Search results for 'justification' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. There Is Immediate Justification (2013). Is There Immediate Justification? In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.score: 180.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. A. Priori Justification (2011). Experience as a Natural Kind: Reflections on Albert Casullo's A Priori Justification. In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the a Priori? Open Court. 93.score: 180.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Thomas Sturm & Gerd Gigerenzer (2006). How Can We Use the Distinction Between Discovery and Justification? On the Weaknesses of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science. In Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Springer. 133--158.score: 27.0
    We attack the SSK's rejection of the distinction between discovery and justification (the DJ distinction), famously introduced by Hans Reichenbach and here defended in a "lean" version. Some critics claim that the DJ distinction cannot be drawn precisely, or that it cannot be drawn prior to the actual analysis of scientific knowledge. Others, instead of trying to blur or to reject the distinction, claim that we need an even more fine-grained distinction (e.g. between discovery, invention, prior assessment, test and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.score: 24.0
    In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational phenomenology as it (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Laurence BonJour & Ernest Sosa (2003). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Blackwell Pub..score: 24.0
    The regress problem and foundationalism -- Externalist accounts of justification -- In search of coherentism -- Back to foundationalism -- The conceptualization of sensory experience and the problem of the external world -- Knowledge and justification -- Does knowledge have foundation -- Skepticism and the internal/external divide -- A virtue epistemology -- Reply to Sosa -- Reply to Bonjour.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2013). Truth as the Aim of Epistemic Justification. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    A popular account of epistemic justification holds that justification, in essence, aims at truth. An influential objection against this account points out that it is committed to holding that only true beliefs could be justified, which most epistemologists regard as sufficient reason to reject the account. In this paper I defend the view that epistemic justification aims at truth, not by denying that it is committed to epistemic justification being factive, but by showing that, when we (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. John Turri (2010). On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.score: 24.0
    I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic (...). If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification. (shrink)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Steven L. Reynolds (2013). Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.score: 24.0
    Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Alessandro Giordani (2013). A Logic of Justification and Truthmaking. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):323-342.score: 24.0
    In the present paper we propose a system of propositional logic for reasoning about justification, truthmaking, and the connection between justifiers and truthmakers. The logic of justification and truthmaking is developed according to the fundamental ideas introduced by Artemov. Justifiers and truthmakers are treated in a similar way, exploiting the intuition that justifiers provide epistemic grounds for propositions to be considered true, while truthmakers provide ontological grounds for propositions to be true. This system of logic is then applied (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Susan Haack (1976). The Justification of Deduction. Mind 85 (337):112-119.score: 24.0
    It is often taken for granted by writers who propose--and, for that matter, by writers who oppose--'justifications' of inductions, that deduction either does not need, or can readily be provided with, justification. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, contrary to this common opinion, problems analogous to those which, notoriously, arise in the attempt to justify induction, also arise in the attempt to justify deduction.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Andrew Chignell (2007). Kant's Concepts of Justification. Noûs 41 (1):33–63.score: 24.0
    An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of (...), by contrast, sets out conditions under which attitudes are rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence but not candidates for knowledge (even if true). The latter conditions will typically be “pragmatic” or “practical,” and thus license acceptance from a “practical” point of view. For Kant, only broadly-speaking practical reasons can provide adequate motivation for adopting a positive attitude towards a proposition (rather than suspending judgment) in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds. -/- . (shrink)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Peter J. Markie (2005). The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification. Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373.score: 24.0
    In at least some cases of justified perceptual belief, our perceptual experience itself, as opposed to beliefs about it, evidences and thereby justifies our belief. While the phenomenon is common, it is also mysterious. There are good reasons to think that perceptions cannot justify beliefs directly, and there is a significant challenge in explaining how they do. After explaining just how direct perceptual justification is mysterious, I considerMichael Huemers (Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, 2001) and Bill Brewers (Perception (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Why Justification Matters. In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This chapter is guided by the hypothesis that the point and purpose of using the concept of justification in epistemic evaluation is tied to its role in the practice of critical reflection. In section one, I propose an analysis of justification as the epistemic property in virtue of which a belief has the potential to survive ideal critical reflection. In section two, I use this analysis in arguing for a form of access internalism on which one has (...) to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. In section three, I distinguish between propositional and doxastic versions of access internalism and argue that the propositional version avoids familiar objections to the doxastic version. In section four, I argue that the propositional version of access internalism also explains and vindicates internalist intuitions about cases. In section five, I conclude with some reflections on the relationship between critical reflection, responsibility and personhood. (shrink)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Jeffrey Glick (2010). Justification and the Right to Believe. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):532-544.score: 24.0
    Some philosophers have attempted to utilize the conceptual tools of ethics in order to understand epistemology. One instantiation of this understands justification in terms of having a certain kind of epistemic right, namely, a right to believe. In variations of this theme, some hold that justification involves having the authority to believe, or being entitled to believe. But by examining the putative analogies between different versions of rights and justification, I demonstrate that justification should not be (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Joshua Schechter & David Enoch (2006). Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens. Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.score: 24.0
    In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Declan Smithies (2014). The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave MacMillan. 98-124.score: 24.0
    In this chapter, I argue for the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the basis of epistemic justification. More precisely, I argue for the thesis of phenomenal mentalism, according to which epistemic facts about which doxastic attitudes one has justification to hold are determined by non-epistemic facts about one’s phenomenally individuated mental states. I begin by providing intuitive motivations for phenomenal mentalism and then proceed to sketch a more theoretical line of argument according to which phenomenal mentalism provides the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Chris Tucker (2009). Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.score: 24.0
    As I use the term, ‘entitlement’ is any warrant one has by default—i.e. without acquiring it. Some philosophers not only affirm the existence of entitlement, but also give it a crucial role in the justification of our perceptual beliefs. These philosophers affirm the Entitlement Thesis: An essential part of what makes our perceptual beliefs justified is our entitlement to the proposition that I am not a brain-in-a-vat. Crispin Wright, Stewart Cohen, and Roger White are among those who endorse this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Jon Altschul (2012). Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping Problem. Acta Analytica 27 (4):345-366.score: 24.0
    According to the bootstrapping problem, any view that allows for basic knowledge (knowledge obtained from a reliable source prior to one’s knowing that that source is reliable) is forced to accept that one can utilize a track-record argument to acquire justification for believing that one’s belief source is reliable; yet, we tend to think that acquiring justification in this way is too easy. In this paper I argue, first, that those who respond to the bootstrapping problem by denying (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Michael Pace (2011). The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'. Noûs 45 (2):239-268.score: 24.0
    A moral-pragmatic argument for a proposition is an argument intended to establish that believing the proposition would be morally beneficial. Since such arguments do not adduce epistemic reasons, i.e., reasons that support the truth of a proposition, they can seem at best to be irrelevant epistemically. At worst, believing on the basis of such reasoning can seem to involve wishful thinking and intellectual dishonesty of a sort that that precludes such beliefs from being epistemically unjustified. Inspired by an argument from (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Heimir Geirsson (2005). Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):279-304.score: 24.0
    This paper advances the thesis that we can justifiably believe philosophically interesting possibility statements. The first part of the paper critically discusses van Inwagens skeptical arguments while at the same time laying some of the foundation for a positive view. The second part of the paper advances a view of conceivability in terms of imaginability, where imaginging can be propositional, pictorial, or a combination of the two, and argues that conceivability can, and often does, provide us with justified beliefs of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.score: 24.0
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Moti Mizrahi & Wesley Buckwalter (2014). The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific Progress. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 45 (1):151-166.score: 24.0
    Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of the concept of scientific progress. For Bird, progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. For Rowbottom, progress consists in the accumulation of true scientific beliefs. Both appeal to intuitions elicited by thought experiments in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, we conduct a systematic study of the factors that underlie (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Matthew Skene (2013). Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):539-559.score: 24.0
    Abstract I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Declan Smithies (2012). Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.score: 24.0
    This paper argues that justification is accessible in the sense that one has justification to believe a proposition if and only if one has higher-order justification to believe that one has justification to believe that proposition. I argue that the accessibility of justification is required for explaining what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions of the form, ‘p and I do not have justification to believe that p.’.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Steven Ross (2008). Meta-Ethics and Justification. Acta Analytica 23 (2):91-114.score: 24.0
    The author takes up three metaphysical conceptions of morality — realism, projectivism, constructivism — and the account of justification or reason that makes these pictures possible. It is argued that the right meta-ethical conception should be the one that entails the most plausible conception of reason-giving, rather than by any other consideration. Realism and projectivism, when understood in ways consistent with their fundamental commitments, generate unsatisfactory models of justification; constructivism alone does not. The author also argues for a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Robert Audi (1993). The Structure of Justification. Cambridge University Press.score: 24.0
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. B. J. C. Madison (2014). Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and Memory. Logos and Episteme 5 (1):33-62.score: 24.0
    Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Don Garrett (2007). Reasons to Act and Believe: Naturalism and Rational Justification in Hume's Philosophical Project. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):1 - 16.score: 24.0
    Is Hume a naturalist? Does he regard all or nearly all beliefs and actions as rationally unjustified? In order to settle these questions, it is necessary to examine their key terms (‘naturalism’ and ‘rational justification’) and to understand the character—especially the normative character—of Hume’s philosophical project. This paper argues (i) that Hume is a naturalist—and, in particular, both a moral and an epistemic naturalist—in quite robust ways; and (ii) that Hume can properly regard many actions and beliefs as “rationally (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Richard Swinburne (2001). Epistemic Justification. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Richard Swinburne offers an original treatment of a question at the heart of epistemology: what makes a belief rational, or justified in holding? He maps the rival accounts of philosophers on epistemic justification ("internalist" and "externalist"), arguing that they are really accounts of different concepts. He distinguishes between synchronic justification (justification at a time) and diachronic justification (synchronic justification resulting from adequate investigation)--both internalist and externalist. He also argues that most kinds of justification are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. William Alston (1989). Epistemic Justification. Cornell University Press.score: 24.0
    Introduction As the title indicates, the chief focus of this book is epistemic justification. But just what is epistemic justification and what is its place ...
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Peter J. Markie (2009). Justification and Awareness. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):361 - 377.score: 24.0
    In Justification Without Awareness, Michael Bergmann attacks Internalism and Mentalism. His attack on Internalism refutes some versions of an awareness requirement for justification but leaves another standing and well-motivated. His attack on Mentalism, while successful, leaves us with a difficult question—what non-mental features play a role in determining justification?—that his own externalist theory fails to answer correctly.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. K. Kappel (2006). The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):131-147.score: 24.0
    The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. James Chase (2001). Is Externalism About Content Inconsistent with Internalism About Justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46.score: 24.0
    (2001). Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 227-246.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2009). Justification by an Infinity of Conditional Probabilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2):183-193.score: 24.0
    Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Rainer Forst (2011). The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice. Columbia University Press.score: 24.0
    Introduction: the foundation of justice -- Practical reason and justifying reasons: on the foundation of morality -- Moral autonomy and the autonomy of morality: toward a theory of normativity after Kant -- Ethics and morality -- The justification of justice: Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's discourse theory in dialogue -- Political liberty: integrating five conceptions of autonomy -- A critical theory of multicultural toleration -- The rule of reasons: three models of deliberative democracy -- Social justice, justification, and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Kenneth Hobson (2008). Foundational Beliefs and the Structure of Justification. Synthese 164 (1):117 - 139.score: 24.0
    I argue that our justification for beliefs about the external physical world need not be constituted by any justified beliefs about perceptual experiences. In this way our justification for beliefs about the physical world may be nondoxastic and this differentiates my proposal from traditional foundationalist theories such as those defended by Laurence BonJour, Richard Fumerton, and Timothy McGrew. On the other hand, it differs from certain non-traditional foundationalist theories such as that defended by James Pryor according to which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg (2010). Justification by Infinite Loops. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (4):407-416.score: 24.0
    In an earlier paper we have shown that a proposition can have a well-defined probability value, even if its justification consists of an infinite linear chain. In the present paper we demonstrate that the same holds if the justification takes the form of a closed loop. Moreover, in the limit that the size of the loop tends to infinity, the probability value of the justified proposition is always well-defined, whereas this is not always so for the infinite linear (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Michael Buckley (2010). The Structure of Justification in Political Constructivism. Metaphilosophy 41 (5):669-689.score: 24.0
    Abstract: In this article the author develops the view, held by some, that political constructivism is best interpreted as a pragmatic enterprise aiming to solve political problems. He argues that this interpretation's structure of justification is best conceived in terms of two separate investigations—one develops a normative solution to a particular political problem by working up into a coherent whole certain moral conceptions of persons and society; and the other is an empirically based analysis of the political problem. The (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Stephen Hetherington (2010). Elusive Epistemological Justification. Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330.score: 24.0
    What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Harold Langsam (2008). Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate. Erkenntnis 68 (1):79 - 101.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification. The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way; since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified iff a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Robert J. Fogelin (1994). Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This work, written from a neo-Pyrrhonian perspective, is an examination of contemporary theories of knowledge and justification. It takes ideas primarily found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, restates them in a modern idiom, and then asks whether any contemporary theory of knowledge meets the challenges they raise. The first part, entitled "Gettier and the Problem of Knowledge," attempts to rescue our ordinary concept of knowledge from those philosophers who have assigned burdens to it that it cannot bear. Properly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Dean J. Machin (2009). The Irrelevance of Democracy to the Public Justification of Political Authority. Res Publica 15 (2):103-120.score: 24.0
    Democracy can be a means to independently valuable ends and/or it can be intrinsically (or non-instrumentally) valuable. One powerful non-instrumental defence of democracy is based on the idea that only it can publicly justify political authority. I contend that this is an argument about the reasonable acceptability of political authority and about the requirements of publicity and that satisfying these requirements has nothing to do with whether a society is democratic or not. Democracy, then, plays no role in publicly justifying (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Matthias Steup (ed.) (2001). Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Jesper Kallestrup (2009). Reliabilist Justification: Basic, Easy, and Brute. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.score: 24.0
    Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Chris Tucker (2012). Movin' on Up: Higher-Level Requirements and Inferential Justification. Philosophical Studies 157 (3):323-340.score: 24.0
    Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Moti Mizrahi (2014). Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-Defeat. Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jarrett Leplin (2009). A Theory of Epistemic Justification. Springer.score: 24.0
    This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. David Atkinson (2012). Confirmation and Justification. A Commentary on Shogenji's Measure. Synthese 184 (1):49-61.score: 24.0
    So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast, Shogenji’s new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.score: 24.0
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Jan Willem Wieland (2013). Is Justification Dialectical? International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):182-201.score: 24.0
    Much of present-day epistemology is divided between internalists and externalists. Different as these views are, they have in common that they strip justification from its dialectical component in order to block the skeptic’s argument from disagreement. That is, they allow that one may have justified beliefs even if one is not able to defend it against challenges and resolve the disagreements about them. Lammenranta (2008, 2011a) recently argued that neither internalism nor externalism convinces if we consider the argument in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000