JP argue that expressivists must admit that becoming competent with ethical utterances involves learning to make them only when one believes one has the relevant attitude. For expressivists hold that communicating our attitudes is the function of ethical utterances, in which case sincerity demands that we not utter an ethical sentence unless we believe we have the relevant attitude. So (b) is false, as long as we suppose that this commitment, as reflected in well-entrenched and clear-cut (henceforth, 'robust' abbreviates 'well-entrenched (...) and clear-cut') conventions, means that ethical utterances express one's belief that one has the relevant attitude. This, in turn, means that (a) is false, if we grant that a belief expressed in virtue of such conventions provides the utterance's truth-conditions. (shrink)
Though lobbying for federal money may seem like business as usual today–with billions of dollars spent annually by companies, labor unions, and other organizations in an effort to win a piece of what has become an enormous federal pie–this was not always the case in the United States. An all-but-forgotten [...].
My interest in semantic categories arises out of consideration of what is often called structural entailment. Consider the following: 1. Lisa quickly left; so Lisa left. The first of the two sentences in (1) entails the second; necessarily, if the first is true then so is the second. Moreover, (1) is an instance of a more general pattern whose validity doesn’t seem to depend on the specific meanings of the words in (1). The adverb ‘quickly’, for example, can be replaced (...) with any of a wide range of adverbs without loss of validity; analogous remarks hold for the verb ‘leave’. Here are a few more paradigm examples of structural entailment. (shrink)
Here’s a false generalization with manifestly false consequences: all people who differ by one millimeter in height from a short person are themselves short. Why are we inclined to believe it? Boundary-shifters, usually lumped together under the heading “contextualists”, say that we believe the false generalization because when we consider any instance, that instance is true at the time of our consideration. Critics complain that the explanation is no good, for (i) if it were, then fallacious inferences would be rampant; (...) (ii) if it were, then we would always generalize from instances that we knew to be true at the time we considered them. But, they say, fallacious inferences are not rampant and we do not always generalize from the instances. Responses: (i) boundary-shifters require only that weakly fallacious inferences are rampant, and indeed they are; (ii) generalizing from the instances is both natural and explanatory, albeit defeasible. (shrink)
One way to challenge the substantiveness of a particular philosophical issue is to argue that those who debate the issue are engaged in a merely verbal dispute. For example, it has been maintained that the apparent disagreement over the mind/brain identity thesis is a merely verbal dispute, and thus that there is no substantive question of whether or not mental properties are identical to neurological properties. The goal of this paper is to help clarify the relationship between mere verbalness and (...) substantiveness. I first argue that we should see mere verbalness as a certain kind of discourse defect that arises when the parties differ as to what each takes to be the immediate question under discussion. I then argue that mere verbalness, so understood, does not imply that the question either party is attempting to address is a non-substantive one. Even if it turns out that the parties to the mind/brain dispute are addressing subtly different questions, these might both be substantive questions to which their respective metaphysical views provide substantive answers. One reason it is tempting to reach deflationary conclusions from the charge of mere verbalness is that we fail to distinguish it from the claim that a sentence under dispute is, in a certain sense, indisputable. Another reason is that we fail to distinguish mere verbalness from a certain sort of indeterminacy. While indisputability and indeterminacy plausibly capture forms of non-substantiveness, I argue that mere verbalness is insufficient to establish either indisputability or indeterminacy. (shrink)
In this article, I link the empirical hypothesis that neural representations of sensory stimulation near the body involve a unique motor component to the idea that the perceptual field is structured by skillful bodily activity. The neurophenomenological view that emerges is illuminating in its own right, though it may also have practical consequences. I argue that recent experiments attempting to alter the scope of these near space sensorimotor representations are actually equivocal in what they show. I propose resolving this ambiguity (...) by treating these representations as responsive to the development or degeneration of know-how—which can be isolated as an appropriate object for scientific investigation. (shrink)
Intuitively, (1)-(3) seem to express genuine claims (true or false) about what the world is like, attempts to correctly describe parts of extra-linguistic reality. By contrast, it is tempting to regard (4)-(6) as merely reflecting decisions (or conventions, or dispositions, or rules) concerning the terms in which that extra-linguistic reality is described, decisions about which things to label with 'vixen', 'bachelor' or 'cup'.
We observe a number of connections between recent developments in the study of constraint satisfaction problems, irredundant axiomatisation and the study of topological quasivarieties. Several restricted forms of a conjecture of Clark, Davey, Jackson and Pitkethly are solved: for example we show that if, for a finite relational structure M, the class of M-colourable structures has no finite axiomatisation in first order logic, then there is no set (even infinite) of first order sentences characterising the continuously M-colourable structures amongst compact (...) totally disconnected relational structures. We also refute a rather old conjecture of Gorbunov by presenting a finite structure with an infinite irredundant quasi-identity basis. (shrink)
The scope of existential anthropology -- How to do things with stones -- Knowledge of the body -- The migration of a name: Alexander in Africa -- The man who could turn into an elephant -- Custom and conflict in Sierra Leone: an essay on anarchy -- Migrant imaginaries: with Sewa Koroma in southeast London -- The stories that shadow us -- Foreign and familiar bodies: a phenomenological exploration of the human-technology interface -- The prose of suffering -- On autonomy: (...) an ethnographic and existential critique -- Where thought belongs: an anthropological critique of the project of philosophy -- Epilogue. (shrink)
Liberalism is the dominant ideology of our time, yet its character remains the subject of intense scholarly and political controversy. Debates about the liberal political tradition - about its history, its central philosophical commitments, its implications for political practice - lie at the very heart of the discipline of political theory. Many outstanding political theorists have contributed to the growing sophistication of these debates in recent years, but the original voice of Michael Freeden deserves particular attention. In the course of (...) a body of work that spans over thirty years, Freeden's iconoclastic contributions have posed important challenges to the dominant understandings of liberal ideology, history, and theory. Such work has sought to redefine the very essence of what it is to be a liberal. This book brings together an international group of historians, philosophers, and political scientists to evaluate the impact of Freeden's work and to reassess its central claims. (shrink)
Four books in the area of critical thinking will be reviewed in this article. One of them is not like the others. The first book reviewed is not a critical-thinking text; it is a compilation of papers presented at a conference about critical thinking. The other three are intended as critical-thinking texts best suited for lower-division college courses. Limitations of space do not allow for a detailed review of the conference papers. It is also difficult to capture generally applicable features (...) to review given the divergence of content and perspectives. I have elected to provide a paragraph summary for each conference paper. The pattern followed for reviewing the three critical-thinking texts is consistent: content and layout, audience, and strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)
We draw some metaphysical conclusions about colour and belief from some epistemological commonplaces. It turns out that this requires us to challenge orthodoxy on the causal efficacy of mental properties and to rewrite the standard argument against dualism, but in a way which is good news for functionalists about the mind.
I do four things in this essay: (1) briefly rehearse the biographies of Simone Weil and Etty Hillesum, (2) outline and compare some of the key themes in their lives and works, noting interesting (and also troubling) similarities between them, as well as salient differences, (3) use their examples as lenses through which to look at contemporary attitudes toward altruism vs. self-interest, freedom vs. necessity, eating vs. fasting, and acting vs. writing, and (4) highlight both their strengths and their weaknesses (...) as religious witnesses to the truth. An overarching issue throughout the essay is the relation between the soul and the body, but I am especially concerned with the relation between self-sacrifice and self-love—also known as agape and temporal happiness—when confronted by radical evil. When allowed to correct one another, Weil and Hillesum show us, I believe, how Christian agapism can refuse both hatred and false security, even in an era of terrorism and torture. (shrink)
One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated (...) as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p. (shrink)
This paper distinguishes two ways to ?put knowledge first?. One way affirms a knowledge norm. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that one must only assert that which one knows. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that one must only treat as a reason for action that which one knows. Another way to put knowledge first affirms a determination thesis. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that what one knows determines what one is justified in believing. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that what (...) one knows determines what it is rational for one to do. This paper argues that the defender of the knowledge norms can and should reject the determination theses. For example, the rationality of acting on a partial belief cannot be explained in terms of the subject's knowledge. That's no problem for the knowledge norm, which only governs acting on full belief. (Analogously, the knowledge norm of flat-out assertion does not govern hedged assertion.) One might worry that rejecting the determination theses undermines the importance of knowing. I reply that the knowledge norms set the standard for epistemic success. The importance of success is not undermined by loosening its ties to justification and rationality. (shrink)
How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take-home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are (...) not as far apart as is often thought. (shrink)
What can we learn about management ethics from other cultures and societies? In this textbook, cross-cultural management theory is applied and made relevant to management ethics. To help the reader understand different approaches that global businesses can take to operate successfully and ethically, there are chapters focusing on specific countries and regions. As well as giving the wider geographical, political and cultural contexts, the book includes numerous examples in every chapter to help the reader critique universal assumptions of what is (...) ethical. By taking a closer look at the way we view other cultures and their values, the author challenges us to rethink commonly held assumptions and approaches in cross-cultural management, and to apply a more critical approach. (shrink)
The ideology of relative truth is inflexible in two ways. Firstly, what's true-for-J is closed under entailment. This is a problem for using truth-relativism to solve the preface puzzle about knowledge. Secondly, it is plausible that vagueness gives rise to some questions having multiple ‘acceptable’ answers, and other questions having no ‘acceptable’ answer. Even if truth-relativism can express the former idea, it can't express the latter. I propose an ideology that is not so rigid. It is preferable to relative truth.
The respective philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor Adorno share a concern with articulating a critique of Husserlian phenomenology which would do justice to the materiality of the subject. With this commonality in mind, it is argued that Levinas reifies this materiality by endowing it with a metaphysical priority expressive of ethical universality. In contrast, Adorno eschews the philosophical obsession with the assertion of metaphysical priority, insisting on the complexly historical nature of material life. In place of the Levinasian concern (...) with the subject’s forgetting of her or his ethical responsibilities to ‘the Other’, Adorno’s notion of the primacy of the object helps to articulate the ways in which the subject is always already materially bound by singular social histories which are essentially exclusionary. Amelioration of our suffering would thus depend on a concrete break in material social life, rather than on an abstractly conceived revelation of transcendence. (shrink)
The immense value of this book is its accessibility and the intimate connections it builds between theories of international relations and their philosophical ...
No matter whether it is a discussion of nationhood, race, family, adolescence, or popular culture, identity is a mainstay in everyday conversations about who we ...
Clinically focused compilation of expert opinion and international perspectives from leaders in anesthesiology, building on real-life case-based problems.
In his essay ‘“Conceptual Truth”’, Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson’s argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider (...) the role that the structure of a sentence plays in determining its meaning. The cases I present suggest that this role imposes greater cognitive requirements on understanding than Williamson can acknowledge. (shrink)
Easwaran has given a definition of transferability and argued that, under this definition, randomized arguments are not transferable. I show that certain aspects of his definition are not suitable for addressing the underlying question of whether or not there is an epistemic distinction between randomized and deductive arguments. Furthermore, I demonstrate that for any suitable definition, randomized arguments are in fact transferable.
This paper makes the case for conceptualizing news as a contested commodity. It offers an unprecedented application of commodification theory to the problem of the sustainability of a free press in a democracy. When the news media are expected to be purveyors of the public interest while pursuing profits for their corporate owners, the result often is a clash of capitalist and journalistic imperatives. The amoral values of the market system conflict with the moral agency of a free press, and (...) the two are inherently incompatible. This study presents a synthesis of otherwise divergent theoretical perspectives to examine the free press-free market paradox from a new vista. The author concludes regulatory reforms are needed to insulate the press from the predatory expansion of a free market system that permeates every aspect of social life, including the production of news. “American mainstream media have become the watchdog and guardian of the corporate bottom line instead of the vanguard of democracy and the public interest…. Driven by profit maximization … Instead of protecting against abuses of government power by keeping the public adequately informed, they have become complicit in destabilizing and undermining American democracy.” —Elliot D. Cohen (2005a, p. 17). (shrink)
This article discusses Goethe’s theory of color and his (at times vitriolic) diatribes against the Newtonians by situating his work within two contexts, one political and the other intellectual. The political context is Goethe’s dismay over the rise of obscurantism, typified by the Illuminati movement of the late eighteenth century, with secrecy and elitism as its hallmarks. The intellectual context is the tradition of German Idealism. He was fundamentally committed to understanding the relationship between the subject, or the investigator (...) of nature (or Naturforscher), and the object, or nature itself. How can a Naturforscher, who is a part of nature, be able to depict it objectively? (shrink)
Notice that each of (1)–(4) is an instance of a more general pattern. For example, we could replace ‘black’ in (1) with any of a wide range of other adjectives such as ‘furry’ or ‘hungry’ or ‘three-legged’, without rendering the entailment invalid or any less obvious. Similarly, there are a number of verbs that occur in entailments parallel to (3): ‘Moe boiled the water; so the water boiled’; ‘Bart blew up the school; so the school blew up’; ‘Homer sank the (...) boat; so the boat sank’ and so on. (shrink)
These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full (...) and complete stop at the stop sign, we fret that traffic is moving too slowly, we observe that the sun has dropped below the hills on the horizon, all without ever saying which frames of reference we have in mind. (shrink)
Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does that job: a certain reflectance profile as it might be. Redness is the property something is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reflectance profile. What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on the (...) contest between realism and subjectivism about colour? I address the issues through the lens of a representationalist position on colour experience. (shrink)
This paper argues that the path to knowledge concerning the right account of proper names attends to their representational and epistemological roles — to, that is, their contribution in sentences of the form "A is F" to how things are being represented to be by the sentence, to the information about how things are that such sentences deliver to us, and to the way this information is used to justify the production of such sentences. These considerations, I argue, support a (...) version of the description theory of reference for names. (shrink)
This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.
The theme of the possibility or impossibility of the compatibility between Heideggerian philosophy and Freudian metapsychology has been taken up in various ways. Without going into the details of this body of commentary, it is argued that there is a clear difference between the ways in which Heidegger and Freud think cultural crisis. By examining texts of both thinkers from the early 1930s, it is shown that whereas Freud conceives of the possibility of amelioration of crisis in terms of a (...) grappling with material necessity, Heidegger's philosophical conception of crisis seeks to bring about freedom's performative coincidence with ontological necessity. Heidegger's approach, it is claimed, is blind to the confrontation with material necessity that is its own condition of possibility. This blindness is evident in his ontological understanding of suffering. Key Words: crisis • critique • Sigmund Freud • Martin Heidegger • materiality • necessity • questioning. (shrink)
Preface: theme and variations -- In the footsteps of Walter Benjamin -- Of time and the river : the interface of history and human lives -- Imagining the powers that be : society versus the state -- On the work of human hands -- Storytelling events, violence, and the appearance of the past -- Migrant imaginaries : with Sewa Koroma in southeast London -- A walk on the wild side : the idea of human nature revisited -- From anxiety to (...) method : a reappraisal -- Despite Babel : an essay on human misunderstanding -- On birth, death, and rebirth -- Quandaries of belonging : home thoughts from abroad -- A critique of colonial reason. (shrink)
This highly successful textbook provides a systematic introduction to the principal theories of international relations. Combining incisive and original analyses with a clear and accessible writing style, it is ideal for introductory courses in international relations or international relations theory. Introduction to International Relations, Third Edition, focuses on the main theoretical traditions--realism, liberalism, international society, and theories of international political economy. The authors carefully explain how particular theories organize and sharpen our view of the world. They integrate excellent pedagogical features (...) throughout, including chapter summaries, key points, questions, further reading, web links, boxes, and world maps. New to this Edition: * Two new chapters, on social constructivism and foreign policy * An expanded companion website with web links to theoretical debates, maps and world situations, figures and tables from the text, and a flashcard glossary * A closer link between theory and practice * New glossary of key terms * Two-color text for easier navigation. (shrink)
In the light of current events, particularly the ‘post September 11th’ debates with much focus on aspects of the ‘clash of civilisation’ thesis, the issue of Islamic identity is a crucial one. Whilst Friedrich Nietzsche was addressing an audience of a different culture and age, his own originality, creativity, psychological, philological and historical insights allows for a fresh and enlightening understanding of Islam within the context of our modern era. In this book, Roy Jackson sets out to determine: Why did (...) Nietzsche feel inclined to be so generous towards the Islamic tradition yet so critical of Western Christianity? How important was religion for Nietzsche’s views on such matters as moral and political philosophy and how does this help us to understand the Islamic response to modernity? How does Nietzsche’s distinctive outlook and methodology help us to understand such key Islamic paradigms as the Qur’an, the Prophet, and the ‘Rightly-Guided’ Caliphs? Nietzsche and Islam provides an original and fresh insight into Nietzsche’s views on religion and shows that his philosophy can make an important contribution to what is considered to be Islam’s key paradigms. As such it will be of interest to a diverse readership and will provide useful material for researchers when thinking about religion, Islam and the future. (shrink)
The term ‘logical form’ has been called on to serve a wide range of purposes in philosophy, and it would be too ambitious to try to survey all of them in a single essay. Instead, I will focus on just one conception of logical form that has occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, and in particular in the philosophical study of linguistic meaning. This is what I will call the classical conception of logical form. The classical conception, (...) as I will present it in section 1, has (either explicitly or implicitly) shaped a great deal of important philosophical work in semantic theory. But it has come under fire in recent decades, and in sections 2 and 3 I will discuss two of the recent challenges that I take to be most interesting and significant. (shrink)
We make powerful motor cars by suitably assembling items that are not themselves powerful, but we do not do this by 'adding in the power' at the very end of the assembly line; nor, if it comes to that, do we add portions of power along the way. Powerful motor cars are nothing over and above complex arrangements or aggregations of items that are not themselves powerful. The example illustrates the way aggregations can have interesting properties that the items aggregated (...) lack. What can we say of a general kind about what can be made from what by nothing over and above aggregation? I think that this is the key issue that Galen Strawson (2006) puts so. (shrink)
Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto.
