Search results for 'intentional stance' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2012). Unlikely Allies: Embodied Social Cognition and the Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.score: 240.0
    I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the (...) stance is not to attribute concrete, unobservable mental causes of behavior. Once this is appreciated, the kinship between IS—understood as a model of our quotidian interpretive practices—and ESC is apparent: both assume that quotidian interpretation involves tracking abstract, observable, behavioral patterns, not attributing unobservable, concrete, mental causes, i.e., both assume social cognition is possible without metapsychology. I argue that this affinity constitutes an opportunity: proponents of ESC can use IS as a characterization of the subpersonal basis for social cognition. In the process, I make my interpretation of IS more precise and relate it to current empirical literature in developmental psychology. (shrink)
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  2. Matthew Ratcliffe (2001). A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.score: 184.0
    I examine the way in which Daniel Dennett (1987, 1995) uses his 'intentional' and 'design' stances to make the claim that intentionality is derived from design. I suggest that Dennett is best understood as attempting to supply an objective, nonintentional, naturalistic rationale for our use of intentional concepts. However, I demonstrate that his overall picture presupposes prior application of the intentional stance in a preconditional, ineliminable,'sense-giving' role. Construed as such, Dennett's account is almost identical to the (...)
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  3. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.score: 180.0
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make (...)
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  4. Marcel Weber, Behavioral Traits, the Intentional Stance, and Biological Functions.score: 180.0
    It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuating the behavioral traits of an (...)
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  5. Jeffrey E. Foss (1994). On the Evolution of Intentionality as Seen From the Intentional Stance. Inquiry 37 (3):287-310.score: 180.0
    Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories (...)
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  6. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Precis of the Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):13-25.score: 180.0
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited (and is (...)
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  7. Daisie M. Radner & Michael Radner (1995). Cognition, Natural Selection, and the Intentional Stance. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.score: 180.0
    Abstract Daniel Dennett advocates the use of the intentional stance in adaptationist biology and in cognitive ethology. He sees intentional system theory as closely related to decision theory and game theory. In biological decision and game theory models, nature ?chooses? the strategy by which the animal chooses a course of action. The design of the animal imposes constraints on the model. For Dennett, by contrast, the description of nature's rationale imposes constraints on the design of the animal. (...)
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  8. Daniel C. Dennett (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.score: 152.0
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  9. William P. Bechtel (1985). Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance. Cognitive Science 9 (4):265-92.score: 150.0
  10. Marc Slors (1996). Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):93-98.score: 150.0
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  11. Ajit Narayanan (1996). The Intentional Stance and the Imitation Game. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.score: 150.0
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  12. Richard Griffin (2002). The Intentional Stance: Developmental and Neurocognitive Perspectives. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.score: 150.0
    Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often (...)
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  13. Sydney Shoemaker (1990). Book Review. The Intentional Stance. D Dennett. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-16.score: 150.0
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  14. Sherisse Webb (1994). Witnessed Behavior and Dennett's Intentional Stance. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-70.score: 150.0
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  15. William Dibrell (1988). Persons and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Critical Analysis 9 (1):13-25.score: 150.0
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  16. DanielC Dennett (1983). Taking the Intentional Stance Seriously. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):379.score: 150.0
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  17. Edward N. Zalta (1989). The Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 43 (2):397-400.score: 150.0
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  18. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1985). Aristotle, Final Cause, and the Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):758-759.score: 150.0
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  19. Susan J. Brison (1989). The Intentional Stance. Philosophical Books 30 (3):169-172.score: 150.0
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  20. Daniel C. Dennett (1985). When Does the Intentional Stance Work? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):763.score: 150.0
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  21. Warren Dow (1988). Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 8 (8):300-304.score: 150.0
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  22. György Gergely, Zoltán Nádasdy, Gergely Csibra & Szilvia Bíró (1995). Taking the Intentional Stance at 12 Months of Age. Cognition 56 (2):165-193.score: 150.0
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  23. Gilbert Harman (1988). What is the Intentional Stance? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.score: 150.0
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  24. Allen Newell (1988). The Intentional Stance and the Knowledge Level. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.score: 150.0
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  25. Radu J. Bogdan (1985). The Intentional Stance Reexamined. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):759.score: 150.0
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  26. Yoav Shoham (1991). Implementing the Intentional Stance. In Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press.score: 150.0
     
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  27. Stephen Webb (1994). Witnessed Behavior and Dennett's Intentional Stance. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-470.score: 150.0
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  28. David Davies (1995). Dennett's Stance on Intentional Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.score: 120.0
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  29. Lynne Rudder Baker (forthcoming). Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.score: 90.0
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes (...)
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  30. Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.score: 66.0
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider four metaphysical (...)
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  31. Ramsey Affifi (2014). Biological Pedagogy as Concern for Semiotic Growth. Biosemiotics 7 (1):73-88.score: 66.0
    Deweyan pedagogy seeks to promotes growth, characterized as an increased sensitivity, responsiveness, and ability to participate in an environment. Growth, Dewey says, is fostered by the development of habits that enable further habit formation. Unfortunately, humans have their own habitual ways of encountering other species, which often do not support growth. In this article, I briefly review some common conceptions of learning and the process of habit-formation to scope out the landscape of a more responsible and responsive approach to taking (...)
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  32. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.score: 60.0
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...)
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  33. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 60.0
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, (...)
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  34. John J. Drummond (2007). Phenomenology: Neither Auto- nor Hetero- Be. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):57-74.score: 60.0
    Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the first-person perspective into account.
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  35. Gordon R. Foxall (1999). The Contextual Stance. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.score: 60.0
    The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of (...) systems is an exemplar of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This "contextual stance" is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible. (shrink)
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  36. Franco Scalzone & Guglielmo Tamburrini (2013). Human-Robot Interaction and Psychoanalysis. AI and Society 28 (3):297-307.score: 60.0
    Psychological attitudes towards service and personal robots are selectively examined from the vantage point of psychoanalysis. Significant case studies include the uncanny valley effect, brain-actuated robots evoking magic mental powers, parental attitudes towards robotic children, idealizations of robotic soldiers, persecutory fantasies involving robotic components and systems. Freudian theories of narcissism, animism, infantile complexes, ego ideal, and ideal ego are brought to bear on the interpretation of these various items. The horizons of Human-robot Interaction are found to afford new and fertile (...)
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  37. Gordon R. Foxall (2008). Intentional Behaviorism Revisited. Behavior and Philosophy 36:113 - 155.score: 60.0
    The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other non-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining characteristic of radical behaviorism is not that it avoids mediating processes per se but that it sets out to account for behavior without recourse to propositional attitudes. Based, rather, on the contextual stance, it provides definitions of contingency-shaped, rule-governed verbal and private (...)
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  38. Samuli Pöyhönen (2013). Intentional Concepts in Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Explorations (1):1-17.score: 60.0
    In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show (...)
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  39. Daniel C. Dennett (2012). The Free Floating Rationales of Evolution. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):185-200.score: 60.0
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  40. Ian H. Witten, Bruce A. MacDonald, David L. Maulsby & Rosanna Heise (1992). Programming by Example: The Human Face of AI. [REVIEW] AI and Society 6 (2):166-180.score: 60.0
    It is argued that “human-centredness” will be an important characteristic of systems that learn tasks from human users, as the difficulties in inductive inference rule out learning without human assistance. The aim of “programming by example” is to create systems that learn how to perform tasks from their human users by being shown examples of what is to be done. Just as the user creates a learning environment for the system, so the system provides a teaching opportunity for the user, (...)
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  41. Adam Linson (forthcoming). The Expressive Stance: Intentionality, Expression, and Machine Art. Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):195-216.score: 60.0
    This paper proposes a new interpretive stance for interpreting artistic works and performances that is relevant to artificial intelligence research but also has broader implications. Termed the expressive stance, this stance makes intelligible a critical distinction between present-day machine art and human art, but allows for the possibility that future machine art could find a place alongside our own. The expressive stance is elaborated as a response to Daniel Dennett's notion of the intentional stance, (...)
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  42. Ron Wilburn (1992). Semantic Indeterminacy and the Realist Stance. Erkenntnis 37 (3):281 - 308.score: 36.0
    Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Realism are perhaps the two most ubiquitous and influential doctrines of the Quinean corpus. My concern is to argue against neither in isolation, but against their joint compatibility. Scientific Realism, I argue, when understood as Quine's realistic attitude toward the posits of physical theory, is essentially intentional in character. Thus, Realism requires Intentionality. In Section 1, I provide some necessary exegesis. In Section 2, I attempt to show how this Realism/Intentionality connection arises, surprisingly, within Quine's (...)
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  43. Andy Clark (2002). That Special Something: Dennett on the Making of Minds and Selves. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press. 187--205.score: 30.0
    Dennett depicts human minds as both deeply different from, yet profoundly continuous with, the minds of other animals and simple agents. His treatments of mind, consciousness, free will and human agency all reflect this distinctive dual perspective. There is, on the one hand, the (in)famous Intentional Stance, relative to which humans, dogs, insects and even the lowly thermostat (e.g. Dennett (1998) p.327) are all pronounced capable of believing and desiring in essentially the same theoretical sense. And there is, (...)
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  44. Daniel C. Dennett, An Overview of My Work in Philosophy.score: 30.0
    In my opinion, the two main topics in the <span class='Hi'>philosophy</span> of mind are content and consciousness, and they have received about equal attention from me. As the title of my first book, Content and Consciousness (1969) suggested, that is the order in which they must be addressed: first, a theory of content or intentionality--a phenomenon more fundamental than consciousness--and then, building on that foundation, a theory of consciousness. Over the years I have found myself recapitulating this basic structure twice, (...)
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  45. Jonathan Bennett (1993). Comments on Dennett From a Cautious Ally. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.score: 30.0
    In these notes, unadorned page numbers under 350 refer to Dennett (1987) - The Intentional Stance, hereafter referred to as Stance - and ones over 495 refer to Dennett (1988) - mostly to material by him but occasionally to remarks of his critics. Since the notes will focus on disagreements, I should say now that I am in Dennett’s camp and am deeply in debt to his work in the philosophy of mind, which I think is wider, (...)
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  46. Teed Rockwell, Beyond Eliminative Materialism: Some Unnoticed Implications of Paul Churchland's Pragmatic Pluralism.score: 30.0
    Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense (...)
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  47. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Evolution, Error and Intentionality. In The Intentional Stance. Mit Press.score: 30.0
    Sometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!".
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  48. Simone Gozzano (1994). Rationality, Folk Psychology, and the Belief-Opinion Distinction. Acta Analytica 12 (12):113-123.score: 30.0
    The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to (...)
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  49. Dermot Moran (2013). Intentionality: Some Lessons From the History of the Problem From Brentano to the Present. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.score: 30.0
    Intentionality (?directedness?, ?aboutness?) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl?s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett?s The Intentional Stance, John Searle?s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review (...)
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