of Risk Analysis and Regulatory Review: From Bio- to Nanotechnology. [REVIEW] NanoEthics 2 (2):149-162.
    Risk analysis and regulatory systems are usually evaluated according to utilitarian frameworks, as they are viewed to operate “objectively” by considering the health, environmental, and economic impacts of technological applications. Yet, the estimation of impacts during risk analysis and the decisions in regulatory review are affected by value choices of actors and stakeholders; attention to principles such as autonomy, justice, and integrity; and power relationships. In this article, case studies of biotechnology are used to illustrate how non-utilitarian principles (...)
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  45.  10
    Barbara Osimani (2013). Until RCT-Proven? On the Asymmetry of Evidence Requirements for Risk Assessment. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):454-462.
    The problem of collecting, analyzing and evaluating evidence on adverse drug reactions (ADRs) is an example of the more general class of epistemological problems related to scientific inference and prediction, as well as a central problem of the health-care practice. Philosophical discussions have critically analysed the methodological pitfalls and epistemological implications of evidence assessment in medicine, however they have mainly focused on evidence of treatment efficacy. Most of this work is devoted to statistical methods of causal inference with a special (...)
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  46.  91
    Ronald Francis & Anona Armstrong (2003). Ethics as a Risk Management Strategy: The Australian Experience. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 45 (4):375 - 385.
    This article addresses the connection of ethics to risk management, and argues that there are compelling reasons to consider good ethical practice to be an essential part of such risk management. That connection has significant commercial outcomes, which include identifying potential problems, preventing fraud, the preservation of corporate reputation, and the mitigation of court penalties should any transgression arise. Information about the legal position, examples of cases, and arguments about the potential benefits of ethics are canvassed. The orientation (...)
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  47. Bienke M. Janssen, Tine Van Regenmortel & Tineke A. Abma (2012). Balancing Risk Prevention and Health Promotion: Towards a Harmonizing Approach in Care for Older People in the Community. Health Care Analysis 22 (1):1-21.
    Many older people in western countries express a desire to live independently and stay in control of their lives for as long as possible in spite of the afflictions that may accompany old age. Consequently, older people require care at home and additional support. In some care situations, tension and ambiguity may arise between professionals and clients whose views on risk prevention or health promotion may differ. Following Antonovsky’s salutogenic framework, different perspectives between professionals and clients on the (...)
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    Kristina Blennow, Johannes Persson, Annika Wallin, Niklas Vareman & Erik Persson (2014). Understanding Risk in Forest Ecosystem Services: Implications for Effective Risk Management, Communication and Planning. Forestry 87:219-228.
    Uncertainty, insufficient information or information of poor quality, limited cognitive capacity and time, along with value conflicts and ethical considerations, are all aspects thatmake risk managementand riskcommunication difficult. This paper provides a review of different risk concepts and describes how these influence risk management, communication and planning in relation to forest ecosystem services. Based on the review and results of empirical studies, we suggest that personal assessment of risk is decisive in the management of forest ecosystem (...)
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    Daniel Rasmussen & Chris Eliasmith (2011). A Neural Model of Rule Generation in Inductive Reasoning. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (1):140-153.
    Inductive reasoning is a fundamental and complex aspect of human intelligence. In particular, how do subjects, given a set of particular examples, generate general descriptions of the rules governing that set? We present a biologically plausible method for accomplishing this task and implement it in a spiking neuron model. We demonstrate the success of this model by applying it to the problem domain of Raven's Progressive Matrices, a widely used tool in the field of intelligence testing. The model is (...)
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  50. Lara Buchak (2014). Risk and Tradeoffs. Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.
    The orthodox theory of instrumental rationality, expected utility (EU) theory, severely restricts the way in which risk-considerations can figure into a rational individual's preferences. It is argued here that this is because EU theory neglects an important component of instrumental rationality. This paper presents a more general theory of decision-making, risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory, of which expected utility maximization is a special case. According to REU theory, the weight that each outcome gets in decision-making is not the (...)
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