Search results for 'laws, exceptions, regularities' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Alice Drewery (2000). Laws, Regularities and Exceptions. Ratio 13 (1):1–12.score: 405.0
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  2. David Braddon-Mitchell (2001). Lossy Laws. Noûs 35 (2):260–277.score: 225.0
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  3. Cal Ledsham (2010). Love, Power and Consistency: Scotus' Doctrines of God's Power, Contingent Creation, Induction and Natural Law. Sophia 49 (4):557-575.score: 102.0
    I first examine John Duns Scotus’ view of contingency, pure possibility, and created possibilities, and his version of the celebrated distinction between ordained and absolute power. Scotus’ views on ethical natural law and his account of induction are characterised, and their dependence on the preceding doctrines detailed. I argue that there is an inconsistency in his treatments of the problem of induction and ethical natural law. Both proceed with God’s contingently willed creation of a given order of laws, which can (...)
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  4. Ype H. Poortinga & Fons J. R. Van de Vijver (1997). Is There No Cross-Cultural Evidence in Colour Categories of Psychological Laws, Only of Cultural Rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):205-206.score: 81.0
    Two points are made on the basis of (mainly) the cross-cultural psychological record. The first is that cross-cultural data indicate at least weak, nontrivial constraints on colour classification. The second is that exceptions to cross-cultural regularities as described by Saunders & van Brakel are compatible with the view that constraints on colour categories are probabilistic rather than deterministic.
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  5. Markus Schrenk (2007). Can Capacities Rescue Us From Ceteris Paribus Laws? In B. Gnassounou & M. Kistler (eds.), Dispositions in Philosophy and Science. Ashgate.score: 48.0
    Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) are so called ceteris paribus laws, i.e., roughly speaking, laws with exceptions. Yet, the ceteris paribus clause of these laws is problematic. Amongst the more infamous difficulties is the danger that 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, ceteris paribus' may state no more than a tautology: 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, unless not'. One of the major attempts to avoid this problem (and others concerning (...)
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  6. Robert D. Rupert (2008). Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties. Noûs 42 (3):349-380.score: 42.0
    Laws of nature seem to take two forms. Fundamental physics discovers laws that hold without exception, ‘strict laws’, as they are sometimes called; even if some laws of fundamental physics are irreducibly probabilistic, the probabilistic relation is thought not to waver. In the nonfundamental, or special, sciences, matters differ. Laws of such sciences as psychology and economics hold only ceteris paribus – that is, when other things are equal. Sometimes events accord with these ceteris paribus laws (c.p. laws, hereafter), but (...)
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  7. Christopher H. Eliot (2011). Competition Theory and Channeling Explanation. Philosophy and Theory in Biology 3 (20130604):1-16.score: 33.0
    The complexity and heterogeneity of causes influencing ecology’s domain challenge its capacity to generate a general theory without exceptions, raising the question of whether ecology is capable, even in principle, of achieving the sort of theoretical success enjoyed by physics. Weber has argued that competition theory built around the Competitive Exclusion Principle (especially Tilman’s resource-competition model) offers an example of ecology identifying a law-like causal regularity. However, I suggest that as Weber presents it, the CEP is not yet a causal (...)
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  8. Sandra D. Mitchell (2002). Ceteris Paribus — an Inadequate Representation for Biological Contingency. Erkenntnis 57 (3):329-350.score: 27.0
    It has been claimed that ceteris paribus laws, rather than strict laws are the proper aim of the special sciences. This is so because the causal regularities found in these domains are exception-ridden, being contingent on the presence of the appropriate conditions and the absence of interfering factors. I argue that the ceteris paribus strategy obscures rather than illuminates the important similarities and differences between representations of causal regularities in the exact and inexact sciences. In particular, a detailed (...)
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  9. Seth Lazar (forthcoming). National Defence, Self Defence, and the Problem of Political Aggression. In Seth Lazar & Cécile Fabre (eds.), The Morality of Defensive War. Oxford University press. 10-38.score: 27.0
    Wars are large-scale conflicts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve suffering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justified only if we have some compel- ling account of what is worth fighting for, which can justify contributing, as individu- als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. Although this question should obviously be central (...)
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  10. William Seager (2010). Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):217-237.score: 27.0
    The doctrine of physicalism can be roughly spelled out simply as the claim that the physical state of the world determines the total state of the world. However, since there are many forms of determination, a somewhat more precise characterization is needed. One obvious problem with the simple formulation is that the traditional doctrine of epiphenomenalism holds that the mental is determined by the physical (and epiphenomenalists need not assert that there are any properties except mental and physical ones, so (...)
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