Search results for 'intuition' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Elijah Chudnoff (2014). Intuition in Mathematics. In Barbara Held & Lisa Osbeck (eds.), Rational Intuition. Cambridge University Press.score: 27.0
    The literature on mathematics suggests that intuition plays a role in it as a ground of belief. This article explores the nature of intuition as it occurs in mathematical thinking. Section 1 suggests that intuitions should be understood by analogy with perceptions. Section 2 explains what fleshing out such an analogy requires. Section 3 discusses Kantian ways of fleshing it out. Section 4 discusses Platonist ways of fleshing it out. Section 5 sketches a proposal for resolving the main (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Elijah Chudnoff (2014). The Rational Roles of Intuition. In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.score: 25.0
    NOTE: this is a substantial revision of a previously uploaded draft. Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action-guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Paul Silva Jr (2013). Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.score: 24.0
    An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking (...) has evidentiary value. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Moti Mizrahi (2012). Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 6 (11):169-170.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition are strong arguments just in case there is an agreement among the relevant philosophers concerning the intuition in question. Otherwise, appeals to intuition are weak arguments.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):42-67.score: 24.0
    According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective. I argue that there are cases in (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Moti Mizrahi (2013). More Intuition Mongering. The Reasoner 7 (1):5-6.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition are weak arguments because intellectual intuition is an unreliable belief-forming process, since it yields incompatible verdicts in response to the same cases, and since the inference from 'It seems to S that p' to 'p' is unreliable. Since the reliability of intellectual intuition is a necessary condition for strong appeals to intuition, it follows that appeals to intuition are weak arguments.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Yuri Cath (2012). Evidence and Intuition. Episteme 9 (4):311-328.score: 24.0
    Many philosophers accept a view according to which intuitions are crucial evidence in philosophy. Recently, Williamson has argued that such views are best abandoned because they lead to a psychologistic conception of philosophical evidence that encourages scepticism about the armchair judgements relied upon in philosophy. In this paper I respond to this criticism by showing how the intuition picture can be formulated in such a way that: it is consistent with a wide range of views about not only philosophical (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ernest Sosa (1996). Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162.score: 24.0
    A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Max Seeger (2010). Experimental Philosophy and the Twin Earth Intuition. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:237-244.score: 24.0
    Jonathan Weinberg (2007) has argued that we should not appeal to intuition as evidence because it cannot be externally corroborated. This paper argues for the normative claim that Weinberg’s demand for external corroboration is misguided. The idea is that Weinberg goes wrong in treating philosophical appeal to intuition analogous to the appeal to evidence in the sciences. Traditional practice is defended against Weinberg’s critique with the argument that some intuitions are true simply in virtue of being intuited by (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Janet Levin (2004). The Evidential Status of Philosophical Intuition. Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.score: 24.0
    Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. John Symons (2008). Intuition and Philosophical Methodology. Axiomathes 18 (1):67-89.score: 24.0
    Intuition serves a variety of roles in contemporary philosophy. This paper provides a historical discussion of the revival of intuition in the 1970s, untangling some of the ways that intuition has been used and offering some suggestions concerning its proper place in philosophical investigation. Contrary to some interpretations of the results of experimental philosophy, it is argued that generalized skepticism with respect to intuition is unwarranted. Intuition can continue to play an important role as part (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Moral Intuition in Philosophy and Psychology. In Neil Levy & Jens Clausen (eds.), Springer Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer.score: 24.0
    Psychologists and philosophers use the term 'intuition' for a variety of different phenomena. In this paper, I try to provide a kind of a roadmap of the debates, point to some confusions and problems, and give a brief sketch of an empirically respectable philosophical approach.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Lois Isenman (2013). Understanding Unconscious Intelligence and Intuition: &Quot;blink" and Beyond. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 56 (1):148-166.score: 24.0
    The importance of unconscious cognition is seeping into popular consciousness. A number of recent books bridging the academic world and the reading public stress that at least a portion of decision-making depends not on conscious reasoning, but instead on cognition that occurs below awareness. However, these books provide a limited perspective on how the unconscious mind works and the potential power of intuition. This essay is an effort to expand the picture. It is structured around the book that has (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jennifer Nagel (2014). Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):219-241.score: 24.0
    Action is not always guided by conscious deliberation; in many circumstances, we act intuitively rather than reflectively. Tamar Gendler (2014) contends that because intuitively guided action can lead us away from our reflective commitments, it limits the power of knowledge to guide action. While I agree that intuition can diverge from reflection, I argue that this divergence does not constitute a restriction on the power of knowledge. After explaining my view of the contrast between intuitive and reflective thinking, this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Michael Friedman (2012). Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition. Synthese 186 (1):231-255.score: 24.0
    I use recent work on Kant and diagrammatic reasoning to develop a reconsideration of central aspects of Kant’s philosophy of geometry and its relation to spatial intuition. In particular, I reconsider in this light the relations between geometrical concepts and their schemata, and the relationship between pure and empirical intuition. I argue that diagrammatic interpretations of Kant’s theory of geometrical intuition can, at best, capture only part of what Kant’s conception involves and that, for example, they cannot (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Ole Koksvik, Intuition, Belief and Rational Criticisability.score: 24.0
    A simple reductive view of intuition holds that intuition is a type of belief. That an agent who intuits that p sometimes believes that p is false is often thought to demonstrate that the simple reductive view is false. I show that this argument is inconclusive, but also that an argument for the same conclusion can be rebuilt using the notion of rational criticisability. I then use that notion to argue that perception is also not reducible to belief, (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ole Koksvik, Précis of Intuition.score: 24.0
    This thesis seeks to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that there is a class of mental states deserving of the label ‘intuition’, and which is a good candidate for a psychological kind, a kind which cuts the mind at its natural joints. These mental states are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Peter J. Markie (2013). Rational Intuition and Understanding. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):271-290.score: 24.0
    Rational intuitions involve a particular form of understanding that gives them a special epistemic status. This form of understanding and its epistemic efficacy are not explained by several current theories of rational intuition, including Phenomenal Conservatism (Huemer, Skepticism and the veil of perception, 2001 ; Ethical intuitionism, 2005 ; Philos Phenomenol Res 74:30–55, 2007 ), Proper Functionalism (Plantinga, Warrant and proper function, 1993 ), the Competency Theory (Bealer Pac Philos Q 81:1–30, 2000 ; Sosa, A virtue epistemology, 2007 ) (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Valeria Giardino (2010). Intuition and Visualization in Mathematical Problem Solving. Topoi 29 (1):29-39.score: 24.0
    In this article, I will discuss the relationship between mathematical intuition and mathematical visualization. I will argue that in order to investigate this relationship, it is necessary to consider mathematical activity as a complex phenomenon, which involves many different cognitive resources. I will focus on two kinds of danger in recurring to visualization and I will show that they are not a good reason to conclude that visualization is not reliable, if we consider its use in mathematical practice. Then, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Thomas W. Smythe & Thomas G. Evans (2007). Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge. Philosophia 35 (2):233-247.score: 24.0
    The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Jeffrey Maynes (2012). Linguistic Intuition and Calibration. Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (5):443-460.score: 24.0
    Linguists, particularly in the generative tradition, commonly rely upon intuitions about sentences as a key source of evidence for their theories. While widespread, this methodology has also been controversial. In this paper, I develop a positive account of linguistic intuition, and defend its role in linguistic inquiry. Intuitions qualify as evidence as form of linguistic behavior, which, since it is partially caused by linguistic competence (the object of investigation), can be used to study this competence. I defend this view (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Giuseppe Longo & Arnaud Viarouge (2010). Mathematical Intuition and the Cognitive Roots of Mathematical Concepts. Topoi 29 (1):15-27.score: 24.0
    The foundation of Mathematics is both a logico-formal issue and an epistemological one. By the first, we mean the explicitation and analysis of formal proof principles, which, largely a posteriori, ground proof on general deduction rules and schemata. By the second, we mean the investigation of the constitutive genesis of concepts and structures, the aim of this paper. This “genealogy of concepts”, so dear to Riemann, Poincaré and Enriques among others, is necessary both in order to enrich the foundational analysis (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Damián Enrique Szmuc (2012). A New Hope for Philosophers' Appeal to Intuition. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):336-353.score: 24.0
    Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Hillel D. Braude (2009). Clinical Intuition Versus Statistics: Different Modes of Tacit Knowledge in Clinical Epidemiology and Evidence-Based Medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30 (3):181-198.score: 24.0
    Despite its phenomenal success since its inception in the early nineteen-nineties, the evidence-based medicine movement has not succeeded in shaking off an epistemological critique derived from the experiential or tacit dimensions of clinical reasoning about particular individuals. This critique claims that the evidence-based medicine model does not take account of tacit knowing as developed by the philosopher Michael Polanyi. However, the epistemology of evidence-based medicine is premised on the elimination of the tacit dimension from clinical judgment. This is demonstrated through (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Wesley Buckwalter (2014). Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):n/a-n/a.score: 24.0
    Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First, evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well-researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Ole Koksvik (2013). Intuition and Conscious Reasoning. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):709-715.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that, contrary to common opinion, intuition can result from conscious reasoning. It also discusses why this matters.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Peter Slezak (2010). Doubts About Descartes' Indubitability: The Cogito as Intuition and Inference. Philosophical Forum 41 (4):389-412.score: 24.0
    Kirsten Besheer has recently considered Descartes’ doubting appropriately in the context of his physiological theories in the spirit of recent important re-appraisals of his natural philosophy. However, Besheer does not address the notorious indubitability and its source that Descartes claims to have discovered. David Cunning has remarked that Descartes’ insistence on the indubitability of his existence presents “an intractable problem of interpretation” in the light of passages that suggest his existence is “just as dubitable as anything else”. However, although the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.score: 24.0
    The present paper offers an analogical support for the use of rational intuition, namely, if we regard sense perception as a mental faculty that (in general) delivers justified beliefs, then we should treat intuition in the same manner. I will argue that both the cognitive marks of intuition and the role it traditionally plays in epistemology are strongly analogous to that of perception, and barring specific arguments to the contrary, we should treat rational intuition as a (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Nathan Bauer (2012). A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception. Inquiry 55 (3):215-237.score: 24.0
    Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Jaana Woiceshyn (2011). A Model for Ethical Decision Making in Business: Reasoning, Intuition, and Rational Moral Principles. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 104 (3):311-323.score: 24.0
    How do business leaders make ethical decisions? Given the significant and wide-spread impact of business people’s decisions on multiple constituents (e.g., customers, employees, shareholders, competitors, and suppliers), how they make decisions matters. Unethical decisions harm the decision makers themselves as well as others, whereas ethical decisions have the opposite effect. Based on data from a study on strategic decision making by 16 effective chief executive officers (and three not-so-effective ones as contrast), I propose a model for ethical decision making in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Roopen N. Majithia (2006). Function, Intuition and Ends in Aristotle's Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):187 - 200.score: 24.0
    This essay attempts to show why deliberation is not of ends for Aristotle, not only because deliberation is concerned with means, but because ends are grasped by wish. Such wishing, I argue, is a form of rational intuition that is non-discursive and analogous to seeing and therefore not at all like the discursive thought involved in deliberation. Such a reading also helps shed light on the nature of contemplation and therefore on happiness in Aristotle.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Fernand Gobet & Philippe Chassy (2009). Expertise and Intuition: A Tale of Three Theories. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (2):151-180.score: 24.0
    Several authors have hailed intuition as one of the defining features of expertise. In particular, while disagreeing on almost anything that touches on human cognition and artificial intelligence, Hubert Dreyfus and Herbert Simon agreed on this point. However, the highly influential theories of intuition they proposed differed in major ways, especially with respect to the role given to search and as to whether intuition is holistic or analytic. Both theories suffer from empirical weaknesses. In this paper, we (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Emmanuel Lévinas (1995). The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. Northwestern University Press.score: 24.0
    In this landmark study, Emmanuel Levinas discusses the aspects and function of intuition in Husserl's thought and its meaning for philosophical self-reflection.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Chien-Hsing Ho (2014). Meaning, Understanding, and Knowing-What: An Indian Grammarian Notion of Intuition (Pratibha). Philosophy East and West 64 (2):404-424.score: 24.0
    For Bhartrhari, a fifth-century Indian grammarian-philosopher, all conscious beings—beasts, birds and humans—are capable of what he called pratibha, a flash of indescribable intuitive understanding such that one knows what the present object “means” and what to do with it. Such an understanding, if correct, amounts to a mode of knowing that may best be termed knowing-what, to distinguish it from both knowing-that and knowing-how. This paper attempts to expound Bhartrhari’s conception of pratibha in relation to the notions of meaning, understanding, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Ole Koksvik (2011). Intuition. Dissertation, Australian National Universityscore: 24.0
    In this thesis I seek to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that intuitions are experiences of a certain kind. In particular, they are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character. -/- In Chapter 1 I identify our target and provide some important reliminaries. Intuitions are mental states, but which ones? Giving examples helps: a person has an intuition when it seems to her that torturing the innocent is wrong, or that if something (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Thomas W. Polger (2002). Putnam's Intuition. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143-70.score: 24.0
    Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (1967). I argue that thestandard way of construing multiplerealizability is a much stronger claim thanthat (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition? In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking.score: 24.0
    Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an impression of moral (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Jay Newhard (2009). The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345 - 352.score: 24.0
    Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411.score: 24.0
    In “Weighing Lives” (2004) John Broome criticizes a view common to many population axiologists. On that view, population increases with extra people leading decent lives are axiologically neutral: they make the world neither better nor worse, ceteris paribus. Broome argues that this intuition, however, attractive, cannot be sustained, for several independent reasons. I respond to his criticisms and suggest that the neutrality intuition, if correctly interpreted, can after all be defended.On the version I defend,the world with added extra (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Jennifer Wilson Mulnix (2008). Reliabilism, Intuition, and Mathematical Knowledge. Filozofia 62 (8):715-723.score: 24.0
    It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical know- ledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of ‘rational intuition.’ On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Stephen Palmquist (1987). A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: Mathematics, Method, and Pure Intuition. Review of Metaphysics 41 (1):3 - 22.score: 24.0
    This article is mainly a critique of Philip Kitcher's book, The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge. Four weaknesses in Kitcher's objection to Kant arise out of Kitcher's failure to recognize the perspectival nature of Kant's position. A proper understanding of Kant's theory of mathematics requires awareness of the perspectival nuances implicit in Kant's theory of pure intuition. (Apologies that the pdf of this article was prepared with every other page upside down. Take it as an opportunity to practice changing one's (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. John K. Davis (2007). Intuition and the Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (1):1-30.score: 24.0
    Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Jon Dorbolo (2006). Intuition Pumps. Minds and Machines 16 (1):81-86.score: 24.0
    The award of the 2003 Barwise Prize to Daniel Dennett by the American Philosophical Association signifies Dennett’s importance in the developing area of philosophical inquiry into computing and information. One source of Dennett’s intellectual stature is his command of scientific and engineering ideas, which he effectively applies to philosophical debates over machine intelligence, consciousness, and intentionality. Dennett regards the computer as both a model and a tool that will transform the ways that philosophy is pursued in the 21st century. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Robert Lane (2011). The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter, Part I. Cognitio 12 (1).score: 24.0
    This is the first of two papers that examine Charles Peirce’s denial that human beings have a faculty of intuition. The semiotic and epistemo-logical aspects of that denial are well-known. My focus is on its neglected metaphysical aspect, which I argue amounts to the doctrine that there is no determinate boundary between the internal world of the cognizing subject and the external world that the subject cognizes. In the second paper, I will argue that the “objective idealism” of Peirce’s (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Robert Lane (2011). The Final Incapacity: Peirce on Intuition and the Continuity of Mind and Matter, Part II. Cognitio 12 (2):237-256.score: 24.0
    This is the second of two papers that examine Charles Peirce’s denial that human beings have a faculty of intuition. In the first paper, I argued that in its metaphysical aspect, Peirce’s denial of intuition amounts to the doctrine that there is no determinate boundary between the internal world of the cognizing subject and the external world that the subject cognizes.In the present paper, I argue that, properly understood, the “objective idealism” of Peirce’s 1890s cosmological series is a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. David Morris (2005). Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peirceian Abduction: Toward a Relation Between Method, Sense and Nature. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):267-298.score: 24.0
    Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and Peircean abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. Each method implies a correspondingly different view of the generation of the variations from which knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a distinction between extensive, intensive, and abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link between philosophical method and the generation (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Michael Gilbert (2011). The Kisceral: Reason and Intuition in Argumentation. [REVIEW] Argumentation 25 (2):163-170.score: 24.0
    Gilbert’s four modes of communication include the logical, the emotional, the visceral and the kisceral, which last has not received much attention at all. This mode covers the forms of argument that rely on intuition and undefended basal assumptions. These forms range from the scientific and mathematical to the religious and mystical. In this paper these forms will be examined, and suggestions made for ways in which intuitive frameworks can be compared and valued.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Xianglong Zhang (2006). Flowing Within the Text: A Discussion on He Lin's Explanation of Zhu XI's Method of Intuition. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (1):60-65.score: 24.0
    The author examines He Lin's interpretation of Zhu Xi's method of intuition from a phenomenological-hermeneutical perspective and by exposing Zhu's philosophical presuppositions. In contrast with Lu Xiangshan's intuitive method, Zhu Xi's method of reading classics advocates "emptying your heart and flowing with the text" and, in this spirit, explains the celebrated "exhaustive investigation on the principles of things (ge wu qiong li)." "Text," according to Zhu, is therefore not an object in ordinary sense but a "contextual region" or "sensible (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Rebecca Bennett (2014). When Intuition is Not Enough. Why the Principle of Procreative Beneficence Must Work Much Harder to Justify Its Eugenic Vision. Bioethics 28 (9):447-455.score: 24.0
    The Principle of Procreative Beneficence claims that we have a moral obligation, where choice is possible, to choose to create the best child we can. The existence of this moral obligation has been proposed by John Harris and Julian Savulescu and has proved controversial on many levels, not least that it is eugenics, asking us to produce the best children we can, not for the sake of that child's welfare, but in order to make a better society. These are strong (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Leland F. Saunders (2009). Reason and Intuition in the Moral Life: A Dual-Process Account of Moral Justification. In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. 335--354.score: 24.0
    This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of moral justification which can show that morality is a rational enterprise given the facts of moral dumbfounding. Appealing to the model of reflective equilibrium for the rational justification of moral intuitions solves this problem. Reflective equilibrium views the rational justification of morality as a back-and-forth balancing between moral (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000