Search results for 'knowledge by acquaintance' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nikolay Milkov (2001). The History or Russell's Concepts 'Sense-Data' and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance'. Archiv Fuer Begriffsgeschichte 43:221-231.
    Two concepts of utmost importance for the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century, “sense-data” and “knowledge by acquaintance”, were introduced by Bertrand Russell under the influence of two idealist philosophers: F. H. Bradley and Alexius Meinong. This paper traces the exact history of their introduction. We shall see that between 1896 and 1898, Russell had a fully-elaborated theory of “sense-data”, which he abandoned after his analytic turn of the summer of 1898. Furthermore, following a subsequent turn of August (...)
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  2.  31
    Augustin Riska (1980). Knowledge by Acquaintance Reconsidered. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:129-140.
    A propositional interpretation of knowledge by acquaintance seems more promising than the nonpropositional one, endorsed by Russell. According to the propositional interpretation, to be acquainted with an object means to attend (pay attention) to individuating features of the object. For the actual, direct acquaintance with an object, a subject's perception of the object and his attending to the individuating features of it (just as the fact that these features do belonge to the object in question) are the (...)
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  3.  48
    Ali Hasan & Richard Fumerton, Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  4.  22
    M. Giaquinto (2012). Russell on Knowledge of Universals by Acquaintance. Philosophy 87 (04):497-508.
    Russell's book The Problems of Philosophy was first published a hundred years ago.¹ A remarkable feature of this enduring text is the glint of Platonism it presents on a dark empiricist sea: while our knowledge of physical objects is entirely mediated by direct awareness of sense data, we can also have direct awareness of certain universals, Russell claims.² This is questionable, even if one has no empiricist inclination. Universals are abstract, hence causally inert. How, then, can we have any (...)
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  5. Bertrand Russell (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (5):108--28.
  6.  11
    Thomas Baldwin (2003). 13 From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Causation. In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press 420.
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  7. Richard Fumerton, Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8.  31
    Keith S. Donnellan (1990). Genuine Names and Knowledge by Acquaintance. Dialectica 44 (1‐2):99-112.
  9.  94
    DeWitt H. Parker (1945). Knowledge by Acquaintance. Philosophical Review 54 (1):1-18.
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  10.  45
    John M. DePoe, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  11.  85
    R. S. Bluck (1963). 'Knowledge by Acquaintance' in Plato's Theaetetus. Mind 72 (286):259-263.
  12. Kenneth Westphal (2002). 'Sense Certainty', Or Why Russell Had No 'Knowledge By Acquaintance'. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 45:110-123.
     
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  13.  60
    Paul Hayner (1969). Knowledge by Acquaintance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (3):423-431.
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  14. Bertrand Russell (1917). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. In Mysticism and Logic. London: Longmans Green 152-167.
  15.  47
    Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1944). Do We Have Knowledge-by-Acquaintance of the Self? Journal of Philosophy 41 (25):694-696.
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  16. K. R. Westphal (2005). Hume's Commitment to, and Critique of,''Knowledge by Acquaintance'': Some Hegelian Reflections'. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 51 (52).
     
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  17.  25
    Nicholas D. Smith (1979). Knowledge by Acquaintance and 'Knowing What' in Plato's Republic. Dialogue 18 (3):281-288.
  18.  31
    Paul Hayner (1970). Meyers on Knowledge by Acquaintance: A Rejoinder. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):297-298.
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  19.  24
    Robert G. Meyers (1970). Knowledge by Acquaintance: A Reply to Hayner. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):293-296.
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  20.  11
    G. Dawes Hicks, G. E. Moore, Beatrice Edgell & C. D. Broad (1919). Symposium: Is There "Knowledge by Acquaintance"? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 2:159 - 220.
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  21.  7
    H. L. A. Hart, G. E. Hughes & J. N. Findlay (1949). Symposium: Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 23:69 - 128.
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  22. H. L. A. Hart, G. E. Hughes & J. N. Findlay (1949). Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 23:69-128.
     
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  23. G. Hicks, G. E. Moore, Beatrice Edgell & C. D. Broad (1919). Is There "Knowledge by Acquaintance"? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 2:159-220.
     
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  24. John Perry (1979). ``A Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description&Quot. Noûs 13:3-21.
     
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  25.  22
    Donovan Wishon & Bernard Linsky (eds.) (2015). Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. CSLI Publications.
  26.  22
    Donovan Wishon & Bernard Linsky (2015). The Place of The Problems of Philosophy in Philosophy. In Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy.
    This chapter summarizes Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy, presents new biographical details about how and why Russell wrote it, and highlights its continued significance for contemporary philosophy. It also surveys Russell’s famous distinction between “knowledge by acquaintance” and “knowledge by description,” his developing views about our knowledge of physical reality, and his views about our knowledge of logic, mathematics, and other abstract objects.
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  27.  93
    Dale Cannon (2002). Construing Polanyi's Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation. Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.
    This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative (...)
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  28.  53
    Donovan Wishon (forthcoming). Russellian Acquaintance and Frege's Puzzle. Mind.
    In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance ’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance (...)
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  29. Ian Proops (2014). Russellian Acquaintance Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):779-811.
    philosophers sometimes claim that in his 1912 work, The Problems of Philosophy (hereafter cited as POP), and possibly as early as “on Denoting” (1905), Russell conceives of acquaintance with sense-data as providing an indubitable or certain foundation for empirical knowledge.1 However, although he does say things suggestive of this view in certain of his 1914 works, Russell also makes remarks in POP that conflict with any Cartesian interpretation of this work.2 He says, for example, that all our (...) of truths “is infected with some degree of doubt, and a theory which ignored this fact would be plainly wrong” (POP 135). And again: “It is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and .. (shrink)
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  30.  1
    Guilherme Ghisoni da Silva (2016). A função lógica desempenhada pelas fotografias nos pensamentos acerca dos objetos fotografados. Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 20 (2):29-54.
    The main objective of this paper is to understand the logic role played by photographs in thoughts about entities known only through photographs. I will contrast two general interpretative lines: photography as knowledge by acquaintance and as knowledge by description. The analyses of those interpretations will take into account possible relations with discussions about metaphysics of time and episodic memory. Throughout the paper I will criticize the treatment of photography as acquaintance, based on John Zeimbekis' interpretation. (...)
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  31.  59
    Patricia Hanna (2010). Beyond the “Delivery Problem”: Why There is “No Such Thing as a Language”. Philosophia 38 (2):343-355.
    In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue, pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving the “delivery problem”.
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  32. Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). Hegel, Russell, and the Foundations of Philosophy. In Angelica Nuzzo (ed.), Hegel and the Analytical Tradition. Continuum
    Though philosophical antipodes, Hegel and Russell were profound philosophical revolutionaries. They both subjected contemporaneous philosophy to searching critique, and they addressed many important issues about the character of philosophy itself. Examining their disagreements is enormously fruitful. Here I focus on one central issue raised in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: the tenability of the foundationalist model of rational justification. I consider both the general question of the tenability of the foundationalist model itself, and the specific question of the tenability of Russell’s (...)
     
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  33. Cheng-Hung Tsai (2010). Practical Knowledge of Language. Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.
    One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a (...)
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  34.  13
    Donovan Wishon (2012). Perceptual Aquaintance and Informational Content. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag 47--89.
    Many currently working on a Russellian notion of perceptual acquaintance and its role in perceptual experience (including Campbell 2002a, 2002b, and 2009 and Tye 2009) treat naïve realism and indirect realism as an exhaustive disjunction of possible views. In this paper, I propose a form of direct realism according to which one is directly aware of external objects and their features without perceiving a mind-dependent intermediary and without making any inference. Nevertheless, it also maintains that the qualitative character of (...)
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  35.  41
    Fatema Amijee (2013). The Role of Attention in Russell's Theory of Knowledge. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1175-1193.
    In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination (...)
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  36.  57
    Cheng-Hung Tsai (2015). Knowledge of Language in Action. Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):68-89.
    Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a speaker to understand and perform a variety of linguistic actions in that language. In this paper, I pursue an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. I begin by examining two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language: Michael Dummett's Implicit Knowledge Model and Jennifer Hornsby's Practical Knowledge Model. I argue that each of these models is inadequate for different reasons. (...)
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  37.  44
    Peter Munz (1993). Philosophical Darwinism: On the Origin of Knowledge by Means of Natural Selection. Routledge.
    Philosophers have not taken the evolution of human beings seriously enough. If they did, argues Peter Munz, many long-standing philosophical problems would be resolved. One of the philosophical consequences of biology is that all the knowledge produced in evolution is a priori established hypothetically by chance mutation and selective retention rather than by observation and intelligent induction. For organisms as embodied theories, selection is natural. For theories as disembodied organisms, it is artificial. Following Karl Popper, the growth of (...) is seen to be continuous from "the amoeba to Einstein." Philosophical Darwinism brings perspective to contemporary debates. It has far-reaching implications for cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and questions attempts from the field of biology to reduce mental events to neural processes. Most importantly, it provides a rational postmodern alternative to what the author views as the unreasonable postmodern theories of Kuhn, Lyotard, and Rorty. (shrink)
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  38. Sarah McGrath (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
    On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it (...)
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  39. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction (...)
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  40. Martin Kusch (2002). Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Martin Kusch puts forth two controversial ideas: that knowledge is a social status and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. He defends the radical implications of his views: that knowledge is political, and that it varies with communities. This bold approach to epistemology is a challenge to philosophy and the wider academic world.
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  41.  37
    John McDowell (1994). Knowledge by Hearsay. In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing From Words. Kluwer 195--224.
    Language matters to epistemology for two separate reasons (although they are no doubt connected) -/- My interest in testimony derives from Gareth Evans, as does my conviction that it cannot be accommodated by the sort of account of knowledge which I attack in this paper. I believe I also owe to him my interest in the sorts of case I discuss in §4 below, where knowledge is retained under the risk that what would have been knowledge if (...)
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  42. Martin Kusch (2004). Knowledge by Agreement. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Knowledge by Agreement defends the ideas that knowledge is a social status, and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. Part I develops a new theory of testimony. It breaks with the traditional view according to which testimony is not, except accidentally, a generative source of knowledge. One important consequence of the new theory is a rejection of attempts to globally justify trust in the words of others. Part II proposes a communitarian (...)
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  43.  54
    Dirk Koppelberg (1993). Should We Replace Knowledge by Understanding? — A Comment on Elgin and Goodman's Reconception of Epistemology. Synthese 95 (1):119 - 128.
    Goodman and Elgin have recommended a reconception of philosophy. A central part of their recommendation is to replace knowledge by understanding. According to Elgin, some important internalist and externalist theories of knowledge favor a sort of undesirable cognitive minimalism. Against Elgin I try to show how the challenge of cognitive minimalism can be met. Goodman and Elgin claim that defeat and confusion are built into the concept of knowledge. They demand either its revision or its replacement or (...)
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  44.  39
    Alan R. White (1981). Knowledge, Acquaintance, and Awareness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):159-172.
  45.  8
    V. S. Shvyrev (1999). Kant's Theory of Knowledge by T.I. Oizerman and I.S. Narskii. Russian Studies in Philosophy 38 (3):90-96.
    A deep, unbiased study of I. Kant's intellectual legacy, which would decisively renounce the cliches and stereotypes we have formed, is today one of the most important tasks in the development of Russian philosophical culture. This is not merely because Kant is one of the key figures in world philosophy and, as Ia.E. Golosovker said, "regardless of whence and where a thinker was traveling on the road of philosophy, he would have to have crossed the bridge called Kant." To master (...)
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  46. Ian Rumfitt (2008). Knowledge by Deduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):61-84.
    It seems beyond doubt that a thinker can come to know a conclusion by deducing it from premisses that he knows already, but philosophers have found it puzzling how a thinker could acquire knowledge in this way. Assuming a broadly externalist conception of knowledge, I explain why judgements competently deduced from known premisses are themselves knowledgeable. Assuming an exclusionary conception of judgeable content, I further explain how such judgements can be informative. (According to the exclusionary conception, which I (...)
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  47.  51
    W. D. Hart (2009). The Metaphysics of Knowledge • by Keith Hossack. Analysis 69 (1):178-181.
    Keith Hossack's thesis is that knowledge is a conceptually primitive and metaphysically fundamental relation between a mind and a fact. He argues that in terms of the simple relation of knowledge we can analyze central notions of epistemology , of semantics , of modality and a priori knowledge , of psychology , and of linguistics . He does so in a framework that includes a fairly rich faculty psychology and that stresses causation: knowledge can be caused (...)
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  48.  13
    Paul M. Pietroski & Susan J. Dwyer (1999). Knowledge by Ignoring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):781-781.
    Some cases of implicit knowledge involve representations of (implicitly) known propositions, but this is not the only important type of implicit knowledge. Chomskian linguistics suggests another model of how humans can know more than is accessible to consciousness. Innate capacities to focus on a small range of possibilities, thereby ignoring many others, need not be grounded by inner representations of any possibilities ignored. This model may apply to many domains where human cognition “fills a gap” between stimuli and (...)
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  49. Nicola Mößner & Markus Seidel (2008). Is the Principle of Testimony Simply Epistemically Fundamental or Simply Not? Swinburne on Knowledge by Testimony. In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. Ontos
    The recently much discussed phenomenon of testimony as a social source of knowledge plays a crucial justificatory role in Richard Swinburne's philosophy of religion. Although Swinburne officially reduces his principle of testimony to the criterion of simplicity and, therefore, to a derivative epistemic source, we will show that simplicity does not play the crucial role in this epistemological context. We will argue that both Swinburne's philosophical ideas and his formulations allow for a fundamental epistemic principle of testimony, by showing (...)
     
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  50. Peter Munz (2014). Philosophical Darwinism: On the Origin of Knowledge by Means of Natural Selection. Routledge.
    Philosophers have not taken the evolution of human beings seriously enough. If they did, argues Peter Munz, many long standing philosophical problems would be resolved. One of philosophical concequences of biology is that all the knowledge produced in evolution is a priori, i.e., established hypothetically by chance mutation and selective retention, not by observation and intelligent induction. For organisms as embodied theories, selection is natural and for theories as disembodied organisms, it is artificial. Following Popper, the growth of (...) is seen to be continuous from the amoeba to Einstein'. Philosophical Darwinism throws a whole new light on many contemporary debates. It has damaging implications for cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and questions attempts from within biology to reduce mental events to neural processes. More importantly, it provides a rational postmodern alternative to what the author argues are the unreasonable postmodern fashions of Kuhn, Lyotard and Rorty. (shrink)
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