Search results for 'knowability' (try it on Scholar)

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Bibliography: Knowability in Epistemology
  1. Michael Fara (2010). Knowability and the Capacity to Know. Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.score: 24.0
    This paper presents a generalized form of Fitch's paradox of knowability, with the aim of showing that the questions it raises are not peculiar to the topics of knowledge, belief, or other epistemic notions. Drawing lessons from the generalization, the paper offers a solution to Fitch's paradox that exploits an understanding of modal talk about what could be known in terms of capacities to know. It is argued that, in rare cases, one might have the capacity to know that (...)
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  2. Wolfgang Freitag (2011). Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem. Acta Analytica 26 (3):273-284.score: 24.0
    The paper critically examines an objection to epistemic contextualism recently developed by Elke Brendel and Peter Baumann, according to which it is impossible for the contextualist to know consistently that his theory is true. I first present an outline of contextualism and its reaction to scepticism. Then the necessary and sufficient conditions for the knowability problem to arise are explored. Finally, it will be argued that contextualism does not fulfil these minimal conditions. It will be shown that the contrary (...)
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  3. Boris Rähme, The Paradox of Knowability and Epistemic Theories of Truth.score: 24.0
    The article suggests a reading of the term ‘epistemic account of truth’ which runs contrary to a widespread consensus with regard to what epistemic accounts are meant to provide, namely a definition of truth in epistemic terms. Section 1. introduces a variety of possible epistemic accounts that differ with regard to the strength of the epistemic constraints they impose on truth. Section 2. introduces the paradox of knowability and presents a slightly reconstructed version of a related argument brought forward (...)
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  4. Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri (2013). The Church–Fitch Knowability Paradox in the Light of Structural Proof Theory. Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.score: 24.0
    Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$ , by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$ (KP). The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$ (OP). A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the (...)
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  5. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno, Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 24.0
    The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to (...)
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  6. Michael Hand (2010). Antirealism and Universal Knowability. Synthese 173 (1):25 - 39.score: 24.0
    Truth’s universal knowability entails its discovery. This threatens antirealism, which is thought to require it. Fortunately, antirealism is not committed to it. Avoiding it requires adoption (and extension) of Dag Prawitz’s position in his long-term disagreement with Michael Dummett on the notion of provability involved in intuitionism’s identification of it with truth. Antirealism (intuitionism generalized) must accommodate a notion of lost-opportunity truth (a kind of recognition-transcendent truth), and even truth consisting in the presence of unperformable verifications. Dummett’s position cannot (...)
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  7. W. Dean & H. Kurokawa (2010). From the Knowability Paradox to the Existence of Proofs. Synthese 176 (2):177 - 225.score: 24.0
    The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verification-transcendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or Martin-Löf using the sort of propositional modal operators which are (...)
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  8. Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio (2011). Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument Against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox. Theoria 77 (2):180-193.score: 24.0
    The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers the motivation for a type-theoretic approach with respect to the Knowability Paradox alone, (...)
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  9. Robert G. Hudson (2009). Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability. Philosophia 37 (3):511-523.score: 24.0
    It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some (...)
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  10. Julien Murzi (2010). Knowability and Bivalence: Intuitionistic Solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269 - 281.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson and, most (...)
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  11. Pierdaniele Giaretta (2009). The Paradox of Knowability From a Russellian Perspective. Prolegomena 8 (2):141-158.score: 24.0
    The paradox of knowability and the debate about it are shortly presented. Some assumptions which appear more or less tacitly involved in its discussion are made explicit. They are embedded and integrated in a Russellian framework, where a formal paradox, very similar to the Russell-Myhill paradox, is derived. Its solution is provided within a Russellian formal logic introduced by A. Church. It follows that knowledge should be typed. Some relevant aspects of the typing of knowledge are pointed out.
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  12. Jonathan Kvanvig (2010). The Incarnation and the Knowability Paradox. Synthese 173 (1):89 - 105.score: 24.0
    The best defense of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies that traditional Christianity has a special stake in the knowability paradox, a stake not shared by other theistic perspectives or by non-traditional accounts of the Incarnation. Perhaps, this stake is not even shared by antirealism, the view most obviously threatened by the paradox. I argue for these points, concluding that these results put traditional Christianity at a disadvantage compared to other viewpoints, and I close with some comments about the (...)
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  13. David DeVidi & Tim Kenyon (2003). Analogues of Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495.score: 24.0
    An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, (...)
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  14. André Fuhrmann (2014). Knowability as Potential Knowledge. Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.score: 24.0
    The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation of knowability. (...)
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  15. Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu (2013). Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis. Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.score: 24.0
    In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the Moore sentence (...)
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  16. Martin Fischer (2013). Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle. Synthese 190 (1):63-88.score: 24.0
    The Fitch paradox poses a serious challenge for anti-realism. This paper investigates the option for an anti-realist to answer the challenge by restricting the knowability principle. Based on a critical discussion of Dummett's and Tennant's suggestions for a restriction desiderata for a principled solution are developed. In the second part of the paper a different restriction is proposed. The proposal uses the notion of uniform formulas and diagnoses the problem arising in the case of Moore sentences in the different (...)
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  17. Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). The Paradox of Knowability and Factivity. Polish Journal of Philiosophy.score: 24.0
    This paper shows that the knowability paradox isn’t a paradox because the derivation of the paradox is faulty. This is explained by showing that the K operator employed in generating the paradox is used equivocally and when the equivocation is eliminated the derivation fails.
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  18. Mark Jago (2010). Closure on Knowability. Analysis 70 (4):648-659.score: 21.0
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  19. Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Restriction Strategies for Knowability : Some Lessons in False Hope. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience claim, antirealism is in (...)
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  20. Joe Salerno (ed.) (2009). New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox.
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  21. Nicholas Maxwell, The Problem of Induction and Metaphysical Assumptions Concerning the Comprehensibility and Knowability of the Universe. PhilSci Archive.score: 18.0
    Even though evidence underdetermines theory, often in science one theory only is regarded as acceptable in the light of the evidence. This suggests there are additional unacknowledged assumptions which constrain what theories are to be accepted. In the case of physics, these additional assumptions are metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Rigour demands that these implicit assumptions be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope improved. This leads (...)
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  22. Cesare Cozzo (1994). What Can We Learn From the Paradox of Knowability? Topoi 13 (2):71--78.score: 18.0
    The intuitionistic conception of truth defended by Dummett, Martin Löf and Prawitz, according to which the notion of proof is conceptually prior1 to the notion of truth, is a particular version of the epistemic conception of truth. The paradox of knowability (first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963) has been described by many authors2 as an argument which threatens the epistemic, and the intuitionistic, conception of truth. In order to establish whether this is really so, one has to understand (...)
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  23. Rafał Palczewski (2007). Distributed Knowability and Fitch's Paradox. Studia Logica 86 (3):455--478.score: 18.0
    Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also (...)
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  24. Elia Zardini, If Every True Proposition is Knowable, Then Every Believed (Decidable) Proposition is True, or the Incompleteness of the Intuitionistic Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.score: 18.0
    Fitch’s paradox of knowability is an apparently valid reasoning from the assumption (typical of semantic anti-realism) that every true proposition is knowable to the unacceptable conclusion that every true proposition is known. The paper develops a critical dialectic wrt one of the best motivated solutions to the paradox which have been proposed on behalf of semantic anti-realism—namely, the intuitionistic solution. The solution consists, on the one hand, in accepting the intuitionistically valid part of Fitch’s reasoning while, on the other (...)
     
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  25. Bernhard Weiss (2007). Truth and the Enigma of Knowability. Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.score: 18.0
    Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti-realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti-realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle -- the principle that all truths are knowable -- which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti-realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a (...)
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  26. Timothy Williamson (1988). Knowability and Constructivism. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):422-432.score: 18.0
    There is an argument which seems to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. It may be viewed as a "reductio ad absurdum" of certain forms of antirealism. However, The claim has been made elsewhere that the argument fails against antirealists who employ constructivist rather than classical logic. The paper defends and amplifies this claim against criticisms by crispin wright and others. Relations between knowability and time are discussed. Suggestions are also made about the (...)
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  27. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2006). Knowability and a Modal Closure Principle. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):261-270.score: 18.0
    Does a factive conception of knowability figure in ordinary use? There is some reason to think so. ‘Knowable’ and related terms such as ‘discoverable’, ‘observable’, and ‘verifiable’ all seem to operate factively in ordinary discourse. Consider the following example, a dialog between colleagues A and B: A: We could be discovered. B: Discovered doing what? A: Someone might discover that we're having an affair. B: But we are not having an affair! A: I didn’t say that we were. A’s (...)
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  28. M. Hand (2003). Knowability and Epistemic Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):216 – 228.score: 18.0
    The so-called knowability paradox results from Fitch's argument that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This threatens recent versions of semantical antirealism, the central thesis of which is that truth is epistemic. When this is taken to mean that all truths are knowable, antirealism is thus committed to the conclusion that no truths are unknown. The correct antirealistic response to the paradox should be to deny that the fundamental thesis of the epistemic nature of (...)
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  29. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2008). Knowability, Possibility and Paradox. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 18.0
    The paradox of knowability threatens to draw a logical equivalence between the believable claim that all truths are knowable and the obviously false claim that all truths are known. In this paper we evaluate prominent proposals for resolving the paradox of knowability. For instance, we argue that Neil Tennant’s restriction strategy, which aims principally to restrict the main quantifier in ‘all truths are knowable’, does not get to the heart of the problem since there are knowability paradoxes (...)
     
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  30. Peter Marton (2006). Verificationists Versus Realists: The Battle Over Knowability. Synthese 151 (1):81 - 98.score: 18.0
    Verificationism is the doctrine stating that all truths are knowable. Fitch’s knowability paradox, however, demonstrates that the verificationist claim (all truths are knowable) leads to “epistemic collapse”, i.e., everything which is true is (actually) known. The aim of this article is to investigate whether or not verificationism can be saved from the effects of Fitch’s paradox. First, I will examine different strategies used to resolve Fitch’s paradox, such as Edgington’s and Kvanvig’s modal strategy, Dummett’s and Tennant’s restriction strategy, Beall’s (...)
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  31. Joe Salerno (2009). Knowability Noir: 1945-1963. In , New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oup Oxford.score: 18.0
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  32. Jan Heylen (forthcoming). Closure of A Priori Knowability Under A Priori Knowable Material Implication. Erkenntnis:1-22.score: 18.0
    The topic of this article is the closure of a priori knowability under a priori knowable material implication: if a material conditional is a priori knowable and if the antecedent is a priori knowable, then the consequent is a priori knowable as well. This principle is arguably correct under certain conditions, but there is at least one counterexample when completely unrestricted. To deal with this, Anderson proposes to restrict the closure principle to necessary truths and Horsten suggests to restrict (...)
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  33. Author unknown, Knowability and the Capacity to Know.score: 18.0
    (PDF of penultimate draft; please don’t quote from or cite this version.) Forthcoming in Synthese. Generalizations of Fitch’s paradox of knowability motivate the thesis that in saying that a truth is knowable, or that it could be known, we do not mean that it is possible that it is known. Instead, I argue, claims about knowability express capacities to know. The paper concludes by explaining the requisite sense of “capacity” at work here, and by showing how the paradox (...)
     
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  34. J. L. Shaw (1978). The Nyāya on Existence, Knowability and Nameability. Journal of Indian Philosophy 5 (3):255-266.score: 18.0
    One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by the nyaya philosophers. this discussion leads us to a discussion on absence or negation and its role in logic. a discussion on empty terms has also been introduced in this context. according to the nyaya, existence, knowability and nameability are considered as universal properties. the distinction between these universal properties has been discussed in this context. i have also discussed (...)
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  35. Jonathan Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422-428.score: 18.0
    The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.
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  36. J. C. Beall (2009). Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. 105--125.score: 18.0
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  37. Javier Vilanova (1999). Un Análisis Dei Concepto de Cognoscibilidad Desde la Semántica de Mundos Posibles (an Analysis of the Notion of Knowability in the F Ield of Possible Worlds Semantics). Theoria 14 (3):413-429.score: 18.0
    Las nociones epistémicas modales se definen como aquellos conceptos epistémicos que, como el de cognoscibilidad o el de indudabilidad, incluyen una nota modal. Segun se defiende en este trabajo, la semántica de mundos posibles y algunas de sus extensiones (especialmente las llevadas a cabo para logica temporal, logica epistemica y logica condicional) son instrumentos adecuados para deshacer el nudo de las intensionalidades superpuestas en estas nociones especialmente esquivas al análisis. Para mostrarlo, se proporcionan una serie de análisis sucesivos de la (...)
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  38. Cícero Antônio Cavalcante Barroso (2014). The Knowability Principle and the Qualia. Trans/Form/Ação 37 (2):91-109.score: 18.0
    O princípio da cognoscibilidade, formulado sem restrições, diz que todos os enunciados verdadeiros são cognoscíveis. O problema é que, com essa formulação, ele está sujeito a muitas objeções, pelo que é necessário restringir o princípio. Com tais restrições, ele diz apenas que todos os enunciados verdadeiros interessantes em certo sentido são cognoscíveis. Não obstante, este artigo mostra que alguns desses enunciados também são incognoscíveis e, desse modo, evidencia que o princípio da cognoscibilidade, mesmo na sua forma mais restrita, é falso. (...)
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  39. Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio, Perfected Science and the Knowability Paradox.score: 18.0
    In "The Limits of Science" N. Rescher introduces a logical argument known as the Knowability Paradox, according to which, if every true proposition is knowable, then every true proposition is known, i.e. if there are unknown truths, there are unknowable truths. Rescher argues that the Knowability Paradox, giving evidence to a limit of our knowledge (the existence of unknowable truths) could be used for arguing against perfected science. In this article we present two criticisms against Rescher's argument.
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  40. Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio, The Knowability Paradox, Perfectibility of Science and Reductionism.score: 18.0
    A logical argument known as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, starting from the assumption that every truth is knowable, leads to the consequence that every truth is also actually known. Then, given the ordinary fact that some true propositions are not actually known, it concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. The main literature on the topic has been focusing on the threat the argument poses to the so called semantic anti-realist theories, which aim to epistemically characterize the (...)
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  41. Michael Dummett (2009). Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
     
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  42. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Lessons in False Hope&Quot. In Joseph Salerno (ed.), New Essays on Knowability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 205-222.score: 18.0
  43. Bernard Linsky (2009). Logical Types in Some Arguments About Knowability and Belief. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
     
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  44. Stig Alstrup Rasmussen (2009). The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
     
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  45. David J. Chalmers (2011). Actuality and Knowability. Analysis 71 (3):411-419.score: 16.0
    It is widely believed that for all p, or at least for all entertainable p, it is knowable a priori that (p iff actually p). It is even more widely believed that for all such p, it is knowable that (p iff actually p). There is a simple argument against these claims from four antecedently plausible premises.
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  46. Sten Lindström (1997). Situations, Truth and Knowability: A Situation-Theoretic Analysis of a Paradox by Fitch. In Eva Ejerhed & Sten Lindström (eds.), Logic, Action and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer.score: 15.0
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  47. Jens Christian Bjerring (forthcoming). Review of New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of Logic.score: 15.0
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  48. Dorothy Edgington (1985). The Paradox of Knowability. Mind 94 (376):557-568.score: 15.0
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  49. Michael Hand & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). Tennant on Knowability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422 – 428.score: 15.0
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