Search results for 'intentional action' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2010). The Deep Self Model and Asymmetries in Folk Judgments About Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):159-176.score: 240.0
    Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting (...)
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  2. Danny Frederick (2010). Unmotivated Intentional Action. Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30.score: 240.0
    In opposition to the tenet of contemporary action theory that an intentional action must be done for a reason, I argue that some intentional actions are unmotivated. I provide examples of arbitrary and habitual actions that are done for no reason at all. I consider and rebut an objection to the examples of unmotivated habitual action. I explain how my contention differs from recent challenges to the tenet by Hursthouse, Stocker and Pollard.
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  3. Mark Phelan (2010). The Intentional Action Factory. The Philosophers' Magazine 52.score: 240.0
    This short paper, forthcoming as part of a symposium on experimental philosophy to appear in the popular publication, The Philosophers’ Magazine (including contributions by Papineau, Stich, Machery, Sommers, and Knobe), offers an accessible summary of seven years of experimental-philosophical research into intentional action attributions.
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  4. Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.score: 240.0
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution (...)
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  5. Eric Wiland (2007). Intentional Action and "in Order To". Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.score: 240.0
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation (...)
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  6. Berit Brogaard (2010). Stupid People Deserve What They Get: The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):332-334.score: 234.0
    Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. We tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. Our results show that it is people’s sense of what agents deserve and not the moral status of side-effects that drives intuition.
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  7. Joshua Knobe (2003). Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.score: 228.0
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained (...)
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  8. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.score: 222.0
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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  9. Chauncey Maher, Normative Functionalism About Intentional Action. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.score: 208.0
    In any given day, I do many things. I perspire, digest and age. When I walk, I place one foot ahead of the other, my arms swinging gently at my sides; if someone bumps into me, I stumble. Perspiring, digesting, aging, placing my feet, swaying my arms and stumbling are all things I do, in some sense. Yet I also check my email, teach students and go to the grocery store. Those sorts of doings or behaviors seem distinctive; they are (...)
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  10. Marco Mazzone (2014). A Generative System for Intentional Action? Topoi 33 (1):77-85.score: 208.0
    It has been proposed that intentional actions are supplied by a generative system of the sort described by Chomsky for language. In this paper I aim to provide a closer analysis of this claim for the sake of conceptual clarification. To this end, I will first clarify what is involved in the thesis of a structural analogy between language and action, and then I will consider what kind of evidence there seems to be in favour of the thesis (...)
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  11. Alfred R. Mele (2003). Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.score: 204.0
    This article reviews some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what agents do intentionally and what they intend in various stories and explores its bearing on the philosophical project of providing a conceptual analysis of intentional action. The article is a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a variety of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and vice versa. Topics examined include double effect; the influence of moral considerations on judgments (...)
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  12. Zoe Drayson (2014). Intentional Action and the Post-Coma Patient. Topoi 33 (1):23-31.score: 204.0
    Detecting conscious awareness in a patient emerging from a coma state is problematic, because our standard attributions of conscious awareness rely on interpreting bodily movement as intentional action. Where there is an absence of intentional bodily action, as in the vegetative state, can we reliably assume that there is an absence of conscious awareness? Recent neuroimaging work suggests that we can attribute conscious awareness to some patients in a vegetative state by interpreting their brain activity as (...)
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  13. Hugh J. McCann (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.score: 200.0
    Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called Simple View that an agent who A’s intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in (...)
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  14. G. Young (2006). Preserving the Role of Conscious Decision Making in the Initiation of Intentional Action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (3):51-68.score: 198.0
    The aim of this paper is to challenge the claim that the neural activity commonly referred to as 'readiness potential' constitutes evidence for the unconscious initiation of action. Although I accept that such neural activity seriously challenges the commonly held view that one's sense of volition is causally efficacious, I nevertheless contend that much of our everyday engagement with the world is consciously initiated. Thus, a distinction is made between awareness and what the awareness is of: the latter constituting (...)
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  15. Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.score: 194.0
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts (...)
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  16. Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.score: 192.0
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a (...)
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  17. Jan M. Broersen (2011). Making a Start with the Stit Logic Analysis of Intentional Action. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):499-530.score: 192.0
    This paper studies intentional action in stit logic. The formal logic study of intentional action appears to be new, since most logical studies of intention concern intention as a static mental state. In the formalization we distinguish three modes of acting: the objective level concerning the choices an agent objectively exercises, the subjective level concerning the choices an agent knows or believes to be exercising, and finally, the intentional level concerning the choices an agent intentionally (...)
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  18. Joshua Shepherd (2014). Deciding as Intentional Action: Control Over Decisions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.score: 188.0
    Common-sense folk psychology and mainstream philosophy of action agree about decisions: these are under an agent's direct control, and are thus intentional actions for which agents can be held responsible. I begin this paper by presenting a problem for this view. In short, since the content of the motivational attitudes that drive deliberation and decision remains open-ended until the moment of decision, it is unclear how agents can be thought to exercise control over what they decide at the (...)
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  19. Alessandro Lanteri (2012). Three-and-a-Half Folk Concepts of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):17-30.score: 186.0
    Fiery Cushman and Alfred Mele recently proposed a ‘two-and-a-half rules’ theory of folk intentionality. They suggested that laypersons attribute intentionality employing: one rule based on desire, one based on belief, and another principle based on moral judgment, which may either reflect a folk concept (and so count as a third rule) or a bias (and so not count as a rule proper) and which they provisionally count as ‘half a rule’. In this article, I discuss some cases in which an (...)
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  20. Annie Steadman & Frederick Adams (2007). Folk Concepts, Surveys and Intentional Action. In C. Lumer & S. Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of Practical Philosophy. Ashgate Publishers.score: 186.0
    In a recent paper, Al Mele (2003) suggests that the Simple View of intentional action is “fiction” because it is “wholly unconstrained” by a widely shared (folk) concept of intentional action. The Simple View (Adams, 1986, McCann, 1986) states that an action is intentional only if intended. As evidence that the Simple View is not in accord with the folk notion of intentional action, Mele appeals to recent surveys of folk judgments by (...)
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  21. Peter Brian Barry, Intentional Action, Causation, and Deviance.score: 180.0
    It is reasonably well accepted that the explanation of intentional action is teleological explanation. Very roughly, an explanation of some event, E, is teleological only if it explains E by citing some goal or purpose or reason that produced E. Alternatively, teleological explanations of intentional action explain “by citing the state of affairs toward which the behavior was directed” thereby answering questions like “To what end was the agent’s behavior directed?” Causalism—advocated by causalists—is the thesis that (...)
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  22. Joshua Knobe (2006). The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.score: 180.0
    It is widely believed that the primary function of folk psychology lies in the prediction, explanation and control of behavior. A question arises, however, as to whether folk psychology has also been shaped in fundamental ways by the various other roles it plays in people’s lives. Here I approach that question by considering one particular aspect of folk psychology – the distinction between intentional and unintentional behaviors. The aim is to determine whether this distinction is best understood as a (...)
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  23. Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser (1994). Intentional Action. Noûs 28 (1):39-68.score: 180.0
    We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness (...)
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  24. Frank Hindriks (2008). Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.score: 180.0
    Recent empirical research by Joshua Knobe has uncovered two asymmetries in judgements about intentional action and moral responsibility. First, people are more inclined to say that a side effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side effect as bad than when they regard it as good. Secondly, people are more inclined to ascribe blame to someone for bad effects than they are inclined to ascribe praise for good effects. These findings suggest that the notion of (...) action has a normative component. I propose a theory of intentional action on which one acts intentionally if one fails to be motivated to avoid a bad effect. This explains the asymmetry concerning intentional action. The praise–blame asymmetry is explained in terms of the claim that praise depends on being appropriately motivated, whereas blame does not. (shrink)
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  25. Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson (2009). Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action. Mind and Language 24 (1):24-50.score: 180.0
    Abstract: Recent experimental research on the 'Knobe effect' suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi-directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support (...)
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  26. Edouard Machery (2006). The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues. Mind and Language 23 (2):165–189.score: 180.0
    Recent experimental fi ndings by Knobe and others ( Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007 ) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the signifi cance of these fi ndings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the signifi cance of these experimental fi ndings for the nature of the concept of (...)
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  27. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.score: 180.0
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A (...)
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  28. Ryan Wasserman (2011). Intentional Action and the Unintentional Fallacy. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534.score: 180.0
    Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility.
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  29. Chandra Sripada & Sara Konrath (2011). Telling More Than We Can Know About Intentional Action. Mind and Language 26 (3):353-380.score: 180.0
    Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the ‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative assessments, but rather by attributions of underlying values and (...)
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  30. Thomas Nadelhoffer (2005). Skill, Luck, Control, and Intentional Action. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):341 – 352.score: 180.0
    On the surface, it seems intuitively plausible that if an agent luckily manages to perform a desired action (e.g., rolling a six with a fair die or winning the lottery), the performance of which is not the result of any relevant skill on her part, we should not say that she performed the action intentionally. This intuition suggests that our concept of intentional action is sensitive to considerations of skill, luck, and causal control. Indeed, some philosophers (...)
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  31. Frank Hindriks (2011). Control, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.score: 180.0
    Skill or control is commonly regarded as a necessary condition for intentional action. This received wisdom is challenged by experiments conducted by Joshua Knobe and Thomas Nadelhoffer, which suggest that moral considerations sometimes trump considerations of skill and control. I argue that this effect (as well as the Knobe effect) can be explained in terms of the role normative reasons play in the concept of intentional action. This explanation has significant advantages over its rivals. It involves (...)
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  32. Alfred R. Mele (2006). The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: A Commentary. Journal of Cognition and Culture.score: 180.0
    In this commentary, I discuss the three main articles in this volume that present survey data relevant to a search for something that might merit the label “the folk concept of intentional action” – the articles by Joshua Knobe and Arudra Burra, Bertram Malle, and Thomas Nadelhoffer. My guiding question is this: What shape might we find in an analysis of intentional action that takes at face value the results of all of the relevant surveys about (...)
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  33. Paulo Sousa & Colin Holbrook (2010). Folk Concepts of Intentional Action in the Contexts of Amoral and Immoral Luck. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):351-370.score: 180.0
    This paper concerns a recently discovered, puzzling asymmetry in judgments of whether an action is intentional or not (Knobe, Philosophical Psychology 16:309–324, 2003a ; Analysis 63:190–193, b ). We report new data replicating the asymmetry in the context of scenarios wherein an agent achieves an amoral or immoral goal due to luck. Participants’ justifications of their judgments of the intentionality of the agent’s action indicate that two distinct folk concepts of intentional action played a role (...)
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  34. Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004). Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.score: 180.0
    Florida State University In a series of recent papers both Joshua Knobe (2003a; 2003b; 2004) and I (2004a; 2004b; forthcoming) have published the results of some psychological experiments that show that moral considerations influence folk ascriptions of intentional action in both non-side effect and side effect cases.1 More specifically, our data suggest that people are more likely to judge that a morally negative action or side effect was brought about intentionally than they are to judge that a (...)
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  35. Hector -Neri Castañeda (1992). Indexical Reference and Bodily Causal Diagrams in Intentional Action. Studia Logica 51 (3-4):439 - 462.score: 180.0
    In this paper, completed only months before his death, the author studies a number of concepts of importance for the analysis of intentional action. Four themes in particular are discussed: the intentionality of action, the practical syllogism, what the author terms the practical causality of practical thinking, and the proximate cause of action. (K. S.).
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  36. Adam Feltz, Maegan Harris & Ashley Perez (2012). Perspective in Intentional Action Attribution. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):673-687.score: 180.0
    In two experiments, we demonstrate that intentional action intuitions vary as a function of whether one brings about or observes an event. In experiment 1a (N?=?38), participants were less likely to judge that they intended (M?=?2.53, 7 point scale) or intentionally (M?=?2.67) brought about a harmful event compared to intention (M?=?4.16) and intentionality (M?=?4.11) judgments made about somebody else. Experiments 1b and 1c confirmed and extended this pattern of actor-observer differences. Experiment 2 suggested that these actor-observer differences are (...)
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  37. Mark Risjord (1999). No Strings Attached: Functional and Intentional Action Explanations. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):313.score: 180.0
    Functional explanation in the social sciences is the focal point for conflict between individualistic and social modes of explanation. While the agent thought she was acting for reasons, the functional explanation seems to reveal the hidden strings of the puppet master. This essay argues that the conflict is merely apparent. The erotetic model of explanation is used to analyze the forms of intentional action and functional explanations. Two explanations conflict if either the presuppositions of their respective why-questions conflict (...)
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  38. Tomis Kapitan (1994). The Incompatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action: A Reply to David P. Hunt. Religious Studies 30 (1):55 - 66.score: 180.0
    In "Omniprescient Agency" (Religious Studies 28, 1992) David P. Hunt challenges an argument against the possibility of an omniscient agent. The argument—my own in "Agency and Omniscience" (Religious Studies 27, 1991)—assumes that an agent is a being capable of intentional action, where, minimally, an action is intentional only if it is caused, in part, by the agent's intending. The latter, I claimed, is governed by a psychological principle of "least effort," viz., that no one intends without (...)
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  39. Carlos J. Moya (2000). A Proposal About Intentional Action. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:55-63.score: 180.0
    In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by (...)
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  40. Carlos J. Moya (1998). Justificación, Causalidad Y Acción Intencional (Justification, Causality and Intentional Action). Theoria 13 (2):349-365.score: 180.0
    Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito causal independiente para entender (...)
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  41. Josep L. Prades (2007). Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action. Theoria 22 (1):25-33.score: 180.0
    In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional ac-tion presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An en-dorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorsement is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her (...)
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  42. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1992). Indexical Reference and Bodily Causal Diagrams in Intentional Action. Studia Logica 51 (3/4):439-462.score: 180.0
    In this paper, completed only months before his death, the author studies a number of concepts of importance for the analysis of intentional action. Four themes in particular are discussed: the intentionality of action, the practical syllogism, what the author terms "the practical causality of practical thinking", and the proximate cause of action. (K. S.).
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  43. Robert K. Shope (1996). Nondeviant Chains in Intentional Action. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:15-49.score: 180.0
    When employing causal terminology in analyzing intentional action, and sometimes in analyzing additional phenomena, philosophers have required that relevant causal chains be free of what they call causal deviance or waywardness. But there is a wider type of deviance that needs to be excluded, of which causal deviance is only a species. Carl Ginet’s On Action considers examples of both types of deviance. A criticism of his treatment of such examples leads to a more satisfactory general analysis (...)
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  44. Davide P. Cargnello (2014). Beyond Morality: Intentional Action in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Mind 123 (491):671-706.score: 180.0
    The paper discusses Hegel’s conception of intentional action. Drawing principally on Hegel’s analysis of the determinations and rights of action in the Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right, I suggest that Hegel is committed to a corrigibilist view of action, according to which intentions are definitive of action, objective, and publicly accessible, in principle, via ex post facto corrective interpretation. I conclude by commenting briefly on the place of Hegel’s conception of action in (...)
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  45. Paul Egré (forthcoming). Intentional Action and the Semantics of Gradable Expressions (On the Knobe Effect). In B. Copley & F. Martin (eds.), Causation in Grammatical Structures. Oxford University Press.score: 174.0
    This paper examines an hypothesis put forward by Pettit and Knobe 2009 to account for the Knobe effect. According to Pettit and Knobe, one should look at the semantics of the adjective “intentional” on a par with that of other gradable adjectives such as “warm”, “rich” or “expensive”. What Pettit and Knobe’s analogy suggests is that the Knobe effect might be an instance of a much broader phenomenon which concerns the context-dependence of normative standards relevant for the application of (...)
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  46. Alfred R. Mele & Fiery Cushman (2007). Intentional Action, Folk Judgments, and Stories: Sorting Things Out. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):184–201.score: 174.0
    How are our actions sorted into those that are intentional and those that are not? The philosophical and psychological literature on this topic is livelier now than ever, and we seek to make a contribution to it here. Our guiding question in this article is easy to state and hard to answer: How do various factors— specifically, features of vignettes—that contribute to majority folk judgments that an action is or is not intentional interact in producing the judgment? (...)
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  47. Peter Lanz (1989). Davidson on Explaining Intentional Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien 36:33-45.score: 164.0
    The empirist tradition has it that the genuine explanation of the occurrence of an event requires citing its cause and citing its real cause requires specifying a law that subsumes the explanandum-event and the explanans-event Davidson denies that the mentalistically described antecedents of intentional actions can be subsumed under strict laws, but nonetheless affirms, that beliefs and desires arc causes of actions. Some critics pointed out that this position is not a consistentone and levelled the charge of epiphenomenalism against (...)
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  48. Shaun Gallagher (2005). Intentionality and Intentional Action. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):319-326.score: 162.0
  49. Fred Vollmer (1993). Intentional Action and Unconscious Reasons. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (3):315-326.score: 162.0
  50. [deleted]Veronika Krieghoff, Marcel Brass, Wolfgang Prinz & Florian Waszak (2009). Dissociating What and When of Intentional Actions. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 3:3.score: 160.0
    Recent brain imaging research revealed that internally guided actions involve the fronto-median wall, in particular the preSMA and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ). However, a systematic decomposition of different components of intentional action is still lacking. We propose a new paradigm to dissociate two components of internally guided behaviour: Which action to perform (selection component) and when to perform the action (timing component). Our results suggest a neuro-functional dissociation of intentional action timing and (...) action selection. While the RCZ is more strongly activated for the selection component, a part of the superior medial frontal gyrus (SFG) is more strongly activated for the timing component. However, in a post-hoc conducted signal-strength analysis we did also observe an interaction between action timing and action selection, indicating that decisional processes concerning action timing and action selection are not completely dissociated but interdependent. Altogether this study challenges the idea of a unitary system supporting voluntary action and instead suggests the existence of different neuranatomically dissociable subfunctions. (shrink)
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