Search results for 'intentional content' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  77
    R. Takenaga (2002). Inverting Intentional Content. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new way. If (...)
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  2. Preston J. Werner (2015). Character (Alone) Doesn't Count: Phenomenal Character and Narrow Intentional Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):261-272.
    Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, phenomenal character constitutively determines narrow intentional content. If this is correct, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. Using a twin-earth style case, I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing narrow intentional contents. After describing and defending the case, I conclude by considering (...)
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  3.  10
    Arnold Silverberg (1994). Meaning Holism and Intentional Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):29-53.
    In this essay I defend meaning holism against certain criticisms that Jerry Fodor has presented against it. In "Psychosemantics" he argued that meaning holism is incompatible with the development of scientific psychology given the ways in which scientific psychology adverts to intentional content. In his recent book "Holism" (co-authored with Ernest Lepore) he indicates that he still upholds this argument. I argue that Fodor's argument fails, and argue in favor of the compatibility of meaning holism with scientific psychology. (...)
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  4.  31
    Carolyn S. Price (2001). Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Oxford University Press.
    In this adventurous contribution to the project of combining philosophy and biology to understand the mind, Carolyn Price investigates what it means to say that mental states--like thoughts, wishes, and perceptual experiences--are about things in the natural world. Her insight into this deep philosophical problem offers a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. Along the way she defends her view from recent objections to teleological theories and indicates (...)
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  5.  83
    Robert D. Rupert (1999). Mental Representations and Millikan's Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.
    In her landmark book, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Millikan1984),1 Ruth Garrett Millikan utilizes the idea of a biological function to solve philosophical problems associated with the phenomena of language, thought, and meaning. Language and thought are activities of biological organisms, according to Millikan, and we should treat them as such when trying to answer related philosophical questions. Of special interest is Millikan’s treatment of intentionality. Here Millikan employs the notion of a biological function to explain what it is (...)
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  6.  44
    Andrew D. Spear (2011). Husserl on Intentionality and Intentional Content. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Edmund Husserl (1859—1938) was an influential thinker of the first half of the twentieth century. His philosophy was heavily influenced by the works of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, and was also influenced in various ways by interaction with contemporaries such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Gottlob Frege. In his own right, Husserl is considered the founder of twentieth century Phenomenology with influence extending to thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and to contemporary continental philosophy generally. (...)
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  7.  18
    Lisa Bortolotti (2002). Review of Carolyn Price, Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):380 – 381.
    Book Information Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content Carolyn Price Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 vi + 263 Hardback £35 By Carolyn Price. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. vi + 263. Hardback:£35.
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  8.  12
    Martin Kurthen (1994). Ahistorical Intentional Content. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 25 (2):241 - 259.
    One of the main problems of current theory of intentionality concerns the possibility of ahistorical intentional content, that is, content in the absence of any developmental history of the respective item. Biosemanticists like Millikan (1984) argue that content is essentially historical, while computationalists like Cummins (1989) hold that a system's current ahistorical state alone determines content. In the present paper, this problem is discussed in terms of some popular 'cosmic accident' thought experiments, and the conceptual (...)
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  9. Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti-Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties. In Chapters One and Two, I consider how best to delineate the opposition between these positions. I reject various characterizations of the distinction, in particular, that (...)
     
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  10. Carolyn Price (2001). Functions of the Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Carolyn Price investigates what it means to say that mental states -- thoughts, wishes, perceptual experiences, and so on -- are about things in the world. Her answer to this deep philosophical problem is a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. Price's teleological account centres on the claim that the content of an intentional state depends both on the information that it is supposed to carry (...)
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  11. Tyler Burge (2003). Qualia and Intentional Content: Reply to Block. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press 405--415.
  12.  27
    Amy Schmitter (2014). The Third Meditation on Objective Being: Representation and Intentional Content. In David Cunning (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations. Cambridge University Press 149-67.
  13.  35
    Klaus Puhl (1994). Davidson on Intentional Content and Self-Knowledge. In Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer
  14. Fern (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. Theoria 21 (56):133-145.
  15.  71
    George Bealer (2010). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
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  16.  80
    Marc Artiga (2014). Prinz's Naturalistic Theory of Intentional Content. Critica 46 (136):69-86.
    This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works (Prinz, 2000; 2002; 2006). More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz's theory faces four important difficulties, which might have significant consequences for his overall empiricist project.
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  17.  41
    Olga Fernández Prat (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. Theoria 21 (2):133-145.
    A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in (...)
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  18.  16
    Olga Fernández Prat (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. Theoria 21 (2):133-145.
    A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in (...)
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  19.  51
    David Pitt (2011). Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. OUP 141.
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  20. Tyler Burge (1991). Vision and Intentional Content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell
  21.  8
    N. SebaNz & U. Lackner (2007). Who's Calling the Shots? Intentional Content and Feelings of Control. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):859-876.
    Based on Pacherie’s dynamic theory of intentions, this study investigated how the way an intention is formed and sustained affects action performance and the experience of control during acting. In Experiment 1, task-irrelevant verbal commands were given while participants responded to stimuli in a two-choice reaction time task. The commands referred to an action goal congruent or incongruent with the actor’s current intention, or ordered the initiation or abortion of the action. In Experiment 2, the same commands were given as (...)
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  22. Georges Rey (2003). Intentional Content and a Chomskian Linguistics. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press 140--186.
     
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  23.  32
    Belinda Richards (1986). Intentional Content and Demonstrative Thought. Synthese 66 (3):401 - 404.
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  24. John Perry, Individuals in Informational and Intentional Content.
    In this paper, I shall defend Russell's view that Mont Blanc, with all of its snow elds, is a component part" or constituent of what is actually asserted when one utters Mont Blanc is more than 4000 meters high," and of what one believes, when one believes that Mont Blanc is 4000 meters high. I also claim, however, that a proposition that does not have Mont Blanc as a constituent plays an important role in the assertion and the belief that (...)
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  25.  7
    Robert Van Gulick (1987). Information and the Holism of Intentional Content. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):759.
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  26.  15
    Andrew Woodfield (1982). Desire, Intentional Content and Teleological Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:69-88.
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  27.  5
    Lisa Bortolotti (2002). Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):380-381.
    Review of the book by Carolyn Price, "Functions in Mind".
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  28.  5
    Maciej Witek (2004). Searle, Burge and Intentional Content. In Johann Marek & Maria Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
  29. Andrew Woodfield (1982). VI—Desire, Intentional Content and Teleological Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (1):69-88.
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  30.  18
    Aspassia Kanellou, On the Distinction Between Content Realism and Realism About Intentional States.
    In this paper I examine following Jerry Fodor a distinction between Standard Realism about psychological States and intentional or content realism. I try to assess whether Standard Realism and Intentional Realism can satisfy the following two conditions: condition a The content of psychological states can satisfy a type-token distinction. condition b. The content of psychological states is causally relevant to action.
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  31.  40
    Howard Robinson (2009). Why Phenomenal Content is Not Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.
    I argue that the idea that mental states possess a primitive intentionality in virtue of which they are able to represent or ‘intend’ putative particulars derives largely from Brentano‘s misinterpretation of Aristotle and the scholastics, and that without this howler the application of intentionality to phenomenal content would never have gained currency.
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  32.  42
    D. Arjo (1996). Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content. Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.
  33.  16
    Marek Pokropski (2015). Leopold Blaustein’s Critique of Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentional Act, Object and Content. Studia Phaenomenologica 15:93-103.
    The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein — philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career Blaustein developed an original philosophy that drew upon both phenomenology and Twardowski’s analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl’s early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein’s biography (...)
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  34.  63
    George H. Miller (1999). How Phenomenological Content Determines the Intentional Object. Husserl Studies 16 (1):1-24.
    This essay argues for internalism in maintaining that there is a sense of “determination” – namely “a selection of one” – according to which phenomenological content determines the object of an experience. The subject may not be able to describe the object in a way which distinguishes it from all other objects, but the object is nevertheless determined by the unity of sense, or noema, which presents it.
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  35. Michael Ayers (2004). Sense Experience, Concepts and Content, Objections to Davidson and McDowell. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality - From Descartes to the Present. Mentis
    Philosophers debate whether all, some or none of the represcntational content of our sensory experience is conccptual, but the technical term "concept" has different uses. It is commonly linked more or less closely with the notions of judgdment and reasoning, but that leaves open the possibility that these terms share a systematic ambiguity or indeterminacy. Donald Davidson, however, holds an unequivocal and consistent, if paradoxical view that there are strictly speaking no psychological states with representational or intentional (...) except the propositional attitudes of language users, since thc source or fundamental bearer of intentionality is the employed sentence. Accordingly he claims that what has content in ordinary sense experience is not sensation, but propositional belief caused, but not justified, by sensation. John McDowell, sharing some ofDavidson's premises,holds a less paradoxical, but (l will argue) equivocal and incoherent view that post-infantile human sensory expcrience must have content in so far as it is what grounds perceptual belief but that this content is itself conceptual or propositional, dependent on language and culture. Reasons are givcn in the present article for rejecting both views, and their common premises. It is argued that perceptual or sensory states have intentional content which is no more conceptual or propositional than the world is. Recognition that perceptual content and conceptual content are, in a certain unsurprising way incommensurable allows for a more realistic understanding of the relationship between Language and the world as we experience it. (shrink)
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  36. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object (...)
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  37. Collin Rice (2013). Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
    Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. Therefore, concepts are vital to any theory of cognition. However, despite their widely accepted importance, there is little consensus about the nature and origin of concepts. Thanks to the work of Lawrence Barsalou, Jesse Prinz and others concept empiricism has been gaining momentum within the philosophy and psychology literature. Concept empiricism maintains that all concepts are copies, or combinations of copies, of perceptual representations—that is, all concepts are couched in the codes of perceptual representation (...)
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  38. D. Laurier (1998). Fred Dretske's Teleological Analysis of the Semantic Properties of Intentional States: Explaining the Semantic Content of Desires. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4):660-690.
     
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  39.  36
    Michael V. Antony (2006). How to Argue Against (Some) Theories of Content. Iyyun 55 (July):265-286.
    An argument is offered against three naturalistic theories of intentional content: causal-covariation theories, teleological theories, and certain versions of conceptual role semantics. The strategy involves focusing on a normative problem regarding the practice of associating content expressions (e.g., that-clauses) with internal entities (states, symbol structures, etc.). The problem can be expressed thus: Which content expressions are the right ones to associate with internal entities? I argue, first, that an empirical solution to this problem—what I call the (...)
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  40.  67
    Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of (...)
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  41.  4
    Marc Slors (2015). Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory. Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
    In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the (...)
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  42. Alexander Sandgren (2016). Cruel Intensions: An Essay on Intentional Identity and Intentional Attitudes. Dissertation, The Australian National University
    Some intentional attitudes (beliefs, fears, desires, etc.) have a common focus in spite of there being no object at that focus. For example, two beliefs may be about the same witch even when there are no witches, different astronomers had beliefs directed at Vulcan, even though there is no such planet. This relation of having a common focus, whether or not there is an actual concrete object at that focus, is called intentional identity. In the first part of (...)
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  43.  49
    Walter Ott (2016). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):131--145.
    According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state’s intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation – asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like – ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of (...)
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  44.  24
    Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne (2015). The Natural Origins of Content. Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.
    We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating (...)
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  45.  5
    David Pitt (2016). Conscious Belief. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):121-126.
    : Tim Crane maintains that beliefs cannot be conscious because they persist in the absence of consciousness. Conscious judgments can share their contents with beliefs, and their occurrence can be evidence for what one believes; but they cannot be beliefs, because they don’t persist. I challenge Crane’s premise that belief attributions to the temporarily unconscious are literally true. To say of an unconscious agent that she believes that p is like saying that she sings well. To say she sings well (...)
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  46.  53
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). On for Someone's Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411.
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s- sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s- sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, (...)
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  47. Boyd Millar (2010). Peacocke's Trees. Synthese 174 (3):445-461.
    In Sense and Content , Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger ; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences (...)
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  48.  8
    Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne (2015). Introduction: Searching for the Natural Origins of Content. Philosophia 43 (3):505-519.
    This paper introduces this special issue which is focused on its target paper - The Natural Origins of Content. The target paper has had a robust and considered set of fifteen replies; a literal A to Z of papers. This extended introduction explains the background thinking and challenges that motivated the target article's proposed research programme. It also provides a sneak peak preview and navigational aid to the special issue’s contents. Brief highlights of each commentary are provided and they (...)
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  49.  78
    Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments (...)
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  50.  72
    Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in (...)
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