Search results for 'iterated change' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Hans Rott (2011). Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.score: 192.0
    According to the Ramsey Test, conditionals reflect changes of beliefs: α > β is accepted in a belief state iff β is accepted in the minimal revision of it that is necessary to accommodate α. Since Gärdenfors’s seminal paper of 1986, a series of impossibility theorems (“triviality theorems”) has seemed to show that the Ramsey test is not a viable analysis of conditionals if it is combined with AGM-type belief revision models. I argue that it is possible to endorse that (...)
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  2. Samir Chopra, Aditya Ghose, Thomas Meyer & Ka-Shu Wong (2008). Iterated Belief Change and the Recovery Axiom. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):501 - 520.score: 192.0
    The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We (...)
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  3. Giacomo Bonanno (2012). Belief Change in Branching Time: AGM-Consistency and Iterated Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):201-236.score: 156.0
    We study belief change in the branching-time structures introduced in Bonanno (Artif Intell 171:144–160, 2007 ). First, we identify a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent (when the set of states is finite) to AGM-consistency, which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, (...)
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  4. Abhaya C. Nayak (1994). Iterated Belief Change Based on Epistemic Entrenchment. Erkenntnis 41 (3):353-390.score: 144.0
    In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal (...)
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  5. John Cantwell (1999). Some Logics of Iterated Belief Change. Studia Logica 63 (1):49-84.score: 144.0
    The problems that surround iterated contractions and expansions of beliefs are approached by studying hypertheories, a generalisation of Adam Grove's notion of systems of spheres. By using a language with dynamic and doxastic operators different ideas about the basic nature of belief change are axiomatised. It is shown that by imposing quite natural constraints on how hypertheories may change, the basic logics for belief change can be strengthened considerably to bring one closer to a theory of (...)
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  6. Craig Boutilier (1996). Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.score: 136.0
    We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be (...)
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  7. Social Change (2006). University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change. Philosophy 9.score: 120.0
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  8. Dimensions of Cultural Change & Supply Vs Demand (2002). Bourdieu's Theory of Cultural Change: Explication, Application, Critique. Sociological Theory 20 (2).score: 120.0
     
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  9. Inconsistent Belief Change (2005). The Agm Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change Kojitanaka. Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):113-150.score: 120.0
     
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  10. Sven Ove Hansson (2010). Multiple and Iterated Contraction Reduced to Single-Step Single-Sentence Contraction. Synthese 173 (2):153 - 177.score: 108.0
    Multiple contraction (simultaneous contraction by several sentences) and iterated contraction are investigated in the framework of specified meet contraction (s.m.c.) that is extended for this purpose. Multiple contraction is axiomatized, and so is finitely multiple contraction (contraction by a finite set of sentences). Two ways to reduce finitely multiple contraction to contraction by single sentences are introduced. The reduced operations are axiomatically characterized and their properties are investigated. Furthermore, it is shown how iterated contraction can be reduced to (...)
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  11. Sven Ove Hansson (2012). Global and Iterated Contraction and Revision: An Exploration of Uniform and Semi-Uniform Approaches. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):143-172.score: 102.0
    In order to clarify the problems of iterated (global) belief change it is useful to study simple cases, in particular consecutive contractions by sentences that are both logically and epistemically independent. Models in which the selection mechanism is kept constant are much more plausible in this case than what they are in general. One such model, namely uniform specified meet contraction, has the advantage of being closely connected with the AGM model. Its properties seem fairly adequate for the (...)
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  12. Hans Rott (2012). Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservative and Moderate Revision. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):173-200.score: 102.0
    This paper presents the model of ‘bounded revision’ that is based on two-dimensional revision functions taking as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence and a reference sentence. The key idea is that the input sentence is accepted as far as (and just a little further than) the reference sentence is ‘cotenable’ with it. Bounded revision satisfies the AGM axioms as well as the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) saying that the set of beliefs accepted after the revision does not depend (...)
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  13. Thomas Andreas Meyer, Willem Adrian Labuschagne & Johannes Heidema (2000). Infobase Change: A First Approximation. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (3):353-377.score: 102.0
    Generalisations of theory change involving operations on arbitrary sets ofwffs instead of on belief sets (i.e., sets closed under a consequencerelation), have become known as base change. In one view, a base should bethought of as providing more structure to its generated belief set, whichmeans that it can be employed to determine the theory contraction operationassociated with a base contraction operation. In this paper we follow suchan approach as the first step in defining infobase change. We think (...)
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  14. Jake Chandler (2013). Transmission Failure, AGM-Style. Erkenntnis 78 (2):383-398.score: 84.0
    This article provides a discussion of the principle of transmission of evidential support across entailment from the perspective of belief revision theory in the AGM tradition. After outlining and briefly defending a small number of basic principles of belief change, which include a number of belief contraction analogues of the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, a proposal is then made concerning the connection between evidential beliefs and belief change policies in rational agents. This proposal is found to (...)
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  15. Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson (2011). AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.score: 72.0
    The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (AGM), "On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions" was the starting-point of a large and rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twentyfive years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of the belief states, change operators not (...)
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  16. Hans Rott (1992). Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.score: 66.0
    A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...)
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  17. Krister Segerberg (2010). Some Completeness Theorems in the Dynamic Doxastic Logic of Iterated Belief Revision. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (2):228-246.score: 60.0
    The success of the AGM paradigmn, Gis remarkable, as even a quick look at the literature it has generated will testify. But it is also remarkable, at least in hindsight, how limited was the original effort. For example, the theory concerns the beliefs of just one agent; all incoming information is accepted; belief change is uniquely determined by the new information; there is no provision for nested beliefs. And perhaps most surprising: there is no analysis of iterated (...). (shrink)
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  18. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.score: 60.0
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
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  19. Thomas Meyer (2001). Basic Infobase Change. Studia Logica 67 (2):215-242.score: 54.0
    Generalisations of theory change involving arbitrary sets of wffs instead of belief sets have become known as base change. In one view, a base should be thought of as providing more structure to its generated belief set, and can be used to determine the theory change operation associated with a base change operation. In this paper we extend a proposal along these lines by Meyer et al. We take an infobase as a finite sequence of (...)
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  20. Gunter Fuchs & Philipp Lücke (2012). Iteratively Changing the Heights of Automorphism Towers. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (2):155-174.score: 50.0
    We extend the results of Hamkins and Thomas concerning the malleability of automorphism tower heights of groups by forcing. We show that any reasonable sequence of ordinals can be realized as the automorphism tower heights of a certain group in consecutive forcing extensions or ground models, as desired. For example, it is possible to increase the height of the automorphism tower by passing to a forcing extension, then increase it further by passing to a ground model, and then decrease it (...)
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  21. Horacio Arló-Costa & Richmond H. Thomason (2001). Iterative Probability Kinematics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):479-524.score: 40.0
    Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...)
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  22. A. K. Choudhury (1967). Review: Thomas H. Mott, Determination of the Irredundant Normal Forms of a Truth Function by Iterated Consensus of the Prime Implicants; D. M. Y. Chang, T. H. Mott, Computing Irredundant Normal Forms From Abbreviated Presence Functions. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (4):541-542.score: 40.0
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  23. Kevin T. Kelly (1999). Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia. Erkenntnis 50 (1):11-58.score: 36.0
    Belief revision theory concerns methods for reformulating an agent's epistemic state when the agent's beliefs are refuted by new information. The usual guiding principle in the design of such methods is to preserve as much of the agent's epistemic state as possible when the state is revised. Learning theoretic research focuses, instead, on a learning method's reliability or ability to converge to true, informative beliefs over a wide range of possible environments. This paper bridges the two perspectives by assessing the (...)
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  24. Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky (1996). Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment. Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.score: 36.0
    In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.
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  25. Nejat Anbarci (2001). Divide-the-Dollar Game Revisited. Theory and Decision 50 (4):295-303.score: 36.0
    In the Divide-the-Dollar (DD) game, two players simultaneously make demands to divide a dollar. Each player receives his demand if the sum of the demands does not exceed one, a payoff of zero otherwise. Note that, in the latter case, both parties are punished severely. A major setback of DD is that each division of the dollar is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Observe that, when the sum of the two demands x and y exceeds one, it is as if Player (...)
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  26. Nir Friedman & Joseph Y. Halpern (1999). Belief Revision: A Critique. [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 8 (4):401-420.score: 36.0
    We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about the ontology or scenario underlying the belief change process. This is something that has been missing in previous work, with its focus on postulates. Our analysis shows that we must pay particular attention to two issues that have often been taken (...)
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  27. Wolfgang Spohn (1988). Ordinal Conditional Functions. A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States. In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics, vol. II. Kluwer.score: 30.0
    It is natural and important to have a formal representation of plain belief, according to which propositions are held true, or held false, or neither. (In the paper this is called a deterministic representation of epistemic states). And it is of great philosophical importance to have a dynamic account of plain belief. AGM belief revision theory seems to provide such an account, but it founders at the problem of iterated belief revision, since it can generally account only for one (...)
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  28. Evangelos D. Protopapadakis (2012). Climate Change: A Challenge for Ethics. In Walter Leal Filho Evangelos Manolas (ed.), English through Climate Change. Democritus University of Thrace. 167.score: 27.0
    Climate change – and its most dangerous consequence, the rapid overheating of the planet – is not the offspring of a natural procedure; instead, it is human-induced. It is only the aftermath of a specific pattern of conomic development, one that focuses mainly on economic growth rather than on quality of life and sustainability. Since climate change is a major threat not only to millions of humans, but also to numerous non-human species and other forms of life, as (...)
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  29. Ciaran Sugrue (ed.) (2008). The Future of Educational Change: International Perspectives. Routledge.score: 27.0
    Divided into four sections, this book addresses the key themes: What has been the impact of educational change?
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  30. Jussi Suikkanen (2014). Contractualism and Climate Change. In Marcello Di Paola & Gianfranco Pellegrino (eds.), Canned Heat: Ethics and Politics of Climate Change. Routledge. 115-128.score: 27.0
    Climate change is ‘a complex problem raising issues across and between a large number of disciplines, including physical and life sciences, political science, economics, and psychology, to name just a few’ (Gardiner 2006: 397). It is also a moral problem. Therefore, in this chapter, I will consider what kind of a contribution an ethical theory called ‘contractualism’ can make to the climate change debates. This chapter first introduces contractualism. It then describes a simple climate change scenario. The (...)
     
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  31. Francesco Orsi (2014). Climate Change and the Intuition of Neutrality. In Marcello Di Paola & Gianfranco Pellegrino (eds.), Canned Heat. Ethics and Politics of Global Climate Change. Routledge. 160-176.score: 27.0
    The intuition of neutrality, as discussed by John Broome, says that the addition of people does not, by itself, produce or subtract value from the world. Such intuition allows us to disregard the effects of climate change policy onto the size of populations, effectively allowing us to make policy recommendations. Broome has argued that the intuition has to go. Orsi responds by urging a normative (rather than Broome's axiological) interpretation of neutrality in terms of an exclusionary permission to disregard (...)
     
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  32. Hans Rott (1999). Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):387-412.score: 26.0
    In this paper I discuss the foundations of a formal theory of coherent and conservative belief change that is (a) suitable to be used as a method for constructing iterated changes of belief, (b) sensitive to the history of earlier belief changes, and (c) independent of any form of dispositional coherence. I review various ways to conceive the relationship between the beliefs actually held by an agent and her belief change strategies (that also deal with potential belief (...)
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  33. Avram Hiller (2011). Climate Change and Individual Responsibility. The Monist 94 (3):349-368.score: 24.0
    Several philosophers claim that the greenhouse gas emissions from actions like a Sunday drive are so miniscule that they will make no difference whatsoever with regard to anthropogenic global climate change (AGCC) and its expected harms. This paper argues that this claim of individual causal inefficacy is false. First, if AGCC is not reducible at least in part to ordinary actions, then the cause would have to be a metaphysically odd emergent entity. Second, a plausible (dis-)utility calculation reveals that (...)
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  34. Dale Jamieson (2010). Climate Change, Responsibility, and Justice. Science and Engineering Ethics 16 (3):431-445.score: 24.0
    In this paper I make the following claims. In order to see anthropogenic climate change as clearly involving moral wrongs and global injustices, we will have to revise some central concepts in these domains. Moreover, climate change threatens another value (“respect for nature”) that cannot easily be taken up by concerns of global justice or moral responsibility.
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  35. Angelo Gilio & Giuseppe Sanfilippo (2013). Conjunction, Disjunction and Iterated Conditioning of Conditional Events. In R. Kruse (ed.), Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer.score: 24.0
    Starting from a recent paper by S. Kaufmann, we introduce a notion of conjunction of two conditional events and then we analyze it in the setting of coherence. We give a representation of the conjoined conditional and we show that this new object is a conditional random quantity, whose set of possible values normally contains the probabilities assessed for the two conditional events. We examine some cases of logical dependencies, where the conjunction is a conditional event; moreover, we give the (...)
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  36. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2010). Putnam's Account of Apriority and Scientific Change: Its Historical and Contemporary Interest. Synthese 176 (3):429-445.score: 24.0
    In the 1960s and 1970s, Hilary Putnam articulated a notion of relativized apriority that was motivated to address the problem of scientific change. This paper examines Putnam’s account in its historical context and in relation to contemporary views. I begin by locating Putnam’s analysis in the historical context of Quine’s rejection of apriority, presenting Putnam as a sympathetic commentator on Quine. Subsequently, I explicate Putnam’s positive account of apriority, focusing on his analysis of the history of physics and geometry. (...)
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  37. Ingo Brigandt (2010). The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation. Synthese 177 (1):19-40.score: 24.0
    The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept’s inferential role and reference can be accounted for as (...)
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  38. Peter Gärdenfors & Frank Zenker (2013). Theory Change as Dimensional Change: Conceptual Spaces Applied to the Dynamics of Empirical Theories. Synthese 190 (6):1039-1058.score: 24.0
    This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes occur in terms of the structure of the dimensions—that is to say, the conceptual spaces—underlying the conceptual framework within which a given theory is formulated. Five types of changes are identified: (1) addition or deletion of special laws, (2) change in scale or metric, (3) change in the importance of dimensions, (4) change in the separability of dimensions, and (5) addition or deletion (...)
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  39. Gustavo Cevolani (2013). Truth Approximation Via Abductive Belief Change. Logic Journal of the Igpl 21 (6):999-1016.score: 24.0
    We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions (...)
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  40. John Bowin (2010). Aristotle on the Unity of Change: Five Reductio Arguments in Physics Viii. Ancient Philosophy 30 (2):319-345.score: 24.0
    This paper examines five indirect proofs in Physics viii 8 and argues that four of them can be understood as attacks on the assumption, implicit in Zeno’s dichotomy paradox, that what we choose to call ‘one change’ is essentially arbitrary. In doing so, I will argue against the claim that one of these proofs is primarily intended to shore up Aristotle’s theory of change in the face of the dichotomy paradox by ‘refining’ the criteria for being ‘one (...)’, as well as acquit Aristotle of a major philosophical mistake in this proof that has generally been thought to vitiate his response to Zeno. (shrink)
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  41. Holly Lawford‐Smith (2014). Benefiting From Failures to Address Climate Change. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2):392-404.score: 24.0
    The politics of climate change is marked by the fact that countries are dragging their heels in doing what they ought to do; namely, creating a binding global treaty, and fulfilling the duties assigned to each of them under it. Many different agents are culpable in this failure. But we can imagine a stylised version of the climate change case, in which no agents are culpable: if the bad effects of climate change were triggered only by crossing (...)
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  42. Dale Jamieson (1996). Ethics and Intentional Climate Change. Climatic Change 33 (3):323--336.score: 24.0
    In recent years the idea of geoengineering climate has begun to attract increasing attention. Although there was some discussion of manipulating regional climates throughout the l970s and l980s. the discussion was largely dormant. What has reawakened the conversation is the possibility that Earth may be undergoing a greenhouse-induced global wamring, and the paucity of serious measures that have been taken to Prevent it. ln this paper Iassess the ethical acceptability of ICC, based on my impressions of the conversation that is (...)
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  43. Carol Agócs (1997). Institutionalized Resistance to Organizational Change: Denial, Inaction and Repression. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 16 (9):917-931.score: 24.0
    An extensive theoretical and research literature on organizational change and its implementation has been accumulating over the past fifty years. It is customary in this literature to find resistance to change mentioned as an inevitable consequence of organizational change initiatives. Yet there has been little discussion of the nature and forms of resistance that is institutionalized in organizational structure and processes. Furthermore, organization development perspectives on organizational change address management-initiated change, but not change proposed (...)
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  44. Michael J. Raven (2011). There is a Problem of Change. Philosophical Studies 155 (1):23-35.score: 24.0
    Impostors are pseudo-problems masquerading as genuine problems. Impostors should be exposed. The problem of change appears genuine. But some, such as Hofweber ( 2009 ) and Rychter ( 2009 ), have recently denounced it as an impostor. They allege that it is mysterious how to answer the meta - problem of saying what problem it is: for even if any problem is genuinely about change per se, they argue, it is either empirical or trivially dissolved by conceptual analysis. (...)
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  45. Daniel J. Simons, Christopher Chabris & Tatiana Schnur (2002). Evidence for Preserved Representations in Change Blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):78-97.score: 24.0
    People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as ''change blindness,'' occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not (...)
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  46. Toby Svoboda (2012). Is Aerosol Geoengineering Ethically Preferable to Other Climate Change Strategies? Ethics and the Environment 17 (2):111-135.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I address the question of whether aerosol geoengineering (AG) ought to be deployed as a response to climate change. First, I distinguish AG from emissions mitigation, adaptation, and other geoengineering strategies. Second, I discuss advantages and disadvantages of AG, including its potential to result in substantial harm to some persons. Third, I critique three arguments against AG deployment, suggesting reasons why these arguments should be rejected. Fourth, I consider an argument that, in scenarios in which all (...)
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  47. Harold I. Brown (1986). Sellars, Concepts, and Conceptual Change. Synthese 68 (August):275-307.score: 24.0
    A major theme of recent philosophy of science has been the rejection of the empiricist thesis that, with the exception of terms which play a purely formal role, the language of science derives its meaning from some, possibly quite indirect, correlation with experience. The alternative that has been proposed is that meaning is internal to each conceptual system, that terms derive their meaning from the role they play in a language, and that something akin to "meaning" flows from conceptual framework (...)
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  48. Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa & Theo A. F. Kuipers (2013). Verisimilitude and Belief Change for Nomic Conjunctive Theories. Synthese 190 (16):3307-3324.score: 24.0
    In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on “nomic conjunctive theories”, i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and (...)
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  49. Quentin Smith (1995). Time, Change, and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics. Routledge.score: 24.0
    Time, Change and Freedom is the first introduction to metaphysics that uses the idea of time as a unifying principle. Time is used to relate the many issues involved in the complex study of metaphysics. Sections of the book are written in dialogue form which allows the reader to question the theories while they read and have those queries answered in the text. In addition, the authors provide glossaries of key terms as well as recommendations for further reading at (...)
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  50. Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.score: 24.0
    According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. The goal of this article is to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. It is argued, in particular, that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal (...)
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