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  1. Conor McHugh (2010). Self-Knowledge and the Kk Principle. Synthese 173 (3):231 - 257.score: 90.0
    I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to (...)
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  2. Simon D'Alfonso (2013). Explicating a Standard Externalist Argument Against the KK Principle. Logos and Episteme (4).score: 90.0
    The KK principle is typically rejected in externalist accounts of knowledge. However, a standard general argument for this rejection is in need of a supportive explication. In a recent paper, Samir Okasha argues that the standard externalist argument in question is fallacious. In this paper I start off with some critical discussion of Okasha’s analysis before suggesting an alternative way in which an externalist might successfully present such a case. I then further explore this issue via a look at (...)
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  3. Murali Ramachandran, Williamson's Argument Against the KK-Principle.score: 60.0
    Timothy Williamson (2000 ch. 5) presents a reductio against the luminosity of knowing, against, that is, the so-called KK-principle: if one knows p, then one knows (or is at least in a position to know) that one knows p.1 I do not endorse the principle, but I do not think Williamson’s argument succeeds in refuting it. My aim here is to show that the KK-principle is not the most obvious culprit behind the contradiction Williamson derives.
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  4. S. Okasha (2013). On a Flawed Argument Against the KK Principle. Analysis 73 (1):80-86.score: 60.0
    Externalists in epistemology often reject the KK principle – which says that if a person knows that p, then they know that they know that p. This paper argues that one standard argument against the KK principle that many externalists make is fallacious, as it involves illicit substitution into an intensional context. The fallacy is exposed and discussed.
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  5. Murali Ramachandran (2012). The KK-Principle, Margins for Error, and Safety. Erkenntnis 76 (1):121-136.score: 60.0
    This paper considers, and rejects, three strategies aimed at showing that the KK-principle fails even in most favourable circumstances (all emerging from Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits ). The case against the final strategy provides positive grounds for thinking that the principle should hold good in such situations.
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  6. Antony Eagle, The KK Principle.score: 45.0
    relevant alternatives: I take it that a process is reliable in the actual world iff, in the actual set of outcomes (i.e. beliefs being formed), the frequency of successes (those beliefs being true) is much greater than the frequency of failures (those beliefs being false). One may wish to run a more sophisticated kind of reliabilism, where one demands that a reliable process also be reliable in counterfactual situations, but one need not, and I won’t here. If perception is a (...)
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  7. Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2008). Mr. Magoo's Mistake. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289 - 306.score: 45.0
    Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior (...)
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  8. Berislav Marušić (2013). The Self-Knowledge Gambit. Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.score: 45.0
    If we hold that perceiving is sufficient for knowing, we can raise a powerful objection to dreaming skepticism: Skeptics assume the implausible KK-principle, because they hold that if we don’t know whether we are dreaming or perceiving p, we don’t know whether p. The rejection of the KK-principle thus suggests an anti-skeptical strategy: We can sacrifice some of our self-knowledge—our second-order knowledge—and thereby save our knowledge of the external world. I call this strategy the Self-Knowledge Gambit. I argue (...)
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  9. Timothy Williamson (1999). Rational Failures of the KK Principle. In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. 101--118.score: 45.0
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  10. David Hemp, KK (Knowing That One Knows) Principle. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 36.0
     
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  11. Susanne Bobzien (2012). If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK.score: 33.0
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in (...)
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  12. Julien Dutant, Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection. Proceedings of Tark XI.score: 30.0
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...)
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  13. Peter Murphy (2013). The Defect in Effective Skeptical Scenarios. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (4):271-281.score: 30.0
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  14. Andrew Reisner (2013). Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality? Organon F 20 (4):436-462.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that the enkratic principle in its classic formulation may not be a requirement of rationality. The investigation of whether it is leads to some important methodological insights into the study of rationality. I also consider the possibility that we should consider rational requirements as a subset of a broader category of agential requirements.
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  15. Douglas Diekema (2004). Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as Threshold for State Intervention. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 25 (4):243-264.score: 18.0
    Minors are generally considered incompetent to provide legally binding decisions regarding their health care, and parents or guardians are empowered to make those decisions on their behalf. Parental authority is not absolute, however, and when a parent acts contrary to the best interests of a child, the state may intervene. The best interests standard is the threshold most frequently employed in challenging a parent''s refusal to provide consent for a child''s medical care. In this paper, I will argue that the (...)
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  16. A. T. Nuyen (2001). The "Ethical Anthropic Principle" and the Religious Ethics of Levinas. Journal of Religious Ethics 29 (3):427 - 442.score: 18.0
    Why did Levinas choose Isaiah 45:7 ("I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all that") as a superscription of his essay on evil? This article explores the role of evil in Levinas's religious ethics. The author discusses the structure of evil as revealed phenomenologically and juxtaposes it to the structure of subjectivity found in the writings of Levinas. The idea of the "ethical anthropic principle," modeled upon the cosmic anthropic principle, is then used to link (...)
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  17. Anthony Brueckner (2009). Moore-Paradoxicality and the Principle of Charity. Theoria 75 (3):245-247.score: 18.0
    In a recent article in Theoria , Hamid Vahid offered an explanation of the phenomenon of Moore-paradoxicality which employed Davidson's Principle of Charity regarding radical interpretation. I argue here that Vahid's explanation fails.
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  18. Rafael De Clercq (2005). A Criterion of Diachronic Identity Based on Locke's Principle. Metaphysica 6 (1):23-38.score: 18.0
    The aim of this paper is to derive a perfectly general criterion of identity through time from Locke’s Principle, which says that two things of the same kind cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In this way, the paper pursues a suggestion made by Peter F. Strawson almost thirty years ago in an article called ‘Entity and Identity’. The reason why the potential of this suggestion has so far remained unrealized is twofold: firstly, the suggestion was (...)
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  19. Claus Beisbart (2009). Can We Justifiably Assume the Cosmological Principle in Order to Break Model Underdetermination in Cosmology? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):175 - 205.score: 18.0
    If cosmology is to obtain knowledge about the whole universe, it faces an underdetermination problem: Alternative space-time models are compatible with our evidence. The problem can be avoided though, if there are good reasons to adopt the Cosmological Principle (CP), because, assuming the principle, one can confine oneself to the small class of homogeneous and isotropic space-time models. The aim of this paper is to ask whether there are good reasons to adopt the Cosmological Principle in order (...)
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  20. Elias Okon & Craig Callender (2011). Does Quantum Mechanics Clash with the Equivalence Principle—and Does It Matter? European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):133-145.score: 18.0
    Does quantum mechanics clash with the equivalence principle—and does it matter? Content Type Journal Article Pages 133-145 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0009-z Authors Elias Okon, Philosophy Department, UC San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla CA, 92093, USA Craig Callender, Philosophy Department, UC San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla CA, 92093, USA Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 1.
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  21. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.score: 18.0
    The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has taken an interesting turn in recent years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is not that PAP is false, but (...)
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  22. Milan M. Ćirković (2002). Anthropic Fluctuations Vs. Weak Anthropic Principle. Foundations of Science 7 (4):453-463.score: 18.0
    A modern assessment of the classical Boltzmann-Schuetz argument for large-scale entropy fluctuations as the origin of our observable cosmological domain is given.The emphasis is put on the central implication of this picture which flatly contradicts the weak anthropic principle as an epistemological statement about the universe. Therefore, to associate this picture with the anthropic principle as it is usually done is unwarranted. In particular, Feynman's criticism of theanthropic principle based on the entropy-fluctuation picture is a product of (...)
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  23. Simon Căbulea May (2009). Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):136-170.score: 18.0
    I argue against Rawls's claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy would be selected in the original position in addition to a democratic principle. Since a religious democracy could satisfy the democratic principle, the parties in the original position would not exclude it as illegitimate.
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  24. Andrea Sauchelli (2012). Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization. Philosophical Studies 159 (1):139-146.score: 18.0
    I advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to fictional characters, a (...)
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  25. Luke Elson (2014). Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle. Utilitas 26 (1):51-60.score: 18.0
    John Broome has argued that value incommensurability is vagueness, by appeal to a controversial about comparative indeterminacy. I offer a new counterexample to the collapsing principle. That principle allows us to derive an outright contradiction from the claim that some object is a borderline case of some predicate. But if there are no borderline cases, then the principle is empty. The collapsing principle is either false or empty.
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  26. J. Adam Carter & Martin Peterson (forthcoming). On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle. Erkenntnis:1-13.score: 18.0
    In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by the de minimis principle.
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  27. John D. Barrow (1986/1988). The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    Ever since Copernicus, scientists have continually adjusted their view of human nature, moving it further and further from its ancient position at the center of Creation. But in recent years, a startling new concept has evolved that places it more firmly than ever in a special position. Known as the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, this collection of ideas holds that the existence of intelligent observers determines the fundamental structure of the Universe. In its most radical version, the Anthropic Principle (...)
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  28. Richard Pettigrew (2012). Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle. Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.score: 18.0
    In ‘A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism’, Jim Joyce attempts to ‘depragmatize’ de Finetti’s prevision argument for the claim that our partial beliefs ought to satisfy the axioms of probability calculus. In this paper, I adapt Joyce’s argument to give a non-pragmatic vindication of various versions of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, such as the version based on Isaac Levi's account of admissibility, Michael Thau and Ned Hall's New Principle, and Jenann Ismael's Generalized Principal Principle. Joyce enumerates properties that (...)
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  29. Rafael De Clercq (2013). Locke's Principle is an Applicable Criterion of Identity. Noûs 47 (4):697-705.score: 18.0
    According to Locke’s Principle, material objects are identical if and only if they are of the same kind and once occupy the same place at the same time. There is disagreement about whether this principle is true, but what is seldom disputed is that, even if true, the principle fails to constitute an applicable criterion of identity. In this paper, I take issue with two arguments that have been offered in support of this claim by arguing (i) (...)
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  30. Jean E. Burns (2012). The Action of Consciousness and the Uncertainty Principle. Journal of Nonlocality 1 (1).score: 18.0
    The term action of consciousness is used to refer to an influence, such as psychokinesis or free will, that produces an effect on matter that is correlated to mental intention, but not completely determined by physical conditions. Such an action could not conserve energy. But in that case, one wonders why, when highly accurate measurements are done, occasions of non-conserved energy (generated perhaps by unconscious PK) are not detected. A possible explanation is that actions of consciousness take place within the (...)
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  31. Stephen John (2010). In Defence of Bad Science and Irrational Policies: An Alternative Account of the Precautionary Principle. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):3 - 18.score: 18.0
    In the first part of the paper, three objections to the precautionary principle are outlined: the principle requires some account of how to balance risks of significant harms; the principle focuses on action and ignores the costs of inaction; and the principle threatens epistemic anarchy. I argue that these objections may overlook two distinctive features of precautionary thought: a suspicion of the value of “full scientific certainty”; and a desire to distinguish environmental doings from allowings. In (...)
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  32. Massimo Renzo (2010). A Criticism of the International Harm Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (3):267-282.score: 18.0
    According to the received view crimes like torture, rape, enslavement or enforced prostitution are domestic crimes if they are committed as isolated or sporadic events, but become crimes against humanity when they are committed as part of a ‘widespread or systematic attack’ against a civilian population. Only in the latter case can these crimes be prosecuted by the international community. One of the most influential accounts of this idea is Larry May’s International Harm Principle, which states that crimes against (...)
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  33. Simon Rippon (2011). In Defense of the Wide-Scope Instrumental Principle. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (2):1-21.score: 18.0
    I make the observation that English sentences such as “You have reason to take the bus or to take the train” do not have the logical form that they superficially appear to have. I find in these sentences a conjunctive use of “or,” as found in sentences like “You can have milk or lemon in your tea,” which gives you a permission to have milk, and a permission to have lemon, though no permission to have both. I argue that a (...)
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  34. Hamish Stewart (2009). The Limits of the Harm Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):17-35.score: 18.0
    The harm principle, understood as the normative requirement that conduct should be criminalized only if it is harmful, has difficulty in dealing with those core cases of criminal wrongdoing that can occur without causing any direct harm. Advocates of the harm principle typically find it implausible to hold that these core cases should not be crimes and so usually seek out some indirect harm that can justify criminalizing the seemingly harmless conduct. But this strategy (...)
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  35. Jaakko Hintikka (2012). If Logic, Definitions and the Vicious Circle Principle. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):505-517.score: 18.0
    In a definition (∀ x )(( x є r )↔D[ x ]) of the set r, the definiens D[ x ] must not depend on the definiendum r . This implies that all quantifiers in D[ x ] are independent of r and of (∀ x ). This cannot be implemented in the traditional first-order logic, but can be expressed in IF logic. Violations of such independence requirements are what created the typical paradoxes of set theory. Poincaré’s Vicious Circle (...) was intended to bar such violations. Russell nevertheless misunderstood the principle; for him a set a can depend on another set b only if ( b є a ) or ( b ⊆ a ). Likewise, the truth of an ordinary first-order sentence with the Gödel number of r is undefinable in Tarki’s sense because the quantifiers of the definiens depend unavoidably on r. (shrink)
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  36. Abner Shimony (1989). The Non-Existence of a Principle of Natural Selection. Biology and Philosophy 4 (3):255-273.score: 18.0
    The theory of natural selection is a rich systematization of biological knowledge without a first principle. When formulations of a proposed principle of natural selection are examined carefully, each is seen to be exhaustively analyzable into a proposition about sources of fitness and a proposition about consequences of fitness. But whenever the fitness of an organic variety is well defined in a given biological situation, its sources are local contingencies together with the background of laws from disciplines other (...)
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  37. Greg Novack (2010). A Defense of the Principle of Indifference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):655-678.score: 18.0
    The principle of indifference (hereafter ‘Poi’) says that if one has no more reason to believe A than B (and vice versa ), then one ought not to believe A more than B (nor vice versa ). Many think it’s demonstrably false despite its intuitive plausibility, because of a particular style of thought experiment that generates counterexamples. Roger White ( 2008 ) defends Poi by arguing that its antecedent is false in these thought experiments. Like White I believe Poi, (...)
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  38. Igor Douven & Jos Uffink (2012). Quantum Probabilities and the Conjunction Principle. Synthese 184 (1):109-114.score: 18.0
    A recent argument by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio purports to show that we can uphold the principle that competently forming conjunctions is a knowledge-preserving operation only at the cost of a rampant skepticism about the future. A key premise of their argument is that, in light of quantum-mechanical considerations, future contingents never quite have chance 1 of being true. We argue, by drawing attention to the order of magnitude of the relevant quantum probabilities, that the skeptical threat of Hawthorne and (...)
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  39. Patricia Kauark-Leite (2009). The Transcendental Role of the Principle of Anticipations of Perception in Quantum Mechanics. In Michel Bitbol, Jean Petitot & Pierre Kerszberg (eds.), CONSTITUTING OBJECTIVITY The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science.score: 18.0
    The aim of this work is to analyse the diffrerences between the formal structure of anticipation of perception in classical and in quantum context. I argue that a transcendental point of view can be supported in quantum context if objectivity is defined by an invariant anticipative structure, which has only a predictive character. The classical objectivity, which defined a set of properties having a descriptive meaning must be abandoned in quantum context. I will focus my analysis on Kant's Principle (...)
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  40. Michael Moehler (2012). A Hobbesian Derivation of the Principle of Universalization. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):83-107.score: 18.0
    In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant's categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are (...)
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  41. John Lemons, Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Carl Cranor (1997). The Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and Type I and Type II Errors. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 2 (2):207-236.score: 18.0
    We provide examples of the extent and nature of environmental and human health problems and show why in the United States prevailing scientific and legal burden of proof requirements usually cannot be met because of the pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty. We also provide examples of how may assumptions, judgments, evaluations, and inferences in scientific methods are value-laden and that when this is not recognized results of studies will appear to be more factual and value-neutral than warranted. Further, we show that (...)
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  42. Steve Clarke (2005). Future Technologies, Dystopic Futures and the Precautionary Principle. Ethics and Information Technology 7 (3):121-126.score: 18.0
    It is sometimes suggested that new research in such areas as artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and genetic engineering should be halted or otherwise restricted because of concerns about possible catastrophic scenarios. Proponents of such restrictions typically invoke the precautionary principle, understood as a tool of policy formulation, as part of their case. Here I examine the application of the precautionary principle to possible catastrophic scenarios. I argue, along with Sunstein (Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and the Environment. Cambridge University (...)
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  43. Attila Grandpierre (2011). The Biological Principle of Natural Sciences and the Logos of Life of Natural Philosophy: A Comparison and the Perspectives of Unifying the Science and Philosophy of Life. Analecta Husserliana 110 (Part II):711-727.score: 18.0
    Acknowledging that Nature is one unified whole, we expect that physics and biology are intimately related. Keeping in mind that physics became an exact science with which we are already familiar with, while, apparently, we do not have at present a similar knowledge about biology, we consider how can we make useful the clarity of physics to shed light to biology. The next question will be what are the most basic categories of physics and biology. If we do not want (...)
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  44. Srećko Kovač (2008). In What Sense is Kantian Principle of Contradiction Non-Classical? Logic and Logical Philosophy 17 (3):251-274.score: 18.0
    On the ground of Kant’s reformulation of the principle of con- tradiction, a non-classical logic KC and its extension KC+ are constructed. In KC and KC+, \neg(\phi \wedge \neg\phi),  \phi \rightarrow (\neg\phi \rightarrow \phi), and  \phi \vee \neg\phi are not valid due to specific changes in the meaning of connectives and quantifiers, although there is the explosion of derivable consequences from {\phi, ¬\phi} (the deduc- tion theorem lacking). KC and KC+ are interpreted as fragments of an S5-based (...)
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  45. Milan M. Ćirković (2006). Is Quantum Suicide Painless? On an Apparent Violation of the Principal Principle. Foundations of Science 11 (3):287-296.score: 18.0
    The experimental setup of the self-referential quantum measurement, jovially known as the ‘quantum suicide’ or the ‘quantum Russian roulette’ is analyzed from the point of view of the Principal Principle of David Lewis. It is shown that the apparent violation of this principle – relating objective probabilities and subjective chance – in this type of thought experiment is just an illusion due to the usage of some terms and concepts ill-defined in the quantum context. We conclude that even (...)
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  46. Philippe H. Martin (1997). "If You Don't Know How to Fix It, Please Stop Breaking It!" The Precautionary Principle and Climate Change. Foundations of Science 2 (2):263-292.score: 18.0
    Taking precautions to prevent harm. Whether principe de précaution, Vorsorgeprinzip, føre-var prinsippet, or försiktighetsprincip, etc., the precautionary principle embodies the idea that public and private interests should act to prevent harm. Furthermore, the precautionary principle suggests that action should be taken to limit, regulate, or prevent potentially dangerous undertakings even in the absence of absolute scientific proof. Such measures also naturally entail taking economic costs into account. With the environmental disasters of the 1980s, the precautionary principle established (...)
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  47. Rodolfo de Cristofaro (2008). A New Formulation of the Principle of Indifference. Synthese 163 (3):329-339.score: 18.0
    The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, (...)
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  48. Claudia Som, Lorenz M. Hilty & Andreas R. Köhler (2009). The Precautionary Principle as a Framework for a Sustainable Information Society. Journal of Business Ethics 85 (3):493 - 505.score: 18.0
    The precautionary principle (PP) aims to anticipate and minimize potentially serious or irreversible risks under conditions of scientific uncertainty. Thus it preserves the potential for future developments. It has been incorporated into many international treaties and pieces of national legislation for environmental protection and sustainable development. In this article, we outline an interpretation of the PP as a framework of orientation for a sustainable information society. Since the risks induced by future information and communication technologies (ICT) are social risks (...)
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  49. Milan Cirkovic (2006). Is Quantum Suicide Painless? On an Apparent Violation of the Principal Principle. Foundations of Science 11 (3):287-296.score: 18.0
    The experimental setup of the self-referential quantum measurement, jovially known as the ‘quantum suicide’ or the ‘quantum Russian roulette’ is analyzed from the point of view of the Principal Principle of David Lewis. It is shown that the apparent violation of this principle – relating objective probabilities and subjective chance – in this type of thought experiment is just an illusion due to the usage of some terms and concepts ill-defined in the quantum context. We conclude that even (...)
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  50. Zoltan Miklosi (2010). How Does the Difference Principle Make a Difference? Res Publica 16 (3):263-280.score: 18.0
    The paper examines the relationship between the two parts of Rawls’ second principle of justice. More specifically, it explores the ways in which the Difference Principle (DP) may constrain the range of acceptable social arrangements in light of the stated lexical priority of the requirement of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) over the DP. The paper discusses two possibilities. First, it examines the role the DP may play within an institutional scheme that satisfies the requirement of FEO. Second, (...)
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