Search results for 'internalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja (2013). Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.score: 24.0
    We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference (...)
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  2. Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund (2013). Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions? Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335.score: 24.0
    In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
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  3. Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.score: 24.0
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism (...)
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  4. Ali Hasan (2013). Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.score: 24.0
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – (...)
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  5. B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.score: 24.0
    The internalism/externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, is that all (...)
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  6. Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.score: 24.0
    Cognitivist motivational internalism is the thesis that, if one believes that 'It is right to ϕ', then one will be motivated to ϕ. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. When defending cognitivist motivational internalism it is tempting to either argue that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus (...)
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  7. Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.score: 24.0
    Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. (...)
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  8. Ali Hasan (2011). Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann's Dilemma for Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:391-410.score: 24.0
    In Justification without Awareness (2006), Michael Bergmann presents a dilemma for internalism from which he claims there is “no escape”: The awareness allegedly required for justification is either strong awareness, which involves conceiving of some justification-contributor as relevant to the truth of a belief, or weak awareness, which does not. Bergmann argues that the former leads to an infinite regress of justifiers, while the latter conflicts with the “clearest and most compelling” motivation for endorsing internalism, namely, that for (...)
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  9. B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.score: 24.0
    In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are (...)
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  10. Caj Strandberg (2013). An Internalist Dilemma—and an Externalist Solution. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):25-51.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our conception of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the notion that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, a weaker form of internalism avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain the mentioned conception concerning (...)
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  11. Gary Bartlett (2008). Whither Internalism? How Internalists Should Respond to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.score: 24.0
    A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the (...)
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  12. Christian Miller (2008). Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233 - 255.score: 24.0
    Cases involving amoralists who no longer care about the institution of morality, together with cases of depression, listlessness, and exhaustion, have posed trouble in recent years for standard formulations of motivational internalism. In response, though, internalists have been willing to adopt narrower versions of the thesis which restrict it just to the motivational lives of those agents who are said to be in some way normal, practically rational, or virtuous. My goal in this paper is to offer a new (...)
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  13. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.score: 24.0
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is (...)
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  14. Thomas M. Crisp (2010). A Dilemma for Internalism? Synthese 174 (3):355 - 366.score: 24.0
    Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject (...)
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  15. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.score: 24.0
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  16. B. J. C. Madison (2014). Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory. Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.score: 24.0
    Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can (...)
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  17. Keith Butler (1997). Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.score: 24.0
    Externalism holds, and internalism denies, that the individuation of many of an individual's mental states (e.g., thoughts about the physical world) depends necessarily on relations that individual bears to the physical and/or social environment. Many philosophers, externalists and internalists alike, believe that introspection yields knowledge of the contents of our thoughts that is direct and authoritative. It is not obvious, however, that the metaphysical claims of externalism are compatible with this epistemological thesis. Some (e.g., Burge, 1988; Falvey and Owens (...)
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  18. Michael Pelczar (2009). Content Internalism About Indexical Thought. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):95 - 104.score: 24.0
    Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant (...)
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  19. Robert Lockie (1998). What's Wrong with Moral Internalism. Ratio 11 (1):14–36.score: 24.0
    Moral Internalism is the claim that it is a priori that moral beliefs are reasons for action. At least three conceptions of 'reason' may be disambiguated: psychological, epistemological, and purely ethical. The first two conceptions of Internalism are false on conceptual, and indeed empirical, grounds. On a purely ethical conception of 'reasons', the claim is true but is an Externalist claim. Positive arguments for Internalism — from phenomenology, connection and oddness — are found wanting. Three possible responses (...)
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  20. Alexander Sarch (2011). Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It. Philosophical Studies 154 (02):161 - 184.score: 24.0
    Internalism about a person's good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person's well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person's good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least (...)
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  21. James Chase (2001). Is Externalism About Content Inconsistent with Internalism About Justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46.score: 24.0
    (2001). Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 227-246.
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  22. Bennett Gilbert, Moral Impartialism and Moral Internalism.score: 24.0
    A. Moral impartialism is a theory in normative ethics. Moral internalism is a theory in meta-ethics. One’s manner of twining normative ethics and meta-ethics varies according to his or her position on the relations of normative ethics and metaphysics, as to in what ways ethics needs analysis, or ontology, or metaphysics, if it needs any of these at all. This large question is the deeper background of this paper. Here I will show why impartialism and internalism both need (...)
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  23. Corine Besson (2009). Externalism, Internalism, and Logical Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):1-29.score: 24.0
    The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist-internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order (...)
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  24. Harold Langsam (2008). Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Erkenntnis 68 (1):79 - 101.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification. The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way; since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified iff a relevant possible instance of (...)
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  25. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Internalism and Evidence of Reliability. Philosophia 37 (1):47-54.score: 24.0
    This paper concerns various competing views on the nature of perceptual justification. Various thought experiments that motivate various views are discussed. Once reliabilism is rejected and some form of internalism is instead embraced, the following issue arises: must an internalist nevertheless require that perceptual justification involve the possession of evidence for the reliability of our perceptual processes? Matthias Steup answers in the affirmative, espousing what he calls internalist reliabilism. Some problems are raised for this form of internalism.
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  26. Sanford Goldberg (ed.) (2007). Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents eleven specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and epistemology and ...
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  27. Mikkel Gerken (2008). Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent with Content Externalism? Philosophia 36 (1):87-96.score: 24.0
    There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps (...)
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  28. Jon Tresan (2009). Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 13 (1):51 - 72.score: 24.0
    Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items (...)
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  29. Chris Tillman (2012). Reconciling Justificatory Internalism and Content Externalism. Synthese 187 (2):419-440.score: 24.0
    At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming (complete) mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved. The paper proceeds as follows. In §1 I explain the threat (...)
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  30. John Turri (2009). On the General Argument Against Internalism. Synthese 170 (1):147 - 153.score: 24.0
    I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections.
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  31. Danielle Bromwich (2013). Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):n/a-n/a.score: 24.0
    Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first-person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject or (...)
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  32. Matthew Davidson & Gordon Barnes (forthcoming). Internalism and Properly Basic Belief. In David Werther Mark Linville (ed.), Philosophy and the Christian Worldview : Analysis, Assessment and Development. Continuum.score: 24.0
    In this paper we set out a view on which internalist proper basicality is secured by sensory experience.
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  33. Kate Manne (2014). Internalism About Reasons: Sad but True? Philosophical Studies 167 (1):89-117.score: 24.0
    Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that (...)
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  34. James McBain (2005). Epistemological Practice and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):283-291.score: 24.0
    The dialogue between internalists who maintain a belief is a case of knowledge when that which justifies the belief is within the agent's first-person perspective and externalists who maintain epistemic justification can be in part, or entirely, outside the agent's first-person perspective has been part of the epistemological literature for some time with one side usually attempting to show how the other side is mistaken. Edward Craig argues the internalist/externalist debate is flawed from the outset. Specifically, both internalism and (...)
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  35. Prakash Mondal (2011). Can Internalism and Externalism Be Reconciled in a Biological Epistemology of Language? Biosemiotics 5 (1):61 - 82.score: 24.0
    This paper is an attempt at exploring the possibility of reconciling the two interpretations of biolinguistics which have been recently projected by Koster(Biolinguistics 3(1):61–92, 2009). The two interpretations—trivial and nontrivial—can be roughly construed as non-internalist and internalist conceptions of biolinguistics respectively. The internalist approach boils down to a conception of language where language as a mental grammar in the form of I-language grows and functions like a biological organ. On the other hand, under such a construal consistent with Koster’s (Biolinguistics (...)
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  36. Andrew E. Newman (2005). Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail). Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169.score: 24.0
    Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, (...)
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  37. Sarah Wright (2010). Internalist Virtues and Knowledge. Acta Analytica 25 (2):119-132.score: 24.0
    What role can intellectual virtues play in an account of knowledge when we interpret those virtues internalistically, i.e., as depending only on internal states of the cognizer? Though it has been argued that internalist virtues are ill suited to play any role in an account of knowledge, I will show that, on the contrary, internalist virtues can play an important role in recent accounts of knowledge developed to utilize externalist virtues. The virtue account of knowledge developed by Linda Zagzebski is (...)
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  38. Colin Ruloff (2009). Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma. Theoria 75 (2):129-151.score: 24.0
    Epistemic Internalism (EI) is the claim that an agent S is justified in believing that p at a time t iff S has either an actual or potential direct awareness of the grounds or properties that confer justification on p at t . In this paper I argue that EI does not provide the proponent of EI with an intuitively clear analysis of epistemic justification. More exactly, after identifying two different versions of EI – a weak version and a (...)
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  39. Maciej Witek (2003). Wittgenstein and the Internalism-Externalism Dilemma. In W. Löffler & P. Weingartner (eds.), Knowledge and Belief. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.score: 24.0
    It can be said that Wittgenstein"s Private Language Argument initiated the internalism-externalism dilemma. In one of its interpretations the argument is read as a criticism of methodological solipsism. Internalism, in turn, assumes that methodological solipsism is an adequate account of mental content. Therefore some externalists refer to Wittgenstein as their forerunner. I argue, first, that the Private Language Argument does not support the claim of externalism that meanings are not in the head, even though it undermines methodological solipsism. (...)
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  40. Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Fredrik Björklund (forthcoming). Motivational Internalism and Folk Intuitions. Philosophical Psychology:1-20.score: 24.0
    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral thinking, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as (...)
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  41. Benjamin Bayer (2012). Internalism Empowered: How to Bolster a Theory of Justification with a Direct Realist Theory of Awareness. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.score: 24.0
    Abstract The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. (...)
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  42. Christopher Gregory Weaver (forthcoming). Evilism, Moral Rationalism, and Reasons Internalism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-22.score: 24.0
    I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law's (2010) evil god challenge.
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  43. Basil Smith, Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    How are the contents of our beliefs, our intentions, and other attitudes individuated? Just what makes our contents what they are? Content externalism, as Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and others have argued, is the position that our contents depend in a constitutive manner on items in the external world, that they can be individuated by our causal interaction with the items they are about. Content internalism, by contrast, is the position that our contents depend primarily on the properties of (...)
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  44. Ana Gavran (2004). Tim Crane on the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.score: 24.0
    The subject of this paper is the debate between externalism and internalism about mental content presented by Tim Crane in Chapter 4 of his book Elements of Mind. Crane’s sympathies in this debate are with internalism. The paper attempts to show that Crane’s argumentation is not refuting the Twin Earth argument and externalism, and that in its basis it does not differ much from externalism itself Crane’s version of the argument for externalism features two key premises: (1) The (...)
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  45. Joshua Gert (2012). Internalism and Hyperexternalism About Reasons. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):15-34.score: 24.0
    Alan Goldman’s Reasons from Within is one of the most thorough recent defenses of what might be called ‘orthodox internalism’ about practical reasons. Goldman’s main target is an opposing view that includes a commitment to the following two theses: (O) that there are such things as objective values, and (E) that these values give rise to external reasons. One version of this view, which we can call ‘orthodox externalism’, also includes a commitment to the thesis (I) that rational people (...)
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  46. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2007). Internalism and Epistemology : The Architecture of Reason. In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Internalism and Epistemology is a powerful articulation and defense of a classical answer to an enduring question: What is the nature of rational belief? In opposition to prevailing philosophical fashion, the book argues that epistemic externalism leads, not just to skepticism, but to epistemic nihilism - the denial of the very possibility of justification. And it defends a subtle and sophisticated internalism against criticisms that have widely but mistakenly been thought to be decisive. Beginning with an internalist response (...)
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  47. J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Epistemic Internalism, Content Externalism and the Subjective/Objective Justification Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly.score: 24.0
    Two arguments against the compatibility of epistemic internalism and content externalism are considered. Both arguments are shown to fail, because they equivocate on the concept of justification involved in their premises. To spell out the involved equivocation, a distinction between subjective and objective justification is introduced, which can also be independently motivated on the basis of a wide range of thought experiments to be found in the mainstream literature on epistemology. The subjective/objective justification distinction is also ideally suited for (...)
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  48. John M. DePoe (2012). Bergmann's Dilemma and Internalism's Escape. Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.score: 24.0
    Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification cannot (...)
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  49. Karl Schafer (2014). Doxastic Planning and Epistemic Internalism. Synthese 191 (12):2571-2591.score: 24.0
    In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be (...)
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