Search results for 'intentionality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third (...)
  2.  80
    Graham Priest (2005). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language--verbs such as "believes," "fears," "seeks," or "imagines." Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or (...)
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  3. Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal (...) theories over tracking theories. (shrink)
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  4. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the (...)
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  5.  79
    Keith Lehrer (2011). What Intentionality Is Like. Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
    Intentionality is a mark of the mental, as Brentano (1874) noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality, which informally put, is the feature of being about something that may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Aesthetic experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality as we focus attention on the phenomenology of the sensory exemplar. This focus (...)
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  6.  48
    Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle (2010). Can Unintended Side Effects Be Intentional? Resolving a Controversy Over Intentionality and Morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36:1635-1647.
    Can an event’s blameworthiness distort whether people see it as intentional? In controversial recent studies, people judged a behavior’s negative side effect intentional even though the agent allegedly had no desire for it to occur. Such a judgment contradicts the standard assumption that desire is a necessary condition of intentionality, and it raises concerns about assessments of intentionality in legal settings. Six studies examined whether blameworthy events distort intentionality judgments. Studies 1 through 4 show that, counter to (...)
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  7. Robert Stalnaker (1999). Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford University Press.
    In Context and Content Robert Stalnaker develops a philosophical picture of the nature of speech and thought and the relations between them. These collected essays offer philosophers and cognitive scientists a summation of Stalnaker's important and influential work in this area. His new introduction to the volume gives an overview of this work and offers a convenient way in for those who are new to it.
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  8. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external (...)
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  9. Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
    More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational (...)
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  10. Uriah Kriegel (2003). Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, (...)
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  11.  2
    Kenneth M. Sayre (1986). Intentionality and Information Processing: An Alternative Model for Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):121-38.
    This article responds to two unresolved and crucial problems of cognitive science: (1) What is actually accomplished by functions of the nervous system that we ordinarily describe in the intentional idiom? and (2) What makes the information processing involved in these functions semantic? It is argued that, contrary to the assumptions of many cognitive theorists, the computational approach does not provide coherent answers to these problems, and that a more promising start would be to fall back on mathematical communication theory (...)
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  12. Michelle Montague (2009). The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional (...)
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  13.  11
    Marc Rowlands (forthcoming). Hard Problems of Intentionality. Philosophia:1-6.
    This paper argues that Hutto and Satne’s three-pronged attempt to solve the problem of intentionality – or, at least, to provide an outline of how this problem should be approached – suffers from two shortcomings. First, the idea of Ur-intentionality is problematic. Second, Hutto and Satne have not provided us with a way of getting from Ur-intentionality to content intentionality.
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  14.  35
    John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Chapter THE NATURE OF INTENTIONAL STATES I. INTENTIONALITY AS DIRECTEDNESS As a preliminary formulation we might say: Intentionality is that property of ...
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  15. Tim Crane (2006). Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins Publishing Company 107-119.
    I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (Hutto (...)
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  16. Sacha Golob (2013). Heidegger on Kant, Time and the 'Form' of Intentionality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):345 - 367.
    Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...)
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  17. Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2009). Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):371-388.
    I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with (...)
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  18. Olivier Massin (2013). The Intentionality of Pleasures. In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi 307-337.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
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  19.  98
    Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality, Cognitive Integration and the Continuity Thesis. Topoi 28 (1):31-43.
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I (...)
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  20.  9
    M. Oreste Fiocco (2015). Intentionality and Realism. Acta Analytica 30 (3):219-237.
    In this paper, I argue that how a mind can come to be about an object and how the world is independently of the workings of any mind are inextricably linked. Hence, epistemology, at its most basic, and metaphysics are systematically related. In order to demonstrate the primary thesis of the paper, I first articulate two contrary accounts of the nature of reality and then two contradictory general views of intentionality. I argue that these positions can be combined in (...)
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  21. Jan Slaby (2008). Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
    This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling. The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact (...)
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  22.  73
    Erik Rietveld (2012). Bodily Intentionality and Social Affordances in Context. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction. !e role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing Company
    There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective embodied intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of (...)
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  23. John Drummond (2008). Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.
    This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the (...)
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  24. Andrew R. Bailey & Bradley Richards (2014). Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about (...)
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  25.  39
    Steven Sverdlik (2004). Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense Thought About Action. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236.
    The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. Philosophers of action, psychologists and moral philosophers all have taken an interest in understanding this important concept. One issue that has been discussed by philosophers is whether the concept of intentional action is purely ‘naturalistic’, that is, whether it is entirely a descriptive concept that can be used to explain and predict behavior. (Of course, judgments using such a concept could be used to support moral (...)
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  26. Dan Zahavi (2005). Intentionality and Experience. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):299-318.
    Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind , it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature (...)
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  27. Peter-Paul Verbeek (2008). Cyborg Intentionality: Rethinking the Phenomenology of Human–Technology Relations. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):387-395.
    This article investigates the types of intentionality involved in human–technology relations. It aims to augment Don Ihde’s analysis of the relations between human beings and technological artifacts, by analyzing a number of concrete examples at the limits of Ihde’s analysis. The article distinguishes and analyzes three types of “cyborg intentionality,” which all involve specific blends of the human and the technological. Technologically mediated intentionality occurs when human intentionality takes place “through” technological artifacts; hybrid intentionality occurs (...)
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  28. David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
    Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range (...)
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  29.  62
    Uriah Kriegel (2011). The Sources of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    This book attempts a synthesis of both approaches, developing an account of the sources of such directedness that grounds it both in reliable tracking and in ...
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  30. William Fish (2005). Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality. In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...)
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  31. Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo, Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. We (...)
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  32.  76
    Marion Hourdequin (2012). Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
    Internalists about reasons generally insist that if a putative reason, R, is to count as a genuine normative reason for a particular agent to do something, then R must make a rational connection to some desire or interest of the agent in question. If internalism is true, but moral reasons purport to apply to agents independently of the particular desires, interests, and commitments they have, then we may be forced to conclude that moral reasons are incoherent. Richard Joyce (2001) develops (...)
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  33. Uriah Kriegel (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.
    One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality (...)
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  34. Richard Menary (2009). Intentionality and Consciousness. In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Elsevier
    Intentionality is usually defined as the directedness of the mind toward something other than itself. My desire for a cold beer is directed at the cold beer in front of me. Much of consciousness is intentional, my conscious experiences are usually directed at something. However, conscious experiences typically have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like for me to see the deep blue of the Pacific Ocean and to feel the warm water lapping over my feet, and (...)
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  35. Jason Stanley (2010). "Assertion" and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113.
    Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's (...)
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  36.  80
    Jan Almäng (2007). Intentionality and Intersubjectivity. Göteborgs Universitet.
    1. Introduction. The problems of other minds ; Body, mind and other minds ; The analogical theory ; The critical theory ; Functionalism and mental states as theoretical entities ; A brief outline of things to come -- 2. Functionalism and the nature of mental representations. Functionalism and cognitive psychology ; Folk psychology and the representational theory of mind -- 3. Theory theory and simulation theory. A very short introduction to the world of theory theory and simulation theory ; A (...)
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  37.  2
    Ullin T. Place (1996). Intentionality as the Mark of the Dispositional. Dialectica 50 (2):91-120.
    summaryMartin and Pfeifer have claimed“that the most typical characterizations of intentionality… all fail to distinguish … mental states from …dispositional physical states.”The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's inexistence of the intentional object, (...)
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  38. Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
    William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, (...)
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  39.  3
    Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki (forthcoming). Dennett’s Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: An Innovative Play at Second Base. Philosophia:1-17.
    I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne, recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the “second-base … neo-behaviorist” strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and (...)
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  40.  45
    Dale Jacquette (2011). Intentionality as a Conceptually Primitive Relation. Acta Analytica 26 (1):15-35.
    If conceptual analysis is possible for finite thinkers, then there must ultimately be a distinction between complex and primitive or irreducible and unanalyzable concepts, by which complex concepts are analyzed as relations among primitive concepts. This investigation considers the advantages of categorizing intentionality as a primitive rather than analyzable concept, in both a historical Brentanian context and in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind. Arguments in support of intentionality as a primitive relation are evaluated relative to objections, especially (...)
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  41. Robert Stalnaker (2004). Lewis on Intentionality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199 – 212.
    David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one (among the admissible interpretations) that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the (...)
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  42.  16
    Laurent Cesalli & Hamid Taieb (2012). The Road to Ideelle Verähnlichung. Anton Marty’s Conception of Intentionality in the Light of its Brentanian Background. Quaestio 12:171-232.
    Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (ideelle Verähnlichung), a (...)
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  43.  34
    Panos Theodorou (2014). Pain, Pleasure, and the Intentionality of Emotions as Experiences of Values: A New Phenomenological Perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):625-641.
    The article starts with a brief overview of the kinds of approaches that have been attempted for the presentation of Phenomenology’s view on the emotions. I then pass to Husserl’s unsatisfactory efforts to disclose the intentionality of emotions and their intentional correlation with values. Next, I outline the idea of a new, “normalized phenomenological” approach of emotions and values. Pleasure and pain, then, are first explored as affective feelings . In the cases examined, it is shown that, primordially, pleasure (...)
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  44.  60
    Matteo Colombo (2010). How Authentic Intentionality Can Be Enabled: A Neurocomputational Hypothesis. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):183-202.
    According to John Haugeland, the capacity for “authentic intentionality” depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland’s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand “authentic intentionality”. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect (...)
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  45. Uwe Meixner (2006). Classical Intentionality. Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45.
    In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it (...)
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  46. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Naturalizing Intentionality. In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Philosopy Documentation Center 83-90.
    Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A (...)
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  47. Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.
    The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits (...)
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  48.  55
    John Haugeland (2002). Authentic Intentionality. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press
    What is the relation between computation and intennonality? Cognition presup- poses intentionality (or semantics). This much is certain. So, if, according to com- putationalism, cognition is computation, then computation, mo, presupposes..
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  49. George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis (...)
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  50.  97
    Jeff Speaks (2006). Is Mental Content Prior to Linguistic Meaning?: Stalnaker on Intentionality. Noûs 40 (3):428-467.
    Since the 1960's, work in the analytic tradition on the nature of mental and linguistic content has converged on the views that social facts about public language meaning are derived from facts about the thoughts of individuals, and that these thoughts are constituted by properties of the internal states of agents. I give a two-part argument against this picture of intentionality: first, that if mental content is prior to public language meaning, then a view of mental content much like (...)
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