Search results for 'intentional stance' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  44
    Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2012). Unlikely Allies: Embodied Social Cognition and the Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.
    I argue that proponents of embodied social cognition (ESC) can usefully supplement their views if they enlist the help of an unlikely ally: Daniel Dennett. On Dennett’s view, human social cognition involves adopting the intentional stance (IS), i.e., assuming that an interpretive target’s behavior is an optimally rational attempt to fulfill some desire relative to her beliefs. Characterized this way, proponents of ESC would reject any alliance with Dennett. However, for Dennett, to attribute mental states from the (...)
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  2. Marc Slors (2015). Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory. Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
    In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the (...)
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  3. Daniel C. Dennett (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  4.  28
    Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Precis of the Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):13-25.
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited in artificial (...)
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  5. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make (...)
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  6.  54
    Matthew Ratcliffe (2001). A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.
    I examine the way in which Daniel Dennett (1987, 1995) uses his 'intentional' and 'design' stances to make the claim that intentionality is derived from design. I suggest that Dennett is best understood as attempting to supply an objective, nonintentional, naturalistic rationale for our use of intentional concepts. However, I demonstrate that his overall picture presupposes prior application of the intentional stance in a preconditional, ineliminable,'sense-giving' role. Construed as such, Dennett's account is almost identical to the (...)
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  7.  26
    Jeffrey E. Foss (1994). On the Evolution of Intentionality as Seen From the Intentional Stance. Inquiry 37 (3):287-310.
    Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories (...)
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  8.  57
    Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make (...)
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  9.  41
    Marcel Weber, Behavioral Traits, the Intentional Stance, and Biological Functions.
    It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuating the behavioral traits of an (...)
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  10.  7
    Daisie M. Radner & Michael Radner (1995). Cognition, Natural Selection, and the Intentional Stance. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.
    Abstract Daniel Dennett advocates the use of the intentional stance in adaptationist biology and in cognitive ethology. He sees intentional system theory as closely related to decision theory and game theory. In biological decision and game theory models, nature ?chooses? the strategy by which the animal chooses a course of action. The design of the animal imposes constraints on the model. For Dennett, by contrast, the description of nature's rationale imposes constraints on the design of the animal. (...)
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  11.  10
    György Gergely, Zoltán Nádasdy, Gergely Csibra & Szilvia Bíró (1995). Taking the Intentional Stance at 12 Months of Age. Cognition 56 (2):165-193.
  12.  7
    Daniel C. Dennett (1985). When Does the Intentional Stance Work? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):763.
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  13. William P. Bechtel (1985). Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance. Cognitive Science 9 (4):265-92.
  14.  12
    Sydney Shoemaker (1990). The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett. Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.
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  15.  82
    Marc Slors (1996). Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):93-98.
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  16.  4
    DanielC Dennett (1983). Taking the Intentional Stance Seriously. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):379.
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  17.  22
    Richard Griffin (2002). The Intentional Stance: Developmental and Neurocognitive Perspectives. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press
    Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often (...)
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  18.  7
    William Dibrell (1988). Persons and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Critical Analysis 9 (1):13-25.
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  19.  3
    Aaron Ben-Zeev (1985). Aristotle, Final Cause, and the Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):758-759.
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  20. Warren Dow (1988). Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 8 (8):300-304.
     
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  21.  5
    Stephen Webb (1994). Witnessed Behavior and Dennett's Intentional Stance. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-470.
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  22.  2
    Radu J. Bogdan (1985). The Intentional Stance Reexamined. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):759.
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  23.  6
    Gilbert Harman (1988). What is the Intentional Stance? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.
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  24.  24
    Ajit Narayanan (1996). The Intentional Stance and the Imitation Game. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press
  25.  13
    Sydney Shoemaker (1990). Book Review. The Intentional Stance. D Dennett. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-16.
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  26.  11
    Sherisse Webb (1994). Witnessed Behavior and Dennett's Intentional Stance. Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):457-70.
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  27.  8
    Edward N. Zalta (1989). The Intentional Stance. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 43 (2):397-400.
  28.  4
    Susan J. Brison (1989). The Intentional Stance. Philosophical Books 30 (3):169-172.
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  29.  1
    Allen Newell (1988). The Intentional Stance and the Knowledge Level. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.
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  30. D. Jacquette (1988). Dennett, D. C., "The Intentional Stance". [REVIEW] Mind 97:619.
     
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  31. Yoav Shoham (1991). Implementing the Intentional Stance. In Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press
     
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  32.  46
    David Davies (1995). Dennett's Stance on Intentional Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.
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  33.  12
    Richard Dub (forthcoming). The Rationality Assumption. In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited. With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Springer 93-110.
    Dennett has long maintained that one of the keystones of Intentional Systems Theory is an assumption of rationality. To deploy the Intentional Stance is to presume from the outset that the target of interpretation is rational. This paper examines the history of rationality constraints on mental state ascription. I argue that the reasons that Dennett and his philosophical brethren present for positing rationality constraints are not convincing. If humans are found to be rational, this will not be (...)
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  34.  50
    Lynne Rudder Baker (forthcoming). Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-9.
    Some philosophers take personal identity to be a matter of self-narrative. I argue, to the contrary, that self-narrative views cannot stand alone as views of personal (or numerical) identity. First, I consider Dennett’s self-narrative view, according to which selves are fictional characters—abstractions, like centers of gravity—generated by brains. Neural activity is to be interpreted from the intentional stance as producing a story. I argue that this is implausible. The inadequacy is masked by Dennett’s ambiguous use of ‘us’: sometimes (...)
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  35.  5
    Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne (2015). The Natural Origins of Content. Philosophia 43 (3):521-536.
    We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland’s baseball (...)
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  36.  61
    Jonathan Knowles (2001). Does Intentional Psychology Need Vindicating by Cognitive Science? Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.
    I argue that intentional psychology does not stand in need of vindication by a lower-level implementation theory from cognitive science, in particular the representational theory of mind (RTM), as most famously Jerry Fodor has argued. The stance of the paper is novel in that I claim this holds even if one, in line with Fodor, views intentional psychology as an empirical theory, and its theoretical posits as as real as those of other sciences. I consider (...)
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  37.  11
    Ramsey Affifi (2014). Biological Pedagogy as Concern for Semiotic Growth. Biosemiotics 7 (1):73-88.
    Deweyan pedagogy seeks to promotes growth, characterized as an increased sensitivity, responsiveness, and ability to participate in an environment. Growth, Dewey says, is fostered by the development of habits that enable further habit formation. Unfortunately, humans have their own habitual ways of encountering other species, which often do not support growth. In this article, I briefly review some common conceptions of learning and the process of habit-formation to scope out the landscape of a more responsible and responsive approach to taking (...)
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  38. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...)
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  39.  13
    Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (2015). Dennett’s Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: An Innovative Play at Second Base. Philosophia 43 (3):593-609.
    I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s (...)
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  40.  61
    John J. Drummond (2007). Phenomenology: Neither Auto- nor Hetero- Be. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):57-74.
    Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the first-person perspective into account.
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  41.  4
    Daniel D. Hutto & Glenda Satne (2015). Introduction: Searching for the Natural Origins of Content. Philosophia 43 (3):505-519.
    This paper introduces this special issue which is focused on its target paper - The Natural Origins of Content. The target paper has had a robust and considered set of fifteen replies; a literal A to Z of papers. This extended introduction explains the background thinking and challenges that motivated the target article's proposed research programme. It also provides a sneak peak preview and navigational aid to the special issue’s contents. Brief highlights of each commentary are provided and they are (...)
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  42. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, (...)
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  43.  23
    Gordon R. Foxall (2008). Intentional Behaviorism Revisited. Behavior and Philosophy 36:113 - 155.
    The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other non-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining characteristic of radical behaviorism is not that it avoids mediating processes per se but that it sets out to account for behavior without recourse to propositional attitudes. Based, rather, on the contextual stance, it provides definitions of contingency-shaped, rule-governed verbal and private (...)
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  44.  46
    Gordon R. Foxall (1999). The Contextual Stance. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
    The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional (...)
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  45.  21
    Franco Scalzone & Guglielmo Tamburrini (2013). Human-Robot Interaction and Psychoanalysis. AI and Society 28 (3):297-307.
    Psychological attitudes towards service and personal robots are selectively examined from the vantage point of psychoanalysis. Significant case studies include the uncanny valley effect, brain-actuated robots evoking magic mental powers, parental attitudes towards robotic children, idealizations of robotic soldiers, persecutory fantasies involving robotic components and systems. Freudian theories of narcissism, animism, infantile complexes, ego ideal, and ideal ego are brought to bear on the interpretation of these various items. The horizons of Human-robot Interaction are found to afford new and fertile (...)
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  46.  4
    Ian H. Witten, Bruce A. MacDonald, David L. Maulsby & Rosanna Heise (1992). Programming by Example: The Human Face of AI. [REVIEW] AI and Society 6 (2):166-180.
    It is argued that “human-centredness” will be an important characteristic of systems that learn tasks from human users, as the difficulties in inductive inference rule out learning without human assistance. The aim of “programming by example” is to create systems that learn how to perform tasks from their human users by being shown examples of what is to be done. Just as the user creates a learning environment for the system, so the system provides a teaching opportunity for the user, (...)
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  47.  8
    Daniel C. Dennett (2012). The Free Floating Rationales of Evolution. Rivista di Filosofia 103 (2):185-200.
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  48.  6
    Adam Linson (2013). The Expressive Stance: Intentionality, Expression, and Machine Art. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5 (2):195-216.
    This paper proposes a new interpretive stance for interpreting artistic works and performances that is relevant to artificial intelligence research but also has broader implications. Termed the expressive stance, this stance makes intelligible a critical distinction between present-day machine art and human art, but allows for the possibility that future machine art could find a place alongside our own. The expressive stance is elaborated as a response to Daniel Dennett's notion of the intentional stance, (...)
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  49.  10
    Samuli Pöyhönen (2013). Intentional Concepts in Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophical Explorations (1):1-17.
    In this article, I develop an account of the use of intentional predicates in cognitive neuroscience explanations. As pointed out by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, intentional language abounds in neuroscience theories. According to Bennett and Hacker, the subpersonal use of intentional predicates results in conceptual confusion. I argue against this overly strong conclusion by evaluating the contested language use in light of its explanatory function. By employing conceptual resources from the contemporary philosophy of science, I show (...)
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  50.  1
    Gregory R. Peterson (1997). Minds and Bodies: Human and Divine. Zygon 32 (2):189-206.
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