Search results for 'knowledge argument' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.score: 240.0
    In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some (...)
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  2. Gabriel Rabin (2011). Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.score: 240.0
    According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of physicalism or (...)
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  3. Martina Fürst (2004). Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument. Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.score: 240.0
    The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of a quale x requires the experience of x. Arguing what is so special about phenomenal concepts and pointing at the inherence-relation (...)
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  4. Luca Malatesti (2012). The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.score: 240.0
    There is widespread debate in contemporary philosophy of mind over the place of conscious experiences in the natural world – where the latter is taken to be broadly as described and explained by such sciences as physics, chemistry and biology; while conscious experiences encompass pains, bodily sensations, perceptions, feelings and moods. Many philosophers and scientists, who endorse physicalism or materialism, maintain that these mental states can be completely described and explained in natural terms. Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is (...)
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  5. Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). The Knowledge Argument and Higher-Order Properties. Ratio 18 (1):48-64.score: 228.0
    The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an (...)
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  6. Michael Pelczar (2009). The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument, and the Moral Problem. Synthese 171 (1):25 - 45.score: 216.0
    Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made (...)
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  7. Robert J. Howell (2007). The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145 - 177.score: 210.0
    In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson.
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  8. Zhao Yanyan (2012). The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism: Its Proponents and Its Opponents. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7 (2):304-316.score: 210.0
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  9. Torin Alter (1998). A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.score: 204.0
    Mary learns all the physical facts that one can learn by watching lectures on black-on-white television. According to Jackson, Mary learns new facts when she leaves the room and has color experiences, and that this undermines physicalism. Physicalists have responded by denying the new facts thesis; they argue, she acquires abilities, acquaintance knowledge, or new guises. I argue that the NFT is more plausible than any of the proposed alternatives. I also argue that the NFT does not undermine physicalism (...)
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  10. G. Furash (1989). Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Materialism. Dialogue 32 (October):1-6.score: 198.0
     
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  11. Giacomo Gava (2004). The Knowledge Argument: A Survey and a Proposal. Padova: Cleup Ed Padova.score: 198.0
     
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  12. Paul Raymont (1999). The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26.score: 192.0
    I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a first-person perspective. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience redness amounts to no more (...)
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  13. Brie Gertler (1999). A Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.score: 192.0
    This paper calls into question the viability of materialist reduction of the phenomenal. I revisit the 'Knowledge Argument', which claims that there is information about the phenomenal which is not reducible to, nor even inferable from, information about the physical. I demonstrate the failure of the two chief strategies for blocking the Knowledge Argument: (1) analyzing phenomenal knowledge as an ability, and (2) construing it as knowledge of facts which are ontologically reducible to (though (...)
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  14. Neil Campbell (2003). An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 58 (2):261-266.score: 192.0
    I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeed in showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given the structure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim that qualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tension is that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they have causal efficacy, while his (...)
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  15. Emmett L. Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56.score: 192.0
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately.
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  16. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.score: 192.0
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to (...)
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  17. Uwe Meyer (2001). The Knowledge Argument, Abilities, and Metalinguistic Beliefs. Erkenntnis 55 (3):325-347.score: 192.0
    In this paper I discuss a variant of the knowledge argument which is based upon Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment. Using this argument, Jackson tries to support the thesis that a purely physical – or, put generally: an objectively scientific – perspective upon the world excludes the important domain of `phenomenal' facts, which are only accessible introspectively. Martine Nida-Rümelinhas formulated the epistemological challenge behind the case of Mary especially clearly. I take her formulation of the problem as (...)
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  18. James P. Moreland (2003). The Knowledge Argument Revisited. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):218-228.score: 192.0
    The literature on the Knowledge Argument exhibits considerable confusion about the precise nature of the argument. I contend that a clarification of the essence of self-presenting properties provides an explanation of this confusion such that the confusion itself is evidence for dualism. I also claim that Mary gains six different sorts of knowledge after gaining sight, and I show how this claim provides a response to a physicalist undercutting defeater for the Knowledge Argument. I (...)
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  19. Torin Alter (2006). Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. 65--76.score: 186.0
    The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) gave the argument its classic formulation. But now he rejects the argument (Jackson 1998b, 2003, chapter 3 of this volume). (...)
     
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  20. Philip Pettit (2004). Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. 105--142.score: 186.0
    In a now famous thought experiment, Frank jackson asked us t0 imagine an omniscient scientist, Mary, who is coniincd in a black-and-white room and then released into the world 0f color (jackson 1982; jackson 1986; cf. Braddon—Mitch<-:11 and Jackson 1996). Assuming that she is omniscicnt in respect of all physical facts—roughiy, all the facts available to physics and all the facts that they in turn Hx or determine-physicalism would suggest that there is no new fact Mary can discover after emancipation; (...)
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  21. David J. Chalmers (2004). Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. 269.score: 180.0
    *[[This paper is largely based on material in other papers. The first three sections and the appendix are drawn with minor modifications from Chalmers 2002c (which explores issues about phenomenal concepts and beliefs in much more depth, mostly independently of questions about materialism). The main ideas of the last three sections are drawn from Chalmers 1996, 1999, and 2002a, although with considerable revision and elaboration. ]].
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  22. Torin Alter (2013). Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument. Mind 122 (486):fzt072.score: 180.0
    According to social externalism, it is possible to possess a concept not solely in virtue of one’s intrinsic properties but also in virtue of relations to one’s linguistic community. Derek Ball (2009) argues, in effect, that (i) social externalism extends to our concepts of colour experience and (ii) this fact undermines both the knowledge argument against physicalism and the most popular physicalist response to it, known as the phenomenal concept strategy. I argue that Ball is mistaken about (ii) (...)
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  23. Torin Alter, The Knowledge Argument. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.score: 180.0
    Frank Jackson first presented the Knowledge Argument (henceforth KA) in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" 1982). The KA is an argument against physicalism, the doctrine that (very roughly put) everything is physical. The general thrust of the KA is that physicalism errs by misconstruing or denying the existence of the subjective features of experience. Physicalists have given numerous responses, and the debate continues about whether the KA ultimately succeeds in refuting any or all forms of physicalism. Jackson himself has recently.
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  24. Brie Gertler (2005). The Knowledge Argument. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan.score: 180.0
    The definitive statement of the Knowledge Argument was formulated by Frank Jackson, in a paper entitled “Epiphenomenal Qualia” that appeared in The Philosophical Quarterly in 1982. Arguments in the same spirit had appeared earlier (Broad 1925, Robinson 1982), but Jackson’s argument is most often compared with Thomas Nagel’s argument in “What is it Like to be a Bat?” (1974). Jackson, however, takes pains to distinguish his argument from Nagel’s. This entry will follow standard practice in (...)
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  25. Yujin Nagasawa (2010). The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.score: 180.0
    Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most interesting criticisms of Jackson's position is what I call the 'inconsistency objection'. The inconsistency objection says that Jackson's position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is 'the most powerful (...)
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  26. Torin Alter (2007). The Knowledge Argument. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.score: 180.0
    The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the doctrine that the world is entirely physical. Physicalism (also known as materialism) is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy. But some doubt that phenomenal consciousness.
     
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  27. Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.score: 180.0
    This paper offers a new solution to the knowledge argument. Both a priori and a posteriori physicalists reject the claim that Mary does not know all the facts, but they do so for different reasons. While the former think that Mary gains no new knowledge of any fact, the latter think that Mary gains new knowledge of an old fact. This paper argues that on a broad understanding of what counts as physical, it is consistent with (...)
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  28. Yujin Nagasawa, Knowledge Argument.score: 180.0
    The knowledge argument is an argument against physicalism that was first formulated by Frank Jackson in 1982. While Jackson no longer endorses it, it is still regarded as one of the most important arguments in the philosophy of mind. Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that, roughly speaking, everything in this world—including tables, galaxies, cheese cakes, cars, atoms, and even our sensations— are ultimately physical. The knowledge argument attempts to undermine this thesis by appealing to the (...)
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  29. Daniel Stoljar (2011). On the Self-Locating Response to the Knowledge Argument. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 155 (3):437-443.score: 180.0
    On the self-locating response to the knowledge argument Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9612-2 Authors Daniel Stoljar, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT, 0200 Australia Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  30. Benj Hellie (2004). Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument. In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. The Mit Press. 333.score: 180.0
    I argue on linguistic grounds that when Mary comes to know what it's like to see a red thing, she comes to know a certain inexpressible truth about the character of her own experience. This affords a "no concept" reply to the knowledge argument. The reason the Knowledge Argument has proven so intractable may be that we believe that an inexpressible concept and an expressible concept cannot have the same referent.
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  31. Luca Malatesti (2004). The Knowledge Argument. Dissertation, University of Stirlingscore: 180.0
    Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is a very influential piece of reasoning that seeks to show that colour experiences constitute an insoluble problem for science. This argument is based on a thought experiment concerning Mary. She is a vision scientist who has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision but has never had colour experiences. According to Jackson, upon seeing coloured objects, Mary acquires new knowledge that escapes her complete scientific knowledge. He concludes that (...)
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  32. Paul Raymont (1995). Tye's Criticism of the Knowledge Argument. Dialogue 34 (4):713-26.score: 180.0
    A defense of Frank Jackson's knowledge argument from an objection raised by Michael Tye (1986, 1989), according to which Mary acquires no new factual knowledge when she first sees red but, instead, merely comes to know old facts (that she already knew) in a new way.
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  33. Erich Rast (2012). De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge. Analysis and Metaphysics 11 (December):106-132.score: 180.0
    ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically (...)
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  34. Dennis Nicholson, Solving the Mind-Body Problem - the Real Significance of the Knowledge Argument.score: 180.0
    The Knowledge Argument is misconstructed. Knowing that it is ‘just obvious’ that Mary will learn something new on leaving her black and white room, we nevertheless assume she can acquire a complete knowledge of the physical inside it – thereby predetermining the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. If we reformulate the argument to leave the question of what she can learn in the room open, it becomes clear, not only (...)
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  35. David Hodgson (2008). The Knowledge Argument: A Response to Elizabeth Schier. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):112-115.score: 180.0
    I much appreciated Elizabeth Schier's paper on Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, published in the January 2008 issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Schier, 2008) -- in part, I confess, because of resonances with my gestalt argument for free will (Hodgson, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2007a,b). I would like to offer two comments on this paper.
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  36. Neil Campbell (2012). Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145.score: 180.0
    Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge (...) remains. (shrink)
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  37. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51 - 73.score: 180.0
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to (...)
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  38. M. Kuna (2004). The Knowledge Argument and the Refutation of Physicalism. Organon F 11 (2):128-142.score: 180.0
    The article examines the viability of called ‘the knowledge argument’ that was designed to prove the irreducibility of the subjective, phenomenal aspect of experience to the physical. It is argued that this argument can successfully be defended against its criticism. Its critics are represented here by two physicalist approaches: the mode of presentation hypothesis (here Paul Churchland), and the ability hypothesis (here David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow). The defense of the general soundness of the knowledge (...) is based on some important insights on the issue in question of Frank Jackson and Howard Robinson. It is argued that the physicalist counterarguments to the knowledge argument seem inadequate. The article concludes that it appears that the knowledge argument has still kept a significant amount of its initial force. (shrink)
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  39. Dunja Jutronić (2004). The Knowledge Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):193-197.score: 180.0
    The paper discusses Crane’s analysis of Knowledge argument, and sets forth author’s disagreement with Crane. Surely Mary learns something new when she sees a color for the first time. The time for a physicalist to quarrel comes only when a qualia person says that this experience represents special phenomenal facts, and that such understanding should be identified with propositional knowledge. We should not confuse ‘having information’ with having the same information in the form of knowledge or (...)
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  40. Elizabeth Schier (2008). The Knowledge Argument and the Inadequacy of Scientific Knowledge. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):39-62.score: 174.0
    Recently a number of authors have responded to the knowl-edge argument by suggesting that Mary could learn about new physi-cal facts upon release (Flanagan, 1992; Mandik, 2001; Stoljar, 2001; Van Gulick, 1985). A key step in achieving this is a demonstration that there are facts that can be known via colour experience that cannot be learnt scientifically. In this paper I develop an account of scientific and visual knowledge on which there is a difference between the knowledge (...)
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  41. Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self‐Ascription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-219.score: 168.0
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  42. Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2004). There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.score: 164.0
    The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness.
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  43. Michael Tye (2000). Knowing What It is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. 223.score: 162.0
  44. Yujin Nagasawa (2002). The Knowledge Argument Against Dualism. Theoria 68 (3):205-223.score: 162.0
    Paul Churchland argues that Frank Jackson.
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  45. William G. Lycan (2003). Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 384.score: 162.0
    Someday there will be no more articles written about the.
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  46. Howard M. Robinson (1993). Dennett on the Knowledge Argument. Analysis 53 (3):174-7.score: 162.0
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  47. J. McConnell (1995). In Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Topics 22 (3):157-187.score: 162.0
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  48. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1997). On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.score: 162.0
  49. Dunja Jutronic (2004). The Knowledge Argument--Some Comments. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):193-197.score: 162.0
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  50. J. Berntsen (2004). Why Physicalists Needn't Bother with Perry's Recent Response to the Knowledge Argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):135-148.score: 162.0
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