Search results for 'knowledge by acquaintance' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
See also:
  1. Nikolay Milkov (2001). The History or Russell's Concepts 'Sense-Data' and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance'. Archiv Fuer Begriffsgeschichte 43:221-231.score: 612.0
    Two concepts of utmost importance for the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century, “sense-data” and “knowledge by acquaintance”, were introduced by Bertrand Russell under the influence of two idealist philosophers: F. H. Bradley and Alexius Meinong. This paper traces the exact history of their introduction. We shall see that between 1896 and 1898, Russell had a fully-elaborated theory of “sense-data”, which he abandoned after his analytic turn of the summer of 1898. Furthermore, following a subsequent turn of August (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Augustin Riska (1980). Knowledge by Acquaintance Reconsidered. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:129-140.score: 540.0
    A propositional interpretation of knowledge by acquaintance seems more promising than the nonpropositional one, endorsed by Russell. According to the propositional interpretation, to be acquainted with an object means to attend (pay attention) to individuating features of the object. For the actual, direct acquaintance with an object, a subject's perception of the object and his attending to the individuating features of it (just as the fact that these features do belonge to the object in question) are the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ali Hasan & Richard Fumerton, Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 522.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. M. Giaquinto (2012). Russell on Knowledge of Universals by Acquaintance. Philosophy 87 (04):497-508.score: 522.0
    Russell's book The Problems of Philosophy was first published a hundred years ago.¹ A remarkable feature of this enduring text is the glint of Platonism it presents on a dark empiricist sea: while our knowledge of physical objects is entirely mediated by direct awareness of sense data, we can also have direct awareness of certain universals, Russell claims.² This is questionable, even if one has no empiricist inclination. Universals are abstract, hence causally inert. How, then, can we have any (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Bertrand Russell (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.score: 450.0
  6. Richard Fumerton, Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 450.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. R. S. Bluck (1963). 'Knowledge by Acquaintance' in Plato's Theaetetus. Mind 72 (286):259-263.score: 450.0
  8. Paul Hayner (1969). Knowledge by Acquaintance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (3):423-431.score: 450.0
  9. DeWitt H. Parker (1945). Knowledge by Acquaintance. Philosophical Review 54 (1):1-18.score: 450.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. John M. DePoe, Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 450.0
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1944). Do We Have Knowledge-by-Acquaintance of the Self? Journal of Philosophy 41 (25):694-696.score: 450.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Paul Hayner (1970). Meyers on Knowledge by Acquaintance: A Rejoinder. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):297-298.score: 450.0
  13. Nicholas D. Smith (1979). Knowledge by Acquaintance and 'Knowing What' in Plato's Republic. Dialogue 18 (03):281-288.score: 450.0
  14. Robert G. Meyers (1970). Knowledge by Acquaintance: A Reply to Hayner. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):293-296.score: 450.0
  15. G. Dawes Hicks, G. E. Moore, Beatrice Edgell & C. D. Broad (1919). Symposium: Is There "Knowledge by Acquaintance"? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 2:159 - 220.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Thomas Baldwin (2003). 13 From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Causation. In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press. 420.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Keith S. Donnellan (1990). Genuine Names and Knowledge by Acquaintance. Dialectica 44 (1‐2):99-112.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. H. L. A. Hart, G. E. Hughes & J. N. Findlay (1949). Symposium: Is There Knowledge by Acquaintance? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 23:69 - 128.score: 450.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. John Perry (1979). ``A Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description&Quot. Noûs 13:3-21.score: 450.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Bertrand Russell (1917). ``Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description&Quot. In Mysticism and Logic. London: Longmans Green.score: 450.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. K. R. Westphal (2005). Hume's Commitment to, and Critique of,''Knowledge by Acquaintance'': Some Hegelian Reflections'. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 51 (52).score: 450.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Dale Cannon (2002). Construing Polanyi's Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation. Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.score: 297.0
    This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Patricia Hanna (2010). Beyond the “Delivery Problem”: Why There is “No Such Thing as a Language”. Philosophia 38 (2):343-355.score: 270.0
    In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue, pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving the “delivery problem”.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). Hegel, Russell, and the Foundations of Philosophy. In Angelica Nuzzo (ed.), Hegel and the Analytical Tradition. Continuum.score: 270.0
    Though philosophical antipodes, Hegel and Russell were profound philosophical revolutionaries. They both subjected contemporaneous philosophy to searching critique, and they addressed many important issues about the character of philosophy itself. Examining their disagreements is enormously fruitful. Here I focus on one central issue raised in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: the tenability of the foundationalist model of rational justification. I consider both the general question of the tenability of the foundationalist model itself, and the specific question of the tenability of Russell’s (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Cheng-Hung Tsai (2010). Practical Knowledge of Language. Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.score: 261.0
    One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Cheng-Hung Tsai (forthcoming). Knowledge of Language in Action. Philosophical Explorations:1-22.score: 198.0
    Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a speaker to understand and perform a variety of linguistic actions in that language. In this paper, I pursue an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. I begin by examining two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language: Michael Dummett's Implicit Knowledge Model and Jennifer Hornsby's Practical Knowledge Model. I argue that each of these models is inadequate for different reasons. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Peter Munz (1993). Philosophical Darwinism: On the Origin of Knowledge by Means of Natural Selection. Routledge.score: 176.0
    Philosophers have not taken the evolution of human beings seriously enough. If they did, argues Peter Munz, many long-standing philosophical problems would be resolved. One of the philosophical consequences of biology is that all the knowledge produced in evolution is a priori established hypothetically by chance mutation and selective retention rather than by observation and intelligent induction. For organisms as embodied theories, selection is natural. For theories as disembodied organisms, it is artificial. Following Karl Popper, the growth of (...) is seen to be continuous from "the amoeba to Einstein." Philosophical Darwinism brings perspective to contemporary debates. It has far-reaching implications for cognitive science and artificial intelligence, and questions attempts from the field of biology to reduce mental events to neural processes. Most importantly, it provides a rational postmodern alternative to what the author views as the unreasonable postmodern theories of Kuhn, Lyotard, and Rorty. (shrink)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Sarah McGrath (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.score: 168.0
    On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Dirk Koppelberg (1993). Should We Replace Knowledge by Understanding? — A Comment on Elgin and Goodman's Reconception of Epistemology. Synthese 95 (1):119 - 128.score: 168.0
    Goodman and Elgin have recommended a reconception of philosophy. A central part of their recommendation is to replace knowledge by understanding. According to Elgin, some important internalist and externalist theories of knowledge favor a sort of undesirable cognitive minimalism. Against Elgin I try to show how the challenge of cognitive minimalism can be met. Goodman and Elgin claim that defeat and confusion are built into the concept of knowledge. They demand either its revision or its replacement or (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Alan R. White (1981). Knowledge, Acquaintance, and Awareness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):159-172.score: 168.0
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Ian Rumfitt (2008). Knowledge by Deduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):61-84.score: 164.0
    It seems beyond doubt that a thinker can come to know a conclusion by deducing it from premisses that he knows already, but philosophers have found it puzzling how a thinker could acquire knowledge in this way. Assuming a broadly externalist conception of knowledge, I explain why judgements competently deduced from known premisses are themselves knowledgeable. Assuming an exclusionary conception of judgeable content, I further explain how such judgements can be informative. (According to the exclusionary conception, which I (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Paul M. Pietroski & Susan J. Dwyer (1999). Knowledge by Ignoring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):781-781.score: 164.0
    Some cases of implicit knowledge involve representations of (implicitly) known propositions, but this is not the only important type of implicit knowledge. Chomskian linguistics suggests another model of how humans can know more than is accessible to consciousness. Innate capacities to focus on a small range of possibilities, thereby ignoring many others, need not be grounded by inner representations of any possibilities ignored. This model may apply to many domains where human cognition “fills a gap” between stimuli and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Nicola Mößner & Markus Seidel (2008). Is the Principle of Testimony Simply Epistemically Fundamental or Simply Not? Swinburne on Knowledge by Testimony. In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. Ontos.score: 164.0
    The recently much discussed phenomenon of testimony as a social source of knowledge plays a crucial justificatory role in Richard Swinburne's philosophy of religion. Although Swinburne officially reduces his principle of testimony to the criterion of simplicity and, therefore, to a derivative epistemic source, we will show that simplicity does not play the crucial role in this epistemological context. We will argue that both Swinburne's philosophical ideas and his formulations allow for a fundamental epistemic principle of testimony, by showing (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Anne Newstead (2006). Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. 183.score: 158.0
    A fallibilist theory of knowledge is employed to make sense of the idea that agents know what they are doing 'without observation' (as on Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Martin Kusch (2002). Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 158.0
    Martin Kusch puts forth two controversial ideas: that knowledge is a social status (like money or marriage) and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. He defends the radical implications of his views: that knowledge is political, and that it varies with communities. This bold approach to epistemology is a challenge to philosophy and the wider academic world.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Andreas Kemmerling (1999). How Self-Knowledge Can't Be Naturalized (Some Remarks on a Proposal by Dretske). Philosophical Studies 95 (3):311-28.score: 156.0
    In his book Naturalizing the Mind, Fred Dretske, among other things, gives what he thinks is a naturalist account of what he calls introspective knowledge.1 I shall not quarrel with his labels; I shall quarrel with what he tries to sell by using them. For him, introspective knowledge is “the mind’s direct knowledge of itself”,2 and he concentrates on knowledge of one’s own current mental occurrences, especially those which belong to the realm of sensory perception. An (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. James Russell (2007). Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children. Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.score: 156.0
    The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as 'the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts' [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432—451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Renewed Acquaintance. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.score: 153.0
    I will elaborate and defend a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what I call the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject’s grasp of that reality. In Section 1 of the paper I outline the acquaintance approach by drawing on its Russellian lineage. A more (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Martina Fürst (2004). Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument. Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.score: 153.0
    The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of a quale x requires the experience of x. Arguing what is so special about phenomenal concepts and pointing at the inherence-relation with (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Paulo Faria (2010). Memory as Acquaintance with the Past: Some Lessons From Russell, 1912-1914. Kriterion 51 (121):149-172.score: 153.0
    Russell’s theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of ‘presentation’, which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell’s theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Lauren Ashwell (2013). Review of Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8.score: 152.0
  42. Morris Lazerowitz (1937). Knowledge by Description. Philosophical Review 46 (4):402-415.score: 152.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Gillian K. Russell & John M. Doris (2008). Knowledge by Indifference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):429 – 437.score: 146.0
    Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don't much care about? Jason Stanley 2005 argues that whether or not the relational predicate 'knows that' holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent: the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Alfred J. Freddoso, Review of God, Time, and Knowledge by William Hasker (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), Faith and Philosophy 8 (1993): 99-107. [REVIEW]score: 146.0
    This outstanding book, which incorporates but goes beyond Hasker's extensive previous work on the subject, is a genuinely pivotal contribution to the lively current debate over divine foreknowledge and human freedom. If you plan to plunge into this debate at any time in the foreseeable future, you will have to take account of God, Time, and Knowledge.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Gillian Russell with John Doris, Knowledge by Indifference.score: 146.0
    Is it harder to acquire knowledge about things that really matter to us than it is to acquire knowledge about things we don’t much care about? Jason Stanley (2005) argues that whether or not the relational predicate “knows that” holds between an agent and a proposition can depend on the practical interests of the agent: the more it matters to a person whether p is the case, the more justification is required before she counts as knowing that p.2 (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Douglas Patterson, Meaning, Communication and Knowledge by Testimony.score: 146.0
    A central component of ordinary thought about language is that things like English, Japanese and so on exist and that expressions of these languages mean things in them. A familiar philosophical take on this is that communication between speakers is something that happens in such languages and that happens because expressions have meanings in them: one communicates by means of English sentences because these sentences mean something in English. Opposed to this sort of philosophical common sense are two closely related (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Torin Alter (1998). A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.score: 144.0
    Mary learns all the physical facts that one can learn by watching lectures on black-on-white television. According to Jackson, Mary learns new facts when she leaves the room and has color experiences, and that this undermines physicalism. Physicalists have responded by denying the new facts thesis; they argue, she acquires abilities, acquaintance knowledge, or new guises. I argue that the NFT is more plausible than any of the proposed alternatives. I also argue that the NFT does not undermine (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). I-Paper by Jennifer Hornsby. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107–130.score: 144.0
    [Jennifer Hornsby] The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided. /// [Jason Stanley] The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Samir Okasha (2000). The Underdetermination of Theory by Data and the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.score: 144.0
    Advocates of the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge have argued that, because scientific theories are "underdetermined" by data, sociological factors must be invoked to explain why scientists believe the theories they do. I examine this argument, and the responses to it by J.R. Brown (1989) and L. Laudan (1996). I distinguish between a number of different versions of the underdetermination thesis, some trivial, some substantive. I show that Brown's and Laudan's attempts to refute the sociologists' argument fail. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Brie Gertler (2011). Self-Knowledge. Routledge.score: 144.0
    The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. -/- Beginning with an outline of the distinction (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000