Search results for 'intensionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. James W. Cornman (1962). Intentionality and Intensionality. Philosophical Quarterly 12 (January):44-52.score: 18.0
    Certain philosophers have held the thesis of the unity of science. As often conceived, the thesis has two parts: the thesis of physicalism and the thesis of extensionality. For each of these two parts there is an outstanding problem, i.e. the problem of intentionality and the problem of intensionality respectively. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to make explicit the nature of these two problems, and second, to show to what extent they can be said to be (...)
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  2. Ezra Keshet (2010). Split Intensionality: A New Scope Theory of de Re and de Dicto. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):251-283.score: 18.0
    The traditional scope theory of intensionality (STI) (see Russell 1905; Montague 1973; Ladusaw 1977; Ogihara 1992, 1996; Stowell 1993) is simple, elegant, and, for the most part, empirically adequate. However, a few quite troubling counterexamples to this theory have lead researchers to propose alternatives, such as positing null situation pronouns (Percus 2000) or actuality operators (Kamp 1971; Cresswell 1990) in the syntax of natural language. These innovative theories do correct the undergeneration of the original scope theory, but at a (...)
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  3. Chris Fox & Shalom Lappin (forthcoming). Type-Theoretic Logic with an Operational Account of Intensionality. Synthese:1-22.score: 18.0
    We formulate a Curry-typed logic with fine-grained intensionality within Turner’s typed predicate logic. This allows for an elegant presentation of a theory that corresponds to Fox and Lappin’s property theory with curry typing, but without the need for a federation of languages. We then consider how the fine-grained intensionality of this theory can be given an operational interpretation. This interpretation suggests itself as expressions in the theory can be viewed as terms in the untyped lambda-calculus, which provides a (...)
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  4. David Parsons (2013). Inscriptionalism and Intensionality. Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.score: 18.0
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
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  5. Mark Sainsbury (2012). Representing Unicorns: How to Think About Intensionality. In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications.score: 16.0
    The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of representation (...)
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  6. Patrick Bondy (2013). Intensionality and Epistemic Justification. Philosophia 41 (2):463-475.score: 16.0
    The purpose of this paper is to raise a new objection to externalist process reliabilism about epistemic justification. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional—it does not permit the substitution of co-referring expressions—and reliabilism cannot accommodate that.
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  7. Mohan P. Matthen (1989). Intensionality and Perception: A Reply to Rosenberg. Journal of Philosophy 86 (December):727-733.score: 15.0
  8. Harold Morick (1971). Intentionality, Intensionality, and the Psychological. Analysis 32 (December):39-44.score: 15.0
  9. David S. Oderberg (2002). Intelligibility and Intensionality. Acta Analytica 17 (1):171-178.score: 15.0
    A common argumentative strategy employed by anti-reductionists involves claiming that one kind of entity cannot be identified with or reduced to a second because what can intelligibly be predicated of one cannot be predicated intelligibly of the other. For instance, it might be argued that mind and brain are not identical because it makes sense to say that minds are rational but it does not make sense to say that brains are rational. The scope and power of this kind of (...)
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  10. William C. Kneale (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:73-90.score: 15.0
  11. A. N. Prior (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-106.score: 15.0
  12. Alexander Rosenberg (1989). Intentionality, Intensionality and Representation. Behaviorism 17 (2):137-140.score: 15.0
  13. Mary Dalrymple, John Lamping, Fernando Pereira & Vijay Saraswat (1997). Quantifiers, Anaphora, and Intensionality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (3):219-273.score: 14.0
    The relationship between Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG) functional structures (f-structures) for sentences and their semanticinterpretations can be formalized in linear logic in a way thatcorrectly explains the observed interactions between quantifier scopeambiguity, bound anaphora and intensionality.Our linear-logic formalization of the compositional properties ofquantifying expressions in natural language obviates the need forspecial mechanisms, such as Cooper storage, in representing thescoping possibilities of quantifying expressions. Instead, thesemantic contribution of a quantifier is recorded as a linear-logicformula whose use in a proof will establish (...)
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  14. Stefano Predelli (2012). Indexicality, Intensionality, and Relativist Post-Semantics. Synthese 184 (2):121-136.score: 12.0
    This essay argues that relativist semantics provide fruitful frameworks for the study of the relationships between meaning and truth-conditions, and consequently for the analysis of the logical properties of expressions. After a discussion of the role of intensionality and indexicality within classic double-indexed semantics, I explain that the non-relativistic identification of the parameters needed for the definition of truth and for the interpretation of indexicals is grounded on considerations that are irrelevant for the assessment of the relationships between meaning (...)
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  15. Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason (2011). Paradoxes of Intensionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.score: 12.0
    We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the (...)
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  16. Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.score: 12.0
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not (...)
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  17. Ari Maunu (2006). Alethic Statements Are Not Intensional. Teorema 25 (3):53-61.score: 12.0
    According to the standard view, alethic (or modal) statements are intensional in that the Principle of Substitution (PS) fails for them -- e.g. substituting 'nine' in "Necessarily, nine is composite" with the co-referring 'the number of planets' turns this statement from true to false. It is argued in the paper that we could avoid ascribing intensionality to alethic statements altogether by separating between singular and functional uses of definite descriptions: on the singular use the description given above amounts to (...)
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  18. Friederike Moltmann (1997). Intensional Verbs and Quantifiers. Natural Language Semantics 5 (1):1-52.score: 12.0
    This paper discusses the semantics of intensional transitive verbs such as 'need', 'want','recognize', 'find', and 'hire'. It proposes new linguistic criteria for intensionality and defends two semantic analyses for two different classes of intensional verbs. The paper also includes a systematic classification of intensional verbs according to the type of lexical meaning they involve.
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  19. Prakash Mondal (2013). How the Intentionality of Emotion Can Be Traced to the Intensionality of Emotion: Intensionality in Emotive Predicates. Pragmatics and Cognition 21 (1):35-54.score: 12.0
    In this paper a connection between intentionality, intensionality, language and emotion will be drawn up through a demonstration of an intimate relationship between the intentionality of emotion and intensionality in language. What will be shown is that the intentionality of emotion can ultimately be traced to the intensionality of emotional contexts. For this purpose, emotive predicates will be categorized in terms of their intensional behavior and regularities. They will then be brought forward for an explication of why (...)
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  20. Friederike Moltmann (2012). Tropes, Intensional Relative Clauses, and the Notion of a Variable Object. In Aloni Maria, Kimmelman Vadim, Weidman Sassoon Galit, Roloefson Floris, Schulz Katrin & Westera Matthjis (eds.), Proceedings of the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium 2011. Springer.score: 10.0
    NPs with intensional relative clauses such as 'the impact of the book John needs to write' pose a significant challenge for trope theory (the theory of particularized properties), since they seem to refer to tropes that lack an actual bearer. This paper proposes a novel semantic analysis of such NPs on the basis of the notion of a variable object. The analysis avoids a range of difficulties that an alternative analysis based on the notion of an individual concept would face.
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  21. Graeme Forbes (2002). Intensionality: Graeme Forbes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):75–99.score: 10.0
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes (2000b). In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an (...)
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  22. Dustin Tucker (2010). Intensionality and Paradoxes in Ramsey's 'the Foundations of Mathematics'. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (1):1-25.score: 10.0
    In , Frank Ramsey separates paradoxes into two groups, now taken to be the logical and the semantical. But he also revises the logical system developed in Whitehead and Russellthe intensional paradoxess interest in these problems seriously, then the intensional paradoxes deserve more widespread attention than they have historically received.
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  23. Friederike Moltmann (2008). Intensional Verbs and Their Intentional Objects. Natural Language Semantics 16 (3):239-270.score: 10.0
    The complement of intensional transitive verbs, like any nonreferential complement, can be replaced by a ‘special quantifier’ or ‘special pronoun’ such as 'something', 'the same thing', or 'what'. In this paper, I will defend the ‘Nominalization Theory’ of special quantifiers against a range of apparent counterexamples involving intensional transitive verbs.
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  24. J. M. Saul (2002). Intensionality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:75 - 119.score: 10.0
    [Graeme Forbes] In I, I summarize the semantics for the relational/notional distinction for intensional transitives developed in Forbes (2000b). In II-V I pursue issues about logical consequence which were either unsatisfactorily dealt with in that paper or, more often, not raised at all. I argue that weakening inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a gorgon', are valid, but that disjunction inferences, such as 'Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon, therefore Perseus seeks a mortal gorgon or an (...)
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  25. Graeme Forbes (2006). Attitude Problems: An Essay On Linguistic Intensionality. Clarendon Press.score: 10.0
    Ascriptions of mental states to oneself and others give rise to many interesting logical and semantic problems. Attitude Problems presents an original account of mental state ascriptions that are made using intensional transitive verbs such as 'want', 'seek', 'imagine', and 'worship'. Forbes offers a theory of how such verbs work that draws on ideas from natural language semantics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics.
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  26. Guido Imaguire (2011). Logic and Intensionality. Principia 14 (1):111-24.score: 10.0
    There are different ways we use the expressions “extension” and “intension”. I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional definition of (...)
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  27. Harald Andreas Bastiaanse (2013). The Intensional Many - Conservativity Reclaimed. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-19.score: 10.0
    Following on Westerståhl’s argument that many is not Conservative [9], I propose an intensional account of Conservativity as well as intensional versions of EXT and Isomorphism closure. I show that an intensional reading of many can easily possess all three of these, and provide a formal statement and proof that they are indeed proper intensionalizations. It is then discussed to what extent these intensionalized properties apply to various existing readings of many.
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  28. Edward N. Zalta (1988). Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. The MIT Press.score: 10.0
    This book tackles the issues that arise in connection with intensional logic -- a formal system for representing and explaining the apparent failures of certain important principles of inference such as the substitution of identicals and existential generalization-- and intentional states --mental states such as beliefs, hopes, and desires that are directed towards the world. The theory offers a unified explanation of the various kinds of inferential failures associated with intensional logic but also unifies the study of intensional contexts and (...)
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  29. David D. Auerbach (1985). Intensionality and the Gödel Theorems. Philosophical Studies 48 (3):337--51.score: 9.0
  30. John-Michael Kuczynski (2010). Intensionality, Modality, Rationality: Some Presemantic Considerations. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (8):2314-2346.score: 9.0
    On the basis of arguments put forth by (Kripke, 1977a) and (Kripke, 1980), it is widely held that one can sometimes rationally accept propositions of the form "P and not-P" and also that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We will find that Kripke's arguments for these views appear probative only so long as one fails to distinguish between semantics and presemantics—between the literal meanings of sentences, on the one hand, and the information on the basis of which one identifies (...)
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  31. Gennaro Chierchia (1994). Intensionality and Context Change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (2):141-168.score: 9.0
    It is arguably desirable to have a theory of meaning that (i) does not identify propositions with sets of worlds, (ii) enables to capture the dynamic character of semantic interpretation and (iii) provides the basis for a semantic program that incorporates and extends the achievements of Montague semantics. A theory of properties and propositions that meets these desiderata is developed and several applications to the semantic analysis of natural languages are explored.
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  32. Graeme Forbes (1987). Indexicals and Intensionality: A Fregean Perspective. Philosophical Review 96 (1):3-31.score: 9.0
  33. Michael Jubien (1972). The Intensionality of Ontological Commitment. Noûs 6 (4):378-387.score: 9.0
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  34. Gerald Vision (2010). Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: 'Because', 'in Virtue Of', and 'Made True By…'. Topoi 29 (2):109-123.score: 9.0
    Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p ’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and their (...)
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  35. Tim Fernando (2009). Situations as Indices and as Denotations. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (2):185-206.score: 9.0
    A distinction is drawn between situations as indices required for semantically evaluating sentences and situations as denotations resulting from such evaluation. For atomic sentences, possible worlds may serve as indices, and events as denotations. The distinction is extended beyond atomic sentences according to formulae-as-types and applied to implicit quantifier domain restrictions, intensionality and conditionals.
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  36. Neil Campbell (2010). Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation. Theoria 76 (3):207-220.score: 9.0
    Ausonio Marras has argued that Jaegwon Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion depends on an implausibly strong interpretation of explanatory realism that should be rejected because it leads to an extensional criterion of individuation for explanations. I examine the role explanatory realism plays in Kim's justification for the exclusion principle and explore two ways in which Kim can respond to Marras's criticism. The first involves separating criteria for explanatory truth from questions of explanatory adequacy, while the second appeals to Kim's fine-grained (...)
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  37. Nicholas Griffin (2003). Foreword to the Importance of Nonexistent Objects and of Intensionality in Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1):16-19.score: 9.0
  38. Richard Sylvan (2003). The Importance of Nonexistent Objects and of Intensionality in Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1):20-52.score: 9.0
    In this article, extracted from his book Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, Sylvan argues that, contrary to widespread opinion, mathematics is not an extensional discipline and cannot be extensionalized without considerable damage. He argues that some of the insights of Meinong's theory of objects, and its modern development, item theory, should be applied to mathematics and that mathematical objects and structures should be treated as mind-independent, non-existent objects.
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  39. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1979). Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method. Noûs 13 (2):235-260.score: 9.0
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  40. Terry Horgan (2000). The Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality of Probability. Noûs 34 (4):578–603.score: 9.0
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  41. Genoveva Marti (1993). The Source of Intensionality. Philosophical Perspectives 7:197-206.score: 9.0
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  42. Solomon Feferman (1985). Intensionality in Mathematics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (1):41 - 55.score: 9.0
  43. Rosemarie Rheinwald (1994). Causation and Intensionality: A Problem for Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):41-64.score: 9.0
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  44. Dale Jacquette (2000). Identity, Intensionality, and Moore's Paradox. Synthese 123 (2):279 - 292.score: 9.0
  45. Jennifer M. Saul (2002). Intensionality: What Are Intensional Transitives?: Jennifer Saul. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):101–119.score: 9.0
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  46. William Kneale & A. N. Prior (1968). Symposium: Intentionality and Intensionality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 42:73 - 106.score: 9.0
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  47. Nicholas D. Smith (1976). Republic 476e–480a: Intensionality in Plato's Epistemology? Philosophical Studies 30 (6):427 - 429.score: 9.0
  48. John J. Drummond (1998). From Intentionality to Intensionality and Back. Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28):89-126.score: 9.0
  49. Dale Jacquette (1997). Conceivability, Intensionality, and the Logic of Anselm's Modal Argument for the Existence of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 42 (3):163-173.score: 9.0
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  50. George Sher (1969). Reasons and Intensionality. Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):164-168.score: 9.0
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