Search results for 'intentional content' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. R. Takenaga (2002). Inverting Intentional Content. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.score: 228.0
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new way. If (...)
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  2. Arnold Silverberg (1994). Meaning Holism and Intentional Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):29-53.score: 192.0
    In this essay I defend meaning holism against certain criticisms that Jerry Fodor has presented against it. In "Psychosemantics" he argued that meaning holism is incompatible with the development of scientific psychology given the ways in which scientific psychology adverts to intentional content. In his recent book "Holism" (co-authored with Ernest Lepore) he indicates that he still upholds this argument. I argue that Fodor's argument fails, and argue in favor of the compatibility of meaning holism with scientific psychology. (...)
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  3. Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 180.0
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti-Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties. In Chapters One and Two, I consider how best to delineate the opposition between these positions. I reject various characterizations of the distinction, in particular, that (...)
     
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  4. Andrew D. Spear, Husserl on Intentionality and Intentional Content.score: 180.0
    Edmund Husserl (1859—1938) was an influential thinker of the first half of the twentieth century. His philosophy was heavily influenced by the works of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, and was also influenced in various ways by interaction with contemporaries such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Gottlob Frege. In his own right, Husserl is considered the founder of twentieth century Phenomenology with influence extending to thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and to contemporary continental philosophy generally. (...)
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  5. Robert D. Rupert (1999). Mental Representations and Millikan's Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.score: 180.0
    In her landmark book, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (Millikan1984),1 Ruth Garrett Millikan utilizes the idea of a biological function to solve philosophical problems associated with the phenomena of language, thought, and meaning. Language and thought are activities of biological organisms, according to Millikan, and we should treat them as such when trying to answer related philosophical questions. Of special interest is Millikan’s treatment of intentionality. Here Millikan employs the notion of a biological function to explain what it is (...)
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  6. Lisa Bortolotti (2002). Review of Carolyn Price, Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):380 – 381.score: 180.0
    Book Information Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content Carolyn Price Oxford Clarendon Press 2001 vi + 263 Hardback £35 By Carolyn Price. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. vi + 263. Hardback:£35.
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  7. Carolyn S. Price (2001). Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Oxford University Press.score: 180.0
    In this adventurous contribution to the project of combining philosophy and biology to understand the mind, Carolyn Price investigates what it means to say that mental states--like thoughts, wishes, and perceptual experiences--are about things in the natural world. Her insight into this deep philosophical problem offers a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. Along the way she defends her view from recent objections to teleological theories and indicates (...)
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  8. Martin Kurthen (1994). Ahistorical Intentional Content. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 25 (2):241 - 259.score: 180.0
    One of the main problems of current theory of intentionality concerns the possibility of ahistorical intentional content, that is, content in the absence of any developmental history of the respective item. Biosemanticists like Millikan (1984) argue that content is essentially historical, while computationalists like Cummins (1989) hold that a system's current ahistorical state alone determines content. In the present paper, this problem is discussed in terms of some popular 'cosmic accident' thought experiments, and the conceptual (...)
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  9. Tyler Burge (2003). Qualia and Intentional Content: Reply to Block. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 405--415.score: 162.0
  10. Klaus Puhl (1994). Davidson on Intentional Content and Self-Knowledge. In Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.score: 162.0
  11. Amy Schmitter (2014). The Third Meditation on Objective Being: Representation and Intentional Content. In David Cunning (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations. Cambridge University Press. 149-67.score: 162.0
  12. Fern (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. Theoria 21 (56):133-145.score: 162.0
  13. Marc Artiga (2014). Prinz's Naturalistic Theory of Intentional Content. Critica 46 (136):69-86.score: 156.0
    This paper addresses Prinz's naturalistic theory of conceptual content, which he has defended in several works (Prinz, 2000; 2002; 2006). More precisely, I present in detail and critically assess his account of referential content, which he distinguishes from nominal or cognitive content. The paper argues that Prinz's theory faces four important difficulties, which might have significant consequences for his overall empiricist project.
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  14. Olga Fernández Prat (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. Theoria 21 (2):133-145.score: 156.0
    A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in (...)
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  15. Olga Fernández Prat (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. Theoria 21 (2):133-145.score: 156.0
    A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way (the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in (...)
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  16. Andrew Woodfield (1982). Desire, Intentional Content and Teleological Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:69-88.score: 154.0
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  17. John Perry, Individuals in Informational and Intentional Content.score: 150.0
    In this paper, I shall defend Russell's view that Mont Blanc, with all of its snow elds, is a component part" or constituent of what is actually asserted when one utters Mont Blanc is more than 4000 meters high," and of what one believes, when one believes that Mont Blanc is 4000 meters high. I also claim, however, that a proposition that does not have Mont Blanc as a constituent plays an important role in the assertion and the belief that (...)
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  18. David Pitt (2011). Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content. In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. OUP. 141.score: 150.0
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  19. Belinda Richards (1986). Intentional Content and Demonstrative Thought. Synthese 66 (3):401 - 404.score: 150.0
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  20. Robert D. Rupert (2012). Mental Representations and Millikan's Theory of Intentional Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.score: 150.0
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  21. Lisa Bortolotti (2002). Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):380-381.score: 150.0
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  22. N. SebaNz & U. Lackner (2007). Who's Calling the Shots? Intentional Content and Feelings of Control. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):859-876.score: 150.0
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  23. Maciej Witek (2004). Searle, Burge and Intentional Content. In Johann Marek & Maria Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.score: 150.0
  24. Tyler Burge (1991). Vision and Intentional Content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 150.0
  25. Robert Van Gulick (1987). Information and the Holism of Intentional Content. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):759.score: 150.0
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  26. George Bealer (2009). The Self-Consciousness Argument : Functionalism and the Corruption of Intentional Content. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
  27. Georges Rey (2003). Intentional Content and a Chomskian Linguistics. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. 140--186.score: 150.0
     
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  28. Aspassia Kanellou, On the Distinction Between Content Realism and Realism About Intentional States.score: 144.0
    In this paper I examine following Jerry Fodor a distinction between Standard Realism about psychological States and intentional or content realism. I try to assess whether Standard Realism and Intentional Realism can satisfy the following two conditions: condition a The content of psychological states can satisfy a type-token distinction. condition b. The content of psychological states is causally relevant to action.
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  29. D. Arjo (1996). Sticking Up for Oedipus: Fodor on Intentional Generalizations and Broad Content. Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.score: 132.0
  30. George H. Miller (1999). How Phenomenological Content Determines the Intentional Object. Husserl Studies 16 (1):1-24.score: 126.0
    This essay argues for internalism in maintaining that there is a sense of “determination” – namely “a selection of one” – according to which phenomenological content determines the object of an experience. The subject may not be able to describe the object in a way which distinguishes it from all other objects, but the object is nevertheless determined by the unity of sense, or noema, which presents it.
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  31. Boyd Millar (2011). Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.score: 120.0
    The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object (...)
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  32. Michael Ayers (2004). Sense Experience, Concepts and Content, Objections to Davidson and McDowell. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality - From Descartes to the Present. mentis.score: 120.0
    Philosophers debate whether all, some or none of the represcntational content of our sensory experience is conccptual, but the technical term "concept" has different uses. It is commonly linked more or less closely with the notions of judgdment and reasoning, but that leaves open the possibility that these terms share a systematic ambiguity or indeterminacy. Donald Davidson, however, holds an unequivocal and consistent, if paradoxical view that there are strictly speaking no psychological states with representational or intentional (...) except the propositional attitudes of language users, since thc source or fundamental bearer of intentionality is the employed sentence. Accordingly he claims that what has content in ordinary sense experience is not sensation, but propositional belief caused, but not justified, by sensation. John McDowell, sharing some ofDavidson's premises,holds a less paradoxical, but (l will argue) equivocal and incoherent view that post-infantile human sensory expcrience must have content in so far as it is what grounds perceptual belief but that this content is itself conceptual or propositional, dependent on language and culture. Reasons are givcn in the present article for rejecting both views, and their common premises. It is argued that perceptual or sensory states have intentional content which is no more conceptual or propositional than the world is. Recognition that perceptual content and conceptual content are, in a certain unsurprising way incommensurable allows for a more realistic understanding of the relationship between Language and the world as we experience it. (shrink)
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  33. Collin Rice (2013). Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.score: 120.0
    Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. Therefore, concepts are vital to any theory of cognition. However, despite their widely accepted importance, there is little consensus about the nature and origin of concepts. Thanks to the work of Lawrence Barsalou, Jesse Prinz and others concept empiricism has been gaining momentum within the philosophy and psychology literature. Concept empiricism maintains that all concepts are copies, or combinations of copies, of perceptual representations—that is, all concepts are couched in the codes of perceptual representation (...)
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  34. Howard Robinson (2009). Why Phenomenal Content is Not Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):79-93.score: 120.0
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  35. D. Laurier (1998). Fred Dretske's Teleological Analysis of the Semantic Properties of Intentional States: Explaining the Semantic Content of Desires. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 96 (4):660-690.score: 120.0
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  36. Gabor -Forrai (2005). Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents. In Gabor Forrai George Kampis (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future.score: 108.0
    The paper argues for the view advocated by Yolton that Locke's ideas are best viewed as intentional contents. Drawing on Smith and McIntyre's distincition between object- and content-theories of intentionality I seek it show that it belongs to the second category. The argument relies mainly on the analysis of Locke's discussion of meaning, the reality and adequacy of ideas and real essence.
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  37. Michael V. Antony (2006). How to Argue Against (Some) Theories of Content. Iyyun 55 (July):265-286.score: 108.0
    An argument is offered against three naturalistic theories of intentional content: causal-covariation theories, teleological theories, and certain versions of conceptual role semantics. The strategy involves focusing on a normative problem regarding the practice of associating content expressions (e.g., that-clauses) with internal entities (states, symbol structures, etc.). The problem can be expressed thus: Which content expressions are the right ones to associate with internal entities? I argue, first, that an empirical solution to this problem—what I call the (...)
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  38. Elisabeth Pacherie (2011). Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control. Social Psychology 42 (1):67-73.score: 102.0
    In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relation- ships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of (...)
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  39. Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). On for Someone's Sake Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397 - 411.score: 90.0
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us (rather than value simpliciter ), has recently been analysed in terms of so-called for-someone’s-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers , which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone’s-sake attitudes (...)
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  40. John McDowell (2010). What is the Content of an Intention in Action? Ratio 23 (4):415-432.score: 84.0
    On the view proposed, the content of an intention in action is given by what one would say in expressing it, and the proper form for expressing such an intention is a statement about what one is doing: e.g. ‘I am doing such-and-such’. By contrast, some think that there are normative or evaluative elements to the content of an intention in action which would be left out of a form that merely stated facts. They think that the appropriate (...)
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  41. Boyd Millar (2010). Peacocke's Trees. Synthese 174 (3):445-461.score: 84.0
    In Sense and Content , Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger ; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences (...)
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  42. Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). The Content of Intentions. Mind and Language 15 (4):400-432.score: 84.0
    I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary no just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions and motor intentions. I characterize each kind of intention in terms of its functions, its type of (...), its dynamics and the rationality and time constraints that bear on it. I then try to show how the difficulties encountered by the causal theory can be solved within this new framework. 1. (shrink)
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  43. Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.score: 84.0
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in (...)
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  44. Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.score: 84.0
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical arguments (...)
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  45. Anders Nes (2006). Content in Thought and Perception. Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 72.0
    The dissertation addresses a debate in the philosophy of perception between conceptualists and nonconceptualists. Its principal thesis is that the intentional content of a perceptual experience is the content of a thought that a reflective subject is in a position to think if she has the experience. I call this claim, endorsed by conceptualists, the thesis of content congruence. Two principal lines of argument are put forward for it. The first, ‘simple’ argument contends that a perceptual (...)
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  46. Martina Fürst (2011). What Mary's Aboutness Is About. Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.score: 72.0
    The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the hard problem to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the hard problem tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a (...)
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  47. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Kant on Perceptual Content. Mind.score: 72.0
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the “Content View.” I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. (...)
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  48. Jan Almäng (2014). Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments. Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.score: 72.0
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless (...)
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  49. Denis M. Walsh (1998). Wide Content Individualism. Mind 107 (427):625-652.score: 72.0
    Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way - according to the aetiological theory - individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide (...) is sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content. (shrink)
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  50. Ilaria Canavotto (2013). The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.score: 72.0
    Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and Tim Crane’s theories of intentionality (...)
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