Search results for 'intentionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.score: 24.0
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external (...)
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  2. John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, (...)
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  3. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 229-251.score: 24.0
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the (...)
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  4. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.score: 24.0
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal (...) theories over tracking theories. (shrink)
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  5. Andrew R. Bailey & Bradley Richards (2014). Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.score: 24.0
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about (...)
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  6. Michelle Montague (2009). The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.score: 24.0
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional (...)
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  7. Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.score: 24.0
    One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality (...)
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  8. Gabor Forrai (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). New York: Rodopi NY.score: 24.0
    The present volume has grown out of a conference organized jointly by the History of Philosophy Department of the University of Miskolc and the History and Philosophy of Science Department of Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), which took place in June 2002. The aim of the conference was to explore the various angles from which intentionality can be studied, how it is related to other philosophical issues, and how it figures in the works of major philosophers in the past. It (...)
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  9. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.score: 24.0
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. We (...)
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  10. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.score: 24.0
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, (...)
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  11. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality and Consciousness. In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.score: 24.0
    Intentionality is usually defined as the directedness of the mind toward something other than itself. My desire for a cold beer is directed at the cold beer in front of me. Much of consciousness is intentional, my conscious experiences are usually directed at something. However, conscious experiences typically have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like for me to see the deep blue of the Pacific Ocean and to feel the warm water lapping over my feet, and (...)
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  12. Olivier Massin (2013). The Intentionality of Pleasures. In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi.score: 24.0
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
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  13. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Naturalizing Intentionality. In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center. 83-90.score: 24.0
    Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A (...)
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  14. George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.score: 24.0
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis (...)
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  15. Tim Crane (2006). Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 107-119.score: 24.0
    I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (Hutto (...)
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  16. Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.score: 24.0
    More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational (...)
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  17. William Fish (2005). Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.score: 24.0
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...)
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  18. Jason Stanley (2010). &Quot;assertion" and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87 - 113.score: 24.0
    Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's (...)
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  19. Ansgar Beckermann (1996). Is There a Problem About Intentionality? Erkenntnis 45 (1):1-24.score: 24.0
    The crucial point of the mind-body-problem appears to be that mental phenome- na (events, properties, states) seem to have features which at first sight make it impossible to integrate these phenomena into a naturalistic world view, i.e. to identify them with, or to reduce them to, physical phenomena.1 In the contemp- orary discussion, there are mainly two critical features which are important in this context. The first of these is the feature of intentional states, e.g. beliefs and desires, to have (...)
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  20. John Drummond (2008). Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.score: 24.0
    This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the (...)
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  21. Uwe Meixner (2006). Classical Intentionality. Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45.score: 24.0
    In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it (...)
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  22. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.score: 24.0
    William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, (...)
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  23. Sacha Golob (2013). Heidegger on Kant, Time and the 'Form' of Intentionality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):345 - 367.score: 24.0
    Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...)
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  24. Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2009). Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.score: 24.0
    I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with (...)
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  25. Lisa Bortolotti (2005). Intentionality Without Rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):385-392.score: 24.0
    It is often taken for granted in standard theories of interpretation that there cannot be intentionality without rationality. According to the background argument, a system can be interpreted as having irrational beliefs only against a general background of rationality. Starting from the widespread assumption that delusions can be reasonably described as irrational beliefs, I argue here that the background argument fails to account for their intentional description.
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  26. Grant R. Gillett & John McMillan (2001). Consciousness and Intentionality. John Benjamins.score: 24.0
    This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major...
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  27. Peter Andras Varga (2008). BRENTANO'S INFLUENCE ON HUSSERL'S EARLY NOTION OF INTENTIONALITY. Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - Philosophia (1-2):29-48.score: 24.0
    The influence of Brentano on the emergence of Husserl's notion of intentionality has been usually perceived as the key of understanding the history of intentionality, since Brentano was credited with the discovery of intentionality, and Husserl was his discipline. This much debated question is to be revisited in the present essay by incorporating recent advances in Brentano scholarship and by focusing on Husserl's very first work, his habilitation essay (Über den Begriff der Zahl), which followed immediately after (...)
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  28. Robert Stalnaker (2004). Lewis on Intentionality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199 – 212.score: 24.0
    David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one (among the admissible interpretations) that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the (...)
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  29. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis. Topoi 28 (1):31-43.score: 24.0
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I (...)
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  30. Peter-Paul Verbeek (2008). Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking the Phenomenology of Human–Technology Relations. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):387-395.score: 24.0
    This article investigates the types of intentionality involved in human–technology relations. It aims to augment Don Ihde’s analysis of the relations between human beings and technological artifacts, by analyzing a number of concrete examples at the limits of Ihde’s analysis. The article distinguishes and analyzes three types of “cyborg intentionality,” which all involve specific blends of the human and the technological. Technologically mediated intentionality occurs when human intentionality takes place “through” technological artifacts; hybrid intentionality occurs (...)
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  31. Terence E. Horgan (1994). Naturalism and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26.score: 24.0
    I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to (...)
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  32. Jan Slaby (2008). Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.score: 24.0
    This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact (...)
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  33. Anthonie W. M. Meijers (2000). Mental Causation and Searle's Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.score: 24.0
    In my article I evaluate Searle's account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle's philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional states can be causally efficacious. My (...)
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  34. Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.score: 24.0
    The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits (...)
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  35. David L. Thompson (1986). Intentionality and Causality in John Searle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (March):83-97.score: 24.0
    Intentionality, as Brentano originally introduced the term in modern philosophy, was meant to provide a distinctive characteristic definitively separating the mental from the physical.(1) Mental states have an intrinsic relationship to an object, to that which they are "about." Physical entities just are what they are, they cannot, by their very essence, refer to anything, they have no "outreach", as one might put it. Mental states have, as it were, an incomplete essence, they cannot exist at all unless they (...)
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  36. Dan Zahavi (1994). Intentionality and the Representative Theory of Perception. Man and World 27 (1):37-47.score: 24.0
    Among the many accomplishments achieved by Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations, the outline of an intentional account of perception counts among the most prominent. 1 One of the consequences of this account was a severe criticism of the traditional representative theory of perception, and my aim in the following paper is to present this criticism and some of its ontological implications. 2 Even though Husserl's critique was directed against the positions of thinkers like Locke, Kant, Brentano (...)
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  37. Jeff Speaks (2006). Is Mental Content Prior to Linguistic Meaning?: Stalnaker on Intentionality. Noûs 40 (3):428-467.score: 24.0
    Since the 1960's, work in the analytic tradition on the nature of mental and linguistic content has converged on the views that social facts about public language meaning are derived from facts about the thoughts of individuals, and that these thoughts are constituted by properties of the internal states of agents. I give a two-part argument against this picture of intentionality: first, that if mental content is prior to public language meaning, then a view of mental content much like (...)
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  38. Jan Almäng (2007). Intentionality and Intersubjectivity. Göteborgs Universitet.score: 24.0
    1. Introduction. The problems of other minds ; Body, mind and other minds ; The analogical theory ; The critical theory ; Functionalism and mental states as theoretical entities ; A brief outline of things to come -- 2. Functionalism and the nature of mental representations. Functionalism and cognitive psychology ; Folk psychology and the representational theory of mind -- 3. Theory theory and simulation theory. A very short introduction to the world of theory theory and simulation theory ; A (...)
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  39. Keith Lehrer (2011). What Intentionality Is Like. Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.score: 24.0
    Intentionality is a mark of the mental, as Brentano (1874) noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality, which informally put, is the feature of being about something that may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Aesthetic experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality as we focus attention on the phenomenology of the sensory exemplar. This focus (...)
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  40. Bence Nanay (2006). Symmetry Between the Intentionality of Minds and Machines? The Biological Plausibility of Dennett's Position. Minds and Machines 16 (1):57-71.score: 24.0
    One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility of (...)
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  41. Antti Saaristo (2006). There is No Escape From Philosophy: Collective Intentionality and Empirical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.score: 24.0
    This article examines two empirical research traditions—experimental economics and the social identity approach in social psychology—that may be seen as attempts to falsify and verify the theory of collective intentionality, respectively. The article argues that both approaches fail to settle the issue. However, this is not necessarily due to the alleged immaturity of the social sciences but, possibly, to the philosophical nature of intentionality and intentional action. The article shows how broadly Davidsonian action theory, including Hacking’s notion of (...)
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  42. Ori Simchen (2012). Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This book argues that words and thoughts are typically about whatever they are about necessarily rather than contingently. The argument proceeds by articulating a requisite modal background and then bringing this background to bear on cognitive matters, notably the intentionality of cognitive episodes and states. The modal picture that emerges from the first two chapters is a strongly particularist one whereby possibilities reduce to possibilities for particular things (or pluralities thereof) where the latter are determined by the natures of (...)
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  43. Graham Priest (2005). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language--verbs such as "believes," "fears," "seeks," or "imagines." Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or (...)
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  44. Henry Jackman (1998). James' Pragmatic Account of Intentionality and Truth. Transactions of the Charles s Peirce Society 34 (1):155-181.score: 24.0
    William James presents a preference-sensitive and future-directed notion of truth that has struck many as wildly revisionary. This paper argues that such a reaction usually results from failing to see how his accounts of truth and intentionality are intertwined. James' forward-looking account of intentionality (or "knowing") compares favorably the 'causal' and 'resemblance-driven' accounts that have been popular since his day, and it is only when his remarks about truth are placed in the context of his account of (...) that they come to seem as plausible as they manifestly did to James. (shrink)
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  45. Donald Levy (2003). How to Psychoanalyze a Robot: Unconscious Cognition and the Evolution of Intentionality. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 13 (2):203-212.score: 24.0
    According to a common philosophical distinction, the `original' intentionality, or `aboutness' possessed by our thoughts, beliefs and desires, is categorically different from the `derived' intentionality manifested in some of our artifacts –- our words, books and pictures, for example. Those making the distinction claim that the intentionality of our artifacts is `parasitic' on the `genuine' intentionality to be found in members of the former class of things. In Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of Consciousness, Daniel (...)
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  46. Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.score: 24.0
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by the brain. (...)
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  47. Marion Hourdequin (2012). Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.score: 24.0
    Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. Richard Joyce (2001) develops (...)
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  48. Pierre le Morvan (2005). Intentionality: Transparent, Translucent, and Opaque. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.score: 24.0
    Exploring intentionality from an externalist per- spective, I distinguish three kinds of intentionality in the case of seeing, which I call transparent, translucent, and opaque respec- tively. I then extend the distinction from seeing to knowing, and then to believing. Having explicated the three-fold distinction, I then critically explore some important consequences that follow from granting that (i) there are transparent and translucent in- tentional states and (ii) these intentional states are mental states. These consequences include: ?rst, that (...)
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  49. Wolfgang Barz (2007). Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness? Acta Analytica 22 (3):183-188.score: 24.0
    It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise.
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  50. Suzanne Cunningham (1997). Two Faces of Intentionality. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460.score: 24.0
    Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.
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