Search results for 'innateness' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Shaun Nichols (2005). Innateness and Moral Psychology. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 353--369.score: 25.0
    Although linguistic nativism has received the bulk of attention in contemporary innateness debates, moral nativism has perhaps an even deeper ancestry. If linguistic nativism is Cartesian, moral nativism is Platonic. Moral nativism has taken a backseat to linguistic nativism in contemporary discussions largely because Chomsky made a case for linguistic nativism characterized by unprecedented rigor. Hence it is not surprising that recent attempts to revive the thesis that we have innate moral knowledge have drawn on Chomsky’s framework. I’ll argue, (...)
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  2. Steven Gross & Georges Rey (forthcoming). Innateness. In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.
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  3. Andre Ariew (1999). Innateness is Canalization: In Defense of a Developmental Account of Innateness. In , [Book Chapter] (in Press). MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. S19-S27.score: 24.0
    Lorenz proposed in his (1935) articulation of a theory of behavioral instincts that the objective of ethology is to distinguish behaviors that are “innate” from behaviors that are “learned” (or “acquired”). Lorenz’s motive was to open the investigation of certain “adaptive” behaviors to evolutionary theorizing. Accordingly, since innate behaviors are “genetic”, they are open to such investigation. By Lorenz’s light an innate/acquired or learned dichotomy rested on a familiar Darwinian distinction between genes and environments. Ever since Lorenz, ascriptions of (...) have become widespread in the cognitive, behavioral, and biological sciences. The trend continues despite decades of strong arguments that show, in particular, the dichotomy that Lorenz invoked in his theory of behavioral instincts is literally false: no biological trait is the product of genes alone. Some critics suggest that the failure of Lorenz’s account shows that innateness is not well-defined in biology and the practice of ascribing innateness to various biological traits should be dropped from respectable science. Elsewhere (Ariew 1996) I argued that despite the arguments of critics, there really is a biological phenomenon underlying the concept of innateness. On my view, innateness is best understood in terms of C.H. Waddington’s concept of “canalization”, i.e. the degree to which a trait is innate is the degree to which its developmental outcome is canalized. The degree to which a developmental outcome is canalized is the degree to which the developmental process is bound to produce a particular endstate despite environmental fluctuations both in the development’s initial state and during the course of development. The canalization account differs in many ways to the traditional ways that ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz originally understood the concept of innateness. Most importantly, on the canalization account the distinction between innate and acquired is not a dichotomy, as Konrad Lorenz had it, but rather a matter of degree difference that lies along a spectrum with highly canalized development outcomes on the one end and highly environmentally sensitive development outcomes on the other end. Nevertheless, I justified the canalization account on the basis of a set of desiderata or criteria that I suggested falls-out of what seemed uncontroversial about Lorenz’s account of innateness (briefly): innateness is a property of a developing individual, innateness denotes environmental stability, and innate-ascriptions are useful in certain natural selection explanations (more below). From that same set of desiderata I argued (in my 1996) that neither the concept of heritability nor of norms of reactions—two concepts from population genetics—suffice to ground innateness. In this essay, I wish to provide further support of the canalization account in two ways. First, I wish to better motivate the desiderata by revisiting a debate between Konrad Lorenz and Daniel Lehrman over the meaning and explanatory usefulness of innate ascriptions in ethology. Second, I wish to compare my canalization account of innateness with accounts proposed by contemporary philosophers, one by Stephen Stich (1975), another by Elliott Sober (forthcoming), and a third by William Wimsatt (1986). (shrink)
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  4. Paul Griffiths (2002). What is Innateness? The Monist 85 (1):70-85.score: 24.0
    In behavioral ecology some authors regard the innateness concept as irretrievably confused whilst others take it to refer to adaptations. In cognitive psychology, however, whether traits are 'innate' is regarded as a significant question and is often the subject of heated debate. Several philosophers have tried to define innateness with the intention of making sense of its use in cognitive psychology. In contrast, I argue that the concept is irretrievably confused. The vernacular innateness concept represents a key (...)
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  5. Matteo Mameli & Patrick Bateson (2006). Innateness and the Sciences. Biology and Philosophy 21 (2):155-188.score: 24.0
    The concept of innateness is a part of folk wisdom but is also used by biologists and cognitive scientists. This concept has a legitimate role to play in science only if the colloquial usage relates to a coherent body of evidence. We examine many different candidates for the post of scientific successor of the folk concept of innateness. We argue that none of these candidates is entirely satisfactory. Some of the candidates are more interesting and useful than others, (...)
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  6. Paul Griffiths, Edouard Machery & Stefan Linquist (2009). The Vernacular Concept of Innateness. Mind and Language 24 (5):605-630.score: 24.0
    The proposal that the concept of innateness expresses a 'folk biological' theory of the 'inner natures' of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive participants to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our results explain the intuitive appeal of existing philosophical analyses of the innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why these analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples. We argue that this explanation undermines the appeal of these analyses, whether understood as analyses (...)
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  7. James Maclaurin (2002). The Resurrection of Innateness. In The Monist. 105-130.score: 24.0
    The notion of innateness is widely used, particularly in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and linguistics. Despite this popularity, it remains a controversial idea. This is partly because of the variety of ways in which it can be explicated and partly because it appears to embody the suggestion that we can determine the relative causal contributions of genes and environment in the development of biological individuals. As these causes are not independent, the claim is metaphysically suspect. This paper argues (...)
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  8. David Wendler (1996). Innateness as an Explanatory Concept. Biology and Philosophy 11 (1):89-116.score: 24.0
    Although many of the issues surrounding innateness have received a good deal of attention lately, the basic concept of token innateness has been largely ignored. In the present paper, I try to correct this imbalance by offering an account of the innateness of token traits. I begin by explaining Stephen Stich's account of token innateness and offering a counterexample to that account. I then clarify why the contemporary biological approaches to innateness will not be able (...)
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  9. Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2001). Innateness and Domain-Specificity. Philosophical Studies 105 (2):191-210.score: 24.0
    There is a widespread assumption in cognitive science that there is anintrinsic link between the phenomena of innateness and domainspecificity. Many authors seem to hold that given the properties ofthese two phenomena, it follows that innate mental states aredomain-specific, or that domain-specific states are innate. My aim inthis paper is to argue that there are no convincing grounds forasserting either claim. After introducing the notions of innateness anddomain specificity, I consider some possible arguments for theconclusion that innate cognitive (...)
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  10. Christopher D. Horvath (2000). Interactionism and Innateness in the Evolutionary Study of Human Nature. Biology and Philosophy 15 (3):321-337.score: 24.0
    While most researchers who use evolutionary theory to investigatehuman nature especially human sexuality describe themselves as ``interactionists'', there is no clear consensus on the meaning of thisterm in this context. By interactionism most people in the fieldmean something like, both nature and nurture ``count'' in thedevelopment of human psychology and behavior. Nevertheless, themultidisciplinary nature of evolutionary psychology results in a widevariety of interpretations of this general claim. Today, mostdebates within evolutionary psychology about the innateness of agiven behavioral characteristic or (...)
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  11. Nicholas Shea (2012). Genetic Representation Explains the Cluster of Innateness-Related Properties. Mind and Language 27 (4):466-493.score: 24.0
    The concept of innateness is used to make inferences between various better-understood properties, like developmental canalization, evolutionary adaptation, heritability, species-typicality, and so on (‘innateness-related properties’). This article uses a recently-developed account of the representational content carried by inheritance systems like the genome to explain why innateness-related properties cluster together, especially in non-human organisms. Although inferences between innateness-related properties are deductively invalid, and lead to false conclusions in many actual cases, where some aspect of a phenotypic trait (...)
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  12. S. Quartz (2003). Innateness and the Brain. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):13-40.score: 24.0
    The philosophical innateness debate has long relied onpsychological evidence. For a century, however, a parallel debate hastaken place within neuroscience. In this paper, I consider theimplications of this neuroscience debate for the philosophicalinnateness debate. By combining the tools of theoretical neurobiologyand learning theory, I introduce the ``problem of development'' that alladaptive systems must solve, and suggest how responses to this problemcan demarcate a number of innateness proposals. From this perspective, Isuggest that the majority of natural systems are in (...)
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  13. Nicholas Shea (2012). New Thinking, Innateness and Inherited Representation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367:2234-2244.score: 24.0
    The New Thinking contained in this volume rejects an Evolutionary Psychology that is committed to innate domain-specific psychological mechanisms: gene-based adaptations that are unlearnt, developmentally fixed and culturally universal. But the New Thinking does not simply deny the importance of innate psychological traits. The problem runs deeper: the concept of innateness is not suited to distinguishing between the two positions. That points to a more serious problem with the concept of innateness as it is applied to human psychological (...)
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  14. Christopher D. Viger (2005). Learning to Think: A Response to the Language of Thought Argument for Innateness. Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25.score: 22.0
    Jerry Fodor's argument for an innate language of thought continues to be a hurdle for researchers arguing that natural languages provide us with richer conceptual systems than our innate cognitive resources. I argue that because the logical/formal terms of natural languages are given a usetheory of meaning, unlike predicates, logical/formal terms might be learned without a mediating internal representation. In that case, our innate representational system might have less logical structure than a natural language, making it possible that we augment (...)
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  15. Brian J. Scholl (2005). Innateness and (Bayesian) Visual Perception: Reconciling Nativism and Development. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York.score: 22.0
  16. Jinglin Li (2009). On the Creativity and Innateness of the “Strong, Moving Vital Force”: A Discussion of Feng Youlan's “Explanation of Mencius' Chapter on the 'Strong, Moving Vital Force'”. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (2):198-210.score: 22.0
    Feng Youlan emphasizes the concept of “creativity” in his article “Explanation of Mencius’ Chapter on Strong, Moving Vital Force”, in particular highlighting the problem whether the “strong, moving vital force” is “innate” or “acquired”. Cheng Hao and Zhu Xi believed the “strong, moving vital force” was endowed by Heaven, so was therefore innate; “nourishment” cleared fog and allowed one to “recover one’s original nature”. Mencius’ theory on “the good of human nature” is illustrated in the concept of (...)
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  17. Richard Samuels (2007). Is Innateness a Confused Notion? In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Foundations and the Future. Oxford University Press.score: 22.0
  18. Alison Gopnik (2003). The Theory Theory as an Alternative to the Innateness Hypothesis. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell. 238--254.score: 21.0
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  19. James A. McGilvray (2006). On the Innateness of Language. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 97--112.score: 21.0
  20. Margaret L. Atherton & R. Schwarz (1974). Linguistic Innateness and its Evidence. Journal of Philosophy 71 (March):155-168.score: 21.0
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  21. Noam A. Chomsky & Jerrold J. Katz (1975). On Innateness: A Reply to Cooper. Philosophical Review 84 (January):70-87.score: 21.0
  22. Henry Rosemont (1978). Gathering Evidence for Linguistic Innateness. Synthese 38 (May):127-148.score: 21.0
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  23. Denise D. Cummins (1996). Evidence for the Innateness of Deontic Reasoning. Mind and Language 11 (2):160-90.score: 21.0
  24. Ralph-Axel Müller (1996). Innateness, Autonomy, Universality? Neurobiological Approaches to Language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):611.score: 21.0
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  25. Raffaella de Rosa (2000). On Fodor's Claim That Classical Empiricists and Rationalists Agree on the Innateness of Ideas. Protosociology 14:240-269.score: 21.0
     
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  26. Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt (2010). The Innateness Hypothesis and Mathematical Concepts. Topoi 29 (1):3-13.score: 18.0
    In historical claims for nativism, mathematics is a paradigmatic example of innate knowledge. Claims by contemporary developmental psychologists of elementary mathematical skills in human infants are a legacy of this. However, the connection between these skills and more formal mathematical concepts and methods remains unclear. This paper assesses the current debates surrounding nativism and mathematical knowledge by teasing them apart into two distinct claims. First, in what way does the experimental evidence from infants, nonhuman animals and neuropsychology support the nativist (...)
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  27. Paul E. Griffiths & Edouard Machery (2008). Innateness, Canalization, and 'Biologicizing the Mind'. Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):397 – 414.score: 18.0
    This article examines and rejects the claim that 'innateness is canalization'. Waddington's concept of canalization is distinguished from the narrower concept of environmental canalization with which it is often confused. Evidence is presented that the concept of environmental canalization is not an accurate analysis of the existing concept of innateness. The strategy of 'biologicizing the mind' by treating psychological or behavioral traits as if they were environmentally canalized physiological traits is criticized using data from developmental psychobiology. It is (...)
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  28. Jonathan Birch (2009). Irretrievably Confused? Innateness in Explanatory Context. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 40 (4):296-301.score: 18.0
    The hunt for a biologically respectable definition for the folk concept of innateness is still on. I defend Ariew’s Canalization account of innateness against the criticisms of Griffiths and Machery, but highlight the remaining flaws in this proposal. I develop a new analysis based on the notion of environmental induction. A trait is innate, I argue, iff it is not environmentally induced. I augment this definition with a novel analysis of environmental induction that draws on the contrastive nature (...)
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  29. Richard Samuels (2004). Innateness in Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):136-141.score: 18.0
    has a more specific role to play in the development of Of course, the conclusion to draw is not that innateness innate cognitive structure. In particular, a common claim claims are trivially false or that they cannot be character-.
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  30. Andre Ariew, Innateness.score: 18.0
    As Paul Griffiths [2002] puts it, “innateness” is associated with different clusters of related ideas where each cluster depends on different historical, cultural and intellectual contexts. In psychology innateness is typically opposed to learning while the biological opposite of innate is ‘acquired’. ‘Acquired’ and ‘learned’ have different extensions. Learning is one way to acquire a character but there are others. Cuts and scratches are unlearned yet acquired; if we could acquire languages by popping a pill, then languages would (...)
     
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  31. Peter Godfrey-Smith, Innateness and Genetic Information.score: 18.0
    The idea that innateness can be understood in terms of genetic coding or genetic programming is discussed. I argue that biology does not provide any support for the view that the whole-organism features of interest to nativists in psychology and linguistics are genetically coded for. This provides some support for recent critical and deflationary treatments of the concept of innateness.
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  32. Murray Miles (2010). Analytic Method, the Cogito, and Descartes's Argument for the Innateness of the Idea of God. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (2):289-320.score: 18.0
    The analytic method by which Descartes discovered the first principle of his philosophy—cogito, ergo sum—is a unique cognitive process of direct insight and nonlogical inference. It differs markedly from inductive as well as deductive procedures, but also from older models of the direct noetic apprehension of first principles, notably those of Plato and Aristotle. However, a critical examination of Descartes’s argument for the innateness of the idea of God shows that there are serious obstacles in the way of his (...)
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  33. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ron Mallon (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323–344.score: 18.0
    Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.
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  34. John Collins (2011). Innateness, Canalization, and the Modality-Independence of Language: A Reply to Griffiths and Machery. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):195-206.score: 18.0
    Griffiths and Machery (2008) argue that innateness is a ?folk biological? notion, which, as such, has no useful reconstruction in contemporary biology. If this is so, not only is it wrong to identify the vernacular notion with the precise theoretical concept of canalization, but worse, it would appear that many of the putative scientific claims for particular competences and capacities being innate are simply misplaced. The present paper challenges the core substantive claim of Griffiths and Machery's position, namely, that (...)
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  35. Ron Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science 73 (3):323-344.score: 18.0
    Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.
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  36. Patricia Greenspan, Emotions, Innateness, and Ethics.score: 18.0
    My discussion below is an highly abbreviated version of a paper in preparation for a conference on innateness . I allow for both types of influence but suggest that more attention should be paid to mechanisms of social transfer of emotions, as a possible innate source of plasticity in moral learning via emotions - and hence of cultural variation in moral codes.
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  37. Robert Northcott, Innateness and Science.score: 18.0
    Although a huge range of definitions has accumulated in the philosophy, biology and psychology literatures, no consensus has been reached on exactly what innateness amounts to. This has helped fuel an increasing skepticism, one that views the concept as anachronistic and actually harmful to science. Yet it remains central to many life sciences, and to several public policy issues too. So it is correspondingly urgent that its philosophical underpinnings be properly cleaned up. In this paper, I present a new (...)
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  38. Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ron Mallon (2008). Living with Innateness (and Environmental Dependence Too). Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):415 – 424.score: 18.0
    Griffiths and Machery contend that the concept of innateness should be dispensed with in the sciences. We contend that, once that concept is properly understood as what we have called 'closed process invariance', it is still of significant use in the sciences, especially cognitive science.
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  39. Claudia Lorena García (2003). Biología e innatismo: Algunos comentarios críticos (Biology and Innateness: Some Critical Comments). Critica 35 (104):3 - 30.score: 18.0
    En el presente artículo argumento que algunos de los descubrimientos empíricos relativamente recientes en la biología del desarrollo nos llevan a abandonar ciertos conceptos de lo innato, en particular, aquellos que llamaremos 'internistas'. También examino la adecuación de tres caracterizaciones de lo innato propuestas recientemente que toman en cuenta los descubrimientos empíricos antes mencionados y pretenden recoger un núcleo importante de las connotaciones y afirmaciones asociadas a lo innato en algunas disciplinas empíricas. Además, argumento que dos de estas caracterizaciones son (...)
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  40. Claudia Lorena García (2005). Innatismo Y Biología: Hacia Un Concepto Biológico de Lo Innato (Innateness and Biology: Towards a Biological Concept of Innateness). Theoria 20 (2):167-182.score: 18.0
    En el presente artículo examino algunas propuestas recientes que pretenden caracterizar una noción de lo innato coherente y teóricamente útil usando conceptos e ideas de la biología del desarrollo o de la biología evolucionista (o ambas), y argumento que la mayoría de elIas o bien padecen serios problemas conceptuales, o bien no pueden capturar de maneras biológicamente interesantes algunas de las connotaciones más importantes asociadas al termino ‘innato’ tal y como se usa en algunas disciplinas cognitivas de corte evolucionista. Asimismo, (...)
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  41. Eduoard Machery & P. E. Griffiths, Innateness, Canalization, and 'Biologicising the Mind'.score: 18.0
    This paper examines and rejects the claim that ‘innateness is canalization’. Waddington’s concept of canalization is distinguished from the narrower concept of environmental canalization with which it is often confused. Evidence is presented that the concept of environmental canalization is not an accurate analysis of the existing concept of innateness. The strategy of ‘biologicizing the mind’ by treating psychological or behavioral traits as if they were environmentally canalized physiological traits is criticized using data from developmental psychobiology. It is (...)
     
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  42. Eduoard Machery, Paul Griffiths & Stefan Linquist, The Vernacular Concept of Innateness.score: 18.0
    ‘inner natures’ of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive participants to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our results explain the intuitive appeal of existing philosophical analyses of the innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why these analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples. We argue that this explanation undermines the appeal of these analyses, whether understood as analyses of the vernacular concept or as explications of that concept for the purposes of science.
     
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  43. Hilary Putnam (1967). The 'Innateness Hypothesis' and Explanatory Models in Linguistics. Synthese 17 (March):12-22.score: 17.0
  44. Thomas Wasow (1973). The Innateness Hypothesis and Grammatical Relations. Synthese 26 (October):38-52.score: 17.0
  45. Gary F. Marcus (2005). What Developmental Biology Can Tell Us About Innateness. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 23.score: 16.0
  46. Robert Boyd & Peter Richerson (2006). Culture, Adaptation, and Innateness. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition.score: 16.0
    It is almost 30 years since the sociobiology controversy burst into full bloom. The modern theory of the evolution of animal behavior was born in the mid 1960’s with Bill Hamilton’s seminal papers on inclusive fitness and George William’s book Adaptation and Natural Selection. The following decade saw an avalanche of important ideas on the evolution of sex ratio, animal conflicts, parental investment, and reciprocity, setting off a revolution our understanding of animal societies, a revolution that is still going on (...)
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  47. Seyed N. Mousavian (2014). Suhrawardi on Innateness: A Reply to John Walbridge. Philosophy East and West 64 (2):486-501.score: 16.0
    Here I shall focus on Suhrawardi’s use and conception of ‘fiṭrī’, translated as ‘innate’ by Hossein Ziai (1990), Hossein Ziai and John Walbridge (Suhrawardi 1999), and Mehdi Aminrazavi (1997, 2003),1 and will try to make some points in passing regarding Cartesian innate ideas in relation to Suhrawardi’s fiṭrīāt. I will try to explain my understanding of Suhrawardi’s i‛tibārāt ‛aqliyya (beings of reason) and their relationship to fiṭrīāt. As a relevant issue, I will touch on Suhrawardi’s distinction between objective and intellectual (...)
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  48. Susan Carey (2011). Concept Innateness, Concept Continuity, and Bootstrapping. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):152.score: 16.0
    The commentators raised issues relevant to all three important theses of The Origin of Concepts (henceforth TOOC). Some questioned the very existence of innate representational primitives, and others questioned my claims about their richness and whether they should be thought of as concepts. Some questioned the existence of conceptual discontinuity in the course of knowledge acquisition and others argued that discontinuity is much more common than was portrayed in TOOC. Some raised issues with my characterization of Quinian bootstrapping, and others (...)
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  49. Brian J. Scholl (2005). Innateness and (Bayesian) Visual Perception. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 34.score: 16.0
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  50. Gregg E. A. Solomon (1998). Innateness, Universality, and Domain-Specificity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):588-589.score: 16.0
    There are problems with Atran's argument for an innate cognitive module for folk biology. He has been too quick to assume innate origins for what might plausibly be learned. Furthermore, in his characterization he includes aspects – essentialist reasoning and inductions from classes – that are not domain-specific. Finally, his characterization compromises his argument that the module is pretheoretical.
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